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ABSTRACT 
The world chemical industry is one of the most basic and important manufacturing 
businesses globally. Petrochemicals have played a pivotal role in industrial modernisation. 
In the 1970s and 1980s South Africa developed an unusually large chemical industry 
as Import Substitution Industrialisation was conveniently extended into military/strategic 
apartheid policy. These policies steered the industry away from conventional crude oil and 
natural gas based feedstocks into a uniquely coal based chemical industry. The shift from oil 
to coal based petrochemicals also narrowed the slate of petroche,micals available. 
Pricing is' critical in the commodity plasticsjiliere. Coal based production contributed 
to a higher cost structure than crude oil based producers and a 'missing link' in the 
production chain, the petrochemical intermediate naphtha. This facilitated the introduction of 
a pricing mechanism which concentrated the benefits amongst upstream producers at the 
expense of downstream plastic converters, stunting growth in this higher value added and 
more labour intensive sector. Ironically a 'sunk costs' approach and recent developments 
allow SASOL's to produce coal based petrochemicals at low cost. 
In a significant change the traditional pillars of the local chemical industry, 
agricultural and mining chemicals, were supplanted by plastic raw materials as the major 
sector of the industry during the 1980s despite its coal base. Trade patterns also reflect these 
developments. A significant shift in employment from blacks to whites in Industrial 
Chemicals and Refineries accompanied this reordering of the major sectors. 
Providing mass housing, electrification and other basic wage goods will require 
industrial policies, embracing the entirejiliere, which are significantly different from previous 
policies. Such policies should facilitate the development of higher value added and more 
labour intensive sectors within a broadly conceived framework of redistribution of political 
and economic opportunity. This will require lowering chemical intermediate input costs as 
111 
well as a range of nurturing and facilitative policies for the jiliere. These will help to reduce 
the current anti-export bias. The process of implementing such policies is as important as the 
direction itself. To facilitate national reconciliation and empowerment of previously 
disadvantaged groups transparent tripartite policy making institutions are recommended. 
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PREFACE 
The first thoughts of embarking upon a study such as this were prompted by a perusal 
of the Report by the Working Group for the Promotion of the Chemical Industry in 
September 1990. This Report represented the collective efforts o,f the Department of Trade 
and Industry together with the three major chemical companies and some larger plastic 
converting comp~ies, who in this document called for public comment. I was involved in 
drafting a response to this document in my capacity as General Secretary of the Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union. We pointed out that whilst the Report contained elements of a 
lucid overview of the industry it also contained several basic errors, not the least of which 
was to underestimate the size of the local chemical industry by about 50%. In subsequent 
meetings with AECI economists they acknowledged the errors we had identified. These errors 
and the notion of leaving very important economic policy issues in such hands alone elicited 
a sense of profound unease. 
In the process of preparing comments on the Working Group's document the paucity 
of publicly available information on the local chemical industry became evident. This was 
partly due to government policy which shrouded the workings of the oil and liquid fuels 
industry in secrecy. For example at that time another group known as the 'Sander Committee' 
(after AECI Managing Director, Mr Mike Sander) worked in parallel with the Working 
Group. It investigated the liquid fuels - petrochemical interface with a view to future possible 
sources of petrochemical feedstocks. Its findings have never been made public. 
Another criticism made of the Working Group's document was that it lacked any 
analysis of the chemical industry's historical development. Also at this time considerable 
public debate was taking place about the desirability or otherwise of building a large 
petrochemical complex adjacent to the strategic Mossgas refinery. Capital costs of the order 
of (US) $6 billion were mentioned. It was public knowledge that the economics of the 
Mossgas project were suspect and these fears spilled over into perceptions of the proposed 
petrochemical project. 
These were among the factors which made a serious study of the local chemical 
industry a necessity for those groupings which opposed apartheid and a tantalising prospect 
for an interested individual. An opportunity to address these needs and interests arose when 
a research post focusing on the chemical industry with the Industrial Strategy Project team 
became available. I am grateful to the Chemical Workers Industrial Union for releasing me 
from my commitments to them so enabling me to take up that post. It was during the course 
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of work for this Project, between January 1992 and April 1993, that much of the research for 
this study was carried out. 
This thesis was first submitted as a Masters thesis in December 1993. Both of the 
examiners were of the opinion that it could be upgraded to a PhD thesis with relatively little 
additional work. Their suggestions and additional requirements have been incorporated into 
this version. It has also been substantially reorganised and an attempt made to make the prose 
more accessible to those who do not have special knowledge of this industry. Furthermore 
certain additional material relating to recent developments in the industry such as the advent 
of Polifin has been included. Taking these into account necessitated certain changes to the 
conclusions and policy options. 
As it turns out the rapid pace of political change in South Africa has presented 
unforseen difficulties. What was secret and forbidden knowledge, carrying serious penalties, 
during the period of research has suddenly been revealed to the public. Looking back upon 
the more or less successful April 1994 elections and the 'honeymoon' period immediately 
thereafter, it is easy to forget the fear, secrecy and uncertainty which prevailed before those 
elections, particularly in respect of matters such as the liquid fuels industry. 
In the process of gathering the resources necessary for this study and in the process 
of writing it up many people have assisted. This study would not have been possible without 
the material provided by Jim Catterson at the International Federation of Chemical, Energy 
and General Workers' Unions (ICEF) research and information department. Among many 
others who assisted in the collection of resource material were; Seeraj Mohamed, Jerry 
Thibedi and Bill Govender. Judith Shier was relentless in her pursuit of library material. 
Statistical data was generously provided by the Industrial Development Corporation and the 
Central Economic Advisory Services. Thanks are also due to many other individuals and 
organisations which responded to requests for information or data. 
An international study trip during the course of the research undertaken for this study 
was made possible by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung funding and the help of Fred Higgs of the 
Transport & General Workers' Union (UK), Annie Rice of the ICEF, Yves Legrange of the 
Federation Unifiee des Industries Chimiques (France) and Petra Krijnen of the Industriebond 
FNV (Netherlands). I am also grateful to Reinhard Reibsch and the IG Chemie-Papier-
Keramik for hosting me in Germany. 
Charles Meth helped me grapple with statistics and warned against technicist 
inclinations. Most helpful comments on parts of earlier drafts were received from Colin Cook 
of the CSIR, Dave Walwyn of the ANC Science and Technology Committee, Philip Lloydu 
Vlll 
of Industrial and Petrochemical Consultants (PTY) LTD and in particular my supervisor 
Professor Bill Freund. I am also grateful for several challenging discussions with Woody 
Naicker and Alan Mciver of Sentrachem's Strategic Raw Materials Project. David Wield, 
Director of the Centre for Technology Strategy at The Open University (UK) and Professor 
Raphie Kaplinsky of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex both 
made many valuable comments for which I am most grateful. 
All of the members of the Industrial Strategy Project collaborated, commented or 
assisted in some way with parts of this study. Zav Rustomjee was especially helpful in getting 
me started. Particular thanks are due to the Industrial Strategy Project Directors; Dave 
Kaplan, Raphie Kaplinsky, Dave Lewis and Avril Joffe for their encouragement, guidance 
and deadlines. 
I am grateful to Professor Mike Morris and other members of the Centre for Social 
and Development Studies at the University of Natal, Durban, for affording me office facilities 
(and encouragement) for a few months during 1994 whilst I worked part-time to upgrade this 
thesis. A small grant from the ISP made this financially possible. 
Jenny, my wife, gave incomparable support and also did her best to c~rrect my 
attempts at written English. Tom and Sally, our children, provided the distractions and the 
sanity. 
I hereby formally declare that the contents of this thesis, unless otherwise 


























ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Acrylonitrile-butadiene styrene, an engineering plastic 
African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd. 
Barrels per day (crude oil) 
British thermal unit, a measure of heat energy. 
Chemical & Engineering News 
Computer aided design 
Current domestic value 
Central Economic Advisory Service 
Central Energy Fund 
Developed market economy 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) 
European Chemical News 
Effective Rate of Protection 
Financial Mail 
Finance Week 
Gross Domestic Product 
General Export Incentive Scheme 
High density polyethylene, a commodity plastic 
In Bond Landed Cost (of petrol) 
ix 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers' Unions 
Imperial Chemical Industries 
Industrial Development Corporation (South Africa) 
Import Substitution Industrialisation 



























Less developed country 
Low density polyethylene, a commodity plastic 
Linear low density polyethylene, a commodity plastic 
Liquified petroleum gas 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
Multinational corporation 
Not elsewhere classified 
National Economic Forum 
Newly industrialising country 
Net Present Value 
North West Europe 
Oil & Gas Journal 
Polyethylene, generic name for some commodity plastics 
Polyethylene terepthalate (a polyester used in 2 litre Coca Cola bottles and in 
synthetic fibres) 
Polypropylene, a commodity plastic 
Polystyrene, a commodity plastic 
Polyvinyl chloride, a commodity plastic 
Research and development 
South Africa 
South African Bureau of Standards 
Styrene-acrylo-nitrile, an engineering plastic 
Styrene-butadiene rubber, a synthetic rubber made from petrochemicals 
Standard Industrial Classification (South Africa) 
Strategic Fuel Fund 
Tonnes (metric) per annum 
xi 
UK United Kingdom 














Hydrocarbon gasses produced as a by product along with crude 
oil from oil wells. This gas was flared off until it was harnessed 
(at very low cost ie the cost of flaring) as feedstock for 
petrochemical manufacture. 
These are, LDPE, LLDPE, HDPE, PVC, PP and PS. 
See steam cracking 
Requiring to be cooled to very low temperatures in order to 
make transport feasible, usually a gas to liquid. The volume of 
liquid methane for example is 600 times less than an equal 
weight of gas. 
A product of crude oil refineries. A light distillate feedstock for 
gas or petrochemical manufacture. The boiling range is 
generally about 40-150 OC. (Sharp 1990). 
A group of petrochemicals. Alkenes (olefins) are a group of 
unsaturated hydrocarbon compounds characterised by one or 
more double carbon-carbon bond, for example ethylene and 
propylene which are the precursors to commodity plastics, 
polyethylene and polypropylene. 
Substances (e.g. plastics, fertilizers, synthetic fibres, etc) that 
have been manufactured by chemical means using petroleum 
compounds, gas or coal as raw materials. 
Thermal cracking of petroleum products (usually naphtha) in the 
presence of steam and at very low furnace residence times. A 
process used in the manufacture of olefins. 
See steam cracking 
Plastic material that can be repeatedly softened when heated and 
become firm when cooled~ 
Plastics which undergo a chemical reaction during processing 
that results in a thermally stable molecular network. 
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In recent years a public debate has developed concerning the most desirable economic 
growth path for a future South Africa. Following several academic contributions and a spate 
of local and international conferences, the media have come to refer to this debate as the 
'great economic debate' . 
Briefly, this debate turns around what is wrong with the South African economy and 
how to go about fixing it. Almost all the participants in this debate agree that there is a need 
for some form of economic restructuring. Exactly what, where and how are central issues in 
the debate. 
In pursuance of their positions in this debate the chief protagonists have taken a 
I growing interest in the restructuring and reorganisation of South Africa's manufacturing 
v sector in preparation for what many hope will be a period of post-apartheid growth and 
development. However a closer look at the ideas being exchanged shows that they have very 
few detailed industry studies of the major industries at their disposal.! 
Nevertheless there is a broad consensus that some form of economic strategy is 
required in order to lift the economy out of its stagnant (or in 1992 negative) growth curve. 
To this end a negotiating platform, the National Economic Forum, comprising organised 
labour, capital and the state has come into being and is expected to commence its work in 
1993. The private sector too has begun to see the need for industrial strategy. For example 
the Nedcor and Old Mutual sponsored Professional Economic Panel in February 1993, argued 
inter alia, that: "the country needs a coordinated or unified industrial vision or strategy -
something it sorely lacks at present." (Financial Mail, 19-2-93:95) This report also argued 
in favour of the need for long term industrial policy and for the targ,eting of important 
industries for development. Adequate historical and contemporary research of various 
industries could greatly facilitate the difficult decisions which will no doubt face those 
entrusted with the task of determining industrial policy. 
This study attempts to redress the lack of detailed information available on industrial 
sectors by analysing the historical development of one area of manufacturing, a section of the 
chemical industry and in that way it hopes to make a small contribution to the 'great 
economic debate'. It has as its central focus the historical development of a large part of the 
South African chemical industry, the petrochemical to plastics production chain. This chain 
1. Kaplan's (1990) study of the telecommunications industry is a notable exception. 
2 
traverses petrochemicals, synthetic resins and plastic raw materials, and the plastics 
converting and fabrication industries. I 
r This filiere's upstream segments fall within the petrochemical industry,;. The lower 
\ 
reaches of the filiere comprise the plastic products or lastic ci>nv . n . ndus , which 
\ 
produces fi. mal products and intermediate inputs, to a wide .'lIJlg~ of i~UStri.es. The Plastic 
I Products Industry is used as an example of thls lower lInk 10 the cham 10 thlS study. 
In so far as the petrochemical, plastic raw materials and plastic converting industries 
are concerned, a number of proposals for restructuring these links in the chain, or parts of 
it, have been published in recent years. They are critiqued in the course of this study in so 
far as they bear upon the scope of this study. Their principal weaknesses are their lack of 
historical analysis and their failure to embrace the full length of the plastics production chain. 
The chemical industry is usually considered a core or strategic industry in national 
~ . 
~ industrial development programmes. Its selection as a core industry by many developing 
countries is bound up with its interpenetration of so many industrial activities. An indication 
V of the strategic importance attached to the chemical industry, particularly in developing 
countries, is found in the prolific use of state ownership to launch, control and steer the 
industry. Internationally chemical business activity is approaching that of automobiles and 
\ electronics as a major economic indicator in terms of turnover, capital investment and 
I 
research and development. 
In South Africa there is little consolidated information publicly available for would-be 
policy makers to gauge where South Africa's chemical and plastic industries stand in relation 
to the shifting global configurations and trends. This study is concerned with such issues and 
with the developing political economy which has given rise to the present structure of the 
South African industry. 
By way of backdrop and introduction it attempts to provide a multi-dimensional global 
'map' of recent developments in the qualitative and spatial aspects of the international 
chemical industry, locating and emphasising the principal concern in this study, the plastics 
production chain. Recent developments in South Africa's chemical and plastic industries are 
placed in an international perspective by contrasting them with other economies. 
South Africa's chemical industry constitutes a comparatively large share of 
manufacturing, and includes some large and well established businesses. AECI is the world's 
largest producer of commercial explosives. Mining chemicals (explosives) and agricultural 
chemicals (fertilizers), as may be expected, have traditionally dominated the local chemical 
industry, unlike in many developed countries. 
3 
The pivotal role played by petrochemicals in industrial modernisation has been stressed 
by World Bank officials.2 The size of the petrochemical sector relative to other branches of 
the chemical industry is apparent in Figure 1. It is the single largest sector of the chemical 
industry accounting for 36.5% of world output valued at $414bn in 1989 (Chemical Industries 
Association, 1990:22). This excludes other major sectors of the industry such as Fertilizers, 
Artificial Fibres,3 Soaps and Detergents and Other Chemicals all of which utilize 
intermediate inputs from the petrochemicals sector. 
Petrochemicals have the following three characteristics: 
a) They are derived from crude oil or natural gas (and in South Africa from 
coal). 
b) They are mostly, although not all, commodity chemicals. 
c) Most petrochemicals are used as raw materials in the manufacture of other 
synthetic materials rather than as final products. 
In developed economies the post World War 2 economic success story was 
petrochemicals based on oil and natural gas. Petrochemicals provide the raw materials used 
in the manufacture of plastics, detergents, paints and rubbers and a host of other products. 
Such 'synthetic' products have been substituted for traditional materials such as glass, wood, 
cement, paper, natural fibres and aluminium and steel etc. Currently, increasing potential is 
seen for new types of plastics in new and composite materials, This has been seen as the 
commencement of a 'second round' of substitution (Thorpe, 1987). 
In the context of rapid international development of petrochemicals and their derivative 
materials an intriguing question arises: how has the small South African economy lacking in 
crude oil and with limited natural gas resources coped In globalised industries like 
petrochemicals whilst pursuing apartheid policies?4 None of sparse published material 
attempts an answer to this question. 
2. See for example Walter Vergara, senior chemical engineer for the World Bank's Asia technical department 
cited in Haggin, 1992:12 and Vergara and Babylon, 1990. • 
3. The Standard Industria~ ~lassi~cation te~ is 'Man-made' fibres but since such sexist terminology is 
unacceptable, the term 'artifiCial' wtll be subshtuted in this study. 
4. South Africa lacks any proven oil resources but is not entirely lacking in natural gas. A gas deposit off-shore 
of Mossel Bay, of uncertain size, provides feedstock for the small Mossref synfuel reflDery at Mossel Bay which 
commenced production in 1993. 
Figure 1 
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In this study the development and heritage of this uniquely coal-based endeavour is 
tracked and analyzed together with the implications for the plastics industry. Finally shorter 
term options are identified for a future strategy to maximise the development of the 
commodity plastics production chain with a more democratic and egalitarian post apartheid 
dispensation in mind. 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter One provides an introduction to the chemical industry from three points of 
view. It begins with a 'snapshot' outline of the wider international chemical industry, 
providing a sense of proportion to the different sectors which make up the chemical industry. 
Secondly it traces the industry's historical development from its earliest beginnings up to the 
1980s. Finally it provides some basic insights into and dimensions of the modern 
4 
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petrochemical and plastic industries. 
Chapter Two provides an international backdrop to the South African focus in four 
parts. It examines recent trends in the global chemical and petrochemical industry. The 
chemical process industries are capital intensive and like many similar industries, economies 
of scale play an important in determining the competitiveness of plants. Part One explores 
the historical trajectory of this aspect of the chemical industry as well as the role of research 
and development in technological change and innovation. The South African chemical 
industry is contrasted and compared with international developments in these areas. 
Part Two examines concentration, oligopolies and cartel behaviour in the international 
industry. Part Three explores the complex processes of globalisation and their inextricable 
interlinkages with the corporate strategies of the leading multinational chemical corporations 
as well as technological developments. 
Environment is increasingly a 'buzz word' in the chemical industry. The reasons for 
this are explored. The more important dimensions of the relationship between the industry 
and the environment are examined before turning to the industry's responses to social 
pressures which have emerged. 
Chapter Three provides the final element of the international backdrop to the South 
African commodity plastics Jiliere. It narrows the focus to petrochemical industries in 
developing countries and the roles the state has played in shaping the petrochemical industry 
in these countries. In particular it highlights the way in which conflicting public policy 
objectives can come to rest upon the pricing structure of key petrochemicals. This provides 
useful platform of international experience against which the South African experience can 
be compared in later chapters. 
Chapter Four narrows the focus still further. It provides an historical introduction to 
the South African chemical and petrochemical industry. 
Chapter Five describes the South Africa commodity plastics Jiliere and analyses the 
historical development of the pricing and production" structure of the first link in the chain, 
the petrochemical sector and in the process identifies a 'missing link'. 
Chapter Six moves one step further down the South African production chain to the 
plastic raw materials or polymer industry. Certain structural problems in the industry and 
growing international competition, or the threat of it, induced a significant restructuring of 
the ownership of the petrochemical industry in 1994. Chapter Seven evaluates the ingenious 
solution which the two largest companies developed to meet these threats. 
Chapter Eight proceeds further down the chain to the last link, the plastic converting 
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industry. The changing relationship between the different links in the jiliere and the changing 
demand patterns are identified and discussed. 
Chapter Nine examines the South Africa's trade performance in chemicals and pl~tics, 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in production and the trade regime. Some possible 
improvements are proposed. 
Petrochemical complexes have large economies of scale. They represent large 
investments and place large tranches of material on the market. A decision on South Africa's 
next petrochemical complex is thus an important one. Chapter Ten looks forward to future 
options for the South African petrochemical industry. It provides a research framework to 
address the strategically important question: where will South Africa source future tranches 
of petrochemicals? 
Finally Chapter Eleven draws upon the preceding chapters to shape conclusions and 
industrial policy options for the commodity plasticsjiliere. 
The country classifications used are set out in Annexure E and the principal towns and 
cities discussed in Map 1. 
It may be helpful to point out what this study is not. It is not a detailed analysis of 
SASOL and its role in the (secret) liquid fuel supply arrangements which have operated in 
South Africa since the 1970s. SASOL features repeatedly in this study because it is virtually 
the only manufacturer of petrochemicals in the country, however it is primarily a synfuels 
producer. Only one quarter of SASOL's turnover is derived from chemical sales. This study 
is concerned primarily with only two of its chemicals, ethylene and propylene, which together 
account for 9% of SASOL's turnover (Tison, 1992). 
Source Material 
A brief comment on source material for a study of this nature is appropriate. The 
chemical industry bibliography is a short one. As far as could be ascertained during the 
course of this study the most accurate, detailed and useful information is to be found in three 
types of publications. The first and more easily available are the industry journals such as 
Chemical Week, European Chemical News, Oil & Gas Journal, Hydrocarbon Processing and 
Chemical & Engineering News. Even these are not readily available in South African 
libraries. Other journals of wider scope also carry useful information from time to time such 
as The Economist, Forbes and Fortune Magazine. 
In depth studies are prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Stanford 
Map 1. 
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Research Institute (SRI) from time to time. These are expensive publications not often to be 
found in South Africa. For example the latest Economist Intelligence Unit publication on the 
chemical industry was not to be found in a single public or private company library in South 
Africa. 
More inaccessible still are the third category of sources. These are the by-subscription-
only type of industry news briefings such as 'Chemical Matters' and Stuart Wamsley's 'Focus 
on Chemicals' and others. They too are expensive and rarely held in South Africa and then 
only by private companies. Beyond these there are the works of the international private 
research organisations which are also for subscribers only, almost only the large companies 
in the industry. A single volume costs several thousand Rands or more. 
The privatisation of knowledge in the chemical and petrochemical industry makes 
research on the chemical industry a very expensive undertaking. This may account for social 
scientists comparative neglect of this industry. The need for publicly available research is an 
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argument implicit in the chapters which deal with South Africa. Some suggestions as to how 
this objective might be achieved are made in the concluding Chapter. 
The 'Great Economic Debate' 
This study is concerned with past economic development strategies and options 
available for future ones. It is appropriate then to situate it within the current debate in South 
Africa over how economic development should be pursued. 
The plethora of views aired in this debate may be collapsed into three broad tendencies 
for current purposes. It goes almost without saying that some of the complexity, variation 
within tende~cies and nuances in the debate will be lost in the summaries which follow. 
Big business have advanced the view commonly referred to as 'redistribution through 
growth'. The opposing view put forward by organised labour, chiefly COSA TU and its 
associated Economic Trends Group has been described as 'growth through redistribution'. 
This approach rests upon their analysis of the economic 'crisis' spelt out in Gelb (1991). A 
variant of the former, lying somewhere between these two positions has been described as 
'growth and redistribution' and has been attributed to the African National Congress (ANC) 
(Finance Week, 20-26 February, 1992: 18). The need for economic growth5 is common cause 
among the three tendencies identified. It is the speed and manner in which redistribution is 
to be achieved which largely separates the three views. 
The 'redistribution through growth' thesis, put simply, advocates creating the 'right' 
climate for business and then allowing business to get on with the business of business. The 
resulting economic growth would then 'trickle down' to the historically disadvantaged in the 
economy. The task given to the state in this model is to fashion policies resulting in suitable 
input prices of capital and labour. A part of the state's role in creating the 'right' environment 
is the correct package of incentives such as tax allowances and incentives for exporters which 
are seen as the mechanism to expand markets. SACOB in its study finds that: 
"The competitive analysis reveals the following four areas are significant and these 
are the areas which need to be tackled first. They are : 
1. Cost of capital 
S. "~rowth" rathe~ than "development" is the term most frequently used. The notion of environmentally 
susta~able econonuc development, as opposed to more economic growth of a similar kind, has not yet surfaced 
as an Issue among the main protagonists in the "great economic debate". 
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2. Productivity of capital 
3. Productivity of labour 
4. Cost of intermediate inputs." (SACOB, 1991:62) 
Thereafter the path of development can be left to market forces which will deliver the desired 
economic transformation. This type of thinking also permeates the economic strategy 
document of the State President's Economic Advisory Council (see Economic Advisory 
Council of the State President, 1991). 
Gelb (1991) in his criticism of what he calls 'neo-liberal export orientated growth' 
argues that the aim of this growth path is a continuation of the capital and raw material 
intensive economic trajectory pursued in the past accompanied by a continuation of the 
unemployment crisis. The benefits of reinvestment and rising productivity would accrue to 
large corporations and to some extent urban manufacturing workers. Social inequalities are 
unlikely to be resolved through the trajectory of this growth path. Instead the gap between 
those in formal employment and those left out, presumably relegated to the informal sector, 
is likely to increase. Although this growth path would make some effort to facilitate the 
'trickle down' of limited funds, for example by including representatives of the disadvantaged 
on social funds, redistribution would become an activity separate from the workings of the 
formal economy. The likely consequence is that the disadvantaged communities remain 
marginalised . 
The 'growth and redistribution' tendency is less clearly formulated than the other two 
positions and it is perhaps unfair to describe this as an ANC view. The ANC's discussion 
document on economic policy of 1990 refers to 'satisfying basic needs by growth through 
redistribution.' (African National Congress. 1990) However its position in this document is 
far less clearly developed and could be considered as an attempt to straddle the other two 
positions. For example it calls for a programme of "Growth through Redistribution in which 
redistribution acts as a spur to growth and in which the fruits of growth are redistributed to 
satisfy basic needs." (Ibid:5). A more careful argument for 'growth and redistribution' has 
been developed by McGrath and van der Berg (1991). It improves upon the 'redistribution 
through growth' position principally in its acknowledgement of "the close interaction between 
economic growth and redistribution" and the need for "some redistribution (social justice)" 
to provide the stability for further growth. (McGrath and van der Berg, 1991:21) 
The 'growth through redistribution' position takes as its starting point the need for 
South Africa's extreme racial inequalities to be redressed and the consequent necessity to 
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fundamentally reorganise the economy. It is underpinned by the notion of an emerging 
structural (economic) crisis which has its origins in the early 1970s. Gelb (1990) refers to this 
pattern of production, distribution and consumption or growth model followed at that time 
as 'racial Fordism'. He argues that a combination of racial domination and mineral wealth 
steered South Africa down a capital intensive growth path of production of previously 
imported sophisticated consumer goods. Capital labour ratios are more than double those of 
developing countries at comparable levels of per capita income (Levy 1992:3). The chemical 
industry has made a major contribution to the unusually high capital intensity of 
manufacturing. This is principally as a result of a strong apartheid state whose policy 
objectives were focused on strategic self sufficiency, import substitution and at the expense 
of developing (black) human resources amongst others. The apartheid state had a direct and 
heavy involvement in manufacturing. The reliance upon imported capital goods and the 
increasing failure to absorb labour into employment have grown to become the chief problems 
for 'racial Fordism'. 
These problems were compounded by external shocks to the system. Energy prices 
soared with the first oil shock in 1973. At the same time labour costs began to rise, 
particularly for black workers as they increasingly took action and became organised from 
the early 1970s onwards. The effect of these changes was to raise production costs in 
manufacturing and mining. Further destabilisation arose from the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates. 
The longer term underlying trends in the economy together with the external shocks 
have given rise to destabilisation of previously stable relations of production. As a result 
economic growth has declined, indeed stagnated, whilst productivity and investment have 
fallen. This analysis identifies the 'racial Fordism' crisis as a supply side crisis having its 
origins in the processes of production. 
Consequently the proposal to end the crisis and place the economy on a more equitable 
growth path commences at the supply side and calls for "not the redistribution of 
consumption, but the redistribution of investment." (original emphasis) (Gelb, 1990:35) It 
proposes to draw investment out of financial institutions and to loosen the concentrated grip 
of the conglomerates on the economy. Investment is to be directed at targeted sectors with 
labour intensive growth potential and at human resource development. In this model, state 
intervention is unavoidable. However it would be : 
"targeted and selective, based upon sectoral planning, rather than overarching and 
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based on general principles as in a central planning system. At the same time, where 
it was undertaken, intervention would be pervasive and far-reaching in shaping the 
activities of economic agents, in contrast to the neo-liberal reliance on autonomous 
responses." (Gelb, 1991:31) 
This role for the state rests upon an understanding of markets as being less than optimal 
mechanisms for the achievement of identified socio-economic goals. Instead the relationship 
between economic agents acting within institutional environments, as they develop over time, 
is the focus of attention in order to achieve a dynamic rather than a static efficiency. 
The ultimate test for state economic policy is its ability to meet socio-economic 
objectives. ~acial-Fordism did manage to sustain apartheid for several decades but in the 
process its internal contradictions undermined its sustainability. There are good reasons for 
a future state to take on a new and very different transformative role, one that facilitates 
economic development through redistribution, not just of wealth, but also of power. Industrial 
democracy offers opportunities for including the previously excluded and addressing racial 
inequalities. The particular character of concentrated industry which developed under 
apartheid will also have to be addressed. This too requires a redistribution of power in the 
process of economic policy formation. It also offers the (not unproblematic) prospect of 
unlocking the constraints of stultifying labour markets and bringing the energy of new 
stakeholders in society to bear upon the national effort. It is within this broad analysis that 
the strategy options set out in the final Chapter are located. 
The facilitative role accorded to the state in this approach finds a resonance in aspects 
of recent writings on the nature of capitalist competition, what Best (1990) labels 'the new 
competition' . 
The New Competition 
Another fu~damental economic debate provides theoretical underpinnings for this 
study. This debate revolves around the nature of capitalist competition and what it is that 
drives economic development. Adam Smith argued for the market whereas John Maynard 
Keynes theorised demand management. Schumpeter broke with these views which placed 
market and price at the centre of economic analysis and instead argued for the centrality of 
the firm as the driving force in economic development. Best (1990) has taken this argument 
further. His conceptual categories provide a number of very useful vantage points from which 
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to view the behaviour of firms and the social and state infrastructure or environment 
necessary to secure competitive advantage and economic development. 
For Best 'entrepreneurial' firms in the 'New Competition' operate 'strategically' in 
that they shape markets and choose the markets within which to operate rather than taking 
the existence of markets as a given. Entrepreneurial firms seek competitive advantage through 
continuous improvement and innovation in process and product. In this sense innovation is 
not so much about 'blockbuster breakthroughs' as it is about the Japanese concept of Kaizen 
or a social process of continuous incremental improvement. Success for the entrepreneurial 
firm requires perpetual problem solving which in turn requires a culture of learning and the 
creation of new knowledge within the firm as a result of problems solved. 
The 'New Competition' also focuses upon the relations between firms up and down 
the production chain. Best argues that 'conSUltative-cooperation' amongst mutually 
interdependent firms is an important element in securing competitive advantage. This focus 
upon the relations between the succeeding links of a production chain is a most useful 
perspective from which to analyze the production chain which is the focus of this study. 
Institutional environments within which firms operate also help to determine the basis 
upon which they compete with each other. He argues that paradoxically, it is to their mutual 
advantage to cooperate in certain areas such as labour training, marketing and research 
institutions whilst they develop their competitive advantage in other areas. This paradox 
between cooperation and competition in an industrial sector is, in Best's analysis, not 
necessarily inimical to competitive advantage. For example price cooperation among 
producers in high fixed costs industries in times of depressed prices may allow accumulation 
for futl:lre investment in internationally competitive facilities. The ability of firms to 
voluntarily seize the advantages of the paradox between competition and cooperation and/or 
the state's ability to encourage and engender such inter firm relations is a useful measure of 
an industrial sectors' competitive advantage and its ability to contribute to a country's 
economic development. 
Attention has been drawn to the role of state industrial policy in successful East Asian 
economies by Amsden (1989), Wade (1991) and Best (1990) among others. To varying 
degrees they have emphasised that state intervention in countries such as Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan has not been about the imposition of a command economy type plan. Rather it has 
been to administer the paradox of competition and cooperation. They have shown that 
cooperation between firms (state engendered where necessary) has been instrumental in the 
long term development of industrial sectors whilst at the same time inter firm competition has 
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acted to promote responsive and innovative firms able to survive and exploit new challenges 
and opportunities. State industrial policy has often been associated in the UK and the US with 
rescuing embattled industries. However the recent analyses of East Asian economies referred 
to above have shown that industrial policy is capable of promoting international 
competitiveness and industrial development. A state's ability to generate industrial policy in 
a way which breaks with the market/plan dichotomy provides another useful vantage point 
from which to view the historical development of an industrial sector. 
The conceptual tools offered by Best, Wade and others are helpful but only up to a 




AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
This Chapter provides an introduction to the international chemical industry and an 
international backdrop for the examination of the South African chemical industry which 
follows in subsequent chapters. It proceeds by way of identifying those activities generally 
regarded as constituting the chemical industry, and locates within these the sectors which are 
the focus of this study. It identifies some of the major changes which have occurred in the 
course of the chemical industry's development and which help in understanding the industry's 
historical development in South Africa. Factors contributing to the changing geographical 
distribution of the industry are highlighted. In the conclusion to this chapter the more 
important issues for South Africa and this study and some of their implications are 
summarised. 
The petrochemical to plastics production chain is schematically introduced and certain 
critical factors such as feedstock type and costs are highlighted. As important is the 
interrelatedness and interdependence of feedstock type, processing technology and resultant 
chemical building blocks. 
During the course of this and subsequent chapters some of the everyday language of 
the industry and its chemical composition is encountered. An effort has been made to simplify 
this as much as is practicable. To assist readers who may be unfamiliar with some of the 
terminology, a glossary and an explanatory list of abbreviations and acronyms are provided. 
This, together with Annexure D, a clear and simple guide to the main organic :md inorg~c 1 
production chains, are intended to ease the reader's task. / 
An Outline of the Global Chemical Industry 
There are over nine million known chemicals and this number is increasing by 
approximately one thousand per year. Although the number of chemicals normally used in 
commercial production is far fewer, some thirty to forty thousand, there nevertheless remains 
a bewildering complexity for those wishing to analyze the industry in any detail. This will 
not be attempted here. 
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The chemical industry is one of the most complicated of all manufacturing industries 
involving thousands of different chemical reactions, products and processes (UNIDO, 
1990:174). It interweaves itself in a web-like way into many aspects of economic activity, 
typically selling a half to three quarters of its turnover to other manufacturing operations 
rather than directly to the consumer. It is also characterised by high capital and R&D 
iritensity. For these reasons the chemical industry is usually considered to be core industry 
in national industrial development programmes. Its importance has been fu 
by the fact that internationally chemical industry growth rates have been higher than GDP 
growth rates and this is expected to continue to the year 2000 (ECN, 2-1-90). 
1) The ize f the industry is comparable to that of other large manufacturing industries 
such as steel, automotive and mechanical engineering. Global chemical sales in 1990 
amounted to (US) $ 1230 billion, produced by a workforce of approximately 37 million 
people, of whom about 6.5 million belonged to independent trade unions. The chemical 
industry is also regarded as (\, core technology sector along with electronics, machinery, 
mechanical engineering and scientific instruments (OECD, 1992:90). 
In the 1970s the organic chemical industry began to be regarded as a maturing 
industry. Typical maturity in an industry would include minimal technological advance but 
this was not the case. Within the industry, change has been endemic. The slow-down in the 
1970s was a reflection of overcapacity and lower demand growth in comparison with earlier 
periods (Wittcoff, 1992). Technological_ advan~ continues to be a driving force in the 
com~titive relations between firms, although in recent years the basis of this competition has 
shifted away from the discovery of new chemical entities towards process design and catalyst 
development for the production of known chemical entities. For example 'advanced materials' 
have aroused much interest in recent years. Engineering polymers which fall within this 
category are typical of the current emphasis on 'stretching' the capabilities of known chemical 
products. 
Biotechnology has also attracted considerable interest, particularly in the early 1980s 
as a potential entry point for a new round of growth in the chemical industry. Pharmaceuticals 
and agrochemicals were ~xpected to be the main beneficiaries of this new growth. Although 
it has not lived up to those expectations, considerable R&D investment in this area continues. 
New chemical entity R&D is almost wholly restricted to pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals 
which are comparatively small sectors of the wider chemical industry. 
~ Despite less spectacular rewards from its R&_D efforts in recent years, the chemical 
industry remains characterised by high levels of R&D spending. The largest three companies 
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spent between 4.4% and 6.6% of sales on R&D in 1990. Spending on R&D in 
pharmaceuticals is higher, about 10-12% of turnover (UNlDO, 1992:7). 
Historically the industry has been concentrated in three areas of the world, Western 
I Europe, North America and Japan (the Triad). Together they accounted for 66.8% of demand 
I in 1989 but only 15.8% of world population (see Table 1.1). 
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Sources: Demand: European Chemical News, 22-1-90. 
Notes: 
population: UNIDO, 1989:31. 
a\ Excludes China. Chemical demand in China estimated at 
$30bn in 1988. 
b\ Includes Western Asia. 
c\ Includes China (21.9\). 
Although the chemical fndustry is regarded as maturing, it is evident from Table 1.1 
that it has large potential for expansion of its current range of products outside the Triad, 
should economic growth rates there permit. China and India are potentially large consumers 
~
of chemicals. As economic progress is made in those countries, particularly China, chemical 
markets are expanding. The scale of these emerging markets is influencing the strategic view 
of some global players in the industry. In tum this is contributing to changes in the structure 
of the industry as it moves closer to expanding markets and away from regions with stricter 
environmental regulations. 
Historically world chemical production has been concentrated in the Triad, even more 
so than demand. The European Community remains the largest producer area with an annual 
turnover of around $350 billion in 1989. The second largest producer region is the USA with 
turnover of $258 billion (1989). Japan, the third largest producer at $188 billion is still a long 
way ahead of South Africa with turnover of a mere $10 billion (both 1989) (lCEF, 1992, and 
CSS, 1990). 
The traditional dominance of chemical production by the Triad countries is being 
'Y 1 challenged by changes in feedstock availability and price, differential rates of economic 
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growth and environmental pressures. Instrumental in the changing structure of the global 
chemical industry has been the growing participation of developing countries and regions such 
as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, South East Asia, Nigeria, Trinidad, Thailand, Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Indonesia. This process is eroding the traditional dominance of the Triad. The 
favourable balance of chemical trade which the Triad regions traditionally enjoyed is expected 
to continue to decline in future. Indeed Japan is already feeling the effects of the changing 
global geography of the chemical industry and is, according to Wittcoff, "no longer a factor 
in world (chemical) trade" (Wittcoff, 1992:1-1). 
As the industry has grown from its early beginnings it has iversified nto a wide 
range of activities, from straightforward bulk chemicals such as su uric acid to highly 
specialised 'designer' drugs which may involve up to thirty different manufacturing steps. 
I This diversity is- ~ppar~- i~- t~e Standard Industrial Class~ti-;- (SIC~f the chemical 
industry see Table 1.2). e focus of this study is commodity plastics. Their raw materials 
originate within SIC 35119, Basic Industrial Chemicals. These raw materials supply SIC 
3513, Synthetic Resins and Plastic Raw Materials, Man-made Fibres (hereinafter referred to 
as plastic raw materials) which in tum supply raw materials to SIC 356, Plastic Products not 
elsewhere classified (nec). 
:./ I From each point in the production chain, or sub-sector of industry identified above, 
there is a more elaborate branching of the chemical intermediate inputs into other parts of the 
chemical industry and indeed many other industries in a complex diverse way. 
The relative proportions of production Qy sectors of the industry and the markets 
rved by the industry may be observed i Table 1.3. onsumer goods comprise less than one 
third of end use markets. Table 1.3 also underlines the importahce of ' the" industry as a 
supplier of intermediate inputs to other important sectors and industries. 
The chemical industry, 'like much of sooial science, is illusive of neat categorisation. 
Petrochemicals are a case in point. In Table 1.3 petrochemicals permeate a number of output \ 
~tors; plastics~ in~rganiCS, fertilizers, detergents, paints, fibres and dyes. What is evident 
IS that upstream basIC chemicals, organics and plastics in primary form, which fall within the 
scope of this study, together com'prise 32% of output, a sUQstantial share of the indus!!y. 
- -~ - -
___ ----- The pre-eminence of the organic and plastic industries within the chemical industry 
is a relatively recent phenomenon and is described below. 
--
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Source: Central Statistical Services, 1988. 
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Basic industrial chemicals 
Tanning Extract 
Other Basic Industrial 
Chemicals 




Synthetic resins & plastic raw 
materials, man-made fibres 
Paints varnishes lacquers 
Medicinal pharmaceutical 
Soaps cosmetics cleaning 
preparations 
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Soap other cleaning compounds and 
candles 
Perfumes, cosmetics, & other toilet 
preparations 
Chemical products NEC 




Adhesives, glues sizes and cements 
Other chemical products NEC 
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Table 1.3 EC Chemical Industry Output and End Use Markets I 
I OUTPUT I % I END USE MARKET I % I 
Organics 19 Consumer Goods 27.4 
Pharmaceutical 15 Services 19.2 
Plastics (primary) 13 Agriculture 10.3 
Inorganics 8 Textile/clothing 6.6 
Fertilizers 7 Metal industry 6.5 
Perfumes & Cosmetics . 5 Construction 5.7 
Detergents 4 Paper & Printing 3.9 
Paints 4 Electrical/Electronic industries 3.8 
Fibres 4 Auto industry 3.6 
Dyes 2 Food industry 3.1 
Others 19 Mechanical engineering 2.4 
Others 7.5' 
100 100.0 
Source: Etiro ean Cherillcal Industr Association p y q uOte<f ID Chemical Survey, FlDancilif Times, 13-7 - ~ 1. 
Historical Overview of the Global Chemical Industry 
Scholarship has not been able to trace the emergence of the use of chemicals by 
humankind back to its origins. From the time of written records there is evidence of the use 
of chemicals as tools to improve lifestyle. Chaucer's vibrant but succinct account of the state 
of the chemical industry in his time reminds us of the ancient origins of this art which has 
become a science. 
Oure fourneys eek of calcinacioun, 
And of watres albificacioun; 
Unslekked lym, chalk, and gleyre of an ey, 
Poudres diverse, asshes, donge, pisse, and cley, 
Cered pokkets, sal peter, vitriole, 
And diverse fires maad of wode and cole: 
Sal tartre, alkaly, and sal preparat, 
And combust materes and coagulat; 
Cley maad with hors or mannes heer, and oile 
Of tartre, alum glas, berme, wort, and argoille, 
Resalgar, and oure materes enbibyng 
And eek of oure materes encorporyng, 
And of oure silver citrinacioun, 
Oure cementyng and fermentacioun, 
Oure ygnottes, testes, and many mo. 
The Canon's Yeoman's Tale 
Geoffrey Chaucer 
Although the chemical industry is often seen as an industry of science there remain 
nevertheless, in my experience, a good many chemical engineers who still maintain that the 
operation of their plants is an acquired art rather than a science! Chemical reactions which 
are known are carried out although they are not always fully understood. 
Much early chemical use appears to have grown up around the working of metals such 
as gold, silver, tin, iron, lead and mercury. Also in use from the time of the earliest records 
were chemicals such as salt, soda, potash and others. Organic chemicals when they came into 
use were largely extracted from 'natural' organic substances such as vegetable dyes, sugar, 
products of alcohol and acetic fermentation, oils, fats and waxes. The early origins of organic 
chemistry in these 'natural' products account for the references to materials based upon oil 
and gas as 'synthetic' today. This is despite the fact that (organic) crude oil and natural gas 
are just as 'natural' as plants and animals. 
Advances in chemistry tended to be the pursuit of isolated individuals until 1660 when 
the Royal Society was founded in London. This provided a forum for the exchange of ideas 
among scientists at a time when the rate of change in forms of production and consumption 
began to accelerate in Western Europe. 
The advent of the Industrial Revolution from about 1760 onwards and the rapid 
expansion in the textile industry that accompanied it, made new demands upon the chemical 
industry in particular for bleaching and washing agents. Demand for soap grew. I 
The chlor-alkali nexus provided products which radiated out into a variety of 
industries. Chlorine, a mainstay in bleaching processes to this day, was discovered. Soda was 
a much sought after chemical for its role in the paper, glass, textile and soap industries. The 
struggle for dominance among two competing technologies in the production of this important 
basic product, the Leblanc (1700s) and Solvay (1863) processes, and the chemical 
conglomerates which hitched their fortunes to these processes ultimately led to a merger of 
companies in 1926 to form what is today known as Imperial Chemical Industries (lCI) 
1. Historically soap had been known since Sumerian times, when it was made from animal fats and oils. The 
emergence of a new crude oil based chemistry has resulted in these traditional raw materials being challenged 
by oil based chemicals. The trend to "Green" values in recent years in some consumer markets has led to an 
interesting struggle between the ' more natural' plant and animal oils and the 'synthetic' crude oil based products. 
20 
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(Williams, 1972). Currently ICI is the largest manufacturing concern in the UK. 
, The importance of the chlor-alkali industry has not diminished with time. Just as it 
was at the heart of corporate restructuring in the UK in the 1920s, so is it at the heart of the 
corporate restructuring which occurred in South Africa in mid 1993 (discussed more fully in 
later chapters). ICI holds 38% of AECI which is the largest chemical company in South 
Africa and an important producer of chlor-alkali products. One of the by-products from 
AECl's chlor-alkali complex, chlorine, is a major raw material in the manufacture of 
polyvinyl chloride commonly known as PVC. (PVC is one of the commodity plastics which 
are the focus of this study.) 
At the time Solvay recognised the advantage of his process and set about constructing 
a global manufacturing and marketing cartel, a practice many have attempted to follow 
through the history of the chemical industry. 
Dyes were important to the textile industry and consequently to the chemical industry 
as well. Although dyeing cloth was an ancient art, long known dyes like indigo (woad) were , 
challenged by organic chemical dyes in the latter half of the 18oos. During this period up 
until World War One, Germany excelled at this new dyestuff chemistry. The companies 
established at this time were the antecedents of what are today the world's three largest 
chemical companies, BASF, Hoechst and Bayer. 
A trend apparent even in this brief account thus far, is the manner in which demands 
from other industries closer to consumers, helped to shape the chemical industry into a 
supplier of intermediate inputs. This characteristic is, as has been pointed out, still largely 
true today. 
Another constantly recurring theme in the history of the chemical industry's evolution 
is the use of by-products. Chemical reactions tend to result not only in the desired product 
but also in one or more by-products. The costs of disposing of these by-products, or the 
opportunities to make something useful out of them, today called 'co-products', can often 
make the difference between success or failure in chemical project economics. 
An example of the effective use of by-products is the discovery of carbolic acid (called 
phenol today) in 1865. The new and growing town gas industry produced coal tar as a by-
product from which phenols were extracted. The use of carbolic acid initially as a disinfectant 
gave way to a host of other uses. Today phenol is used in dyes, explosives, pharmaceuticals, 
and perfumes. Phenol is also the basis for an early plastic known as ',Bakelite' developed in 
the 1920s. Just as coal based town gas producers found a valuable by-product in phenol, so 
too today does the coal based SASOL produce phenols from its by-products. Today phenols 
22 
are precursors to phenolic and epoxy resins, caprolactum (in turn a precursor to nylon 66) 
and bisphenol A. 
Another important influence in stimulating the development of the chemical industry 
has been the role of wars. This has had a number of general effects upon the industry. From 
the public's point of view perhaps the most emotive and shocking has been the development 
of new and terrible poisons as weapons of war. From the point of view of science, the 
demands of war have driven the industry to new heights of discovery. Economists on the 
other hand have drawn attention to the effect wars have had on the subsequent ownership 
structure of industry. A few examples illustrate this point. 
Alfred Nobel isolated nitroglycerine in the early 1900's, but the favoured explosive 
for military purposes in 1914 was trinitrotoluene (TNT).2 Such was the demand for toluene 
that an entire refinery was removed from neutral Holland and rebuilt in the UK shortly before 
World War ·I (WWl). The war also made Germany acutely aware of its vulnerability in 
relying upon Chilean saltpetre (potassium nitrate) as a source of gun powder. Fritz Haber, 
on a grant from BASF, had fixed nitrogen as ammonia in 1909 but it was left to a young 
engineer, Bosch, to commercialise the process, which he did by 1913. The difficulties in 
combining hydrogen and nitrogen to form ammonia (NH4) were only overcome with the use 
of unprecedentedly high pressures and temperatures. This has become known as the legendary 
Haber-Bosch process. Of great importance was the fact that this process broke the link 
between nitrates (for fertilizer and explosives) and coke oven feedstocks and allowed the 
harnessing of alternative feedstocks. This allowed nitrogen based fertilizers and explosives 
to grow beyond the limited supplies of coke oven ammonia supply. It provided the basis for 
producing nitrates (for explosives) which Bosch's plant did in large volumes during the course 
of WW1.3 (Today about 80% of ammonia is used to manufacture fertilizers.) 
Another area of the chemical industry to benefit from WWl was gas. It was Haber 
himself, at Ypres in Belgium, who released the first chlorine gas which blew over Allied 
troops in the trenches (Borkin, 1977: 17). In the US, early attempts by Union Carbide to 
produce ethylene (the most important organic chemical building block today) were associated 
with a mustard gas project during WWl. 
Germany's lack of natural rubber also drove the development of synthetic rubber 
2. Toluene is one of the seven basic building blocks in the organic chemical industry (see Annexure D). 
3. BAS~'s Habe.r-Bosch synthetic nitrate plant at Oppau also has its place in history as a source of death and 
~~t~ctton by dIfferent means. In 1921 it was ripped apart by a massive explosion, killing 600 workers and 
lDJunng a further 2 000, the largest industrial accident in history at the time (Borkin, 1977). 
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during the War. Although a hard rubber was produced by BASF and Bayer, the breakthrough 
to rubber soft enough for motor car tyres had to wait for a second world war when gas 
manufacture also took a new turn. 
In the wake of WW 1 ownership in the industry became more concentrated in response 
to the chemical progress which had been made during the war. This concentration in turn 
helped to provide a chemical industry base for the next World War just over two decades 
later. In Germany various companies, including Bayer, BASF and Hoechst merged into IG 
Farben-Industrie which played such an important role in the German war effort during World 
War Two (WW2). 
Other chemical conglomerates emerged in the wake of WWl which remain household 
names to this day, for example ICI in the UK and Du Pont in the USA. In all "The war of 
1914-18 completely revolutionised the chemical industry and marked the end of an epoch." 
(Williams, 1972:87). 
During the inter-war years the lessons of shortages and the need for self sufficiency 
were put into practice. For example in 1933 the British government guaranteed preference 
for the domestic production of petrol from coal which led in 1935 to a 150 000 tpa plant 
being opened at Billingham. Twenty years later this same lesson was again put into practice, 
in South Africa this time, when SASOL 1 began to produce petrol from coal. 
The inter war years were also the heyday of the global cartels, agreed 'spheres of 
interest' and 'co-operation' between companies in the chemical industry. Such anti-
competitive behaviour was pervasive business practice (Spitz, 1988). The cartel system 
"suited an industry that frowned upon unseemly competitive behaviour." (Ibid:225). 
There is a certain logic to the formation of cartels which is inherent in the nature of 
many basic chemical products. Capital intensity and economies of scale dictate that there will 
be a limited number of producers of a particular commodity product. This was especially so 
in the depressed economic conditions of the 1930s. Markets too were much smaller then and 
consequently producers were also fewer. An intermediate commodity input such as soda ash 
for glass manufacture is required in certain volumes (has inelastic demand) depending upon 
the demand for glass.4 Competition among soda ash suppliers may only result in a limited 
drop in the glass price, with limited effect upon the demand for soda ash or glass. Lower 
soda ash prices may instead be simply absorbed by glass producers as additional profit. The 
net result for soda ash producers would be lower revenues for similar volumes of soda ash. 
4. The characteristics of commodity production are considered in more detail in a later section dealing with 
commodity and speciality chemicals. 
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The rise of giant multinational chemical companies is inextricably linked to the 
cartelization of certain chemical markets. For example in 1925 several German chemical 
companies formed IG Farben, the world's largest chemical cartel at that time. Shortly 
thereafter in 1926 four companies came together to form a defensive cartel in the UK under 
the name ICI, to defend their export markets. Discussions between ICI, Du Pont in the US 
and IG Farben quickly followed in what ICI's first President, Sir Harry McGowan, described 
as "only the first step in a comprehensive scheme ... to rationalise the chemical manufacture 
of the world" (Financial Times, 31-7-92). ICI developed a reputation as a company which 
preferred to avoid competition. In 1935 ICI and IG Farben reached agreement on a division 
of the global nitrogen market (an important input for fertili~r). Later McGowan wrote that 
he did not accept "the theory .. that competition is essential to efficiency." (Ibid). 
In the late 1930s the Roosevelt administration began attacking price fixing and market 
sharing agreements in the US. The Sherman and Clayton Acts (in the USA) and article 85 
of the Treaty of Rome (in the European Common Market) were the principal anti-cartel 
measures. After the Second World War US anti-trust actions legally ended hundreds of 
agreements concerning competition (or the lack of it) between Du Pont and ICI. This together 
with the increasing number of competitors in the post World War 2 (WW2) economic growth 
phase made cartels more difficult to manage. Despite this anti-competitive behaviour cartels 
continue to occur in the chemical industry and are discussed in Chapter Two. 
The chemical industry was also dramatically changed by WW2. It was remarkable in 
that it ushered in a wide ranging revolution in the industry, principally the petrochemicals 
era, which remains a dominant sector of the industry to this day. What brought about the 
introduction of petrochemical production? There is no simple explanation. Spitz concludes: 
"in the final analysis .... conditions were ripe for a change in the technology and 
feedstocks for the production of organic intermediates." (Spitz, 1988:63). 
In the period before WW2 a number of developments had occurred which served to 
set the stage for the chemical industry's reorientation during and after the war. Catalytic 
crackers came into use which were far more sophisticated than the thermal crackers which 
had been in use since the 1920s. Importantly catalytic crackers provided much larger volumes 
of olefins which would become important during WW2. 
The development of new products which found a large market in war materials is 
another example. In 1939 IG Farben (BASF) the inventor of nylon 6 and Du Pont the 
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inventor of nylon 66 entered into a cross licensing agreement. This made both of the chemical 
routes to synthetic (nylon) parachutes and stockings available on both sides of the Atlantic. 
As WW2 commenced, the USA was particularly well placed to develop 
petrochemicals. It was not involved in the War at that time, it had local feedstocks (oil and 
gas), and a developed manufacturing base with its attendant research and development 
capacity. The single largest boost to the petrochemical industry was the war time need to 
produce synthetic rubber and high octane gasoline for aircraft engines. These stimuli were 
particularly important in both in the USA and Germany. Germany was cut off from supplies 
of natural rubber. In response IG Farben developed the famous Buna-S synthetic rubber (a 
mixture of styrene and butadiene) from acetylene feedstocks. S The chemical industry played 
an important role in providing the German War effort with synthetic fuel and synthetic rubber 
from coal. Also manufactured in its factories was the infamous Zyklon B gas used in the gas 
ovens at AuSchwitz to exterminate Jews (Borkin, 1977). Several of IG Farben's directors 
were subsequently convicted at the Nuremburg trials. 
During WW2 the USA government had required large chemical firms to build large 
plants in order to meet war needs and after the war they were handed over to these companies 
thus providing the production base for the period of rapid growth that followed. During and 
after the War the US petrochemical industry received a further boost. This took the form of 
a great infusion of German chemical knowledge. This knowledge came from two sources: the 
nationalisation of German plants in the US and several US C.I.O. teams which investigated 
the German chemical industry immediately after the war and returned to the USA with a large 
collection of documentary information on advances made by the German chemical industry 
during the war. The US chemical industry was fortunate to have all the requirements for 
growth in place: pent up demand, new knowledge, large cheap plants, competition subdued 
(Germany), and local feedstocks. It is not surprising that the US petrochemical industry 
surged ahead in the post war period. 
The engine of this growth was commodity plastics. Between 1940 and 1950 US 
thermoplastic production volumes increased 25 times and thermoset plastics 2.9 times (Spitz, 
1988:229). Plastics which had been developed during the war found new markets in a wide 
range of peace time applications after the war. The plastics industry grew faster than any 
other industry in the immediate post WW2 period. 
5. ~ attempt was made, for similar. r~ns. to giv~ a much imprOVed version of this type of technology 
(ultimately coal based) a new lease of Me an SA at Sentrachem's Newcastle poly isoprene plant in the late 1980s. 
It proved unprofitable and was closed. 
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Historical Back~round to Plastics 
To place the plastic industry in some historical and developmental perspective it is 
necessary to go back some 300 years to the 1700s. Some of the breakthroughs in the early 
development of plastics are listed in Table 1.4. Plastics at this time were made largely from 
natural materials. This first phase of plastics relied upon cellulose. In the early 1900s 
synthetic plastics began to overtake their predecessors. These synthetic thermoset (see 
glossary) plastics constitute a second stage of plastics development. Output remained 
relatively small until the end of WW2. 
Table 1.4 Breakthroughs in the Early History of (cellulosic) Plastics J 
I DATE I DISCOVERY I 
1700s Shellac 
1839 Charles Goodyear adds sulphur to rubber, to make stronger rubber. 
1846 Nitrocellulose discovered by Alexander Parkes 
1851 Nelson Goodyear adds more sulphur to rubber to make ebonite'. 
1868 Celluloid discovered 
1892 Rayon 
1889 Acetate silk (Bayer) 
1914 Cellophane 
post WWl Celanese (for cellulose + ease of care) 
Both the early natural (cellulosic) and synthetic plastics were thermosets. Synthetic 
thermosets began with Dr Bakeland's discovery of Bakelite, a phenol formaldehyde resin in 
1905. Up until the 1920's the feedstock for formaldehyde was the destructive distillation of 
wood to methanol. Later coke and natural gas reforming replaced methanol. In 1928 the 
famous 'Beetle' (amino formaldehyde) resins were commercialised in the UK.6 In the US 
American Cyanamid later produced 'Formica' a similar hard resin. 
The limitations of the hard and inflexible thermoset plastics were overcome with the 
development of thermoplastics and it was to this rising star that the post WW2 petrochemicals 
expansion was firmly hitched. This third phase in plastics development, thermoplastics, is still 
the dominant phase. One of the oldest thermoplastics is PVC. It is another example of a 
6. Beetle resins are still produced by British Industrial Plastics in Pinetown SA. 
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chemical product which has its origins in a surplus 'by-product'. The advent of electric power 
led to the demise of acetylene lamps in the UK. This change in energy sources gave rise to 
an excess of acetylene. The availability of acetylene feedstock led to the development by 1909 
of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) the precursor to PVC. Similar developments were 
occurring elsewhere. 
In the US, Union Carbide had produced ethylene di-chloride (EDC) as a waste by 
product (very cheap) which was 'cracked' to VCM in the late 1920s. In Germany at the same 
time the manufacture of acetylene based buna rubber led to surplus acetylene capacity which 
was exploited to make PVC.7 PVC use was limited to rigid applications until the 1930s when 
plasticisers were developed enabling more flexible PVC to be made. Rubber shortages during 
WW2 created the space for PVC products to demonstrate their superiority in certain 
applications. 
Another early commodity plastic to be developed was polystyrene. It is made from 
styrene which had been first isolated in 1831. But it was not until 1925 that the first 
polystyrene (PS) plant was built. It was not a great success. However the key determinant in 
the development of PS, was the need for synthetic rubber. Manufacture of synthetic rubber 
created a demand for styrene capacity (a precursor to synthetic rubber) which could then also 
be used in other applications. In the 1930s both IG Farben (in Germany) and Dow (in the US) 
built PS plants. PS demand during the war created a large capacity which at war-end needed 
a market. 
, 
During the early 1930s, Du Pont in the US, searching for a substitute for silk, 
discovered the first polyamide or nylon 66. Only a few months later German researchers 
discovered nylon 6 via a different chemical route. ' Also at this time ICI in the UK discovered 
'Perspex' (polymethyl methacrylate) and produced it commercially in 1934. Its shatterproof 
qualities were soon in vast demand, which was further boosted a few years later by the need 
for aircraft canopies. 
Polyethylene has been the engine of growth in the petrochemical and plastic industries. 
Low density polyethylene (LDPE) was discovered by ICI in the 1933 when an autoclave of 
ethylene under pressure exploded. The material remaining in the autoclave was polyethylene. 
This is just one of several chemical breakthroughs in the history of the chemical industry 
which occurred by accident. Manufacture of LOPE was only commercialised in 1945 and 
then took several years to break through from specialised military-type applications to 
7. In the late 1970s AECI built an acetylene based PVC plant in Sasolburg SA which is still the major source 
of SA's PVC. 
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consumer applications. It is a continuation of the high pressure chemistry tradition requiring 
pressures of between 1 ()()() and 3 ()()() atmospheres and temperatures in the 100-2000C range. 
In 1958 high density polyethylene (HOPE) was commercialised using processes at ambient 
temperature and atmospheric pressure following Or Karl Ziegler's breakthrough in catalyst 
technology. Ziegler's breakthrough had an important application in soaps and detergents 
which allowed synthetic alcohols to challenge the place of natural products such as coconut 
kernels and tallow. An Italian scientist, Natte, working for Montecatini recognised the 
potential of Ziegler's discovery. By applying it to propylene he was able to produce 
polypropylene (PP), which was first commercialised in 1957. Montecatini (through the state 
owned ENI) remains a world leader in PP development and the largest producer. The last of 
the major thermoplastics to be added to the list was linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE) 
in 1977 by Union Carbide using the 'Unipol' low pressure process. This was intended as a 
low pressure process substitute to the high pressure LOPE. 
These six thermoplastics LOPE, LLOPE, HOPE, PP, PVC and PS (referred to 
hereinafter as the commodity plastics) were the foundations upon which the substitution of 
wood, glass, paper and metal products grew apace in the post WW2 period and is still 
proceeding to this day. These commodity plastics are the major focus of this study. 
The substitution of plastics for other materials was facilitated by certain factors such 
as the available plant machinery and equipment, a drop in the price of ethylene and existing 
chlor-alkali complexes producing soda ash with cheap chlorine by-products (for PVC). The 
Korean war gave a further boost to the chemical industry and by 1979 the volume of all 
plastics materials exceeded the production of iron and steel (Spitz, 1988). 
From Coal to Oil 
At the end of WW2 the petrochemical industry was largely an American industry. In 
the post war period the chemical industry underwent another round of restructuring. The size 
of the industry attracted some large oil companies which forward integrated into 
petrochemicals. Some chemical companies expanded in the opposite direction and back 
integrated into oil. However the major restructuring arose from a change in feedstocks which 
occurred on a wide scale in Europe and Japan. 
The history of the West European and Japanese chemical industries over the 1945-60 
period is dominated by the switch from coal based to oil and gas based petrochemical 
production. This took longer than in the US as neither location had a ready supply of 
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feedstocks. One of the factors driving the change, along with costs, was the lack of local 
supplies of natural fibres. This facilitated the switch to synthetic fibres which in turn 
encouraged the development of other petrochemicals. 
By 1960 Germany was only 40% dependent upon petroleum for organic chemicals 
(with 60% from coal) whilst the US was 80% dependent upon petroleum. In the UK the 
switch was faster. From being two thirds dependenfupon coal in 1954, only half of chemicals 
were coal based by 1959. 
The feedstock switch in Europe was speeded up by the entry of US firms into Europe 
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. They had been more profitable than their European 
competitors during the 1960s and had gained a lead in the industry. Japanese chemical output 
had been more than halved by the end of the war, but following a MITI study in the late 
1950s three large petrochemical complexes were started based upon imported naphtha. Other 
late starters into the petrochemical business were the East European countries in the 1960s 
and the oil-rich Gulf states in the 1970s and 1980s. (Recent trends in globalisation are dealt 
with more fully in Chapter Two.) 
Maturity? 
The strong and steady growth in the petrochemical industry in the developed 
economies eventually began to run into difficulties in the early 1970s. A number of factors 
accounted for this. Something of a ceiling was reached in the economies of scale arising from 
what had been ever increasing plant capacities. Rates of growth and profitability were 
declining and new discoveries were tailing off (Oman, 1989). Value added was declining (see 
Figure 2). The social costs of toxic emissions into the environment and health and safety 
issues among the workforce began to catch up with the industry. This together with the effect 
of napalm bombing in Vietnam, removed the lustre from the eyes of the public and some 
investors. Simultaneously the industry had been globalising and there had been particularly 
strong growth in Western Europe, to the point where certain US companies withdrew as a 
result of the fierce competition there. Rates of growth in the industry also began to decline 
as markets matured. 
Figure 2 Western Europe, Integrated Ethylene/LOPE Trend in Value 
Added per Tonne of LOPE. 
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The single most important factor was the 1973 oil price shock which was in part an 
attempt by OPEC producers to protect real oil prices which had been falling since the 1950s. 
This raised feedstock and energy costs, reduced demand and compounded the tendency which 
had begun in the late 1960s for profitability to fall. Accompanying these developments were 
increased discoveries of oil and gas, for example in Mexico, and the entry of developing 
country producers into the world markets. In 1978 a second oil price shock occurred when 
the Shah of Iran was forced to flee. The two oil shocks brought a latent crisis to a head. 
Profitability in the petrochemical industry declined during the 1970s and the 19808. 
All of these factors in the 1970s contributed to the petrochemical industry's transition 
from orderly and steady growth to an industry characterised by uncertainty and change with 
large fluctuations in profitability. The latter were evident when, against the longer term trend, 
1974 and 1979 were the best years the industry had enjoyed for a considerable time. By the 
early 1980s it was seen by some as an industry in advanced maturity or even decline (Spitz, 
1988:504). 
The different feedstock basis of European and Japanese petrochemical industries 
compared with the US industry resulted in the oil shocks impacting differently. Europe and 
Japan were predominantly dependent upon naphtha as a feedstock whereas the US had its own 
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natural gas (ethane) resources. This led to substantial differences in the competitive positions 
of the European, Japanese and US industries. The two oil shocks weakened the European and 
Japanese industries before they were threatened by competition from low cost associated gas 
producers in Saudi Arabia. A European and Japanese recovery was facilitated by deregulation 
in the US oil industry and a rise in the US dollar exchange rate. 
The global recession of 1981-82 brought some of the uncertainties of the 1970s to an 
end. But changes continued. The recession caused restructuring on a global scale. In certain 
countries in Europe and in Japan it occurred with state assistance. This restructuring led to 
large closures of capacity and concentrations of ownership in product sectors. It also 
contributed to a developing shift in the geographic location of the petrochemical industry. 
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this is the shift in synthetic fibres capacity from the 
Triad to newly industrialising countries (discussed below). 
What forces or phenomena had driven the industry to the point it had reached by the 
early 1980s that such wide ranging restructuring was necessary? There are of course no 
simple answers. The answers are bound up with such issues as technology transfer, 
technological developments, growing capacity in newly industrialising countries, lower 
barriers to entry and changing patterns in feedstock supplies and costs. The role of 
independent engineering firms (ie non petrochemical producers) which have as their business 
objective the erection of new capacity without the responsibility of selling the output from 
such facilities contributed to overcapacity which threatened profitability. Mistaken corporate 
strategies in dealing with issues such as diversification also played a role. In the final analysis 
Spitz pins his answer on "extreme, sometimes irrational competition, the root cause of low 
profitability." (Spitz, 1988:538). Other industry analysts such as Wamsley concur (Interview, 
Wamsley). Whilst there appears to be an element of truth in this explanation Wittcoff (1992) 
tempers such analyses with the view that imperfect knowledge of the market may also have 
played a role. 
The preceding discussion has charted a course through a very condensed history of the 
chemical industry up until the early 1980s. It is appropriate now to sketch the petrochemical 
and plastics production chain and to introduce, briefly, its chief constituent elements. 
The Petrochemicals. Polymers and Plastics filifre 
By way of introduction thisfiliere is schematically presented in Figure 3. It 
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Figure 3 Schematic Petrochemicals and Polymers Fillere 
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emphasises the petrochemical, polymer and plastic links which are the focus of this study. 
A great many more products are produced, particularly at levels Four and Five thari are 
reflected in this schematic outline. The chief characteristics of each of the levels are discussed 
in the sections which follow. 
The petrochemical sector is the single largest sector ,of the chemical industry 
accounting for 36.5% of world output valued at $414bn in 1989 (Chemical Industries 
Association, 1990:22). This excludes other major sectors of the industry such as Fertilizers, 
Artificial Fibres,8 Soaps and Detergents and Other Chemicals all of which utilize 
intermediate inputs from the petrochemicals sector. It is thus important for South Africa (and 
this study) to assess its standing and prospects in this large global industry. 
Levell: Hydrocarbon Sources: Crude Oil, Natural Gas and Coal 
The primary petrochemical feedstocks are petroleum (60%), natural gas (39%) and 
coal a mere 0,2 % (SRI International, 1987:300.100lc). 
Level 2: Feedstocks 
Feed~tocks comprise ethane (from natural gas), refinery products such as naphtha and gas oil, 
propane, liquified petroleum gas, and synthesis gas from synfuels from coal (only in South 
Africa). 
Level 3: The Seven Major Building Blocks 
These organic chemical building blocks are the cornerstone of the modem chemical 
industry. They are mostly, although not all, commodity chemicals and are used as raw 
materials in the manufacture of other synthetic materials rather than as final products. Note 
that in the South African case synthesis gas yields only ethylene, propylene and methane and 
does not yield all seven building blocks. 
Level 4: Derivatives 
At this level the building blocks are further processed. For example ethylene and 
~. ~e, Stan~rd Industrial Classification term is "Man-made" fibres but since this is unacceptable the term 
artIfiCIal" WIll be substituted, 
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propylene are polymerised to polyethylenes and pol ypropylenes , plastic raw materials, 
referred to as commodity polymers in this study. These are the raw materials which are 
converted in the plastic converting industry to various end user products. Each of the seven 
basic building blocks can be processed to a variety of chemicals. For example C. Olefins may 
be processed to adipic acid, a precursor to nylon 66. 
LevelS: Derivative Uses 
At this level the commodity polymers are converted to sheeting, film, piping, and 
many other forms. Common technologies used here are injection moulding and blow 
mOUlding. In addition chemical derivatives have other uses. For example a polypropylene 
derivative acrylonitrile is processed to acrylic fibres. 
Level 6: Finished Products 
Ultimately the seven basic building blocks and t~eir multitudinous derivatives find 
applications in a wide range of finished products: packaging film, crates, boxes, cartons, 
bottles, drums, woven bags, containers, detergents, synthetic lubricants, pipes, sheeting, 
automotive components, paints, inks, solvents, textile fibres, insulation materials, tyres, 
rubber goods, furniture, leisure goods, electronics, building materials etc etc. The recycling 
of post-consumer plastic waste for the manufacture of other products also occurs largely at 
level 6 although some recycling of 'off specification' product is possible at all manufacturing 
levels. 
The preceding schematic jiliere is intended to provide a framework within which to 
locate the more detailed discussion of aspects of the various levels which follows. 
Hydrocarbon Sources: Hist0tY and Prospects 
Hydrocarbons are the basic raw materials for the petrochemical and plastic industries. 
Historically they have been available from three distinct sources which have 'driven' the 
petrochemical industry. Their usage has of course overlapped in time. 
Initially in the mid and late 1800s the availability of large volumes of coal tars and 
coke oven gases provided the basis for the recovery of important petrochemicals such as 
phenols, benzene etc. Technologies were developed to transform these chemicals into 
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dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals. 
. A second phase in the historical development of petrochemical feedstocks emerged in 
the early 1900s with the availability of large volumes of agricultural material from which 
ethanol was made. Ethanol can be used as a basis for petrochemicals. This is still important 
in certain countries. For example Brazil's Proalcohol scheme currently provides ethanol from 
sugar cane to power about one third of its 12 million automobiles. It is also more 
environment-friendly than oil based petrol (see Homewood, 1993).9 
A third phase in feedstock sourcing began in the 1920s with the harnessing of crude 
oil refinery co-products and by-products for petrochemical purposes. Initially the process used 
was thermal cracking but this was supplanted in the 1930s by steam cracking and this in tum, 
was sophisticated further by the advent of catalytic cracking in the late 1930s. The major shift 
occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. For the purposes of this discussion the significant swing in 
the 1980s to the harnessing of associated gas and natural gas for chemical purposes may be 
included in this current phase. The development of petrochemical process is schematised in 
Table 1.5. 
Table 1.5 Olefin Supply History 
I Phase and Source I Olefins Produced I Time Period I 
1. Coke-oven operations Ethylene 18th century to World War II 
2. Ethanol dehydration Ethylene 19108 to World War II 
3.1 Thermal cracking Ethylene, propylene, butylenes 1920s to World War II 
(petroleum fractions) 
3.2 Steam cracking (natural gas Ethylene, propylene, butylenes 19308 to present 
and petroleum fractions) 
3.3 Catalytic cracking Ethylene, propylene, butylenes 1939 to present (propylene, 
(petroleum fractions) butylenes) 
Source: after Spitz, 1988. 
The main barrier to the greater use of the vast global coal reserves for petrochemicals 
has been the capital costs necessary to achieve the requisite high temperatures and pressures. 
There is little sign that this situation will change in the foreseeable future. South Africa is the 
only country sourcing a significant proportion of its liquid fuels, petrochemicals and plastics 
from coal. Despite several severe fluctuations in the price of oil since the early 1970s the 
9: A. ~imilar project proposed for Natal (SA) was recently rejected by government on grounds of poor financial 
vlablhty. 
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petrochemical industry shows no sign of switching back to coal feedstocks. 
In a high capital cost industry such as petrochemicals the expected lifespan of 
feedstock is an important issue. The crucial question is, how long will oil reserves last? This 
is a much debated and controversial issue. However what is less controversial is the amount 
of crude oil that is turned to petrochemical purposes. A most remarkable feature of the 
petrochemical industry is that this giant industry is reliant upon just 7% of crude oil processed 
for its feedstocks in Western Europe (British Plastics Federation, 1992). This fact, taken 
together with the fact that petrochemicals command higher prices than petrol, suggests that 
even under tight crude oil supply conditions, petrochemicals should be assured of feedstock. 
However, as is so often the case in the chemical industry, it is not the immediately obvious 
which event~ally prevails. In this case the converse may be true because, from a refiner's 
point of view, it is more worthwhile to produce petrol than naphtha (the feedstock for 
petrochemicals) . 
The extent of remaining oil reserves is a controversial question. Projections on the 
future availability of crude oil, assuming a 3% p.a. increase in global consumption, point to 
sufficient reserves for several decades to come (van der Pas, 1990). World proven oil 
reserves amount to 991 011 million barrels. Present output is about 59 million barrels per 
day, which at a growth rate of 3% p.a. may be projected to last a further 29.3 years. to Exall 
(1992) estimates 40 years. 
Natural gas deposits are another source of fuel or petrochemicals. They are being 
exploited at an increasing rate and the extraction technology is also developing rapidly. World 
proven gas reserves amount to the energy equivalent of 785 000 million barrels of crude oil. 
Assuming gas is substituted for crude oil and crude oil demand grows at 3 % p.a., then the 
proven gas reserves may be projected to last a further 24.99 years. Assuming current 
consumption patterns continue, Exall (1992) estimates approximately 60 years of reserves. 
The Economist estimated 43.4 years from 1990 (The Economist, 31-8-91:6). Taken together, 
crude oil and natural gas reserves could meet current demand, growing at 3 % p.a. for a total 
of a further 54.34 years. ll 
There are several factors overlooked in this rough calculation such as the cost, 
10. Da~ used in these calculations are dra~ from Un~ted Nations, 1992, Figure V.2., Table V.2, and page 
107. It IS not clear whether or not these estimates take mto account the anticipated oil bonanza expected after 
further exploration of Russia. 
11. Calculated from United Nations (1992) Figure V.2., Table V.2. and page 107. 
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difficulties of transport and extraction which will influence the final result. Further 
discoveries are likely to increase the potential lifespan of oil and gas reserves. Projections of 
global oil and gas reserves are notoriously controversial fields of study and there. will 
doubtless be those that contest the figures used here. Suffice to say that the size of oil and 
gas reserves is unlikely to be the factor which deters potential investors in large petrochemical 
projects. If announced petrochemical projects are taken into account in the context of 
significant world overcapacity then the availability of oil and gas resources fades into 
insignificance relative to other problems which the industry is likely to encounter (Interview 
Wamsley). 
However in the longer term, the growing pressure of the environmental lobby on 
hydrocarbon industries is a factor which should not be overlooked. Disasters such as the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill and public knowledge about the extent of environmental damage 
associated with oilfields previously part of the USSR, have provoked a new round of pressure 
(and costs to the industry) for safer and cleaner processes to be used. Quite what the final 
result of environmental pressure on the hydrocarbon industries will be is uncertain. 
Nevertheless it seems reasonable to assume that there wil~ be an impact of some type. 
Feedstocks. Processes. Buildine Blocks and Prospects 
This section examines feedstocks, building blocks and the processes for extracting 
building blocks from feedstocks together because in reality they are inextricably interlinked. 
In the process some key concepts and technical terms are introduced. 
Feedstocks 
Choice of feedstocks is critically important as they have accounted for up to 70% of 
total costs (APPE, 1986:9). Steam crackers, the major source of olefins, and limited 
aromatics, can be designed to use several different feedstocks: ethane, propane, butane, LPG, 
naphtha or gas oil. These different feedstocks do not give the same yield. Different feedstocks 
give rise to different proportions of co-product (see Table 1.6) and this can have important 
implications for the petrochemical industry as we shall see. In brief, selection of feedstock 
type must take into account the costs and benefits from the co-products that will be generated. 
Table 1.6 Typical Cracking Patterns Using 
Different Feedstocks 
(in percentage of output) 
Feedstock 
Product Naphtha Ethane Propane 
Hydrogen 3 5 2 
Methane 13 7 23 
Ethylene 27 79 43 
Propylene 14 2 20 
Propane 2 
Butadiene 4 2 3 
Butenes 6 1 3 
Raw Gasol ine 24 2 4 
Fuel Oil 5 
Losses 2 2 2 
100 100 100 














As is evident from this table naphtha and propane give a spread of desired products 
whereas ethane (drawn say from natural gas) yields largely ethylene. Propane and butane have 
the disadvantage of yielding significant proportions of low value methane. Naphtha, by 
contrast also yields raw gasoline, the source of BTX chemicals, thus providing a full slate of 
seven building blocks at optimal costs, making it the preferred feedstock in Western Europe 
and Japan. Naphtha is a crude oil refinery by-product. This returns the discussion to the 
feedstock driven nature of the industry and the importance of co-products and by-products of 
other processes. 
In the current (third) phase of the petrochemicals feedstock history, it is the growth 
in demand for automobiles and the accompanying expansion of petrol refining capacity which 
is providing feedstocks for the petrochemical industry. Crude oil refineries typically produce 
a range of products. The petrochemical industry must be concerned with the relationship 
between the prices of the products in this range of products as this effects the availability of 
feedstock from refineries. Typical relationships are given in Table 1.7. It may be observed 
in this table that naphtha, the basis of gasoline and also a major source of petrochemicals is 
not the most valuable product to the refiner and accordingly the refiner must weigh up the 
costs of further processing it to gasoline against the costs of extracting it and selling it on the 
merchant market to the petrochemical industry. Refineries do yield small amounts of olefin 
gases (from which plastic raw materials can be made) which can be extracted where the scale 
of operations makes this viable. This additional supply source makes a significant difference 
39 
to the proportions of the seven building blocks available in the USA. 
Table 1.7 Refinery Product Price Relationships 
Product/crude 
price ratio per 
tonne of crude oil 
1. 4 to 1. 5 
1. 3 to 1.4 
1. 2 to 1.3 
1.1 to 1. 4 
1.15 to 1. 3 
0.95 to 0.7 





Liquified petroleum gas (LPG) 
Gas oils 
Residual fuels 
North America differs from Western Europe in the scale of its crude oil refining 
industry. It alone accounts for about 30% of the world's refinery output (UNIDO, 1990, 
Table IV.114). Consequently the volume of olefin gas by-products is larger and this is an 
important source of building blocks for the petrochemical industry. 
The availability of natural gas in North America has also altered the output of building 
blocks. Typically a mixture of ethane and propane gas have been cracked in North America. 
Thus in North America the availability of feedstocks from crude oil refineries (two sources: 
naphtha and olefins direct), and natural gas has influenced the composition of the building 
block slate and its cost structure. These factors together with the United States' large share 
of world production capacity, caused it, at the end of the 1980s, to be considered the price 
setter in the industry (Vergara & Babylon, 1990:9). 
Building Blocks 
In contemporary times the first fundamental step down the petrochemical production 
chain is the extraction of the seven basic building blocks. These seven basic building blocks 
account for an extraordinary 90% of the number of organic chemicals! Extraction is by way 
of three processes, steam cracking (the most important) fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) and 
catalytic reforming (see Table 1.8). The latter two (fluid catalytic cracking and catalytic 
reforming) are typically intra-refinery processes. 
These seven building blocks are usually separated into two groups, olefins, (ethylene, 
propylene and C4 olefins) and aromatics (benzene, toluene and xylenes or BTX). Olefins are 
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The importance of these seven building blocks emerges from the fact that just three 
(ethylene, propylene, benzene) account for about 75% of all organic chemicals produced. Just 
one chemical, ethylene, accounts for 10% by volume of all chemicals produced and "That is 
an important and impressive figure". (Wittcoff, 1992: 1.3). 
Ethylene's major derivatives, the polyethylenes and polyvinyl chloride (PVC), are the 
older plastics. They account for 35 % and 23 % respectively of global plastics production 
(excluding fibres and elastomers) (Wittcoff, 1992:3.22). The newer and faster growing 
propylene based polypropylene accounts for 13%. Polystyrene (from benzene and ethylene) 
accounts for 12%. The remaining 17% of global plastic production is divided among various 
thermoset plastics (eg polyurethanes) and thermoplastics. 
Having outlined the importance of olefins to the commodity plastics industry, the 
discussion now proceeds to the crucial issues of the inter linkages between feedstocks, 
building blocks and production processes by way of a recent historical example. 
Interlinkages between Feedstocks, Building blocks and Production Processes 
In the early 1980s the feedstock cost basis of the industry began to change. Although 
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not as radical as the shift from coal to oil, the new developments nevertheless impacted upon 
the cost structure of petrochemicals. These changes arose as Saudi Arabian and Canadian 
producers harnessed associated gas at the (extremely low) equivalent cost of flaring. 
Associated gas is an 'unwanted' by-product of crude oil recovery. It yields cheap ethylene 
but no propylene co-product, a point we shall return to shortly. As a consequence of 
harnessing this very low cost associated gas, low cost ethylene based products entered the 
world market in 1984-85. This contributed to the closure of considerable capacity in Western 
Europe as a result of its higher cost, largely naphtha based feedstock. This was significant, 
because as has been shown, naphtha cracking also yields propylene as a co-product, whereas 
associated gas does not yield propylene, a point we shall return to shortly. The global 
building block supply slate had been restructured as a result of a change in feedstocks in some 
part of the world. 
The world economy was recovering at the time and the global supply/demand balance 
for petrochemical products was tightening, aided by the fact that lower oil prices enabled 
plastic prices to undercut the prices of rival materials. The result was that during 1987-89, 
the global petrochemical industry posted record profits. In Europe this profit rebound was 
aided by tight propylene supplies. 
The tight propylene supply arose because as ethylene capacity was closed a 
proportionate volume of propylene supply was also closed (propylene is a co-product of 
ethylene from naphtha cracking). But, and here lies the rub, the new (associated gas based) 
ethylene producers were not producing propylene. As may be expected, it was simply a 
matter of time before a propylene shortage occurred. Indeed some have suggested that more 
European ethylene capacity was closed than was necessary, precisely to bring about a 
propylene shortage in an attempt to recover profits lost on ethylene. None will of course 
admit to this. 
Propylene has traditionally been cheaper than ethylene as it is a naphtha cracking by-
product. The European propylene shortage caused propylene prices to exceed ethylene prices 
in 1991 for the first time, except for a brief period in 1986. Higher propylene prices attracted 
additional investment in propylene producing capacity which, accompanied by the global 
recession from 1990, turned the propylene shortage to an oversupply and depressed prices. 
Despite these cyclical developments, the long term trend is towards lighter feedstocks 
such as natural gas (Vergara & Babylon, 1990). But this trend has been slowed by certain 
factors. The oil price crash in 1986 has lowered naphtha prices. Also the projected 
polypropylene growth rate is higher than any other commodity plastic. (Parpinelli Tecnon, 
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1991: 1.1) This hope tends to keep naphtha cracker operators from closing marginal plants. 
These examples illustrate the complex and apparently contradictory interlinkages 
operating within the industry as well as the swings in fortune which can occur. In short the 
cyclical petrochemical business. is not for faint-hearted investors. Strategic planning in the 
global petrochemicals industry, even for a relatively small economy like South Africa, is a 
complex matter and requires considerable skill and a certain degree of courage and 
determination. 
The long term trend to lighter feedstocks was accompanied by lower world ethylene 
prices to which the industry has responded in a number of ways. The limited feedstock range 
for crackers has been widened, (marginally) and product selectivity improved. Flexibility in 
the capacity to process different feedstocks offers the benefit of being able to take advantage 
of the shifting relative prices of feedstocks. Technological developments in these areas are 
likely to be continuing sources of competitive advantage. Vertical integration, and complete 
co-product integration, for which there is an objective basis in the nature of the products, has 
allowed intra-company transfer pricing and improved flexibility of product choice. This 
applies to both refiners who have vertically integrated forward into petrochemicals and 
plastics manufacture and to cracker operators similarly forward integrated. 
For many olefin producers the ideal is to have an intra-firm or captive demand for all 
petrochemical products so as to avoid having to compete on the less certain merchant mark~t. 
All the Korean producers for example are now in this situation following a reversal of 
government policy on this question. Such measures reinforced by the global nature of many 
of the industry's participants have enabled producers in the Triad to defend their local 
markets against imports. Western Europe and Japan have been less successful in defending 
petrochemical export markets. 
Petrochemical Capacity and Demand 
The inability of the global petrochemical market to balance supply and demand has 
given rise to recurrent periods of overcapacity. For example the global restructuring in the 
industry which took place in the early 1980s, led to the closure of approximately 25 % of 
world capacity at that time (Vergara & Brown, 1988). 
It is in the course of such restructuring that an important geographical shift in 
petrochemical capacity has occurred and appears set to continue. Much of the new capacity 
built during the 1980s has been in the NICs, particularly Asia, the Middle East and South 
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America. Within a relatively short period of time a much more important shift in the 
geographic location of production is taking place in petrochemicals than is taking place in 
most other industrial sectors (Oman 1987). 
The period of restructuring in the early 1980s established a foundation for a much 
tighter demand supply relationship over the 1987 to 1989 period when profits soared before 
the effects of the current economic downturn began to be felt by the industry in the latter part 
of 1989. The period of improved profitability induced another round of capacity expansion. 
Wamsley expects 1995 capacity to exceed 1989 capacity by 47% in polyethylene and 94% 
in polypropylene (Interview, Wamsley). 
In summary the world petrochemical industry that South African producers face in the 
early 1990s is one of general overcapacity and determined exporters in the Gulf and South 
East Asia. 
Demand for petrochemicals is largely from the plastics and fibres industries, to a 
lesser extent from the fertiliser, paint, soap and detergents industries and several others. 
According to Wittcoff (1992) global ethylene demand growth is expected to average 3.45% 
p.a. between 1986 and 1995 growing slowest in Western Europe at 1.2% p.a. and fastest 
outside the Triad at 5.25 % p.a .. High capacity utilisation rates, generally over 80%, are 
needed in capital intensive petrochemicals plants for profitability. Current forecasts predict 
declining capacity utilisation to 1995. (Interview, Wamsley) SRI International expects capacity 
utilisation" rates to fall from 96% in 1988 to 83% in 1992 and to remain in the low 80% 
percentile up to 1997. (Elsberg 1990) A repetition, although possibly less dramatic than the 
early 1980s restructuring, appears inevitable, during which low capacity, high cost plants will 
be closed (Interview, Wamsley). Lower capacity utilisation rates have led to lower profits in 
the chemical industry in the early 1990s. 
The next link in the production chain involves the manufacture of polymer and plastic 
raw materials from petrochemicals and it is to this that the discussion turns next. 
Derivatives: Polymers and Plastics 
At this level the building block gases are further processed or polymerised into 'plastic 
raw materials' or 'polymers' (also referred to as 'resins' in some journals). 
Plastics are conventionally grouped into two categories, thermoplastics and thermosets. 
Thermoplastics can be repeatedly softened by heating and hardened by cooling. Thermosets 
are infusible and insoluble in their final shape. The latter tend to be the older plastics and 
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constitute a small share, less than 15 %, of the plastics market. Several are experiencing 
limited growth as more advanced thermoplastics are developed and capture their market 
share. Such trends are evident in the US market (see Table 1.9). These are among the reasons 
why this study focuses upon the commodity thermoplastics which commanded over 85 % of 
the US plastics market in 1989. In South Africa commodity plastic,S accounted for about 82 % 
of the plastics market in 1990 (see Table 6.lO). The polymer industry is the single largest 
industrial sector within the organic chemical industry representing about 32 % by volume in 
the US in 1990 (calculated from C&EN June 29, 1992:36-38).12 The comparable figure for 
South Africa is probably larger as South Africa does not produce as wide a range of organic 
chemicals as the US. 
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Plastics have a very wide range of applications and end uses. Packaging is a major end 
use, but ultimately the demand pattern in each country is shaped by the nature of the economy 
and to some extent the ability of the plastic marketing firms. In Table 1.10 plastic end uses 
for South Africa and the UK are compared. This reveals the South African market to have 
comparatively weaker engineering and construction demand but stronger agricultural demand. 
Thus far plastics have been considered in two categories, thermoplastics and 
thermosets. There is however a further group of plastics, commonly called engineering 
plastics which is not easily categorised into one category or the other. 
12. Regrettably similar data for South Africa are not available. 

















Sources: Plastics Federation of South Africa 
The British Plastics Federation 
En~ineerin~ Plastics. Speciality Plastics and Advanced Materials 
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An extract from a recent issue of Scientific American captures a new relationship 
between human endeavour and materials within which engineering plastics may be located. 
"A fundamental reversal in the relationship between human beings and materials is 
taking place. Its economic consequences are likely to be profound .. .it is only recently 
that advances in the theoretical understanding of the structure of physical and 
biological matter, in experimental technique and in processing technology have made 
it possible to start with a need and then develop a material to meet it, atom by atom." 
Freeman (1990) has argued that a change in techno-economic paradigm is leading to 
a major change in the type of materials used . in developed economies, particularly in 
machinery, vehicles and micro-electronic industries. This in turn, he argues, means a shift 
away from commodity type material products to speciality type materials of varying mixes 
originating from production facilities which are flexible or capable of varying the type of 
product they produce. This view is taken further by writers such as Kaounides (1991), who 
has claimed that a 'materials revolution' has occurred and that the changes new materials are 
bringing to industrial production are 'revolutionary'. This 'revolutionary' view has been 
challenged by, for example, Turner et al (1992) who, whilst conceding the strong economic 
impact of new materials, nevertheless point to the uneven spread and rates diffusion of these 
new materials across the economy. They conclude that: 
"The evidence indicates that the development and diffusion of materials technology, 
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viewed in terms of transforming the economy, have been too little and too uneven to 
be labelled revolutionary." (Turner et al, 1992: 16) 
It is not the intention here to enter this debate but simply to flag its existence in order 
to draw attention to the significance of the advent of new materials in modem industrial 
production. In this study engineering plastics and speciality plastics are of particular interest 
among the group of advanced materials. It is the impact such advanced plastic materials have 
and may be expected to have, on future industrial development in South Africa which is of 
concern here. 
Engineering plastics are not easily defined. They include both thermoplastics and 
thermosets. Generally they are characterised by their special properties such as: superior 
strength, impact resistance, heat and abrasion resistance and retention of mechanical and 
electrical properties. Increasingly they are designed with particular applications in mind. 
Some of the more common engineering plastics such as ABS (acrylonitrile-butadiene-
styrene) and SAN (styrene acrylonitrile) are used in the appliance and auto industries. They 
are considered by some to be low end" performance polymers, falling just short of engineering 
plastics status. In South Africa they tend to be regarded as engineering plastics and this will 
be accepted for simplicity's sake. Nevertheless their increasing usage means that they are in 
danger of losing their 'engineering' status and becoming commodity plastics. 
Other plastics more firmly within the 'engineering' group are; polyacetyls, polyamides 
(nylons), polyethylene oxides, polyethylene terephthalate (or PET, the material used to 
manufacture 2 litre Coke bottles), polybutylene terephthalate and polycarbonates (for compact 
discs and lenses). 
Beyond engineering plastics exists a still more exotic group of plastics commonly 
referred to as 'speciality plastics'. These include polysulphones, polyacylate, polyether 
sulfone, liquid crystal polymers, polyether ketones and many others. Most are designed with 
a specific purpose in mind. For example General Electric's Noryl plastics have special flame 
resistant abilities whilst their Lexan plastic allows a tenfold reduction in plastic bottle weight, 
an advantage for bottles being transported by air. Such engineering and speciality plastics are 
considered to be one of the categories of a new breed of materials termed 'advanced 
materials' (UNIDO, 1989). 
Discerning the trends and developments within the specialised area of engineering 
plastics is not easy. At one general level this sector represents the leading edge of a second 
round of chemically based substitutes for traditional materials. Despite the widespread interest 
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in their properties, they tend to be considerably more expensive than the commodity polymers 
and remain at this stage small volume plastics. They accounted for only about 3 % of world 
polymer volumes in 1988 (UNIDO, 1991 :341). Growth rates for engineering thermoplastics, 
although predicted to remain above average, are expected to fall from the 10%-12 % p.a. in 
the 1970s and 1980s, to 6%-7% p.a. in the 1990s (Baker, 19~2a:23). Growth rates for 
engineering thermosets are expected to be lower, for the period 1988 to 1995, at 4.9% p.a .. 
The global, production and consumption of engineering plastics is concentrated in the 
Triad countries which account for 91 % and 86% respectively. However some major firms 
in this sector are beginning to invest in NICs such as Taiwan, Korea, Brazil and Singapore. 
It is expected that "the North South production imbalance in these high technology materials 
will begin to correct itself ... towards the year 2000" (my emphasis) (UNIDO, 1990:281). 
The top five producers of engineering plastics, BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, Du Pont and 
General Electric account for 60 % of the global market. Among the next nine largest firms 
are five Japanese firms which is indicative of the direction the Japanese chemical industry is 
taking (Wittcoff, 1992). This move to higher value added materials is understandable in the 
light of Japan's heavy reliance upon imported feedstocks. It also has synergies with their 
electronics and auto industries. The concentration of engineering plastics production in the 
developed economies is attributable to a number of factors. These include the attempt to move 
away from cyclical commodity products to speciality type products and the greater R&D 
capacity necessary to stay ahead of the competition. 
Since engineering plastics do not involve the development of new chemicals but rather 
new applications for combinations of known chemicals and plastics they are, once patented, 
subject to price pressure from 'me too' imitations which are not prohibitively difficult to 
make. The state of chemical knowledge is such that once it is known that a particular product 
can be made it is not too long before others find a way of producing the same or a very 
similar product. Product life cycles are short and R&D costs are high, factors which tend to 
shift competitive advantage into areas such as quality and marketing. 
The growing costs of R&D and market support have contributed to limited returns on 
engineering plastics and this is one of the factors acting as a brake upon their expansion. 
Another factor limiting the volumes of such plastics is their properties, or rather their lack 
of specific properties at a competitive price. For example in the automobile industry, (the 
largest end-~se sector for engineering plastics) their penetration is limited by their lack of 
stiffness (or 'buckle') and shear strength. If this obstacle can be overcome at a competitive 
price, demand is likely to increase considerably (see Amendola, 1990). Overall the trend is 
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to cheaper materials and fewer of them (Baker, 1992a). 
Environmental considerations have also retarded applications in the auto industry. The 
increasing number of different types of plastics in automobiles presents problem~ for 
recycling. Ideally auto producers would like one type of plastic which could meet all of their 
needs. Developments directed at meeting these needs are taking place. For example the 
commercialisation of a new 'super polyethylene' has been announced by Exxon/Mitsui using 
their jointly developed metallocene single site catalysts. The target market in this case is fllm 
packaging and cable applications. However the important feature of this development, as a 
pointer towards future developments, is the ability to tailor-make the molecular structure of 
different grades of the same plastic, using the same equipment, and accordingly offer a 
polyethylene which can have the properties of all the commodity polyethylenes and some of 
the more newly developed ones (Wood, 1992). Among the commodity plastics, polypropylene 
(PP) has been the chief beneficiary of the trend towards fewer materials in auto manufacture. 
This development has implications for South Africa and SASOL in particular, given its 
relative polypropylene advantage. These are considered in a subsequent chapter. 
As a part of the process of mapping the global petrochemical and plastics industries 
we have in the foregoing section journeyed to one of the frontiers of this industry. The course 
of the discussion should now end this recent detour and return to other, more 'mainstream' 
areas. The next industry to be considered in the logical progression this discussion has been 
making down the production chain would be the plastic converting industry. However this 
discussion will be kept in abeyance for a later chapter. 
Instead the discussion returns to a discussion left incomplete earlier, that is mapping 
some of the more recent contours and world trends in the diverse global chemical industry, 
recommencing with the artificial fibre industry, a portion of the chemical industry which 
branches off into the textile and garment production chain. 
Artificial Fibres 
Artificial fibres constitute the chemical industry's attempt to replace natural materials 
such as cotton, wool and silk with artificial materials. As in many such substitutions of 
traditional commodities, price was and is a telling factor. Polyester (a synthetic) prices for 
example dropped steadily from the 1950s to equal cotton prices in the early 1970s. From that 
time until the late 1980s polyester prices were generally below cotton prices. Acrylic (another 
synthetic) prices dropped below wool prices in the early 1960s and since the early 1970s have 
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remained substantially cheaper than wool. By 1980 something of a stand-off in market share 
had Occurred between natural and synthetic fibres with natural fibres holding the edge with 
53 % -54 % of the world fibre market. A market split of this order prevailed through the 1980s 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991:30). 
Artificial fibres comprise two groups: cellulosics and synthetics. Cellulosics (acetates 
and rayons) are made from dissolving wood pulp. Synthetic fibres such as polyamide 
(nylons), polyesters (Dacron, Trevira), acrylics (Orion, Acrilan), Spandex (Lycra), 
polyethylenes and polypropylene are petrochemical based. Within synthetic fibres, only the 
latter two have experienced output growth through the 1980s, whilst the others have declined 
or remained static. 
Cellulosic fibres have steadily lost market share to synthetics over the last two decades 
to the point where synthetics commanded 82% of the artificial fibre market by 1988 (see 
Table 1.11). In the US synthetics accounted for 94.5% of the market by 1989 (Reisch, 1990a) 



























Source: adapted from Akzo quoted in UNIDO, 1989:239. 
Overall synthetic fibres have followed a similar growth trajectory to petrochemicals 
and plastics, with very rapid growth from 1950 to 1970, then slowing to 1980 and slowing 
further still to 1990. 
Within the synthetic fibres group some significant changes in market share have 
occurred during the 1980s. Nylon and acrylics are losing share to polyester and polypropylene 
(see Table 1.12). The rapid growth in polypropylene (PP) has been mirrored in South Africa 
and has important implications for this study, a point which will be pursued later. 
Not only have market shares been changing through the 1980s but a rapid 
restructuring of the sector also occurred over this period. Average growth rates in the output 
of synthetic fibres over the period 1970 to 1987 in the Triad averaged less than 5 % p.a. with 
Japan achieving only 1.7% p.a .. The highest rates of annual average growth rates over this 
period have been in China (30%), and other Asian nations (22%) (SRI International, 
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1989:541.1000 S). 
Table 1.12 Western European Market Shares for Synthetic Fibres 
































In the Triad overcapacity problems which emerged in the 1970s were compounded by 
the recession in the early 1980s. Simultaneously an expansion of capacity in the NICs was 
made possible as these countries gained access to technology which became available through 
the expiry of patents. The result of these changes was a dramatic and wide ranging 
restructuring of the global artificial fibres industry. In the US, cellulosic capacity plummeted 
by 54% over the 1979-89 period and Western Europe was particularly hard hit. 
In response most governments in the Triad counties intervened in efforts to ameliorate 
the crisis. In Japan MITI introduced a law prohibiting capacity expansions which was lifted 
only in 1988. State involvement was most pronounced in Western Europe where the EC 
competition authorities approved a 'crisis cartel' agreement for the period 1978 to 1982 
wherein producers agreed to reduce capacity by 15%. A second agreement ran for the period 
1982 to 1985 in which a further reduction of 18 % took place. Not all countries were equally 
affected. The UK was worst affected; 51 % of capacity was closed and 76% of jobs lost. 
Outside of the Triad other governments also stepped in to assist their industries in countries 
such as Taiwan and Korea. In contrast the US left capacity closure largely to individual firms. 
As a result of this restructuring, global capacity utilization improved from about 80% 
to 85 %, with the exception of Taiwan and Korea which maintained an average of about 90%. 
However the major outcome of the crisis was a massive shift of synthetic fibre production 
capacity to developing countries. In 1970 the Triad accounted for 79% of world capacity and 
developing countries a mere 7%. By 1991 the Triad share had shrunk 'to 43% and the 
developing countries had risen to about 32.5% (Walker, 1992:34). 
The results of this global restructuring are evident in countries like Taiwan. It more 
than doubled its production between 1980 and 1990 to become the second largest producer 
of synthetic fibres after the US. Japan is the third largest. Excluding the Triad, the rest of the 
world's share of production of artificial fibres has increased from 24% in 1970 to 53% in 
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1990 (Wittcoff, 1992:9-18). In polyester fibres this shift has been even more dramatic; the 
non-Triad share grew from 13% in 1970 to 64% in 1990. 
These shifts in global production have tended to change the markets targeted by West 
European and Japanese producers. Increasingly they are turning away from commodity type 
textile products and towards higher value added applications in the industrial and technical 
markets where the opportunities for product differentiation are greater. 
In concluding this discussion of artificial fibres, it is interesting to note the rapid 
progress Taiwan has made in expanding primary petrochemical capacity for previously 
imported synthetic fibres (ethylene glycol, terephthalic acid, acrylonitrile). This import 
substitution was initially in response to demand from the textile industry. It represents an 
expansion of production capacity in the upstream in response to downstream demand from 
the textile sector. This is an example of an economic strategy moving from labour intensive 
production (based on imported intermediate inputs) upstream to capital intensive sectors of 
production. Initially import substitution in nature, this upstream petrochemical development 
subsequently grew to compete internationally in its own right. This example is of interest as 
restructuring appears unavoidable for South Africa's .highly protected synthetic fibre 
industry. 13 
Conclusions 
Organic chemicals and petrochemicals are the largest sectors of the diverse 
international chemical industry. A large proportion of the output of these sectors feeds the 
plastic industry and within the plastic industry the' commodity plastics account for over 80% 
of the plastics market. 
The recession in the early 1980s contributed to a marked surge in the redistribution 
of global capacity away from the Triad countries to developing countries particularly in 
synthetic fibres. 
The switch from coal to oil in the 1950s had major implications for the industry. This 
is worth noting because it is a change which still lies ahead of the South Africat) industry. 
The ceaseless search for the lowest cost point in the terrain of feedstock options is a crucial 
factor in determining international competitiveness. From a cost of production point of view, 
(low) feedstock costs and ~urity of supply are prerequisites. Despite uneven progress the 
13. Nominal import duties for staple synthetic yam are 173% (Levy 1992, Table 3.8). 
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international trend is towards lighter, often gas based, feedstocks. 
Critical too in the cost structure and development of the industry has been the 
existence of by-products and co-products from one process which have met needs for other 
processes. This means that evaluating petrochemical projects is a necessarily complex 
undertaking requiring considerable skills and resources. Weakly resourced governments 
attempting to maintain sovereignty over their industrial strategies for petrochemicals may find 
this difficult in the face of large and powerful firms. 
Other themes are apparent in the historical development of the chemical industry: the 
manner in which chemical demand has been driven by other industries closer to the customer. 
In a later chapter the industry's attempts to break through this barrier and get closer to 
customers so as to meet their specific needs more easily is discussed. The history of the 
industry reveals the deep historical roots that exist for cartels and other anti-competitive 
behaviour. This theme too will recur in later chapters. 
Finally and perhaps for the South African industry the most significant historical factor 
to emerge in the historical overview, is the role wars and strategic considerations have played 
in shaping the nature of the industry and boosting its development. Such considerations have 
loud echoes in the historical trajectory of the South African petrochemical industry in the 
1970s and 1980s as will emerge in subsequent chapters. 
The organic chemical industry can be characterised as a maturing industry with 
ongoing incremental change rather than major breakthroughs. This together with fluctuations 
in feedstock prices and the commodity nature of the business make it prone to cyclical swings 
in product prices. The end of the phase of rapid development and healthy profits in 
petrochemicals in the 1970s brought forth defensive strategies. The major ones include c0-
product integration, forward and backward integration and attempts to widen the range of 
feedstocks that can be used in key processes. In addition increased attention has been paid to 
the development of more specialised engineering plastics and other advanced materials. 
The international developments sketched in this chapter provide touchstones against 
which developments in the South African industry can be contrasted in succeeding chapters. 
Such developments can also begin to inform analysts of the steps which may be necessary to 
direct the local industry down a path towards international competitiveness. 
In the artificial fibre industry the key trend is away from cellulosics to synthetics. 
Within synthetics there is a particular world trend that is of importance to the South African 
commodity polymer industry and that is the recent rapid growth in polypropylene textile 
applications. This point is taken up in subsequent chapters. 
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There has been a tendency for the developed economies to move further down the 
value added chain in petrochemicals to engineering plastics and advanced materials as their 
traditional dominance has been threatened and/or eroded by producers in developing 
countries. Japan in particular has followed this route partly because of its higher cost structure 
arising from its dependence upon imported feedstocks. South Africa could in future become 




THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT 
GLOBAL TRENDS IN THE INIERNA TIONAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
This chapter examines some of the major trends apparent in the recent history of the 
international chemical industry. These trends and forces are not dealt with in great detail. 
Rather the objective is to sketch the international environment in which the South African 
chemical industry has operated and to assess the impact on South Africa in relevant instances. 
South Africa's capabilities and performance are contrasted with international developments 
in an attempt to locate the domestic industry among its international competitors. 
For convenience this chapter is divided into four parts. Part One considers economies 
of scale and technological change. International developments in economies of scale, 
technology and R&D effort are reviewed and contrasted with local developments in which 
South African firms are found wanting but nevertheless with some potential to move closer 
to international competitiveness. 
Part Two analyses concentration, oligopolies, cartels and the role of government in 
dealing with such issues. The anti-competitive behaviour of the leading multinational chemical 
corporations is scrutinised. 
Part Three is concerned with globalisation in the chemical industry which is periodised 
in thr~ phases. The discussion attempts to illustrate how the process of globalisation is 
inextricably interwoven with technological developments and the corporate strategies of 
leading chemical multinationals. 
Trade is an important indicator of an industry's global impact and international 
competitiveness. In this regard South Africa's chemical industry is shown to have lagged 
behind world trends. The international growth and motives of merger and acquisition are 
explored. Although South Africa was for the most part excluded from this process it is argued 
that MNCs nevertheless had access to a share of the local market. 
Other objectives important in determining international corporate strategies during the 
1980s are also identified. Evidence is offered to suggest that South African firms are being 
ineluctably drawn to follow the direction of the world's leading firms towards speciality 
chemicals and 'core business'. Some expected changes in the composition of local chemical 
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conglomerates and the industry in general are identified. 
'Environment' has become the watchword in the chemical and plastics industries and 
Part Four is devoted to this and related issues. 
The analysis is drawn together in a conclusion at the end of each of the four parts in 
this chapter. 
PART ONE 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
In this section the focus is on selected aspects of international technological change 
which are deemed to be more important for the South African industry. The local industry's 
performance in keeping pace with these technological trends and in R&D are assessed. 
Economies of scale are of central concern in the design of capital intensive 
manufacturing processes. The rapid expansion of economies of scale in the chemical industry 
was most prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s. One reason for this was that it was possible to 
increase the scale of petrochemical plants using a six-tenths 'rule', that is, a plant size could 
be doubled for only 60% of the initial cost, provided that the configuration was restricted to 
one 'train' (production line) (Spitz, 1988:424). Where more than one 'train' was built the cost 
of equipment duplication changed the economics and the 'rule' was no longer applicable. 
Lieberman (1987) carried out a study of plant sizes for the manufacture of 22 chemical 
products over a 25 year period. He found that the size of chemical plants had increased five 
fold over the period from the late 1950s through to the early 1980s (see Figure 4). He found 
no correlation between market concentration and the rate of increase in plant scale, but some 
evidence that oil companies tended to build larger plants. (A large number entered the 
industry during the 1960s.) He found no relationship between plant size and company R&D 
intensity which may appear unusual. Part of the answer to this apparent anomaly lies in the 
rapid expansion in the number of engineering contractors active in the industry at this time. 
Scientific Design and other such contracting companies developed the conceptual designs for 
large plants and were able to market them around the world. 
The relationship between production costs and economies of scale in the petrochemical 
industry is, fortunately for small economies like South Africa, not an infinitely linear one. 
It begins to level off at about 400 000 tpa to 500 000 tpa in large volume chemicals like 
ethylene (see Figure 5). In 1990 South Africa's apparent consumption of ethylene was 
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264 000 tpa (see Table 5.4) warranting an approximately half world scale plant. 
Many plants in South Africa were built in pursuit of import substitution policies 
directed at the limited local market and are consequently sub world scale. The capital cost 
per unit of output in such plants is larger than its international competitors. As a result much 
of the industry is not viable without tariff protection (CSIR, 1990:23). Plants built to serve 
the local market suffer in another respect too. Since economies of scale are large there is a 
considerable time interval between one plant and another. In the interim the technology and 
economies of scale of international competitors can advance rapidly. Because of the time 
interval between plants the initial plant has to operate for a considerable period utilising, 
older, smaller and less competitive technology, further contributing to the need for protection. 
Customers downstream from sub world scale plants also have to shoulder the burden of 
higher unit costs, which in turn are passed on to consumers by the more differentiated 
downstream sectors. This is the situation in the local commodity polymers industry. 
Note: 1 
Source: 
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Figure 5 Economies of Scale in Ethylene C@Clcin& 
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Source: OECD, 1985:14S 
Has the advent of post-Fordism and flexible specialisation in manufacturing perhaps 
limited the scale of operations in the chemical process industries? Is this not a source of some 
hope for the South African chemical industry? In recent years there have been efforts to move 
away from-large plants to smaller scale plants. 
Not unexpectedly, these efforts have focused upon two of the most important 
chemicals, ethylene and ammonia. Small scale ethylene manufacturing processes have as far 
as could be determined not been commercialised as yet. However ICI has developed a small 
scale 'Leading Concept Ammonia' (LCA) process. Such plants have moved from world scale 
of about 1 000 to 1 500 tons per day down to 500 tons pet day (Short, 1989). But only three 
small-scale ammonia plants have been built over the past 10 years and licensing of this 
technology has not progressed as quickly as ICI had hoped. There is also uncertainty about 
how cost effective the LCA process is (Chynoweth, 1991). Whilst there may be some hope 
in the future for South African producers wishing to serve only the local market, it would 
appear ~at in petrochemicals at least, there is no escape for South Africa from the constraints 
of low cost producers utilizing large, world scale plants. 
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This has important implications for the South African chemical industry which will 
be taken up in later chapters. One obvious implication is that if the industry is to move away 
from the high cost intermediate inputs of a heavily protected chemical industry, any new 
plants must be of world scale and capable of competing internationally. The latter is a 
prerequisite since world scale output in many chemicals will 1x: larger than the domestic 
market and will require a significant proportion of output to be exported. However should a 
more integrated regional economy emerge in Southern Africa the production base might be 
more geographically diversified and the target market expanded. 
In the international chemical industry economies of scale do not apply only to 
production but also to other aspects of the business, marketing and the extent of market 
penetration, research and development capability, and finance. Such considerations for 
example underlie much of the merger and acquisition activity (dealt with below) during the 
1980s. 
Accompanying the expansion in 'world scale' plant size has been ongoing catalyst 
development. Such ongoing developments have prevented the industry from becoming static 
and 'mature' in the full sense. Consider polypropylene (PP) for example. Over the past 25 
years there have been three distinct generations of catalyst, each an improvement upon its 
predecessor. These improvements were: a reduction in the number of process steps, 
improvements to the stereo regularity (isotacticity) and reductions in the residues of catalyst 
in the end-product polymer (see Figure 6 and Table 2.1). 
Such developments in catalysis are the result of large R&D expenditures and 
considerable experience. How has South Africa fared in this regard? Significant advances in 
catalyst development are known to have been made in the production of synfuels (liquid fuels 
from coal). This capacity was demonstrated when the decision was made to use SASOL 
technology at Mossgas, a natural gas based fuel refinery. A suitable catalyst had to be rapidly 
developed. This was successfully accomplished with the assistance of the CSIR. SASOL also 
has several co-operation agreements in the area of catalytic research with local and overseas 
universities and research institutes (SASOL Annual Report, 1991:20). 
R&D capacity and ability is an important determinant of success in the global chemical 
industry and it is thus necessary t~ locate the leading South African firms in this context. The 
most successful chemical firms in the world have been those capable of making both radical 
new innovations and incremental process innovations and applications (Freeman 1990). 
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Figure 6. The Performance of polypropylene Catalyst 
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Table 2.1 catalyst Improvements (Polypropylene) 
Catalyst Weight of Isotacticity 
type catalyst to of PP 
produce lkg produced 
of PP 
Generation 109 75-85\ 
1 
2 19 85-90\ 
3 0.1-0.15q 96-98\ 
4 0.07-0.06g 98\ + 
Source: Scott 1991:32. 
In so far as the search for radical innovations is concerned three areas have been 
identified by major chemical firms as most likely to yield such developments. These are, 
biotechnology, advanced materials and surface treatments. They are characterised by an 
increasing multidisciplinary interdependence. 
Biotechnology involves transfers from the science branches of chemistry, physics, 
biology and material sciences. Biotechnology's main impact is expected to be in 
pharmaceuticals, crop protection and agriculture, particularly seeds and foods. AECI has a 
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large exposure to agricultural markets (mainly fertilizers) and animal feeds and has embarked 
upon ·some biotechnology research as a result of which a lysine (for animal feeds) plant is 
planned. But AECI is not involved in pharmaceuticals or crop protection and will not benefit 
from synergies in these quarters. Sentrachem holds 90% of the South African agrochemicals 
market (via a joint venture, Sanachem) and also has significant business in food additives. It 
has just one bioherbicide on the market and expects its bio-control work to break even in two 
to three years (Chataway, 1992:17). 
Advanced materials have interdisciplinary interconnections with chemistry and material 
sciences. The main markets for advanced materials are the automobile, aerospace, and 
electronics industries, all weak sectors in South African manufacturing. South Africa is not 
producing even the more standard engineering plastics, let alone more sophisticated speciality 
plastics which could be classified as advanced materials. Internationally, of all R&D in 
advanced materials, 42 % was spent on polymers, 23 % on information technology materials 
and 22% on ceramics (ICEF, 1992:36). 
Surface treatments draw upon three science branches, chemistry, physics and materials 
science. Surface treatments find application in the same industries as advanced materials: 
automobile manufacture, aerospace, electronics and mechanical engineering, which are weak 
sectors in the local economy. However South Africa may have potential in at least one area, 
water treatment chemicals. The developing water shortage in South Africa, together with 
rapid urbanisation and the industrial pollution of waterways is likely to provide a growing 
market for water treatment chemicals. In this area South Africa may be able to develop 
technologies marketable in other third world countries. 
By the 1970s the chemical industry had reached a certain degree of technological 
maturity and this contributed to firms concentrating upon maximising existing investments. 
This reduced the emphasis on radical innovations and place increased emphasis upon 
incremental innovations. It is in this kind of competence that South African firms have better 
prospects. 
What importance have South African companies given to R&D in comparison with 
their international counterparts? R&D spending is one measure of this. It is partly a function 
of scale in that R&D is usually measured as a proportion of sales or profits. The larger the 
sales the larger the sum represented by a similar proportion. A first crude measure then is 
the scale of South African companies when compared with their international rivals. A second 
is the proportion of sales spent on R&D. Recent figures for these two measures are reflected 
in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Sales and R&D Spending 
Top 20 International Chemical Companies, Ranked 
by 1990 Sales Compared with 3 South African 
Chemical companies. 
+-----------------+--------------------------+ : Company : Sales R&D as , R&D as , : 
I : US $m of sales of sales I 
I I 1990 1990 . 1988 I 
~ ---+--------------------------+ I;~;;---------- I 31 195 4.4 4.1 I 
I Hoechst I 30 017 6.0 5.9 
lBayer 27 863 6.6 6.1 
IICI 24 909 5.3 4.8 
IDu Pont1,2 22 268 6.2 6.1 
IDow Chemical 19 773 5.8 4.6 
I Rhone-Polenc 15 483 6.7 5.9 
!Ciba Geigy 15 459 10.4 10.2 
IElf Aquitaine1,2 14 323 3.8 4.3 
I Enichem 13 363 2.6 4.1 
IShell 12 703 2.7 2.2 I 
I Atochem 10 297 2.6 2.1 
:Akzo 10 229 5.2 4.9 
: Sandoz 9 703 9.8 9.0 
: Exxon 9 591 1.7 1.7 
I Monsanto 8 995 6.8 6.9 
IMitsubishi Kasei 8 949 4.1 na 
I Solvay 8 265 5.0 4.3 
:Sumitomo Chem 7 865 6.1 4.8 
IMerck & Co 7 672 11.1 11.3 
+-----------------+--------------------------+ 
I Average I 15 446 5.6 5.2 I 
+-----------------+--------------------------+ I I 
I I 
ISASOL 1 945 na na I 
IAECI 1 944 0.8 na : 
ISentrachem3 I 816 na na I 
+-----------------+--------------------------+ 
Notes: 1 Chemicals only 
2 Excluding intersegment transfers 
3 Annualized 
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Sources: Chemical Insight's Company Analysis, (1991) 
15th Edition. 
Chemical Insight's Company Analysis (1989), 
13th Edition. 
Company Annual Reports 
The three largest South African companies, SASOL, AECI, and Sentrachem (through 
its 50% share in Safripol) dominate the upstream end of petrochemicals and plastics 
production and also dominate the local chemical industry. These South African companies are 
shown to be much smaller than the top 20 international firms in Table 2.2. Where then in the 
international ranking order do the South African firms lie? 
SASOL is the only one of these companies to have been admitted to the Fortune 500 
listing where it was ranked 450 in 1992. In the Fortune 500 'Chemicals' sector it is ranked 
39 out of 45 companies by sales but first by profits as a percent of sales and second by profits 
as percent of assets (Fortune, 27-7-92). If more properly located among the petroleum 
companies it would rank 52nd by sales among 54 companies. AECI is the only South African 
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company ranked in Chemical Insight's Company Analysis (1990) of top global companies 
where it is ranked 88 out of 99 companies by sales. SASOL if ranked there would be 74. 
Sentrachem is too small to be considered in either of these rankings. 
Measured by sales size then the South African companies are well outside the top 30 
world chemical companies which are the firms which really dictate the pace of developments 
in the industry. Only SASOL and AECI are by size within 'striking distance' of being a 
'world player'. Since 1990 SASOL has outstripped AECI in sales. By way of further 
pers~tive on the size of the local firms it is instructive to note that should world majors 
such as BASF or Neste enter the South African market as competitors, the combined size of 
SASOL, AECI and Sentrachem together would be less than one of these world majors. 
Size alone makes possible a certain level of R&D spending but does not determine the 
level of that spending or guarantee the R&D performance. Pharmaceutical companies such 
as Merck & Co. and Ciba-Geigy traditionally spend larger shares of sales on R&D, of the 
order of 10%. This is evident in Table 2.2. Unfortumltely the three largest South African 
companies generally do not publish information on R&D spending and some declined to 
provide it when interviewed. It is estimated that R&D spending as a proportion of sales in 
1990 by the three large chemical companies was 1 %.1 This accords with the figure attributed 
to AECI in Table 2.2. This level of spending is similar to the Taiwanese chemical industry 
which also spends 1 % of its turnover on R&D (Chemistry & Industry, 6-5-91:302). In Robert 
Wade's view this low level of spending will contribute to Taiwan's decline relative to South 
Korea (The Economist, 14-7-90: 19). This is significant because the indications are that South 
Africa's chemical exports targeted at the Far East are growing in importance where they will 
have to compete with South Korean producers who have recently made large expansions to 
their petrochemical capacity. By implication then the level of spending by local chemical 
firms has been too low. 
Evidence suggests that R&D spending by the three South African companies is likely 
to increase (possibly doubling) over the 1990-95 period.2 Certainly the post 1988 attempts 
by SASOL to change its product mix from essentially synfuels to hig~er value added 
petrochemicals will raise its need for in-house R&D given their unique feedstock situation. 
Sentrachem for its part and AECI to some extent, are also changing their product mix 
towards more speciality type chemicals which tend to require higher R&D expenditures. 
1. Personal conununication from Professor David Kaplan, University of Cape Town, based upon interviews 
conducted by him in the chemical industry. 
2. See Baker's, 1992a, review of Enigma Marketing Research 's report, The Chemicals Industry in South Africa. 
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AECI records in its 1992 audited results R 84 million expended on R&D, this on 'novel 
technologies as the foundation for new business'. 1 This is 1.56% of turnover and supports 
the view that R&D expenditure is being given increasing importance by AECI. 
The trend in R&D spending as a share of sales in the US and Western Europe is 
upwards, particularly since the early 1980s. In the US this trend was downwards from 3.5 % 
of sales in 1958 to a low of about 2.7% in 1979. But from that point onwards it rose 
significantly to almost 4.5 % by 1985 (Bozdogan, 1989, Figure 13). In 1990 the US average 
was also 4.5% and in 1991 it rose again to 4.9%.2 Western European figures show a similar 
trend with R&D as a percentage of turnover increasing from about 3.7 % in 1980 to about 
5.2% in 1989 (CEFIC, 1991:61). 
The increasing costs of R&D and efforts to limit these cost increases have contributed 
to an increase in the number of technology alliances among multinational corporations based 
in the Triad countries during the 1980s. (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1991, and United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, 1992). Such alliances usually put their combined 
resources together in a particular field of study or inquiry. These R&D joint ventures tend 
to take place among and between the leading corporations in a particular field. Such 
international alliances involving South African companies appear to be very limited although 
they have occurred domestically between local firms. 
Another measure of R&D intensity is the number of persons engaged in that activity. 
SASOL's R&D arm employs 350 people including 120 graduates and 50 with technical 
diplomas (SASOL News, Vol 2, No. 3:6). This is about 4 graduates per 1 000 employees and 
is a long way behind the largest companies like BASF which employ about 2500 graduates 
alone or 18.6 graduates per 1 000 employees. It is even further behind the US industrial 
chemicals industry where the number of R&D scientists and engineers per 1 000 employees 
increased from 38 in 1977 to 53 in 1987 (National Science Foundation quoted in C&EN, 20-
8-90:45). Nevertheless some consider SASOL to have sufficient 'critical mass' and a 
technology base, unlike AECI and Sentrachem, to be a world player. (Interview, 
Redlinghuys). SASOL's employment of personnel in R&D is on a par with Taiwan's chemical 
industry in which there are 3 persons per 1 000 employees engaged in R&D (Chemistry & 
Industry, 6-5-91 :302). 
SASOL is primarily an energy company with chemical appendages, somewhat like 
1. This is assumed to be AECI's lysine project. 
2. Averages of 18 companies with sales over 1 bn US $, in C&EN, 29-6-92:44. 
64 
BASF and in this sense the basic technology issues are similar. SASOL has had to develop 
technology to extract from its unique feedstock high value materials such as aldehydes, 
ketones and acetates (Interview, Philpot). As SASOL put it: 
"The unique chemical composition of our intermediate and product streams and the 
lack of readily available technology for the recovery and upgrading of these 
compounds, has given rise to substantial in-house technology development" (SASOL 
Annual Report, 1990:8). 
This is presumably a reference to SASOL's latest synfuels development, a commercial-scale 
fixed fluidi~-bed reactor which began successful operation at SASOL 1 in May 1989. This 
is the latest in a series of developments which began with the original Kellogg design 
imported in 1955 which did not work well and had to be modified. The fixed bed reactors 
used at SASOL 1 were upgraded to circulating fluidised bed reactors for SASOL 2 and 3. 
The latest version reverts back to the fixed bed idea, but with the recent improvements at 
about half the capital cost, and increased thermal efficiency and several other savings (Oil & 
Gas Journal, 20-1-92:53). Such technology is expected to be commercially viable at an oil 
price of about $23 barrel or where suitable gas streams are available at very low cost from 
other production processes. There is growing interest in SASOL's technology which SASOL 
claims to have exported, although the licensee/s have not been made public. However with 
growing interest in natural gas for fuel purposes and the experience gained in the use of 
SASOL's technology for converting gas to fuel at Mossgas, there may be additional potential 
in areas such as Iran and Russia where gas is very cheap. 
Although SASOL is regarded as one of the world leaders in synfuel technology it is 
competing against very large companies in this area. For example Shell have developed a 
process which has been used in the recently built Malaysian synfuels complex which is based 
on natural gas like Mossgas. 
SASOL has also developed a process configuration for the production of alpha olefms 
at "significantly lower (costs) than available international technologies" (SASOL Annual 
Report, 1992:22). These efforts may be indicative of a higher level of R&D spending by 
SASOL which regards such information as confidential. 
A concern may be that SASOL has pursued a 'wrong' technology in coal chemistry 
whilst the other major world players focused on oil and gas based technologies. While this 
may be true in that thus far it appears that these coal based technologies have only a very 
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limited market, it may also be argued that having to pioneer such coal chemistry and synfuels 
has generated a 'problem-solving' capacity which could in future be refocused upon other 
challenges which may be more marketable and rewarding. This ability to create knowledge 
through problem solving and a culture of learning is central to Best's (1990) concept of an 
'entrepreneurial' firm. Nevertheless some perspective may be gained from the fact that Exxon 
has spent more than SASOL has on synfuels R&D. 
The same argument may be true of AECl's extensive study into coal based methanol 
(commonly known as methyl alcohol or wood spirit) as fuel. Such experience may stand these 
companies in good stead in the light of the emerging shift in R&D from the traditional 
product and process focus to a more problem solving approach. 
In so far as the production of commodity petrochemicals and plastics is concerned, the 
practice by the large South African firms has been to license the necessary technology. For 
example AECI uses ICI technology for its polyethylene plants. Safripol uses Hoechst 
technology, and in the most recent polymer plant built, SASOL has licensed BASF technology 
for its PP plant. 
Licensing technology for commodity petrochemicaJs is likely to be the pattern for the 
future. As one manager put it, "What is the point of reinventing the wheel?". This approach 
appears to be the one SASOL is pursuing. For example SASOL was negotiating with BP for 
the supply of technology for its planned acrylonitrile plant in October 1992. But since world 
scale plants will probably have to export, it is crucial that such licensing agreements allow 
for exports, otherwise South African economic development will continue to be constrained 
by uncompetitive, sub world scale plants aimed at the small domestic market. Consequently 
it is with some misgiving that one learns that the size of the plant SASOL is negotiating with 
BP "will depend on whether or not a proportion of the total capacity will be exported to 
Europe." (ECN, 5-10-92:33). Such issues have important implications for state technology 
licensing policy. 
Even if foreign technology is licensed there. is still considerable scope for local 
incremental innovation, assuming that local firms have a reasonably competitive technology 
and economies of scale to begin with. The first challenge facing new chemical plants is to get 
them operating at their maximum capacities as quickly as possible. Thereafter the next 
challenges are continuous improvements i~ plant operation efficiencies, 'capacity stretching' 
or 'debottlenecking' in the trade jargon. That is incremental modifications to plant capacity 
allowing higher levels of output. In the same vein more cost effective procedures and 
processes can be developed around the licensed 'core' technology in a plant. 
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The skills and capacities of the South African companies in this regard are difficult 
to determine. Largely as producers for the protected local market, and having had ready 
access to the government's ear with regard to tariff protection one might expect a less than 
average ability. Nevertheless SASOL has claimed that it has been able to operate its synfuels 
plants at 120% of their original design capacity. (Minutes of a meeting between Government 
and the Petrochemicals Industry Development Study Group, 10-4-89:4). Its newer 
polypropylene plant was also able to move output beyond nameplate capacity fairly quickly. 
Within 18 months of coming on-stream, output was 10% above nameplate capacity. SASOL 
is also under more pressure to debottleneck and cut costs as it is squeezed between its $23 
per barrel (static but wlnerable) tariff protection floor price and its coal mining and operating 
costs, influenced by domestic inflation. 
Improved process control is a continuing source of competitive advantage. 'Precision 
chemistry by the tanker load' is the boast of the international chemical industry. This boast 
has become possible with the increasing use of computerised data recording and control 
systems in complex multi-product plants requiring careful temperature and pressure 
regulation. Indeed some plants would not be possible without such systems. In this regard 
Safripol claim to have developed the computer software for their KO batch process which was 
subsequently used as a basis by Hoechst internationally (Interview, Blackburn). 
In summary it appears that domestic firms have been too small to generate advanced 
technologies for the production of commodity chemicals and have not had comparative 
advantage in this area, nor may they be expected to achieve it. They will in all probability 
remain licensors of such technologies. However within this paradigm they evince some ability 
to carry out development work which could help them to international competitiveness, other 
things being equal. A suitable technology policy will be necessary to help and encourage these 
firms to develop their core competencies. 
Additional potential appears to lie in their ability to exploit 'soft' technologies, that 
is the reorganisation of work so as to take full advantage of not just labour's physical 
resources but also labour's intellectual resources. Greater emphasis on training and skill 
formation will be central to such a process. 
Japanese firms solicit suggestions from their workforces, many of which are 
implemented. This results in a process of shop floor incremental change, which although less 
glamorous perhaps than 'big science' may nevertheless be just as comPetitive. In this 
approach, which the Japanese call Kaizen, the focus is upon factory organisation, inventory 
sizes, batch sizes, work organisation, inter-firm linkages and qUality. Now whilst it is true 
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that in the chemical process industries, the initial choice of technology is very important in 
determining the reaction time or cycle time of a particular process, nevertheless Kaizen-type 
improvements can be made. For example Safripol (a producer of HOPE and PP) has recently 
introduced a version of the Crosby systemS in an effort to empower workers and to improve 
problem solving abilities. Similarly attempts have been made to reduce racial discrimination, 
no easy thing in a town like Sasolburg, whose white local government is controlled by the 
(right wing and explicitly racist) Conservative Party. Training has increased including an in-
house literacy course. The results include a dramatic increase in quality standards, improved 
interdepartmental communication, and a 25% reduction in the distribution budget (Interview, 
Blackburn). The coincidence in timing of the introduction of these innovations and the 
commencement of the firm's export drive are striking. They appear to have seen and grasped 
a window of opportunity. 
The examples considered here suggest that the, perhaps uneven, assortment of skills 
and competencies available in the South African petrochemical industry do offer a basis upon 
which competitive producers could be established even if they lack large R&D budgets. 
It is, however, worth bearing in mind that the improvements at Safripol have been 
achieved without any political pact or accommodation between capital and labour on the shop 
floor. The real fruits of Kaizen-type technology change are only likely to emerge in any real 
way, if some kind of accommodation is achieved. This will require overcoming some deep 
rooted hostilities. Management have grudgingly recognised trade unions but retain a deep 
hostility towards them. Black workers' experience of the shop floor has been politicised by 
apartheid laws. Both management and labour apply racist stereotypes to each other. These 
difficult challenges may be eased following political settlement at the national level. Even so, 
it seems likely a great deal of mistrust will remain which will require innovative solutions. 
Conclusions 
Much of South Africa's chemical industry developed within the framework of import 
substitution industrialisation policies. Such policies allowed the development of plants with 
limited economies of scale and they have, partly for this reason, been high cost producers. 
The cost of import substitution industrialisation policies has been a declining share of world 
chemical trade. 
s. A. v~riatio~ ~f a total quality management process, founded on one devised by American quality management 
specialist, Philip Crosby. 
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Plants in the chemical process industries typically have large economies of scale. 
Attempts to develop technologies permitting small scale plants have not progressed very far 
and consequently this route does not appear to offer a solution for South Africa. Consequently 
local plants will need to expand their capacity towards 'world scale' if they seek to be 
internationally competitive producers. 
Economies of scale are important not only at the plant level but also at the firm level 
in the international chemical industry. To be able to compete internationally South African 
fmns will need to consider how they might expand in size. There are potential benefits for 
South Africa in adopting industrial policy which promotes the development a local company 
to become a 'world player' (SASOL is the only obvious candidate). Such a development 
would lead to a high level of concentration in the local market and the disadvantages of this 
would need to be carefully weighed up. It would seem that a necessary condition for such a 
development would be a state sufficiently powerful to influence the domestic market and 
capable of preventing unreasonable pricing and private control. 
In so far as South Africa's contribution to the three new fields of chemical R&D: 
biotechnology, advanced materials and surface treatments, is concerned, the potential appears 
stronger in biotechnology and surface treatments than in advanced materials. Further 
development will be a function of the local firms willingness to increase their level of R&D 
spending to bring them in line with leading companies and then to continue to follow the 
world trend towards proportionately higher levels of R&D spending. 
Shortcomings in R&D however need not necessarily preclude the internationally 
competitive operation of large chemical plants which is something of a feat in itself. This 
endeavour will be aided by increased training and education and an improved dispensation 
for shop floor politics and relationships. 
South Africa is unlikely to become a leading player in the world of 'big science' 
technology development although no doubt suffficient expertise exists to make a small 
contribution. Consequently South Africa is likely to remain an importer and licensor of 
chemical process technologies. The implication for public policy of this view is that policy 
will need to be directed towards securing technology on the best possible terms and with the 
least restrictions, for local producers. 
Indications are that the pursuit of greater efficiency and productivity may, in the short 
term, be better directed towards the adoption of 'soft' technologies along with efforts 
designed to improve shop floor relations between workers and management. 
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PART TWO 
CONCENTRATION. OLIGOPOLIES AND CARTELS 
Introduction 
The chemical process industries are capital intensive and are characterised by large 
economies of scale. Concentration and the extent of competition in this industry is an 
important and difficult area for policy makers especially in comparatively small developing 
economies. 
This section attempts to provide a global overview of the extent of concentration in 
the international chemical industry and in certain of its sub sectors and at different levels 
within those sub sectors. The picture which emerges is one of high levels of concentration 
in certain sectors. Some of the imperatives which drive firms into this kind of behaviour were 
encountered in Part One in the form of economies of scale in areas such as plant and 
equipment or R&D. 
Part Two is intended to provide a backdrop and a yardstick against which to evaluate, 
in a later chapter, levels of concentration in SA. There are difficult policy choices to be made 
by a post apartheid South Africa in the tension between protecting local industry with the 
objective of developing locally based 'world players' and the price consumers might have to 
pay to achieve this. 
Also identified in this section are some of the international barriers to entry which 
have developed in certain chemical sectors; petrochemicals, agrochemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals. These provide something of an historical map which may help producers 
identify entry points, or 'no-entry' points, in international markets. 
Concentration. Oli~opolies and Cartels 
The ranks of the leading multinational chemical corporations have been dominated by 
a relatively small number of firms whose presence in and relative position among, other 
leading firms has been fairly stable over a number of years. The largest six firms in 1990 
were also the largest six firms in 1988 and in the same rank order (see Table 2.3). The same 
six firms were also the largest six firms in 1979, only in a slightly different order. 
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Table 2.3 Largest 20 Chemical Companies by 1990 and 1988 Sales 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ ITop companies 1990 Rank 1990 1988 Top Companies 1988: 
I Sales Sales , 
, I 
I $ bn $ bn , 
, -------------------+ +-------------------------------------------IBASF 1 31.2 24.7 BASF 
I Hoechst 2 30.0 23.1 Hoechst 
I Bayer 3 27.9 22.8 Bayer 
IICI 4 24.9 21.1 ICI 
'Du Pont 5 22.3 19.6 Du Pont 
:DOW Chemical 6 19.8 16.7 Dow Chemical 
ICiba-Geigy 7 15.5 11.8 s~ell . 
'Rhone-Polenc 8 15.5 11.7 C~ba-Ge~gy 
IElf Aquitane 9 14.4 10.8 Montedison 
I Enichem * 10 13.4 10.8 Rhone Polenc 
'Shell 11 12.7 8.8 Exxon I Atochem * 12 10.3 8.3 Union Carbide 
I Akzo 13 10.2 8.3 Monsanto 
'Sandoz 14 9.7 8.3 Akzo 
: Exxon 15 9.6 8.1 Elf Aquitaine 
!Monsanto 16 9.0 7.2 Sumitomo 
IMitsubishi Kasei * 17 9.0 6.8 Solvay 
I Solvay 18 8.2 6.8 Sandoz 
ISumitomo 19 7.9 6.4 Eastman Kodak 
IMerck & Co 20 7.7 5.9 Merck & Co , 
I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
ITop 10 sales as , of. top 76 42.1 64.8 ! 
ITop 5 sales as , of top 76 20.6 32.4 , 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Note: * = new entrants to the top 20 after 1988. 
Sources: Chemical Insight's Company Analysis, 15th Edition, 1991 
Chemical Insight's Company Analysis, 13th Edition, 1989 
Between 1988 and 1990 there were only three new entrants to the ranks of the top 20 
firms. EniChem moved up from 24th in 1988 to 10th in 1990. Atochem moved up from 32nd 
in 1988 to 12th in 1990 and Mitsubishi Kasei up from 28th in 1988 to 17th in 1990. 
These examples are indicative of the stability which has prevailed among the world's 
leading chemical MNCs. Leading firms have retained dominant positions within the industry 
for extended periods of time although their relative position may change somewhat from year 
to year. Significant changes to the group of leading firms are far more likely to result from 
mergers and acquisitions than from penetration of these ranks by new entrants. Some consider 
that only about 30 firms make up the 'world players' (Interview, Marriot). 
Considerable market power lies in the largest ten firms which have commanded about 
half of the combined sales of the 76 leading world chemical firms in 1988 and 1990 (Table 
2.3). 
The majority of the 1990 top 20 firms are based in Western Europe, only four are 
based in the USA, Du Pont, Dow Chemical, Monsanto and Merck & Co. Japan is 
represented by only 2 firms in the top twenty whilst no firms based outside the Triad are 
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represented. 
In general the pattern that emerges is much as would be expected: the leading fmns 
are located in the Triad and particularly in Western Europe. This is of course a highly 
aggregated view. If a less aggregated view is adopted and the various industries which make 
up the chemical industry are separated out, a different picture begins to emerge and much 
higher levels of concentration tend to occur. Let us consider some examples. 
The petrochemical industry includes among its leading participants oil conglomerates 
which have a history in the legendary 'Seven Sisters'. In addition to this petrochemicals is 
regarded as a strategic sector in many countries. Such factors induce an expectation that, 
notwithstanding the size of this giant industry, there will be high levels of concentration. 
Indeed this was the case in 1987, when just 25 producers of primary petrochemicals 
accounted for more than half of the world capacity whilst the ten largest owned over 30% 
(see Table 2.4). Of these ten largest firms, six were US based corporations and five of these 
were oil rather than chemical corporations. 
Table 2.4 Largest 25 Primary Petrochemical Producers (1987) 
Rank 
Parent Company/Ownership 
1 USSR government 
2 Exxon Corp. (US) 
3 Dow Chemical (US) 
4 Shell Chemical Co. (US) 
5 Amoco Inc. (US) 
6 Atlantic Richfield Co. (US) 
7 Mexican government (Pemex) 
8 Union Carbide Corp. (US) 
9 People's Republic of China, government 
10 BP Oil Corp (UK) 
11 Du Pont (US) 
12 Royal Dutch/Shell (UK/Netherlands) 
13 German Democratic Republic, government 
14 Enichem (Italy) a/ 
15 Rumanian government 
16 Taiwan government (Chinese Petroleum Corp.) 
17 VEBA AG (Germany) 
18 Alberta Gas Chemical (Canada) 
19 Czechoslovakian government 
20 Brazilian government (Petroquisa) 
21 Mobil Oil Corp. (US) 
22 Texaco Inc. (US) 
23 Petrofinia (Belgium) 
24 Bulgarian government 
25 Yugoslavian government 
Total 
Notes: a/ 51\ Italian government owned. 
Capacity Percent of 
million Global 













2.55 1. 62 
2.51 1. 60 
2.47 1.57 
2.37 1. 51 
2.23 1.42 
2.21 1.41 
2.13 1. 36 





1. 74 -L..!l 
83.28 53.00 
Source: adapted from SRI International, 1987:300.10000. 
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The largest group, about half (13) among the 25 largest, were state owned. The 
second largest group are the giant privately owned oil companies which accounted for -nine 
places in the list. Significantly firms from three NICs feature within the leading 25 producers, 
Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil. This is unlike almost all similar tables of the largest 20 
producers in the other sectors of the chemical industry and is in~icative of the importance 
these NICs have attached to the petrochemical industry. It is against such formidable 
competitors as this that South African producers must compete. 
This level of concentration is also evident in other sectors. The agrochemicals industry 
for example is even more highly concentrated. The 14 largest firms account for about 75% 
of world sales. Between four and six firms account for about 35 % to 60% of the sales in each 
of the three sectors which make up agrochemicals (see Table 2.5). 






























Source: Data from UNIDO (1989). 
The highly profitable pharmaceutical industry appears to be an anomaly in so far as 
the level of concentration is concerned. It appears to be one of the most competitive and least 
concentrated of all the chemical sectors, by comparable measures, despite the continuing 
tendency to concentration. The sales of the top 15 companies accounted for only 20% of 
world sales, far less than in petrochemicals and agrochemicals. 1 No one company holds more 
than a few percent in anyone country's market (see Table 2.6). 





Table 2.6 Pharmaceutical Companies: Top Ten Market Share 
in Selected Countries 
-----------------------~;~-----------~;~i~---------;~;l;---------;ndia Indonesia 
America 
Company % Company % Company % company % Company % 
;;;~~------~:~-;~~~;-----~:;-~;~;;i~i--;:;-~l;~~------;~;-~;1~;-----;~9 
Smithkline 3.6 Abbott 2.6 CibaGeigy 3.0 Pfizer 5.0 CibaGeigy 3.4 
Pfizer 3.2 Merck 2.3 Hoechst 2.9 Hoechst 3.0 Bristol 3.3 
Ayerst 2.5 Schering 2.2 Glaxo 2.7 Wellcome 2.5 Rhone-P 3.3 
Upjohn 2.5 Lepetit 2.1 SigmaTau 2.3 Boots 2.3 Interbat 3.1 
Veyth 2.4 Veyth 2.1 Bayer 2.3 Sandoz 2.0 Warner-L 3.1 
Ortho 2.3 Sandoz 2.0 Erbamont 2.0 ParkDavis 1.9 Merck 3.1 I 
Roche 2.2 Boer.lng 1.9 Fidia 1.8 Veyth 1.8 Medifarma 2.8 
Squibb 2.2 Hoeschst 1.8 Beechams 1.8 Smithkline 1.7 Hoechst 2.8 








+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: ICEF, 1989:22 ~ 
However this belies the truth. If one proceeds to a lower level of aggregation, such 
as the treatments for particular illnesses, the picture that emerges is one of very high levels 
of concentration. For example two anti-ulcer drugs, Tagamet, made by SmithKline and 
Zantag made by Glaxo, together held over 80% of the world market in 1984. Squibb's 
Capoten drug held 73% of the ACE inhibitor market in 1985. Pfizer's Feldene together with 
Syntex's Naprosyn accounted for over 45% of the world arthritic alleviators and there are 
many more such examples (lCEF 1989:25). 
This phenomenon is not restricted to the speciality type chemicals found in the 
pharmaceutical sector, it is also true, although t~ a somewhat lesser extent, in commodity 
plastic markets as well. At the level of the individual commodity plastics the levels of 
concentration in certain developed economies are as high as some therapeutic markets in the 
pharmaceutical industry (see Table 2.7). In South Africa all of the products which feature in 
Table 2.7 are monopolies except for PP where there are two producers. The levels of 
concentration in some speciality type polymers can be even higher in large markets. For 
example in the US polyamides film market Du Pont alone holds 90% of the market (Chemical 
Week, 30-1-91: 16). 
Such levels of concentration have undoubtedly increased the temptation for producers 
to enter into cartels and price fixing agreements or other forms of anti-competitive behaviour. 
In several instances the temptation has proved too great to resist. This was especially so in 
the EC during the phase of restructuring in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The officially 
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sanctioned 'crisis cartel' in synthetic fibres at that time may have lulled certain producers into 
a falSe sense of security in regard to their business practices in other products. 
Table 2.7 
Notes: 
caBacit~ Concentration for Eth~lene and Eol~ers, 
Certain OECO count[~es, 1980, Fi[st Fou[ Firms ('l 
Countr~ Eth~lene PVC LOPE HOPE PP PS ABS 
USA 40 52 44 50 57 54 90 
Japan 39 41 48 68 S4 54 47 
Germany 60 54 88 64 84 100 100 
UK 95 87 71 - 100 56 74 
France 82 62 83 67 43 Sl 100 
Italy 93 56 74 60 100 54 7* 
South Africa 100 100 100 100 100 na na a\ 
* An apparent anomaly in the source table. 
a\ First two firms. 
Sources: adapted from Oman 1989:120 and own research. 
The polypropylene (PP) industry was the subject of a cartel in the EC between 1977 
and 1983 (Chemical Week, 18-3-92:4). In 1992 the European Court found seven major PP 
producers guilty of operating this cartel. These firms had increased capacity to meet a surge 
in demand in the late 1970s but with the slump in the early 1980s found that they had about 
double the capacity required. They then entered into pacts to control prices and output to 
cover losses over a five year period (Food and Drink Daily, 28-10-91). The MNCs implicated 
were among the top 20 chemical corporations. They were: ICI, Shell, Huls, Hoechst, Solvay, 
Chemie Linz and Montedipe (Packaging Week, 18-3-92:4). A further three, Atochem, Rhone-
Poulenc and Petrofinia participated in the cartel between 1980 and 1982 (Energy Alert, 25-10-
91). 
Low density polyethylene (LDPE) producers also operated a cartel at about the same 
time, in this case from 1978 to 1984. A number of firms were convicted and had fines 
imposed. These included, again, leading MNCs which regularly feature among the top twenty 
largest firms; Atochem, BASF, Bayer, DSM, EniChem, Hoechst, ICI, Montedison, Orkem 
and Solvay (ECN, 9-1-89:4). Together they held 80% of the LDPE market (C&EN, 2-1-
89:7). Such practices were not restricted to the phase of restructuring in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
More recent cartels in Europe have also led to convictions. In 1992 the European 
Court, found 14 PVC producers had colluded on target prices and quotas as well as acting 
in concert over price increases (Packaging Week, 22-4-92: 11). The fines imposed were later 
overturned by a higher court on a technical point. However their conviction for operating a 
cartel remained (packaging Week, 4-3-92: 1). The companies implicated included the by now 
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familiar names: Atochem, BASF, EniChem, Hoeschst, Huls, ICI, Montedison, Shell, Norsk 
Hydro, Solvay and Wacker. Together they held 90% of the European PVC market (C&EN, 
2-1-89:7). 
Thus three of the five major commodity plastics in Europe have been the subject of 
cartels in the past decade leading to the conviction of many of tile world's leading chemical 
firms. Cartels however have not been the preserve of the plastics industry. 
Soda ash, used mainly in the glass and detergent industries, has also been the subject 
of a European cartel. Solvay of Belgium, the world's largest producer of soda ash, together 
with ICI and Chemische Fabrik Kalk (German) a BASF subsidiary, were found guilty of 
operating a cartel in 1991 and fined (performance Chemicals, March, 1991:6). Even without 
this cartel the level of concentration is unusually high. Solvay commanded 70% of the 
continental market and ICI 92 % of the British and Irish markets (Strategic Intelligence 
Systems - Europe, January 1991:5). 
It is not only in the EC that cartel type practices. operate, in the US too, leading firms 
have been charged with similar practices. For example Allied Signal has sued Du Pont 
alleging that Du Pont uses anti-competitive practices in the polyamide films market by 
enforcing exclusive supply contracts which are preventing it gaining market share (Chemical 
Week, 30-1-91: 16). Similar kinds of 'co-operative' agreements feature in South East Asian 
markets. For example 20 South Korean and Japanese producers of polystyrene and ABS 
plastics were reported set to meet on 8-11-91 to discuss ways to prevent 'excessive 
competition' in the South East Asian market (Korea Economic Daily, 31-10-91). 
What this evidence appears to suggest, not surprisingly, is that the international 
chemical industry has scant regard for ethical and legal niceties. The propensity for anti-
competitive practices appears, to a degree, inherent in the nature of commodity chemical 
production and the relatively inelastic demand associated with it. Is it too much to assert that 
something of the culture of 'cooperation' which prevailed in the 1930s has continued to 
pervade commodity chemical markets? If it is not, then the return to 'core businesses' in the 
early 1990s may strengthen the temptation to indulge in this type of business practice. 
The Japanese state has permitted cartels in the chemical industry at various periods, 
notably in the early 1980s. However the significant difference in the Japanese case has been 
that they have been allowed m where a long term restructuring plan for the sector has been 
agreed by management and where they have had limited duration (Best, 1990). 
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Conclusions 
A review of the world's leading chemical companies shows there to have been stability 
in the ranks of the top 10 as well as very considerable market power. New entrants are more 
likely to gain a foothold among these giants by way of merger and acquisition than 
competition. Significantly it is only in the petrochemical industry that firms based in NICs 
have a presence among the ranks of the leading producers, underlining the importance they 
have attached to this industry. During the 1980s many of the leading companies were party 
to cartels and other forms of anti-competitive behaviour. High levels of concentration have 
emerged in both commodity and speciality markets across a range of chemical sectors. 
The implications of the international chemical idustry's structure are significant for 
South Africa. If unprotected, comparatively small local firms may be more vulnerable to 
take-over or predatory pricing. Equally local markets, when opened to more international 
competition, will be more vulnerable to the strategies .of the major chemical MNCs. At the 
level of domestic competition policy, the large economies of scale and cyclical nature of 
commodity plastic markets, suggest that competition p<,>licy should be synchronised with 
industrial policy, if the two are not to work at cross purposes. The determinants of successful 
competition policy in such circumstances are difficult to pin down as they include a number 
of interrelated factors which at times have to be traded off against each other. Clearly the 
proximity of product prices to 'world prices' is important. From the point of view of 
domestic industrial development the performance of an industry in respect of innovation and 
upgrading is also important. 
It may be that in the preceding examples it was the application of competition policy 
which was inappropriate for the survival of the industry, resulting in convictions against 
leading firms rather than their inherent predisposition to anti-competitive behaviour. The 
creative approach to these issues followed by South Korea and Taiwan, (see Chapter Three) 
suggests that it is not the existence of a monopoly or oligopoly per se which is critical but 
rather the price levels pertaining in such markets - provided that the prices delivered are 
appropriate to the industrial strategy being followed, an argument may exist for a more 





Global dominance has been a concern among chemical producers since the early days 
of Solvay's introduction of his chlor-alkali process. Some companies still have names which 
speak to their vision of themselves, such as Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). Part Three 
examines the chemical industry's leading role in the process of the globalisation of industrial 
activity. The ascendency of MNCs in the global political economy and their impact upon 
international institutions is also considered. 
The globalisation of industrial activity has proceeded through three broad, overlapping 
phases (OECD, 1992). The first, sometimes referred to as the 'Golden Age of Trade', was 
characterised by a rapid expansion in trade and measured by the levels of exports and degrees 
of import penetration. In this discussion South Africa's lagging performance is identified. 
Internationally the relationship between industrial policy and trade policy is changing. The 
nature of these changes is briefly discussed in the light of the South African state's tendency 
over the last decade to regard trade policy as the only instrument of industrial policy. 
The second phase, evident through the 1950s to the 1970s, shifted the emphasis to 
foreign direct investment as the multinational corporations played out their struggles for 
dominance and measured their success by the proportion of sales generated abroad. However 
as regional trade blocs such as Nafta and the European Union emerge, the imperatives for 
foreign direct investment change too. 
These developments give rise to two considerations; firstly the need for an assessment 
of the vulnerability of South African firms to foreign take-over and secondly the importance 
for South African firms, wishing to become global players, to adopt a global perspective and 
strategy. 
The third and current phase which emerged in the 1980s is less easily periodised. It 
is more complex and is characterised by complex webs of interlinkage between parts of a firm 
spread across the globe made possible by new technological developments. A host of 
mechanisms carry these linkages; new information systems, joint ventures, licensing 
agreements, etc. It is a period when global corporations, unlike Caesar, literally do 'bestride 
the world like a huge colossus'. Their corporate strategies and frames of reference are global. 
Finally the intermeshing of various corporate strategies with these changing approaches to 
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global dominance are explored. 
Trade was the first of the three phases in the internationalisation of industry and it as 
well to begin this review of trends in globalisation by identifying its global trends and to 
compare South Africa's performance with the observed trends. Trade is still the most 
widespread form of internationalisation although not necessarily the key diagnostic. 
In the chemical industry an increasing share of world sales has been traded, from just 
over 10% in 1963 to 30% in 1990 (see Figure 7.). US and Japanese exports as a proportion 
of sales hav~ hovered at about 10% and 9% respectively through the 1980s. The largest 
growth in exports as a share of sales has been in Western Europe. But most West European 
trade is intra West European trade. For example a total of 47.1 % of chemical turnover was 
exported from EC countries in 1990 but only 13.3% of chemical turnover was exported 
outside the EC (CEFIC, 1991:29). Accordingly, in order to eliminate the West European 
influence on the statistics, West European exports:sales ratios have been reflected separately, 
as has the remainder of the world (that is World exports less West European exports). The 
result shows that the world export:sales ratio still grew, although not as fast as when West 
European exports were included. 
Figure 7 
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Comparing South Africa's historical performance with world trends shows that it has 
lagged behind the world trends in two ways, the proportion of chemical sales exported and 
the increase in proportion exported over time. Considering the export:sales ratio, South 
Africa in 1972 exported 7% whilst the world figure was 16%. Comparing the same ratio in 
1990, South Africa had increased its exports from 7% to 8.8% of sales whereas the world 
figure had almost doubled from 16% to 30%.1 A comparison of world trade, excluding 
Western Europe, also shows that South Africa has been under performing. In short South 
Africa's chemical trade performance suggests that it is increasingly being left behind in the 
world globalisation stakes. This is understandable in view of the lSI policies followed by the 
apartheid state and economic sanctions against South Africa. 
Global chemical trade has been dominated by Western European producers and 
thereafter US and Japanese producers. Japan, reliant upon imported naphtha for 95 % of its 
feedstock, is no longer a significant factor in world petrochemical trade (Wittcoff, 1992). The 
West European and US domination of world trade is being challenged by NICs and resource 
rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Canada, Malaysia, Nigeria, Trinidad, 
Indonesia, and Mexico. Less well endowed NICs such as.Taiwan, Korea, and Brazil are also 
increasing their share of world trade. Western Europe's net trade in polymers is expected to 
move to a deficit for the first time in 1993 (Wamsley, 1992). The relative decline of the 
Japanese and West European petrochemical industries, experienced first in the loss of export 
markets is a trend predicted to continue (Wittcoff, 1992 and Wamsley, 1992). This is 
understandable as major growth markets are in China, India and other Asian economies which 
are far removed from the traditional centres of chemical production in Western Europe and 
the USA. The fortunate implication for South Africa is that it is closer to these markets than 
the EC or US producers. 
Trade in large volume low added value commodity chemicals can incur high 
transportation and handling costs. In addition there may be tariff barriers. Consequently long 
distance, deep sea exports from South Africa will require producers to have a cost advantage, 
either capital or feedstock, if they wish to export profitably into distant markets where an 
established commercial chemical industry operates such as Western Europe. Since these are 
largely absent today in the South African chemical industry it is unlikely to become a major 
exporter in the short term at least. However internationally competitive production is a viable 
objective if suitable industrial policies are followed. An attractive alternative is to attempt to 
1. South African figures calculated from IDC, 1992. 
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beneficiate locally the commodity chemicals which are available from sources that emerged 
as a result of apartheid policies, to higher value added products further down the value added 
chain. In this way better use could be made of existing resources if prices were such as to 
allow growth in the local market whilst at the same time creating employment in the more 
labour intensive downstream sectors. Such higher value added products could, if cheaply 
produced, benefit mass housing, electrification and basic wage goods. Under such conditions 
a considerably larger share of production might be exported since transport costs comprise 
a smaller proportion of the value of the product. This would make a contribution to the 
chemical industry's trade imbalance and the balance of payments. 
The interlinkages between trade policy and industrial policy are of growing importance 
(OECD, 1992). Indeed the boundaries between them are becoming increasingly blurred. The 
symbiotic relationship between industrial policy and trade policy has long been recognised in 
countries such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan where trade policy has been harnessed to good 
effect in promoting industrial policy objectives. The analysis of the South African commodity 
plastics jiliere pinpoints the crucial impact of trade policy on the pricing structure in the local 
jiliere. Trade policy can also create an anti-export bias and this too is identifiable in the 
commodity plastics jiliere. 
From Foreil:n Direct Investment to Complex Interlinkal:es 
A second phase identified in the internationalisation of industry was characterised by 
foreign direct investment. This has long been a feature of the international chemical industry. 
During the 1980s mergers and acquisitions have been the chief form of globalisation in the 
international chemical industry. In this regard the chemical industry has been "one of the top 
three manufacturing industries out of fifty" (Elsberg, 1989:28). 
The US was the country with the single largest chemical market during the 1980s and 
for that reason lured foreign investment. Foreign ownership of the US chemical industry 
increased from about 7%-8% in 1980 to nearly 30% of US assets by 1989 (Ibid). Much of 
this arose from West European chemical companies in search of large stable markets in order 
to increase profits. The imperative behind this largely West European investment drive into 
the USA during the 1980s has for the most part been financial rather than strategic or 
technological although these too have played a role. As County Natwest consultant John 
Knight put it "To be in the top five globally in a product, you've got to be in the US" 
(Layman, 1990:8). Investment in the US chemical sector in the latter part of the 1980's has 
far outstripped the industry average as is apparent from Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 North American Acquisition Market Trends -
Foreign Buyer Activity 
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The .largest of the acquisitions and mergers have taken place in the US, several of 
them running into billions of dollars. Among the largest reported have been British 
Petroleum's (UK) acquisition of 45% of Sohio (US) for $7.6bn and the Bristol-Myers (US) 
acquisition of Squibb (US) for $11.5bn. Beecham (UK) merged with SmithKline (US) at a 
cost of $16bn. 
Another explanation for the concentration of foreign investment in the US in the 1980s 
relates to the comparative ease with which investors could find suitable take-over targets and 
get access to them. By contrast Western Europe lacked publicly held small and medium sized 
companies "because before the (small and medium sized) companies reach that size, the 
bigger firms buy them up" (Layman, 1990:8). The large chemical companies on the other 
hand are less vulnerable to take-over because stockholdings are structured in such a way that 
hostile take-overs are virtually impossible. Henkel, for example, one of the bigger German 
firms remains a family owned business. The 15% of its shares which are traded are non 
voting shares. 
The leading South African chemical companies are similarly structured. Relatively 
small proportions of their shares are actively traded. Some, like AECI, if they had not been 
protected by their large corporate shareholders (lCI and Anglo American) might have been 
the target of take-over bids. The South African companies have also been protected from 
international take-overs by sanctions but this may be expected to change if the lifting of 
sanctions is followed by the emergence of a politically stable country. Again there are 
implications for industrial policy arising from both of these features of the local chemical 
industry which are addressed in later chapters. 
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Notwithstanding the less accessible chemical industry in Western Europe, the flow of 
capital from Western Europe to the US began to reverse as the 1980s wore on. The looming 
political unity in the EC scheduled for 1992 and the extent of that market, uninterrupted by 
political barriers, made it important for many firms to have a presence in the EC. 
Merger and acquisition activity in the US and Western Europe has been both inter-
continental and intra-continental. Much of this activity in Western Europe in the early and 
mid 1980s was part of the efforts to rationalise and reduce capacity and to consolidate what 
were frequently fragmented businesses. Within the US firms concentrated on improving 
domestic market share and growth to pay back loans used for take-over purchases or used to 
defend themselves from hostile take-overs. During the 1980s a large number of leveraged buy 
outs took place in the US commodity chemicals industry which helped it to survive those 
difficult years. However, ruthless take-overs, asset stripping and severe management 
practices, with their consequent loss of jobs, were used to gen~rate cash to meet loan 
repayments. The downturn at the end of the decade tipped the balance against some of these 
precariously financed companies and they were forced into bankruptcy. 
This flurry of merger and acquisition activity in the 1980s was also bound up in firms' 
attempts to achieve 'critical mass' as a part of the continuing drive into specialities and other 
high added value materials. 
Japanese companies were an apparent anomaly in this spate of merger and acquisition 
activity (lespite benefits accruing from the increasing value of the Yen through the 1980s. 
However they have been surprisingly small actors in international merger and acquisition 
activity although Japanese chemical firms are currently investing abroad at twice the rate of 
US companies and three times the rate of German companies. Similarly within Japanese 
domestic markets there was relatively little take-over activity. Shigekuni Kawamura, president 
of Dainippon Ink & Chemicals gives the following explanation for this: 
"Because of the strong bond of unity between the company and its employees, it is 
very difficult for Japanese companies to carry out a take-over in their home market. 
It would almost be like trafficking in the lives of human beings. This is one reason 
why the companies in the Japanese market are more concerned about market share 
than profit." (quoted in Layman, 1990: 10)2 
2. This is in ~tark contrast to the attitude many South African managers came to adopt towards black labour 
under apartheId. . 
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Japanese companies have also been comparatively rare investors in the West although 
this is changing and in the past two years they have begun to embark upon Western-style 
merger and acquisition activity (ECN, 27-5-91:16). They are also beginning to take part in 
more joint ventures. They appear to be moving slowly into downstream areas to support their 
auto and electronics industries in smaller joint ventures such as plastics processing. 
Newer entrants to the chemical industry have been driven by their needs. South Korea 
and Taiwan for example have sought foreign technology through acquisitions and joint 
ventures. Taiwan being a small country with a small population and growing environmental 
problems, looked to foreign ventures beyond its shores. Saudi Arabia sought market share 
through joint ventures (dealt with more fully below). 
The burst of merger and acquisition activity during the 1980s is slowing in the early 
1990s as the 'shake out' launched by the deep recession in 1980-81 draws to a close. In the 
early 1990s another recession is giving rise to calls for yet another round of rationalisations. 
It is often difficult to distinguish motives in corporate behaviour. Expansionary moves 
by one can lead to similar, but defensive moves by another. No doubt one of the imperatives 
to globalisation in the 1980s has been the need to improve or maintain competitive position 
and represents less of a proactive choice than a survival strategy. 
Joint ventures are an alternative to mergers and acquisitions. They have long been a 
feature of the international chemical industry. Factors such as, lower and shared cost, longer 
time scales in developing new materials and the speed of technological change make alliances 
attractive, particularly in pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and agrochemicals. Joint ventures 
can sometimes also provide easier access to markets than exports. Such seems to be the case 
in South Africa. The largest chemical company, AECI, is 48% owned by ICI and 
Sentrachem, the second largest, has joint ventures with Hoechst. 
Internationally direct investment is increasingly being targeted at rapidly growing 
markets. Most notable has been Asia, or countries with low feedstock costs such as in the 
Gulf states, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Shell and BP Chemicals for example are 
making huge investments in East and South East Asia. 
South Africa's pariah status in the 1970s and 1980s has excluded it, to a large extent, 
from foreign direct investment in the globalisation of the chemical industry. However it has 
nevertheless managed to participate, by way of licensing foreign technology for a fee or 
royalties. This has had a limiting effect on exports, particularly among plastic converters, a 
point we shall return to. Put differently, MNCs have had access to a share of South Africa's 
closed market through joint ventures and licensing. As a result of changing political 
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developments in South Africa some observers expect large MNCs to renew their interest in 
South Africa (Interview, Redlinghuys, and Baker, 1992b). The exact form this might take is 
difficult to predict. However if the wishes of leading South African chemical employers are 
met increasing numbers of joint ventures and alliances with MNCs are likely.3 A key 
consideration for a post-apartheid state in such instances will be gaining the right to export 
production made with internationally licensed technologies. 
Both AECI and Sentrachem have had long relationships with large foreign 
multinationals (AECI with ICI and Sentrachem with Hoechst). They continue to see such 
relationships as important because it gives them access to leading edge technology that they 
would otherwise not be able to generate themselves. The restraints upon exports that have in 
many cases accompanied such technology licensing agreements have not been regraded as 
unduly burdensome partly because these firms do not see themselves as emerging international 
players but rather as important players in the Southern African region exporting 
internationally where possible (ibid). 
Chan&e in Global Institutions 
The current phase in the internationalisation of industry is changing the notion of 
comparative advantage among nations (Ibid). Traditionally comparative advantage has been 
measured by political nation states taking into account factors such as natural resources, 
labour and capital inputs. Increasingly this has shifted to the role accorded to particular 
countries within the global strategies pursued by large multinational companies. In some 
senses it is a case of the rest of industry catching 'up with industries like chemicals and food 
products which have internationalised earlier than other industries. 
The ascendency of multinational corporations (MNCs) is impacting at other levels as 
well. Major international institutions and the global rules of economic exchange are being 
rearranged at their bidding, albeit indirectly. For example the United NatioAs Centre for 
Transnational Corporations was closed in 1992 apparently due to its critical stance towards 
the activities of multinational corporations. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations has emphasised the need for tariff barriers to be 
lowered and for the protection of intellectual property. Such developments will stand to 
improve the position for the MNCs relative to nation states and domestic firms. Indeed these 
3. M. Sander, MD of AECI, and JH van der Walt, MD of Sentrachem, in addresses to the CWIU, February 
20, 1991. Johannesburg. 
85 
twin thrusts, access to markets and the protection of intellectual property have were the chief 
concerns of the organised multinational chemical corporations in the GAIT deliberations. 
The chemical industry has been ahead of the general trend towards globalisation. For 
example in petrochemicals, competitiveness is dependent upon such factors as feedstock 
availability and price, scale of production, capital costs and location in relation to markets. 
Hence for the chemical industry globalisation has been under way throughout the last thirty 
years although the division of world markets among major companies was common from the 
1920s. 
From a chemical industry corporate strategy point of view recent globalisation has 
been driven by diverse motivations: attempts to achieve critical mass, maximising returns on 
R&D, increasing competition, attempts to achieve market dominance, survival, attempts to 
minimise the effects of economic downturns in one region and environmental considerations. 
For newer entrants such as South Korean and Taiwanese fmns, technology needs and limited 
domestic markets have motivated merger and acquisition activity. 
COJllOrate Strategies 
The changing structure of the international chemical industry is powerfully influenced 
by the strategic objectives of the large corporations which dominate the industry. Accordingly 
no review of recent trends in the industry would be complete without some attempt to 
understand the corporate strategies which were at work. The following two sub-sections 
attempt to unpack some of these strategies. 
a) Commodities, Specialities and 'Core Businesses' 
The economic downturn in the early 1980s exposed structural problems in the 
chemical industry. In addition to immediate cost cutting measures firms began to change 
strategies. The bulk or commodity chemicals were particularly hard hit by the downturn of 
the early 1980s. In efforts to move away from the 'boom and bust' cycles of 'commodity' 
chemicals, firms diversified towards the production of 'speciality' chemicals such as paints, 
adhesives, 'performance' chemicals, pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, engineering plastics and 
advanced materials. 
Commodity production usually involves mass production of a standard product such 
as commodity plastics. The objective for commodity producers is 'low cost leadership', that 
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is to have the lowest unit costs of production. This requires economies of scale, skill, 
experience, research and development (R&D) and investment. Speciality business on the other 
hand is aimed at 'price leadership' - that is the suppliers' ability to determine the selling 
price. 
The relationship between commodity chemicals and, specialty chemicals is 
schematically represented in Figure 8. In this figure commodity chemicals are represented by 
'Basic Chemicals' and 'Bulk Intermediates', whilst those sectors to the extreme right of the 
figure are specialties. 
Success in specialities requires a firm to have the flexibility to respond rapidly to 
customer needs. It requires investment in staff, for marketing, research and development and 
after sales service. Speciality production is characterised by flexibility, smaller batch 
processing and multi-purpose use of equipment, conducive factors for those who seek 
competitive advantage in terms similar to Best's (1990) 'new competition'. Such 'designer 
chemical systems' require a firm with an orientation quite different from a firm rooted in the 
production of commodities. 
Speciality' business requires higher R&D and marketing costs, market segmentation, 
globalisation, (to maximise returns on R&D and increase exposure to problems) managerial 
decentralisation and financial strength for the period necessary to win customer loyalty 
according to Diagle.4 Diagle's (undated) study of US speciality firms found that size alone 
had little correlation with profitability whereas market dominance had a direct relationship 
with profitability. 
For those international companies which succeeded in making the transition from 
commodities to specialities in the 1980s, profits were better than average. A good example 
of a firm which succeeded in changing its corporate culture away from commodity production 
to speciality production is Monsanto. It is also one of the more anti-union companies in the 
US. Some firms have struggled to adjust their corporate culture sufficiently to meet these new 
requirements. Others found that their location in the industry made it difficult to move. For 
example the three major German firms, Bayer, BASF and Hoechst each appear to have taken 
a different route. BASF earned 30% of 1988 revenue from specialities, Bayer 60% and 
Hoechst half of its income (JCEF, 199Oc). An explanation offered for this is that their 
opportunities for manoeuvre were restricted by the parts of I G Farben that they were given 
when it was broken up at the end of WW2. BASF is the more commodity orientated because 
4. Diagle is Vice President of Kline & Co. which claims to be the largest business consulting firm for chemical 
and allied industries. 
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it was given the Ludwigshafen site which was the site where more of the commodity 
prodUction was located (Interview, Glassen and Todtner). 
However the stampede into specialities and the accompanying competition reduced 
many specialities to pseudo-commodities. This in turn required continuous innovation of new 
products in order to stay ahead of competitors. The increasing costs of research and 
development required to do this (dealt with below) caused speciality chemical manufacture 
to lose some of its attractiveness. A further constraint on the trend to diversify into 
specialities has been the limited size of the market for such products. In addition the wide 
spread of speciality applications across industry, does limit them to some extent to GOP 
growth rates. 
For these reasons some, but not ail, leading firms were obliged to modify strategy 
once again in the late 1980s. This time re-emphasising 'core competencies' in order to 
maximise their competitive advantages in generating new products and staying ahead of the 
competition. Stern (1992) asserts: 
"In the 1990s and beyond, the multinational corporation's most reliable source of 
sustained competitive advantage will be its core competencies. These are the unique 
capabilities and collective skills and knowledge that have driven the business in the 
past and, if channelled, will fuel its growth in the future." (Stern, 1992: 13) 
A chemical industry perspective is given by leI's chief operating officer who is quoted as 
saying: 
"A much greater focus on a smaller number of business areas must, I believe, replace 
the 1980s strategies of diversification." (Business Day, 9-12-92) 
This does not suggest an abandonment of the pursuit of dominance in specialities but 
rather a trend by firms to home in on those areas in which they perceived they held the 
greatest competitive advantage. Such areas would be known core competencies capable of 
generating new high value added products. 
SASOL by contrast, has since 1988 embarked upon an almost frantic and wide ranging 
phase of diversification. At the upstream end it is involved in oil and gas prospecting and is 
investigating exporting coal. In more specialised areas it is expanding into the manufacture 
of alpha oleflns, synthetic fibres and a wider range of speciality waxes. Its unique position 
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as a producer of synthetic fuels from coal and its need to increase the share of its product 
portfolio devoted to higher value added products account for its behaviour. SASOL's strategy 
may appear at first glance to be outdated diversification but it has more to do with a desperate 
corporate survival strategy. The end of political apartheid is likely to bring to an end 
SASOL's windfall profits which arise from the state regulated r~gime of support (subsidy) 
for synfuels worth approximately Rl billion p.a .. It is not unlike the diversification strategies 
followed by large oil companies from the mid 1970s to the 1980s, who whilst cash rich from 
the oil shocks feared the end of their global dominance of the industry. 
Nevertheless SASOL will soon have to begin competing with those companies which 
have concentrated on developing their core competencies whilst it is still grappling with a 
very diverse range of activities. 
Accompanying the shift to specialities international firms have also sought additional 
means to avoid the effects of economic cycles. These include joint ventures in large volume 
investments to better regulate the introduction of new capacity. Another strategy is sector 
'swaps' between leading firms, as a means to concentrate on core business and to rationalise 
production. For 'example in 1992 ICI swapped its nylon businesses for Du Pont's acrylics 
businesses in the biggest swap ever made. An ICI spokesperson has said that business swaps 
are likely be more popular as a way of restructuring operations, not least of all because they 
did not incur huge costs in the way acquisitions did (Business Day, 9-12-92). The effect of 
the swap was to make each of the firms the largest producer in the world in their chosen 
product. Du Pont now has a 25 % share of the world market in nylons. ICI has secured 
production capability in the US for methyl methacrylate (intermediate input in manufacture 
of acrylics) which it lacked (ECN, 27-4-92:4 and 4-5-92:8). Acrylics are used in paints, a 
business in which ICI is a world leader. It appears that ICI's strategy is that it only wishes 
to remain in those businesses in which it can compete, if not dominate, globally. It is also 
an attempt by ICI to change its 60:40 commodity:speciality ratio of three or four years ago 
by reducing its exposure to commodities (Interview, Freeman). 
In a new and innovative step which has attracted the interest of industry 
commentators, ICI has broken up its business into two separate businesses, ICI and 
ZENECA. ICI will be high volume, capital intensive cyclical commodity type businesses. 
ZENECA will include ICI's pharmaceutical, specialities, seeds, bioscience and agrochemicals 
businesses. It is second in the world only to Ciba-Geigy in the latter. 
At one level ICI's unbundling appears to be its novel approach to dealing with the 
differences between commodity and specialty production. There is an inherent conflict in all 
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chemical conglomerates and an eternal competition for resources. The pharmaceutical and 
specialty businesses within ICI felt that they were supporting the flagging commodity parts 
of the business. Conversely the commodity type business believed that they were .being 
starved of investment (The Economist, 1-8-92:56). A split is one way to overcome such 
problems. 
The timing of ICI's unbundling in 1992, comes after two years of falling profits and 
just months after Hanson's take-over bid which ICI managed to survive. ICI's pharmaceutical 
business lacked a major new 'blockbuster' drug to launch and thus following Ciba-Geigy's 
example of investing heavily in marketing and sales did not seem warranted. On the other 
hand it was reluctant to follow the example of other drug companies and enter into a joint 
venture for fear of losing control of its business. Clearly ICI management felt bound to take 
some action. ICI's breakup is a precedent in portfolio management by chemical conglomerates 
(Chemical Week, 7-1O-92:27). 
It is instructive to observe the effect of a breakup in a major MNC like ICI's and the 
impact this has on a leading South African firm like AECI. In 1991 AECI was structured with 
a 62:38, commodities to specialties ratio, (although the specialities are typically lower order 
type speciality products) much as ICI was a decade earlier. AECI like ICI has had falling 
profits in recent years. In 1991 it reduced its dividend for the first time since it was listed on 
the stock exchange in 1966. In the same year the Johannesburg Stock Exchange dropped 
AECI from its chemicals and oils rating index. Its large exposure to commodity sectors such 
as mining and farming which were depressed industries at that time in South Africa, 
contributed to its flagging performance. Business day predicted that It.. AECI is due for a 
shake-up. The market's impression is that it is a dinosaur in a vibrant industry. It (19-8-91). 
Presumably in an attempt to meet these criticisms ABCI split one of its main operating 
arms Explosives and Chemicals Ltd, into two, AECI Explosives Ltd and another company 
which will operate the fertilizer business. The coincidence in timing is striking, the South 
African split coming just months after the ICI split, although the effect was not as dramatic. 
Both remained wholly owned subsidiaries of AECI Ltd. and they are both commodity 
businesses, although the explosives business is developing speciality type applications (see 
below). But this was merely the harbinger of things to come. 
In 1994 AECI underwent a fundamental shake up which left it a very much less 
significant player. AECI appeared to be caught between the scissors of, on the one hand its 
problematic polymers business compounded by SASOL's stranglehold over its feedstocks, and 
on the other ICI's reluctance to retain an interest in activities outside its core areas of interest 
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and competence. Both of these factors also had to be seen in the context of post apartheid 
South Africa's increasing exposure to the chill winds on international competition. The 
outcome of these imperatives was that AECI lost control of its polymers business to SASOL 
in a joint venture called Polifin, owned 60:40 by SASOL and ABCI. 
On the other hand AECI lost control of its traditional core business, explosives and 
accessories, to ICI (a world leader in explosives) in a 51 :49 joint venture. Both of these 
changes were effective from 1 January 1994. In the process ICI extracted itself from AECl's 
other (presumably less desirable) activities. This did however leave what was left of AECI, 
for the first time in 70 years, in control of its own destiny but at the same time more 
vulnerable to further take-over. 
The perils of relatively small economies trying to carry out deliberate industrial policy 
in the chemical industry which is subject to the changing fortunes and strategies of its major 
international players are apparent from this example. 
Higher value added speciality chemical manufacture 10 South Africa is limited 
according to Baker (1992a).s A part of the explanation for this is the relatively narrow 
spectrum of basic chemical building blocks available from our essentially coal based industry, 
when compared with an oil based industry. Another part of the explanation has to do with the 
distance between South Africa and major speciality chemical markets. Speciality chemicals 
typically require the producer to be close to the customer in order to understand their needs 
and to provide the 'systems service'. A further limiting factor is the small size of the local 
market and the reluctance of technology licensors to permit exports into their own markets. 
The South African chemical industry is nevertheless expected to become more 
speciality-chemical orientated as it becomes less preoccupied with self sufficiency and mining 
and more consumer orientated (Interview, Laing). Potential areas of development include 
water treatment, and the chemical application of the treasure chest of locally available 
minerals such as gold, manganese, platinum, chrome and others. However this would require 
these minerals to be available at lower than import parity prices. This would require some 
form of industrial strategy. As a world leader in explosives South Africa should be able to 
export explosive systems (as opposed to commodity type explosives). AECI has targeted 
electronic detonators used in computer controlled phased explosions which they anticipate will 
"become an important cash generator within three years." (Business Day, 21-12-92:5) Low 
cost health care systems associated with primary health care delivery may also hold potential 
5. Baker, . 1 992a, bases his views on Enigma Marketing Research's latest report, The Chemicals Industry in 
South Afnca. 
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if the health care system is reorientated in that direction. Low cost housing may also generate 
new speciality chemicals. 
Whilst this might imply some hope for South African firms, Wittcoff (1992) believes 
that a turnover in excess of Rl 350 million and a return on sales of over 20% are the levels 
at which 'critical mass' is achieved. By way of comparison AECI's 1991 turnover was R5 
280 million derived largely from the sale of commodity chemicals. Its speciality chemicals 
subsidiary, Chemical Services, had a turnover of R 478 million in 1991. The smallest of 
South Africa's three large chemical companies, Sentrachem, has the largest share of its 
business in specialties. About half its business is consumer orientated. There would appear 
to be only a limited number of suitably sized local enterprises which could enter this 
competitive ~ea of business. The changes in the policy environment that may be necessary 
in order to facilitate the emergence of such businesses with 'critical mass' will require further 
investigation. 
If the shift to a more market orientated, speciality-type chemical industry materialises 
then the local chemical industry is likely to account for a smaller proportion of manufacturing 
than has been the case in the past. 
b) Other Corporate Strategies 
For a firm trying to become or remain a world leader there are a number of strategies 
to choose from. Different firms have selected one or more depending upon their vision and 
their perceived strengths and weaknesses at the time. 
Marketing offers a range of possibilities. Exporting is an obvious means to increase 
sales although this usually requires a proximity to markets. Another is to try and become the 
world's largest producer as leI and Du Pont did in their nylons and acrylics swop. 
Most of the major world chemical companies are conglomerates involved in a range 
of chemical activities through a portfolio of companies. As with most portfolios they require 
managing in constantly changing circumstances. The rule of thumb appears to have been to 
shed losing companies, usually to other companies already strong in that business and to buy 
profitable companies which have synergies with stronger elements within the remaining 
portfolio. A variation of this is to remain with those activities that the company does best. 
Vertical integration became a feature of the industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The advantage for an oil producer like Shell integrating forward into petrochemicals is that 
it allows flexibility. Through intra-firm transfer pricing profits can be extracted at different 
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points in the production chain, depending upon the pattern of prevailing product prices. 
Owning several links in a production chain also usually means that the company can extract 
profit from downstream and higher value added activities. Vertical integration has been a 
crucial means to competitive advantage for the international petrochemical firms. The lack 
of vertical integration in South Africa's commodity plasticsjiliere and the reasons for this are 
discussed in detail in later chapters. 
Another option for companies developing new technologies is to license them around 
the world. This has the advantage of avoiding the risks involved in direct investment around 
the world. It also helps to off-set the weaknesses of the patenting system. Once a product has 
been patented other researchers know that it is possible and if there is sufficient incentive, 
it is usually just a matter of time before another route to the same product is found. As this 
happens more and more quickly, it places pressure on those who make the initial advance to 
maximise their returns in the short term. By globalising the development, the sales revenue 
basis is expanded, which in tum permits greater R&D investment for the next round of 
developments. 
The capital costs involved in constructing plants a~ross the world in a short space of 
time is usually prohibitive even for large chemical companies. Licensing the technology offers 
a way of rapidly achieving the same result without the capital expenditure, at someone else's 
risk, and with a guaranteed income through royalties or license fees. 
Union Carbide's discovery in the 1970s of linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE) 
is a case in point. The manufacture of its predecessor, LDPE, requires high pressures and 
temperatures. LLDPE was the result of efforts to make LDPE at lower temperatures and 
pressures and at consequently lower costs. Union Carbide chose a strategy of marketing its 
new 'Unipol' technology world wide. Indeed the first recipient, in 1982, of this new gas 
phase low pressure technology was the AECI LLDPE plant in Sasolburg South Africa. This 
technology marketing approach stands in stark contrast to Union Carbide's approach to 
globalising its ethylene oxide (anti-freeze) breakthrough 50 years previously. At that time it 
chose foreign direct investment as the mechanism to globalise that business. 
Control of technology is also a crucial mechanism in shaping world production. For 
example from the 1950s to the 1970s an oligopoly existed in petrochemicals and 
thermoplastics, held largely through the control of technology (see Oman, 1989). This barrier 
to entry has been eroded since the 1970s for several reasons: the collapse in profitability 
during the 1970s and initiatives by new entrants to the industry such as Saudi Arabia, to 
entice multinational corporations to invest and/or share their technology. Saudi Arabia used 
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its low cost feedstock as a bargaining lever to gain entry to world markets. 
International petrochemical construction firms also played a role in technology 
diffusion. Consequently today for many of the commodity chemicals there is a range of 
technology options to choose from. This is of course much less so in the more speciality type 
products where new technologies are more closely guarded. 
Another set of strategy options pursued by the chemical majors can be categorised as 
'financial management' options. In capital intensive industries the choice of timing in bringing 
new capacity on stream is critical. But such decisions must be weighed against the cost of 
finance. Dow Chemical's approach to this issue for example, has helped to give it an edge 
on its competitors. Simply put, they built plants when business was bad and the cost of capital 
was low. Thus prepared they were able to take advantage of the subsequent upswing. 
Approaches to financing investment can also make a difference. Very different 
approaches have prevailed in the US and Japan for example. US companies tend to be more 
equity based, and therefore profit orientated whereas the Japanese firms are much less equity 
based enabling them to take a longer view and accept lower profits in the short term. 
Conclusions 
The globalisation of the world chemical industry has emerged and continues through 
a variety of complex interlinked and interdependent developments. South Africa's engagement 
with and participation in this process was comparatively limited during the apartheid era. 
However there are clear signs that this is beginning to change. 
Trade figures as a measure of participation in the global economy show that South 
Africa has lagged behind the world trend which shows an increasing proportion of sales 
accruing from exports. The historically dominant share of world trade commanded by North 
America, Europe and Japan (particularly the latter two) has been increasingly challenged by 
newer producers in developing countries. Successful trade in bulk commodities requires low 
costs. South Africa's bulk chemical producers have for the most part lacked economies of 
scale and have been high cost producers. The cost of import substitution industrialisation 
policies has been a declining share of world chemical trade. Small scale production processes 
have not a~vanced very far. Consequently local plants will have to expand their capacity if 
they seek to be internationally competitive producers. 
In the current phase of globalisation the instruments of this process are more complex 
than in earlier phases and less amenable to simple industrial policy measures. At the same 
95 
time the ascendent power of MNCs makes industrial policy more important for those 
concerned to protect national economic sovereignty. The perils of charting industrial policy 
for South Africa are manifold as the AECI/ICI example demonstrates. Changes in MNC 
corporate strategy can have a significant impact on local ownership and the prospects for local 
firms. 
There are signs that local producers are beginning, a decade later than their 
international rivals, to show more interest in speciality chemicals and the higher levels of 
R&D spending which must accompany such developments. This is a promising development 
which should be encouraged because South Africa's disadvantageous geographical location 
relative to major markets requires the export of higher value added products the better to 
withstand the,burden of transport costs. 
The challenges of raising the bulk of South Africa's population from the deprivation 
they have endured will create a market for a variety of low cost speciality type chemicals, 
for example in water treatment and low cost housing. This together with the chemical 
beneficiation of the wide range of locally available minerals, in the context of a suitable 
technology policy suggest that considerable potential for the local chemical industry may 
exist. 
In sectors such as commodity petrochemicals note must be taken of the need to be a 
low cost producer and the advantages of vertical integration in achieving this. This issue is 
the subject of discussion in subsequent chapters. 
The penetration of regional trade blocs in North America and Western Europe during 
the 1980s was primarily by means of mergers and acquisitions, often at a cost far beyond the 
means of South African firms. Consequently this 'does not appear to be an option for local 
firms, and instead suggests that a better strategy may be to try and dominate niche markets -
this would appear to be the case in SASOL's investment in alpha olefin production. 
In recent years globalisation has proceeded in part by strategic alliances among leading 
firms. This may be a useful route into participation in the global chemical industry for local 
firms. South African firms are likely to be in search of technology. In addition attempts may 
be made by local firms to inveigle themselves into the new and complex interlinkages that 
charncterise the current pattern of globalisation. If this is so then industrial policy should 
support this by ensuring that plants in which there is foreign participation are designed to 
export and that measures are taken to monitor and limit the extent to which foreign companies 
gain influence in the domestic economy. Most importantly companies negotiating technology 
licenses should receive strong state support to ensure that these include the right to export. 
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Corporate strategies in response to changing circumstances have been complex in the 
1980s but it is possible to isolate two broad approaches. One advocated vertical integration 
but the more popular favoured diversification into speciality chemicals. This phase is ending 
in the early 1990s and being replaced by a return to 'core business'. In this regard SASOL's 
current diversification strategy appears to be not so much out of step with world trends, as 
a desperate attempt to survive the looming end to its subsidies by finding more viable core 
competencies than synfuels. 
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PART FOUR 
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 
The evil that men do lives after them, the good is oft interred with their bones. 
Mark Antony 
In recent years world wide attention has been increasingly focused on environmental 
degradation both at national and international levels. Industrialisation has exerted stresses 
upon the environment and the chemical industry is no exception. Indeed it is one of the main 
causes of this stress as is explained below. The way in which environmental issues are viewed 
is beginning to change. Rather than being considered in isolation they are starting to be 
viewed as a complex set of issues linking patterns of production, consumption, quality of life, 
and the potential for future economic growth or development. In this chapter the chemical 
industry's role and contribution to this process are considered and evaluated. 
Major environmental disasters such as Chernobyl, Bhopal, the Sandoz spillage into 
the Rhine and others have increasingly tarnished the image of the chemical industry. They 
have also demonstrated, in dramatic fashion, the interdependence and global nature of 
industrial threats to the environment. 
These major environmental disasters are among the reasons why 'Environment' has 
beco~hword for the chemical industry in the 1 ~,. This is not surprising as it is 
one of the most energy intensive and environmentally polluting industries (UNIDO, 1989). 







Each of these aspects is discussed before turning to some of the social pressures for change 
faced by the chemical industry and its responses to some of these pressures. Particular 
emphasis is given to plastics as they are a central focus of this study and this includes some 
discussion of plastic recycling. 
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Enerey Use 
/ / ' [ Chemical Industry energy consumption may be separated into two categories, 
/ feedstock (oil and gas) and energy to drive the processes of production. About 57% of the 
chemical industry's energy consumption is in the" form of raw materials input, not process 
energy (United Nations, 1992:6). Process energy is however also a concern as much of it is 
sourced from coal fired power stations. Such power stations release large quantities of sulphur 
dioxides, nitrogen oxides and other pollutants, many of which are known to be 
environmentally damaging (see Table 2.9). In South Africa 92% of electricity is sourced 
Table 2.9 Annual Effluent Production from 1 000 





























fly ash 360 000 
Total 403 445 
Source: M J Chadwick and other eds., 
Environmental Impacts of Coal Mining and 
Utilization, Oxford, Pergammon Press, 1987, 
in UNIDO, 1990:99. 
from coal fired power stations which in 1991 had a generating capacity of 36 000 mega watts 
(Eberhard & Trollip, 1992:26). If the results of Table 2.9 are applied to this capacity, South \ 
Africa's coal fired power stations have the capacity to deliver 14.5 million tonnes per annum 
of emissions into the environment. However not all coals contain and emit the same volumes 
of pollutants)'or example the sulphur content of coal can vary from as low as 1 % to as high 
as 10% for brown coal. The emission of sulphur dioxide air pollution from coal fired power 
stations is in direct proportion to the sulphur content of the coal burned. South African coal 
is. generally regarded as a lower (higher emissions) quality coal. A CSIR study found that 
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electric power generation resulted in 22 million tons of waste/pollution (CSIR, 
1993/1994:35). 
Data on energy consumption by industrial sector is difficult to come by but the .., 
indications are that the chemical industry consumes the largest share of energy in the 
manufacturing sector. The chemical and allied products industry was the largest consumer of 
energy among all manufacturing sectors in the US in 1985 consuming 22.7% of the total 
(UNIDO, 1990: 100). In South Africa the chemicals sector (excluding liquid fuels) consumes 
29.6% of the total energy consumption in the manufacturing and metallurgical industries.~ 
One estimate places the chemical products industry at 24% of 1991 national electricity 
consumption.2(This suggests that the South African chemical industry is more energy 
intensive than its US counterpart. This is understandable given the coal based technologies 
used by SASOL and AECI.") 
The trend in chemical industry energy consumption in the DMEs has been downwards, 
spurred on by the oil shocks. Consumption of process energy relative to production is 
declining. This is mainly due to improving operations efficiency. 
Waste Generation 
A disturbing feature of the local chemical industry is that its output of waste exceeds ,'\ 
that of its output of product for further processing or final sale (CSIR 1993/1994:35). A J 
similar relationship between waste and 'saleable' output exists in mining. The local mining 
industry generated 240 million tonnes of waste/pollution in 1989, some 20 times more than 
the chemical process industry at 12.3 million tonnes (ibid). However the South African 
chemical industry has particularly strong bac . ard linkages into the mining sector in, for 
example, synfuels and petrochemicals (coal mining) and inorganic chemicals (phosphates, 
lime etc). The chemical industry also has strong forward linkages into post consumer waste 
of which plastic materials are often the most visible (see below). If these backward j 
forward linkages are taken into account then the overall contribution by the chemical industry 
to the national waste inventory is larger than that of just the chemical process industry. 
A 1987 study of chemical pollution by the US Department of Commerce yielded some 
1. Calculated from Eberhard and Trollip, 1992, Table 4: 17. 
2. Environmental Monitoring Group, based on ESKOM Sales To Selected Industries 1991. 
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interesting data.3 Industrial Chemicals (lSIC 351) accounted for 54% of the volume of 
manufacturing releases. Industrial Chemicals was also the largest sector of manufacturing by 
coefficient of manufacturing value added, producing 99.7 pounds of chemical pollutants per 
US $ 1 ()()() of manufacturing value added (MVA), nearly twice as much as the next largest 
sector, the paper and paper products industry. In that year (1987) Industrial Chemicals 
contributed 4.9% of MVA, which is not an unusually large proportion in a developed market 
economy.4 In the. same year the South African Industrial Chemicals sector accounted for a 
similar proportion of MVA, 4.8%, and assuming that South Africa's environmental 
regulations were not more demanding than those prevailing in the US, (the opposite is more 
likely the case) then South Africa's Industrial Chemicals sector may also have accounted for 
about half of the chemical pollutants released by manufacturing. Indeed given the older 
technology used at SASOL and that used to make PVC in SA, it may have been substantially 
worse. (These technologies are considered in more detail in a later chapter). Data from a 
CSIR commissioned study suggest that in South Africa, chemical process industry waste 
accounted for 62 % of the volume of manufacturing waste/pollution generated annually.5 
In addition to Industrial Chemicals this study is concerned with the plastic converting 
industry, largely included in the Plastic Products (ISIC 356) category. Unlike Industrial 
Chemicals, its share of MV A in the US study is larger than its share of chemical pollution. 
This sector together with Rubber Products (ISIC 355) accounted for just 1.2 % by volume of 
manufacturing chemical releases, whilst the combined contribution to MV A by these sectors 
was 3.7%. These sectors combined were the seventh largest sector (out of 20) measured by 
weight of pollution per US $ 1 ()()() of output, that is 16 times smaller than Industrial 
Chemicals. 
If these figures are correct it may be concluded that, from an environmental impact 
point of view, the Plastic Products industry is preferable to the Industrial Chemicals industry. 
The relative size of South Africa's Plastic Products industry in 1987, was 2.1 % of MVA 
compared with the US figure of 2.6%. If the previous assumption concerning environmental 
regulation is employed, then the South African Plastic Products industry released a 
proportionately smaller share of chemical pollutants than the Industrial Chemicals industry. 
With this data in mind, and assuming the proportions to be roughly applicable world 
3. Calculations in this paragraph based on UNIDO, 1990, Table III.32 and p123, unless otherwise stated. 
4. Calculated from UNIDO, 1989, statistical annex. 
5. Calculated from CSIR, 1993/1994 table 25. 
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wide, it is not difficult to understand why the chemical industry has been targeted as a major 
environmental spoiler by those concerned about the effects of industrialisation on the 
environment.ITo compound matters further for the chemical industry, many of the chemi s 
being produced are not fully understood in so far as their impact upon human health is 
concerned, let alone the environment. A complete health hazard assessment is possible in 
respect of only a small percentage of known chemical substances (see Table 2.10). Worse 
still, many chemicals remain in some form or shape as polluting agents long after they have 
performed their intended tas!lndustrial organic chemicals are the chief offenders in so far 
as the environment is concerned and their global output has grown dramatically since 1945: 
from 7 million tonnes p.a. in 1950 to 250 million tonnes in 1985 (UNIDO, 1990: 121). 
Air Pollution 
In so far as the chemical industries contribution to environmental pollution is 
concerned, this occurs in several ways; air pollution, water pollution, solid wastes, hazardous 
wastes and toxic chemicals. Again data on these emissions is sketchy. That which is available 
identifies the major contributors to air pollution as those industries producing basic industrial 
materials; namely chemicals, primary metals, paper etc. The European chemical industry has 
accounted for 20% of industrial CO2 emissions. It is also the source of large volumes of 
nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxides. 
[ Many organic chemical emissions originate in the petrochemical industry. The chief 
difference between air pollution from the petrochemjcal industry and other sectors of 
manufacturing is the concentration of a variety of hydrocarbons from a single point source. 
Many are toxic and/or hazardous, requiring special technology to extract and control. Such 
equipment is costly. Emissions tend to be greater from the older plants. Newer plants tend 
to have more sophisticated, pollution reducing original equipment. Retrofitting older plants 
with pollution control equipment may not be cost effective. Since many older plants are 
smaller scale and therefore less competitive, the financial problems are exacerbated. In 
addition to these financial problems there remain serious technical problems to overcome in 
achieving comprehensive solutions to air emissions from the petrochemical industry J 
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Liquid effluents from the petrochemical industry are, like its air emissions, 
characterised by their variety. They include ballast water, product spills, contaminated 
.runoffs, cooling waters, and start-up and shut-down liquid effluentsJ The considerable 
technical complexity in dealing with these sources usually requires an integrated approach to 
a petrochemical site to determine the optimum solutions. According to the US Environmental 
Protection Agency, the best practicable technology for treating liquid effluents from 
petrochemical plants is biological treatment together with post-filtration. 
In so far as water pollution is concerned a 1987 study by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency found that just five industries accounted for 90% of total industry releases 
of toxic chemicals into surface water. Among them the chemical industry alone accounted for 
48% (UNIDO, 1990:131). 
Accident Potential 
As chemical plants have become larger the potential for catastrophic accidents has 
grown, and indeed materialised in some well known tragedies. Bhopal, Chernobyl and Three 
Mile Island are household words The deteriorating accident rate in US oil and petrochemical 
facilities has been highlighted in a video documentary called 'Out of Control' produced by 
the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers Union. It details the explosions and accidents which 
have occurred during the 1980s and draws attention to the plight of workers operating these 
installations. 
[ South Africa's largest insurance claim arose from a fire at SASOL 3. Although supply 
interruptions are undesirable in the petrochemical business they happen regularly. It appears 
that insurance is cheaper than adequate health, safety and environmental standards. The 
environmental consequences of such accidents have gone largely unmeasured. J 
Minimum health and safety standards and procedures are commonly legislated. 
Improvements beyond those are left to the collective bargaining process. This has been the 
case in South Africa. However the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act enacted in the 
early 1980s did not officially recognise the role of trade unions in health and safety issues -
indeed many trade unionists believe that it was deliberately designed to marginalise their role 
in health and safety. This problem has been ameliorated to some extent by the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act (1993) which now recognises worker representatives and gives them 
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some rights but no duties, although it falls short of the British model, upon which it appears 
to be based, which recognises the right of representative trade unions to appoint health and 
safety representatives. 
From a policy point of view there are two basic approaches; the minimum regulation 
"plus collective bargaining approach and the 'safety case' approach. The latter approaches 
health and safety issues not from the regulatory point of view, but imposes a responsibility 
upon the employer to firstly identify the hazards and then to conduct his/her operations in a 
safe manner. 
The regulatory model has the disadvantage that the growing complexity of the 
chemical industry and new technologies such as biotechnology make it difficult to draft 
appropriate regulations. Secondly the employer is only required to comply with the 
regulations, rather than provide a hazard free work environment. The 'safety case' approach 
has the advantage that the initial inventory of hazards provides a useful basis for an audit if 
an accident occurs. It also obliges the employer to think about potential hazards rather than 
just comply with regulations. Neither approach appears to be adequate by itself but employed 
in the appropriate combination, they have the potential to deliver safer workplaces. 
Pressures for Change and Responses 
One chemical in particular has been singled out for considerable environmental 
{/ pressur~reenpeace, for example, have mounted an international campaign for the 
elimination of chlorine usage. It is usually produced in chlor-alkali plants which separate the 
chlorine and soda in salt. The soda is largely used" in the glass and detergent industries whilst 
chlorine is a central building block in the chemical industry having a wide variety of 
applications. It is an essential component of bleaches for the paper and textile industries and 
in water purification chemicals. It is also a major component of PVC, (one of the commodity 
plastics considered in this study) and other plastics. Indeed many chlor-alkali producers are 
also PVC producers as PVC is a convenient 'sink' for the chlorine by-product of the soda 
making process. Chlorine has other uses as well, in pharmaceuticals and pesticides. PVC has 
been an important target of the anti-chlorine lobby because when it is burnt at low 
temperatures it releases d~ns, one of the more dangerous poisons, and other potentially 
harmful by-products created when the liberated chlorine reacts with other substances. 
Another area where chlorine has received much bad pUblicity has been the effect of 
o chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) on the ozone layer. In paper bleaching and CFCs chlorine is 
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losing market share to alternatives, even though the alternatives are less effective in some 
applications. However the great difficulty is that for many applications there is no alternative 
or suitable substitute. This example starkly illustrates one of the trade offs in modem soci~ty. 
The lifestyle made possible by industrial production necessarily wears down the natural 
systems that are the ultimate human life support mechanism. Thus far technological 
development has not yielded a complete solution to the chlorine problem. 
r- .... 4c.--- f. Increasin(fii}lic aware~n the more developed.eco~omies and ~me of th~ NIC:, 
such as Taiwan, has resulted 10 pressure upon the chemIcal tndustry to clean up Its act, 
along with other industries. One form this pressure has taken is political intervention through 
greater environmental regulation of industrial activities. This has obliged companies to devote 
increasing proportions of their capital investment to meeting environmental considerations. 
In the UK 33% of environmental protection spending in 1991 was attributed to legislative 
requirements and this is expected to rise to 56% by 1994 (Chemical Industries Association, 
1992:5). 
P Other pressures on the chemical industry with environmental origins have arisen from 
some, perhaps unexpected, quarters such as ~Cial institutio~ Environmental 
considerations are also beginning to influence financial flows, such as capital markets and 
takeovers. Increasing numbers of merger and takeover decisions are being made only after 
an environmental audit has been conducted, chiefly to determine what 'hidden' environmental 
liabilities might lie in store for a new owner at some point in the future. 
I Banks too are taking an increasing interest in the environmental performance of their 
corporate clients in view of the risks they face as lenders. For banks a danger arises in having 
to foreclose on debt defaulters as a result of which the banks may become property owners. 
As owners they are then responsible and liable for any pollution the firm may have caused. 
This danger has now increased one step further, in that banks may become liable, whether 
they foreclose or not. This follows a US court decision which set a broad precedent making 
banks liable for environmental clean up costs in certain instances. The court ruled that banks 
must pay if they participate "in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating 
a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes". (Quoted in Financial 
Times, 27-3-92). The legal position on this question in the EC, Japan and developing 
countries is less clear. But whatever the legal regulations may be, there is the ever present 
threat of common law liability which is likely to make banks more attentive to environmental 
considerations ~anks may find themselves increasingly becoming environmental enforcement 
agencies, irrespective of how unpalatable that may be to them. 
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j. How have the large chemical corporations responded to these public and financial 
forms of pressure? @ response in the UK has been to increase the proportion of all new 
investment directed towards health, safety and environmental protection from 8 % in 1982 to 
17% in 1990 and to 25% in 1991. (Chemical Industries Association, 1992:5). This is in line 
with the trend in the OECD generally, where 20% to 30% of investment budgets of major 
chemical firms are devoted to environmental research and protection measures (OECD, 
1992:76). Whilst this may appear large, such figures are placed in perspective when 
considered as a proportion of sales. As Table 2.11 shows environmental costs are a small 
proportion of sales. 
Table 2.11 Environmental Costs as % of Sales 
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1 South African chemical companies do not include their environmental spending in their 
annual reports as some chemical MNCs do and consequently no comparison is possible. 
As the large chemical corporations have begun addressing their environmental 
problems they have also begun to lobby for more time in which to do so. With this objective 
in mind, increasing sums have been spent on advertising in efforts to polish up the chemical 
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companies' environmental images. Similarly all manner of ordinary products have suddenly 
become 'environmentally friendly', even those which never stood accused in the first place. 
South Africa is no exception in this regard. Increasing amounts are being spent on advertising 
designed to demonstrate how 'environmentally friendly' chemical companies or their products 
·are. 
Perhaps the most ~tructive re~by some chemical firms has been to seize the 
business opportunities opened by the move towards cleaner production. Du Pont for example 
has been able to market the experience it gained in cleaning up its own operations. A separate 
division has been created for this purpose to enter the burgeoning environmental service 
industries. The growth in this sector has been fuelled by the increasing volumes of per capita 
waste that haye accompanied increasing per capita incomes in the developed economies. Some 
perspective on the size and growth of this industry may be gained from Table 2.12. Growth 
and profits are both healthy in this industry, often facilitated by large state expenditures on 
clean up programmes in the DMEs. 
Table 2.12 Growth Indicators: Waste Disposal and Recycling in Europe 
1989 1990 1993 
Production (billion ECU) 
Collection & Processing 11.0 11.8 14.8 
Materials' Reprocessing 14.0 14.0 16.0 
Number of Employees 
Collection & Processing 160000 171000 225 000 
Materials Reprocessing 120000 115000 100 000 
I Total I 280000 I 286000 I 325 000 I 
Source. EC Panorama quoted to ICEF, 1992:54. 
anised chemical employer have also sought to engage environmentalists and to -erect defences protecting them from environmental pressure. The thrust of the chemical 
employer's initiative revolves ar~und two programmes: th 'Res- ~sible C;ge programme 
and th 'Business Charter for Sustainable Developmen the latter being a multi industry 
initiative. 
The esponsible Care nitiative is intended to improve the image and conduct of 
chemical firms. It comprises a number of 'codes' such as 'Product Stewardship, Process 
Safety and Distribution'. One of its many weaknesses is that in Responsible Care 
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is voluntary in the US and many other countries. In Canada however, implementing 
Responsible Care is a condition of membership of the CMA, whilst in Argentina the 
government has created a secretariat to tackle the implementation of Responsible Care and 
the petrochemicals industry will be expected to follow specific guidelines (BCN 27-1-92:29). 
Nevertheless in the view of a leading US trade journal, Chemical Week: 
"In terms of its effect on the chemicals industry, the Responsible Care program is as 
unproven as a newborn blinking its eyes in the light of day." (Chemical Week, 11-12-
91:21) 
The approach of the US Chemical Manufacturers Association to Responsible Care 
involved a public outreach initiati~ to establish an advisory panel of people from outside the 
industry to assist it in developing its codes of practice. Several large firms have reproduced 
the idea at company level, sometimes incorporating well known company critics. AECI in 
South Africa are attempting to do something similar. 
Weaknesses in the Res nsible Care ro ramme occur at both levels d 
level. One is the difficulty in measuring the improvements made and whether or not they 
\...._.~--
are in accordance with the plan adopted. This is exacerbated by the imprecise wording in 
parts of the programme which allows wide interpretation. More fundamental to the legitimacy 
of Responsible Care is the 'player and referee' syndrome. That is, companies measure and 
• • 
judge their own performance. There is no provision for third party audits or evaluations. 
In South Africa, the local Chemical Manufacturers Association began to debate 
adopting Responsible Care in 1992. The chief advocate was AECI, the biggest chemical 
company (Chemical Week, 17-6-92: 154). The unashamed intention of this initiative is spelt 
out by one of its supporters, Peter Hart, Sentrachem's General Manager of technical/risk 
control: 
"The main step is to get CMA to adopt Responsible Care, so we can go to the public 
as an industry with our improvement" (Quoted in Chemical Week, 17-6-92: 154). 
Judging by this and other company statements the main intention is to use the adoption of 
Responsible Care as a defence bulwark at the propaganda level. The three large chemical 
companies AECI, SASOL and Sentrachem claim to have begun implementing Responsible 
Care type programmes although they cannot call them that until the CMA adopts Responsible 
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Care. 
The other initiative by organised business is the ' usiness Charter for S_ustainab e 
De;elopmen developed by the International Chamber of Commerce and launched in April 
1991. This is even less far reaching than the Responsible Care programme. It operates on an 
-entirely voluntary, self policing basis. 
Internationally organised chemical trade unions have proposed a much more rigorous 
alternative: 
"A system of Environmental Accounting and Auditing needs to be devised on an 
internationally agreed basis which will have equivalent force to the accounting 
principles which companies are expected to maintain in respect to their capital wealth. 
Just as financial accounting is governed by strict regulation and backed by law, so too 
we have to develop social responsibility in the corporation in environmental matters. 
In the light of experience in other areas of social concern, only the incurably naive 
or the intentionally ingenuous would believe that this transformation could be effected 
without the compulsion of public accountability." (lCEF, 1990: 12) 
Several leading chemical MNCs are including some environmental reporting in their annual 
reports which may, with time, be developed in the direction organised labour envisages. 
More substantial than such voluntary programmes, has been the way in which high 
polluting businesses have 'voted with their feet'. The phase of global industrial restructuring 
which gained considerable impetus from the recession during the 1980-82 period, resulted in 
a significant proportion of chemical capacity being closed - usually the older an~ less viable 
plants. This was true of other smokestack industries as well. These closures in the developed 
countries were accompanied by a shift towards more hi-tech industries (like speciality 
chemicals) . 
The fastest growing industries in the developing countries over the 1970-88 period 
may be classified into two groups: the light manufacturing group including shoes, textiles, 
leather and beverages. The second group is the capital intensive, or what in South Korea is 
referred to as the 'heavy and chemical industries', these include iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals, basic chemicals, plastics, petroleum and coal products, metal products and paper 
(UNIDO, 1990: 157). The latter group are resource and energy intensive and also highly 
polluting. There has thus been a geographical redeployment of these 'smokestack' industries 
from the developed to the developing economies. In many cases developing economies are 
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competing for forei n investment and cannot afford to be too concerned about how 
environmentally 'clean' the technology is that comes with it. 
The redistribution of 'smokestack' industries across the globe in the context of 
increasing environmental awareness, has impacted on international trade. Indeed 
environmental issues are growing in importance as an international trade issue since trade is 
likely to be the manner in which environmentally based differentials in international 
competitiveness are expressed. 
Trade and Environmental Issues 
\ 
f--llt 
Countries which have adopted stricter environmental regulations and invested 
considerable resources in implementing environmental clean up - largely the developed 
countries - have felt threatened by lower priced imports from countries which have not 
concerned themselves with environmental issues to the same degree. 
For this reason GATT agreements have not ignored environmental questions. Article 
XX allows member countries to adopt measures to protect human, plant and animal life or 
to conserve finite natural resources. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade signed 
under the Tokyo Round, allows signatories to deviate from international regulations and 
standards for health, safety and environmental considerations (United Nations, 1992:64). 
There are additional detailed provisions which allow the protection of national environmental 
standards. These would be classified as technical barriers to trade. When taken together they 
could be seen as a new form of non-tariff barrier. Indeed this is a concern raised, largely by 
developing countries wishing to export into developed countries, who fear that environmental 
standards will be used by developed countries as substitute for tariff protection. Whatever the d-
case the signals are clear for those South African exporters who care to read them - higher 
........ . 
environmental standards are and will continue to be a feature of access to markets in 
developed countries. Europe is an important market for South African plastic goods and in 
the next section changing environmental considerations in Europe are discussed. 
Plastics. the Environment and Recyclin~ 
This study has as its major focus the plastics industry, an industry which has come 
under increasing environmental pressure. In short, the problem as often perceived by the 
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public is that plastics do not biodegrade and have very long lifespans, remaining in the 
environment for many years. Indeed PVC water pipes are designed to do just that. 
To begin with it is helpful to identify the sources of waste that emerge from various 
points in the plastics manufacturing production chain. The first step in the manufacture of 
.plastics is usually the cracking 0 na htha hich falls within the category of petrochemicals 
that has already been discussed above. The second step involves the conversion 
(polymerisation) of petrochemical gases to plastic raw materials or polymers. This step 
employs and generates a number of toxic materials. Vinyl chloride, used in PVC manufacture 
for example is carcinogenic. The production of PVC also generates heavily chlorinated tars 
which are an environmental problem. Proper disposal such as incineration is indispensable, 
but expensive. Polymer manufacture also results in by-products such as reactor crusts and 
waste water polymer sludge, most of which can be recycled. Poor quality material and floor 
sweepings can also be recycled. 
The next stage in plastics production involves converting the polymer into finished or 
semi-finished products, usually by the use of heat and/or pressure. Conversion at this stage 
can result in noise, odour, fumes and dust which can be environmentally damaging if they 
are not adequately dealt with by technical means. Much of the scrap arising in these 
processes, both planned (eg. when holes are punched) or unplanned (eg. 'flash' or excess 
material) can be recycled. 
The most important source of plastic waste arises from consumer waste. Most of this 
finds its way to landfills, a common means of disposing of garbage. Plastic producers argue 
that non-biodegradable plastic in landfills stabilises them. 
The call by environmental lobbies has been -for biodegradable plastic. Plastic producers 
for the most part dismiss this pointing out that plastics which claim to be biodegradable are 
often not so. Instead they tend to disintegrate into tiny pieces or crumbs of plastic which still 
clog up the environment, although less visibly. ICI have recently announced a glucose based 
biologically manufactured polymer which if biodegraded or incinerated releases the same 
amount of CO2 as was fixed during manufacture. This results in no nett increase in COz to 
contribute to the greenhouse effect (PSA, February, 1991:16). It has yet to penetrate the 
market. 
The major proposals forthcoming from plastic producers to deal with post consumer 
plastic waste are either to incinerate it or recycle it. Let us examine these proposals in a little 
more detail. 
Consumer waste is the largest source of waste plastic. According to the Franklin 
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Institute, plastics account for 7% of the waste stream, but they have only a 1 % recovery rate. 
The recovery rates for paper and aluminium are higher, 21 % and 29% respectively. Plastic 
in the waste stream consists of mixed and or contaminated products and this is where the 
difficulties begin. Whether intended for incineration or recycling the large variety of plastics 
in use requires sorting which is unpleasant manual labour accomp~ied by several health and 
safety risks. Mechanical and chemical sorting is improving but lacks sufficient technological 
sophistication thus far to deal adequately with waste streams. From a cost point of view the 
collection and sorting operation is the most costly part of the exercise. In Western Europe the 
recovery and recycling of plastics is a marginal and often unprofitable business (United 
Nations, 1991:22). From an energy point of view, the savings in using recycled plastic are 
second only to those from using recycled aluminium. A plastic bottle requires nearly 4 BTU 
to produce, but to recycle it requires only 1.5 BTU (Ross & Steinmeyer, 1990). 
The recycling ethic is gaining ground in some areas. For example the new 1.5 litre 
plastic (PET) Coca-Cola bottle can be washed and reused 15 times before being reground and 
the material recycled into another bottle. This will be the first time that post consumer 
recycled PET wilfbe used for food-contact containers. Previously recycled PET was used in 
fibres and non-food contact applications. 
Some of the larger companies are launching plastics recycling initiatives, but often 
with mixed motives. For example Dow Chemical has launched a (relatively small) US $ 1 
million plastics recycling programme in the US. It is "part public relations campaign and part 
practical recycling mechanics." (C&EN, June 22, 1992: 16) Such programmes are floundering 
because the market for recycled plastics is so dismal. In the US only 4.5% of plastics is 
recycled (Ibid). 
By contrast, the Plastics Federation of South Africa (1991) claims that 14% of total 
plastics used are recycled, compared with 6% in the UK and only 3% in the US and Germany 
(Engineering Week, 1992:XI). One source interviewed disputed the Federation's figures for 
South Africa claiming that they include pre-consumer recycling of production waste which 
makes up the bulk of the local recycling. Nevertheless since domestic prices for virgin 
polymer in South Africa are significantly higher than world prices it is logical that a greater 
proportion of plastic is recycled. Given the extent of waste plastic visible in South Africa's 
urban areas there is considerable potential for further recycling if it can be made economically 
viable, and i~ adequate markets can be developed for recycled material, a problem not yet 
overcome in developed economies. Regrettably South African plastic producers have only just 
begun to adopt the international symbols identifying the type of plastic on their products 
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which facilitates the sorting process. 
Most EC countries and some US states have introduced regulations governing plastic 
usage and recycling. Several have banned non-recyclable or even non-reusable packaging and 
made compulsory the recycling of plastic packaging. For example in Italy 40% of packaging 
. must be recycled by 1992 and all shopping bags must be biodegradable or pay 100 lire per 
bag tax. The UK requires 25 % of the total to be recycled by the year 2000. Germany will 
soon require consumers to pay a deposit on all plastic packaging and the packaging producer 
will be required to take back from consumers any packaging it manufactured. This has 
affected South African fruit exporters who now have to ship back to South Africa all plastic 
fruit packaging. 
South Africa has thus far not introduced any regulations governing plastic usage and 
recycling. This is cause for concern as there is evidence (in a later chapter) to suggest that 
South Africa may be one of the most plastic packaging intensive countries. 
Separation of plastics from the waste stream has generally proved uneconomical. The 
alternative disposal solution then is incineration. Since plastics are hydrocarbons they have 
a good heat value. The problem area in this approach is the .toxic emissions which arise when 
plastics are incinerated, particularly PVC. 
Short of technological breakthroughs in the collection and sorting of waste plastic 
which would fundamentally change the cost structure of this operation, it appears that market 
forces are inadequate to bring about a 'closed loop' in plastics usage. The alternatives are 
either for the state to subsidise the plastic recycling industry or to regulate mandatory 
recycling. In both cases consumers will bear the burden. However in the latter case it will 
be restricted to those who purchase the packaging. Whilst this 'user pays' principle may 
appear equitable, the real issue is, will the user have a choice whether to use packaging or 
not? Will it not just result in a general rise in the cost of living? Will some classes in society 
not bear a heavier burden than others? 
In South Africa producers argue that the rapid urbanisation of mostly poor and very 
poor people, together with the prevailing transport network and shopping pattern has resulted 
in a real need for strong retail carry out shopping bags. Would a tax on such packaging not 
discriminate against those who can least afford it? These are just some of a complex of 
interrelated environmental and resource management issues which are best addressed by 
overarching policy addressing all the issues. That is beyond the scope 'of this study. 
Nevertheless some short term solutions are offered for South Africa in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Finally what impact is the international trend towards recycling likely to have on the 
demand for virgin polymer? Chem Systems (a leading industry consulting firm) projects an 
overall decrease in virgin polymer use of 4 % p.a. to 6% p.a. by the year 2000 as a result of 
recycling (Hydrocarbon Processing, 1991b:39). The cost of recycled polymers is fundamental 
.in efforts to create a 'closed loop' of recycling. A substantial difference between the price of 
'virgin' and recycled polymer is required. In the US only PET meets this requirement. At the 
other extreme polystyrene 'virgin' material is cheaper than the recycled material! (Ibid) For 
the majority of commodity polymers the price of recycled material lies within the price band 
for virgin material thus reducing the incentive to use recycled material. Until this price 
structure changes there is unlikely to be much change in the volumes of recycled material 
used. 
In summary the plastics industry is not an environment friendly industry. But then 
neither are the alternative materials, be they wood based or metal based. In addition plastics 
have made so many contributions to improve lifestyle and standards of living that it seems 
unthinkable to try and do away with them. If the impact of the plastic industry on the 
environment is to be limited, it appears the most effective option in the short term will be to 
regulate plastic waste as many countries already have, and to induce greater R&D efforts to 
resolve petrochemical industry emissions. 
Global Environmental Initiatives and theoretical underpinninl:s 
The global ramifications of pollutants in the biosphere, and the biosphere's finite 
ability to absorb and recycle them, make issues such as the nature of industrial production, 
~herever it may occur, an increasingly international issue. This has resulted in an 
international approach on some issues. 
In recent years some international agreements have been established. For example the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer was signed by delegates 
from 27 countries. It provides for the consumption of chlorofluorocarbons to be halved by 
the year 2000. In 1989 the Basel Conve~ controlling the transboundary movement of toxic 
waste was signed by 34 countries. 
Such issue-based agreements do not go to the heart of the complex web of interrelated 
issues such as access to 'clean' technologies, world debt, political power, economic 
comparative advantage etc. There is thus a growing need for some form of integrated global 
structural adjustment programme. 
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This need was addressed, even if only at the level of intention, at the Rio de Janeiro 
'Earth Summit' in 1992. The central issue behind the issue-base agreements and the 'Earth --Summit' is (environmentally) sustainable development. At the outside this implies the 
continued ability of human beings to inhabit planet earth, which is almost universally accepted 
.goal. Extrapolating backwards from there to today and more probl~matically, what ought or 
ought not to be done tomorrow, is where some of the difficulties begin. 
It may be helpful to identify two poles in the debate surrounding sustainable 
development in order to expose some of the key issues. 
At one pole is which has as its guiding objective 
'growth'. The analytical starting point, in this view, is the circular flow of exchange value 
within the production consumption loop. The weakness of this conceptual approach to 
accounting is that it does not, automatically, take into account negative externalities or market 
failure in respect of the environment and this, it is held, threatens the prospects of 
(environmentally) sustainable development. Developments in the field of applied economics 
are beginning to address this shortcoming. 
At other pole is an approac hich considers the economics of the one-way through 
put of energy/matter in an economy. This approach is concerned with the scale of 
environmental goods (energy/matter) put through the global economic system in the context 
of a finite ecosystem - planet Earth. In short an attempt is made to include the negative 
externalities within the conceptual framework employed. It implies an optimal scale for the 
circular flow and limits to aggregate economic growth. Such optimal scale and limits to 
growth are not, in this view, quantified by measures such as the volume of production or 
consumption, but rather by the depletion of environmental 'capital' (rather than interest) 
brought about in the course the production and consumption. In this way it does imply a limit 
to growth in so far as 'growth' is 'more of the same' but it does not imply limits to 
'development' - implying that it may be possible, through the use of better technologies for 
example, to improve output and consumption without increasing the level of energy/matter 
through put. This latter approach is not as politically popular as the limitless growth ideology. 
It requires a far less simplistic accounting approach to environmental resources which 
conventional economics is currently unable to capture. 
The conceptual weakness in both of these approaches lies in the difficulty of 
'~~~~x.w.~~i~si~ons. An emerging school of 
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'environmental economics' is struggling with these issues.6 Underpinning their difficulties 
is the question: what discount rate, for the future, ought to be factored into their calculations? 
The scope of this study does not permit further pursuit of this debate. It is how~ver 
worth simply identifying certain of the conceptual and theoretical weaknesses in the 
foundations upon which this study is trying to build. 
Conclusions 
Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the chemical industry is the largest 
consumer of energy among the manufacturing industries and that the South African industry 
is relatively more energy intensive than the US industry. In addition the local chemical 
process industry accounts for more than half of the volume of all manufacturing 
waste/pollution. The Plastic Products industry appears to be significantly less polluting than 
the upstream Industrial Chemicals industry. 
Internationally the levels of waste arising from the chemical industry are beginning 
to change financial relationships. Firms' environmental lial>i1ities or potential liabilities are 
beginning to influence credit as well as mergers and acquisitions. This together with 
environmental regulations in many developed countries are resulting in an increased 
proportion of chemical firms' capital spending being directed to this area in those countries. 
There is no evidence yet in South Africa of changing financial relationships attributable to 
environmental concerns. Internationally this phenomenon has contributed to a global 
redeployment of 'smokestack' industries to developing countries. Lower environmental 
standards in developing countries are improving' their relative competitive advantage. In 
response DMEs may employ environmental standards as non tariff barriers thus leading to 
a fusion of trade and environmental policy issues. Factors such as this and the nature of 
environmental pollutants, which do not recognise international boundaries, are stimulating 
attempts to deal with such problems at an international level. 
The response by organised employers to the tarnished image of the chemical industry 
and increasing regulation has been to conduct public relations exercises to try and limit 
damage to the industry's reputation and to belatedly develop two weak programmes 
t) 
(Responsible Care and the Charter for Sustainable Development) which rely upon self 
policin.&: Third party environmental auditing is likely to be more objective and credible.-
6. See for example Pearce et al (1990) and Pearce (1991). 
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The environmental impact of the plastics industry appears to be lower at the 
downstream Plastics Products industry than at the upstream end (petrochemicals and organic 
chemical manufacture). This is a factor to bear in mind when considering where the thrust 
of industrial policy should lie. 
The central issue in the plastic recycling is the cost structure of post consumer 
recycling. Until the price difference between 'virgin' and recycled polymer is widened the 
proportion of polymer recycled is likely to remain limited or where recycling is mandatory, 
the surplus of scrap and recycled plastic is likely to remain. Consequently lower prices of 
'virgin' polymer may reduce the level of recycling. 
In summary the plastics industry is not an environment friendly industry. But then 
neither are the alternative materials, be they wood based or metal based. In addition plastics 
have made so many contributions to improve lifestyle and standards of living that it seems 
unthinkable to try and do away with them. If the impact of the plastic industry on the 
environment is to be limited, it appears the most effective option in the short term will be to 
regulate plastic waste as many countries already have, and to induce greater R&D efforts to 
resolve petrochemical industry emissions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PETROCHEMICALS AND STATE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
Many developing countries have identified the petrochemical industry as a strategic 
industry and have taken steps to protect it from foreign dominance. In Latin America 
constitutional protection has been common whereas in Taiwan and South Korea more complex 
measures have been employed which were not so much concerned with the protection of 
national 'rigbts' as they were with the employment of measures designed to further the 
objectives of economic policy and development. 
As the traditional preserves of state ownership in the oil and petrochemical industries 
have succumbed to pressure for privatisation they have been required to grapple with 
sometimes conflicting policy objectives. The latter have, in important instances, turned upon 
the transfer price of petrochemicals from the public sector .to the private sector. 
This chapter reviews the manner in which certain Latin American and East Asian 
economies have grappled with these policy dilemmas and the results which have flowed from 
their efforts. In doing so major policy options are identified, thus setting the stage for an 
historical review of South Africa's efforts and future options. 
Developing countries have moved forcefully to create and maintain their essential 
chemical industries. Typically in the early developing stages the government's role has been 
to protect the industry (South Korea and Taiwan), to control production output and to create 
the necessary stimuli to develop the industry. As markets have grown and the possibilities of 
competition with them, generally the role of government has decreased. The discussion 
commences with certain Latin American countries followed by a discussion of South Korea 
and Taiwan. 
Latin America 
The oil and gas industries have traditionally been state monopolies in virtually all 
Latin American countries due to the strategic importance attached to energy issues and to the 
economic possibilities their control offered. These state monopolies were extended into 
petrochemicals in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, usually via subsidiaries 
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of the state owned oil and gas companies. In countries where the oil and/or gas resource base 
was historically weaker, such as Columbia and Chile, the state oil or gas companies have also 
been weaker and there has been more private sector involvement and less monopo~stic 
control. The degree of state monopolisation of petrochemicals has varied. In Brazil strong 
state monopolistic control was entrenched in the constitution. In Mexico the state monopoly 
in the petrochemical industry has to a large extent been secured by regulations restricting 
foreign investment. 
Petrochemical industry development in Latin America has tended to follow a general 
pattern in which the state has made the initial investments in the first one or two 
petrochemical complexes. In Brazil for example the first two petrochemical plants (crackers) 
built were government owned. The third was nominally privately owned but effectively 
controlled through the state's minority shareholding, its control of feedstock prices and 
supplies and the state's regulatory powers. Downstream derivative plants such as polymer 
plants in Brazil generally had a one third state ownership. Petrochemical projects were 
supported by state funding. 
The picture that emerges of the Latin American petrochemical industry by the late 
1980s is one of a highly regulated industry with monopolistic control of production resting 
in state owned companies often assisted by state subsidies. 
As consumer markets in the region have grown in size and sophistication, the policies 
and strategies adopted to meet this changing demand pattern have reflected the upstream 
requirements of the (state) oil companies. These factors together with debt and global trade 
liberalisation initiatives have contributed to a dramatic policy shift in Latin America beginning 
in the late 1980s. This shift has been away from state monopolisation of oil and 
petrochemicals to privatisation of these assets and the reduction of state monopolistic control. 
As this shift in policy has been implemented, developing countries have had to address 
the problems associated with petrochemical feedstock supply and pricing and their impact on 
ownership concentration and international competitive advantage. 
An earlier discussion has established that feedstock prices are an important, if not 
critical determinant of international competitiveness. Fluctuations in feedstock prices and 
availability of supply create uncertainty for petrochemical producers. Internationally major 
producers have responded to this by integrating their operations, both backwards and 
forwards, upstream and downstream. Many have developed captive, higher value, derivative 
markets for their primary products. In this way returns are, by virtue of the differentiated 
markets served by derivative products, sheltered to some extent from the cyclical nature of 
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feedstock prices. 
With the move to privatisation of state oil and petrochemical industries a problem 
which has repeatedly emerged is: at what price should the, say primary petrochemical, cross 
the boundary from one ownership to another ownership,? More specifically what is a fair 
.transfer price for petrochemicals (olefins)'? In many developing countries the boundary 
between one ownership and another in the petrochemical industry has often coincided with 
the boundary between public and private ownership. This bears directly upon concentration, 
in the sense of degree of vertical integration, and thus upon international competitiveness, for 
reasons which will become clear in a moment. 
Before proceeding it is necessary to briefly clarify some of the practical aspects 
involved in petrochemical production as this is of central importance to the problematic. 
Olefins are often the product which cross the boundary between one ownership and the next. 
The thing which makes them somewhat different from many other commodities is that they 
are volatile gases, expensive and difficult to transport. They may be considered almost non-
tradeables (in practice limited amounts are traded). Most olefins are transported by pipeline 
within particular economies. 
It is argued later that the olefin transfer price problem is at the heart of the matter in 
so far as the South African plastics industry is concerned. Consequently it may be instructive 
to examine the experiences of other developing countries in some detail in this regard as this 
may serve to inform the debate, in later chapters, on the options available to the South 
African petrochemical industry in addressing these questions. 
The limited size of developing economies requires industrial policy to pay much 
greater attention to the degree of monopolisation or concentration which emerges in the 
petrochemical sector. Petrochemical development in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina has 
analogies with South Africa's development in this sector in several, but sometimes differing, 
respects. In the inspection of the countries which follow, both the historical development of 
the petrochemical industry and the changing state policies adopted to deal with the issues 
which arise around concentration and industrial policy are considered. 
Latin American state monopolies in oil and petrochemicals had advantages in that the 
more profitable petrochemical companies were able to generate profits which could be used 
to fund expansion of upstream development in oil and gas recovery and refining. The 
converse was unfortunately also true. For example, in Brazil when Union Carbide, a 
downstream polymer producer, wanted to expand production the state owned petrochemical 
company could not increase its ethylene supplies because it lacked the funds to make the 
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necessary investment. This type of problem was symptomatic of the deepening economic 
difficulties faced by Brazilian industry partly as a result of the industrial strategies pursued 
prior to this. 
Brazil, by way of background, has domestic oil resources but is a nett importer of oil. 
Crude oil is refined in state owned refineries and naphtha from these refineries is the 
feedstock for the three, traditionally state owned, petrochemical complexes. Historically 
Brazil had followed an Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) development path, as did 
South Africa. The tariff protection necessary to support this strategy led to higher prices. 
Consequently when tariff barriers were lowered the prices of many chemicals in Brazil were 
above the international market price, enabling importers to undercut them, even when import 
duties had to be paid (Chemical Week, 4-12-91 :42). The lSI approach included state subsidies 
for naphtha up until 1991. 
A plait adopted in the late 1980s and which replaced the lSI strategy, made provision 
for the privatisation of all state controlled petrochemical and fertilizer companies by 1993 
(ECN, 7-12-92:4). In trying to privatise its petrochemical industry Brazil has had to grapple 
with three, sometimes conflicting, objectives: preventing the industry being taken over by 
foreign interests, preventing monopolies and trying to engender a more internationally 
competitive industry. 
The industrial strategy for petrochemicals which was pursued by Brazil's Industrial 
Development Council in the late 1980s advocated greater concentration in the sector thus 
promoting the formation of a few large conglomerates with the necessary market power to 
compete on international markets and even begin to invest in R&D activity which was weak 
(Chemical Week, 16-11-1988:37). But in order to restrict foreign ownership the state 
established a ceiling of 40% foreign ownership in basic petrochemical plants (pIaU's 
International Petrochemical Report, 12-6-92:4). And in order to prevent vertically integrated 
monopolies emerging it prohibited base petrochemical producers from owning more than 10% 
of their derivative customers' firms (Chemical Week, 8-4-92:20). This ruling cuts across one 
area of potential competitive advantage in petrochemical production, that is vertical 
integration and the transfer pricing this makes possible. 
The sale of the state's 83% share in the Trufino petrochemical plant (naphtha cracker) 
is a case in point. As a part of the privatisation programme state subsidies of (naphtha) 
feedstock were withdrawn. The obvious question then arose, what price should the 
petrochemical plant (cracker) pay to Petrobras (the state owned oil company) for its naphtha 
feedstocks? This dilemma was overcome by a regulation linking domestic naphtha prices to 
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world oil prices at a price of 1.2 times the crude oil price (Chemical Week, 8-4-92:20). This 
ratio is about the world average (Witcoff, 1992). 
As will be seen in due course, similar kinds of problems have arisen in SA, although 
almost a decade earlier. It will be argued that the mechanism used in South Africa to deal 
with this problem was less optimal than the Brazilian mechanism. 
Mexico has encountered difficulties similar to Brazil's in the privatisation of its 
petrochemical industry. That is, developing a policy which accommodates the sometimes 
conflicting demands of industrial policy, restrictions on foreign ownership and limitations on 
monopolies. The Mexican constitution, like Brazil's, prohibits foreign ownership of basic 
petrochemicals, although the definition of 'basic petrochemicals' is largely a political one. It 
shrank from 66 products to just 20 products in 1989 (MacDonald, 1991). Mexican industrial 
strategy has been driven by balance of payments considerations and has been directed towards 
increased production and export of petrochemicals and manufactured goods. In so far as the 
petrochemical industry is concerned, the strategy has been to have a positive balance of 
payments rather than self-sufficiency in all basic products (Chemical Week, 16-11-88:44). 
Local production has suffered from an inability to meet domestic demand in several important 
products especially in the state-controlled area of basic petrochemicals. This could be 
remedied by foreign investment, but this is not possible because in Mexico's efforts to find 
the optimum mix of foreign private and public ownership it introduced regulations restricting 
foreign investment. 
Mexico has been more cautious than Brazil on the issue of foreign ownership. It 
requires 100% of primary petrochemicals to remain in the hands of Petroleos Mexicanos 
(pemex). the state oil monopoly and its subsidiaries. Foreign ownership of secondary 
petrochemical derivatives is limited to a 49% share (MacDonald, 1991:21). 
A difficulty experienced in keeping ownership and control of primary petrochemicals 
in Pemex's hands is that downstream customers want to backward integrate upstream in 
efforts to improve their international competitiveness. At the same time the constitutionally 
responsible monopoly, Pemex, has experienced a shortage of finance which has curtailed 
investment in further capacity for primary petrochemicals. 
The innovative solution introduced by Pemex to this problem of conflicting policy 
objectives, was to offer the downstream customers, 'rent-to-buy' schemes. It proposed that 
the private sector build and pay for the necessary Pemex expansions and either be reimbursed 
in kind (product) over an agreed period of years or rent the plant back to Pemex for a fixed 
period of time. Ownership and the monopoly would remain in Pemex's hands, thus satisfying 
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the constitutional requirement. These 'rent-to-buy' schemes were not popular with US firms, 
but ~e approach was supported by Mexican firms and some French and German firms took 
up the offer (Chemical Week, 14-11-90:30). 
As in Brazil and similar to South Africa, the difficulty encountered is the price private 
firms ought to pay Pemex for its primary petrochemicals, a problem compounded by the fact 
that Pemex also competes with private producers and customers in the downstream derivatives 
market, much as SASOL does in South Africa. In a classic example of downstream customer 
pleading, the Mexican Chemical Industry Association argues: 
" What we're saying is that Pemex should treat Mexican industry as an integrated 
industry so that we can compete against other integrated producers worldwide, or use 
a fair transfer price for sale of feedstocks, rath~r than a spot market quotation basis. " 
(quoted in Chemical Week, 14-11-90:32) 
It would appear then that Pemex, somewhat like SASOL in South Africa, is dictating the 
prices of its petrochemicals to its customers, who, like SASOL's customers, have no 
alternative source of supply. 
Argentina has been the least cautious in its privatisation of basic petrochemical 
complexes. It has not restricted foreign ownership and has not appeared overly concerned 
about private monopolies emerging. Domestic petrochemical prices were higher than world 
prices which attracted imports of both petrochemicals and finished goods. In response, the 
goal of domestic producers was to reinforce their position in the domestic market and to 
reduce exports (BCN, 27-1-92:29). This is similar to the position that developed in South 
Africa during the 1980s. Argentina is hoping that privatisation will promote vertical 
integration with downstream units, reducing costs and increasing international competitiveness 
(BCN, 27-1-92:29). 
Much of the Latin American movement away from state petrochemical monopolies 
towards privatisation is taking place in the context of the liberalisation of trade and reductions 
and/or removals of state subsidies. World priced imports are placing increasing pressure on 
Latin American producer prices, which in turn are lowering profits and in some cases 
resulting in closures. Argentina's petrochemical industry for example, much like South 
Africa's, is saddled with small plants, high costs, lack of vertical integration, inadequate 
technology, and in some cases, low capacity utilization. It faces an uncertain future. 
Domestic producers in some Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico are as , 
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a result of entrenched state monopolies, denied access to vertical integration and the 
competitive advantage which can flow from this. Yet they have to compete with international 
producers who are vertically integrated. 
South East Asia: Taiwan and South Korea 
Comparisons are often made between South Africa and the economies of South Korea 
and Taiwan. Consequently it may be useful to consider how the latter have dealt with the 
intersecting concerns of monopoly control, concentration and industrial strategy and national 
development concerns? 
Both South Korea and Taiwan are renowned as examples of export led industrial 
growth. What is less well known is the extent of state involvement in bringing about their 
successes. In general they have pursued different approaches to industrialisation, underpinned 
by their different approaches to credit. Broadly Korea's industrialisation has hinged on the 
growth of several large conglomerates (Chaebol) whereas Taiwan's economic 'miracle' rests 
to a greater extent upon the back of 700 ()()() or so small and medium sized enterprises. 
Taiwan's approach to industrialisation has been complex. However it has four 
characteristics which are germane to our discussion here. Firstly a state with a staunchly anti-
big-capitalist approach. This has in general resulted in policy which has preferred not to let 
too many links in an industrial chain be held by the same hand. This leads to the second 
characteristic, a great emphasis upon the development of industrial production chains. Indeed 
Taiwan is generally recognised as a textbook example of a 'pipeline' economy. Thirdly policy 
has been constructed in such a fashion that foreign companies have been prevented from 
securing a large share of the domestic market. Fourthly state owned enterprises were used 
to assist in achieving policy objectives, for example the crude oil refining industry is 
dominated by the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) which has been able to influence 
petrochemical industry's development through its control of feedstocks. 
All of the first three of these four approaches ran into difficulties in the petrochemical 
sector, chiefly as a result of the large economies of scale and the need for foreign technology. 
The state's anti-big-capitalist approach has contributed to the fact that there are few 
Taiwanese companies among the ranks of the world's leading companies, but interestingly, 
one of them, indeed the largest conglomerate in Taiwan, is a petrochemical and plastics 
company, Formosa Plastics. It is also vertically integrated in petrochemicals (Wandycz et al, 
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1989).1 This vertical integration will increase following it being granted permission in 1989 
to build a $240 million petrochemical complex which is scheduled to come on stream in the 
mid 1990s. The Taiwanese chemical industry is also one of the few industries in which 
foreign companies have commanded a large share of the domestic market. 
Despite the inability of the state to have its way in the petrochemical industry it has 
nevertheless seen to it that foreign monopolies did not extract excessive rent and that an 
internationally competitive petrochemical chain was developed. In those areas outside of 
direct control the Taiwanese state has used a combination of indirect influence and other 
sometimes dubious methods to achieve these ends. 
The origins of the petrochemical industry are indicative of the role the state was to 
play in this industry. The first plant built was a PVC plastics plant. Following research which 
identified the plastic industry as a suitable target industry, the government supervised the 
construction of a PVC plant and in 1957, handed it over in running order to Y.C. Wang (who 
subsequently went on to become the country's leading businessman and is currently head of 
Formosa Plastics). This type of initiating role and state tutelage is the hallmark of Taiwanese 
and South Korean state intervention. Later in 1966 when th~re were three more producers of 
PVC it emerged that all four (including Wang's) were using an inefficient technology which 
also required imported intermediates, whilst the Chinese Petroleum Company had excess 
supplies of ethylene from which an intermediate could be made at lower cost than the 
imported intermediate. 
"So the government forced the four private producers of pvc to merge in a joint 
venture with the Chinese Petroleum Company and another state-owned chemical 
company, in order to adopt a more efficient ethylene-using production method." 
(original emphasis) (Wade, 1991: 92) 
The result was a state initiated monopoly in order to serve industrial efficiency objectives. 
The key to Taiwan's chemical industry is the slate of intermediate chemicals available 
from its refineries. These refineries are controlled by the state run Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation (CPC) which is also responsible for all natural gas operations and infrastructure 
and is the major petrochemical producer. At the upstream end then the state has traditionally 
monopolised the production of low profit raw materials for manufacturing. The first two 
1. For comparative purposes Fonnosa Plastics had sales in 1988 about 4.5 times those of SASOL's sales. 
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petrochemical plants (naphtha crackers) built in 1958 and 1975 were built by CPC. State 
monopolies control the upstream sector to this day. Currently nearly all of the feedstocks for 
the Taiwanese petrochemical industry come from the naphtha crackers that are associated with 
the CPC refineries. This traditional control over upstream operations is set to decline. Future 
-naphtha crackers currently being planned will be operated by a v~ety of interests (C&EN, 
10-2-92: 18). However, as will be seen below this is no guarantee that there will not be state 
influence. 
Expansion dow~stream from naphtha crackers into derivatives and plastic raw 
materials was generally by means of joint ventures with foreign firms, but under close 
government supervision and with much government ownership (Wade, 1991 :92). However 
in assessing the impact of state ownership Wade (1991) believes it is misleading to consider 
only those companies with a 50% or more state shareholding as the measure of state power. 
He cites the petrochemical industry as an industry in which an element of subterfuge (for the 
purposes of bolstering the state's image of economic liberalisation) was involved in 
maintaining state power. The government may take a minority shareholding in a joint venture 
with a foreign company and then cajole the MNC to accept its (POlitical) party holding 
company, Central Investments Holding Company (CIHC) to make up the balance of the 
shares. In return for this shareholding CIHC attained the right to appoint a few senior 
managers who act as the government's eyes and ears within the firm. This technique has been 
much used to keep MNCs under scrutiny. 
To secure competitive prices from foreign monopolies, indirect pressure has also been 
used. For example in the four-monthly negotiations between the Man-Made Fibres 
Association and their upstream monopoly supplier over prices the state is ostensibly not 
present. Yet the (state) Industrial Development Board "is constantly engaged in nudging and 
prodding behind the scenes, but wishes the decision to emerge from the negotiators 
themselves" (Wade, 1991:281). 
Other means used to secure competitive prices and a measure of control over foreign 
held monopolies involved the package of investment incentives offered. As a part of the 
inducements to attract foreign investors the government offered a protected domestic market 
to firms that would build a plant sufficiently large to meet the entire domestic demand, in that 
it undertook to purchase the entire output, but at a prescribed price. In this way it was able 
to negotiate the rent accorded to monopolies to provide the product at prices which accorded 
with national objectives. Should the firm not behave satisfactorily the government could 
remove its protection. 
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South Korea has followed a similar, but not identical path in the development of its 
petrochemical industry. It, like Taiwan, has used a variety of policy levers to deal with 
monopolies and oligopolies, such as credit, taxes, domestic content requirements, trade 
policy, and controls on direct foreign investment to influence and steer the path of 
.industrialisation. 
South Korea's first oil refinery was a joint venture between the South Korean 
government and Gulf Oil in 1964. A similar pattern of joint ventures was followed with the 
first petrochemical complex at Ulsan. All but one of the 20 petrochemical plants in this 
complex were built as joint ventures between state firms and established petrochemical 
MNCs, which were attracted by various tax and other incentives. Thus from the outset the 
state did not exercise an ownership monopoly. But the individual derivative producers did. 
In order to minimise the impact of product monopolies, South Korea, like Taiwan, attempted 
to spread them across as many owners as possible, and to maintain a vertical separation of 
ownership. This approach was reversed over time so as to enable advantage to be taken of 
the benefits of vertical integration which is now actively encouraged. 
The key determinant of the level of concentration in South Korea is the requirement 
for all new petrochemical capacity to be approved by the government. This provided the 
means to ensure for example, participation by domestic firms or the public. 
The state minimised rent extracted by virtue of monopoly positions by making import 
restrictions conditional upon the maintenance of prices, considered by it, to be acceptable. 
Feedstock prices are an important determinant of competitiveness. In South Korea naphtha 
feedstock prices were driven by the state policy of ensuring a certain minimum return to the 
refining industry. In order to achieve such returns refinery products such as naphtha feedstock 
prices were set higher than international prices, whilst at the same time the international 
petrochemical prices against which the state determined 'acceptable' prices were low. Despite 
a 30% tariff protection this policy approach led to heavy financial losses to the petrochemical 
industry until this policy was abandoned in 1986. Subsequently there have been no controls 
on the import or price of naphtha. Instead naphtha prices have become a function of 
international market prices. Because South Korean crackers are increasingly reliant on 
imported naphtha it is difficult for them to produce derivatives at advantageous prices. 
Over the period from the 1960s to late 1980s the state withdrew from ownership of 
petrochemical complexes. During the 1970s it encouraged the participation of domestic 
conglomerates in the industry by offering credit at negative real interest rates, provision of 
infrastructure and government financing. These incentives have declined since the late 1970s. 
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. By 1989 there were only two naphtha crackers in South Korea, operated by two 
private companies Yukong and Daelim. Downstream derivative production was in the hands 
of just a few groups. For example vinyl chloride manufacture, in 1991, was an oligopoly of 
just two producers. Permitting high levels of concentration has facilitated the emergence of 
plants with internationally comparable economies of scale. 
In the late 1980s South Korea chose the petrochemical industry as one of the major 
industries for the promotion of its industrialisation (Enos et al, 1988:47). At this time the 
petrochemical industry was deregulated to a significant extent and petrochemical producers 
began to integrate downstream and to enter into competition with their downstream 
customers. Daelim was already back integrated into crude oil refining, an industry which was 
also expanding rapidly at the time. Refining capacity doubled between 1988 and 1992. At the 
same time downstream manufacturers began moving upstream in attempts to secure feedstocks 
on a competitive basis through the advantages of vertical integration. Consequently the 
industry is "in the process of achieving a remarkable standard of vertical integration. By 1990 
no olefin producer will be in the merchant market but serving captive demands." (Vergara 
& Babelon, 1990:21). This process continued in the wave of investment resulting in the last 
of six new naphtha crackers coming on stream by mid 1993. Each cracker is owned by a 
different Chaebol, between whom there is fierce rivalry. 
It appears that when South Korea relaxed its control on pricing in the upper reaches 
of the petrochemical and plastics pipeline, it did so into a sufficiently large and fiercely 
competitive market. This is an important consideration to bear in mind in the South Africa 
petrochemical market when proposals are made for its deregulation. 
The pattern that emerges in the historical development of South Korea is one that 
commences with monopolies but as the number of competitors expands through an 
oligopolistic phase the extent of state regulation is relaxed and substituted by competition. 
Nevertheless controls remain wherever government considers the level of concentration 
to be too high. Prices must be submitted to government whenever a single company controls 
over 50% of the market, or when three companies control over 70% of the market. Such 
regulation has resulted in domestic prices being kept at levels lower than international prices 




All of the examples discussed have highlighted the difficulties state policy makers have 
had to deal with in the form of a matrix of, sometimes conflicting, policy objectives in the 
·petrochemicals industry. These comprise industrial policy objective.s, the extent o~ limitations 
upon private ownership and limitations upon the emergence of monopolies and/or 
concentration in ~e industry. Overlain upon these intersecting objectives lies another, striving 
for international competitiveness, which in the petrochemical industry, as earlier chapters 
have shown, requires very large firms capable of being 'world players'. If this objective is 
pursued by a firm (whether privately or state owned) based in a relatively small economy, 
it is almost axiomatic that such a firm will enjoy a domestic monopoly. The difficulty for 
policy makers is to arrive firstly at the optimal mix of-policy objectives within the parameters 
of the social relations of production and then to bring to bear the appropriate policy 
instruments capable of realising the objectives. 
In each of the countries examined, the need for vertical integration has had to be 
addressed (because it is one of the keys to competitive advantage) in the context of ownership 
and appropriate transfer pricing mechanisms. Solutions to this problem have generally 
attempted to establish some mechanism or other which results in internationally competitive 
prices. 
In both the Latin American and the Asian countries the overriding commonality in the 
petrochemical industry has been state involvement in one form or another. State involvement 
in Taiwan and South Korea has been central in the development of the petrochemical 
industries in those countries. The full range of industrial and trade policy levers have been 
applied, as well as state ownership and subsidies at different points in time, depending upon 
the prevailing objectives. At times monopolies were promoted, at other times competition. 
But almost always these two countries sought to deliver internationally competitive priced 
intermediate inputs to the labour intensive links in the production chain in order to promote 
export orientated industrial policy objectives. In addition Taiwan consistently sought to limit 
the role of multinational companies in the domestic petrochemical industry. 
South Korea provides two especially interesting lessons for South Africa. Firstly the 
state's use of tariffs to keep local feedstock prices down, particularly naphtha. Secondly the 
change in policy, from one attempting to avoid concentration arising from vertical integration, 
to one promoting vertical integration but only in the context of much greater domestic and 
international competition in the local market. 
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This is in contrast to the Latin American model which has placed great emphasis on 
state ownership. Latin American countries have entrenched state monopolies in the 
constitution and adopted rigid regulations about foreign ownership. This has led to all kinds 
of complications such as securing capital for new investment and transfer pricing which have 
been obstacles to development in the industry. On the other hand the two Asian NICs have 
chosen instead to focus upon the prices of intermediate inputs in production chains as the key 
issues and used flexible, but not lax, policy measures to arrange them in such a way that 
downstream industries could export. Where unacceptable levels of concentration or foreign 
ownership have occurred state regulations have been applied to limit their power and secure 
acceptable pricing. 
All of these issues are relevant to the South African commodity plasticsjiliere and are 
taken up at appropriate places in the following chapters. 
CHAPTER 4 




Previous chapters have sought to locate the petrochemical industry within the wider 
international chemical industry and have highlighted its pivotal role in industrial 
modernisation. In this chapter the focus begins to narrow towards the chief concern of this 
study, the development of the South African petrochemical and commodity plastics filiere. 
The importance attributed to the petrochemical industry in newly industrialising 
countries is evident in the industrial policies pursued by certain Latin America and Asian 
countries, in particular Taiwan and South Korea. The latter two have helped to promote their 
petrochemical firms into the exclusive ranks of the leading world companies. 
In contrast, how has a relatively small South African economy lacking in crude oil 
reserves and with only limited natural gas resources tackled the task of developing a 
petrochemical industry? How has this sector come to be the dominant sector of the chemical 
industry? Such fundamental questions underpin this study. 
The answers to these questions are inextricably bound up in a number of intertwined 
historical processes: the evolution of the domestic chemical industry, the emergence of the 
three dominant chemical firms and the apartheid state's pursuit of military/strategic policy 
objectives, particularly in the liquid fuels industry. For convenience these processes are 
reduced to a discussion of four sub-sectors of the chemical industry: fertilizers, explosives, 
synfuels and petrochemicals. 
Historically the chemical industry originated in and was dominated by production for 
mining (explosives) and agricultural (fertilizer) markets. It is in these sectors that some of the 
dominant firms have their origins. As the historical development of these sectors is unfolded 
links are drawn with international developments and it is argued that the early concentration 
of the industry was not unrelated to similar developments in the industry internationally. 
The origins of South Africa's synfuel and uniquely coal-based chemical and 
petrochemical industry are identified. It is argued that the rationale for this unique industry 
is to be found within the convenient extension of Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) 
policy into the apartheid state's military/strategic policy of liquid fuels self-sufficiency. 
The launch of South Africa's petrochemical industry is described and contrasted with 
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South Korea's. This comparison yields helpful insights. For example the extent of South 
Korean state intervention in market processes appears to have been far more thorough going 
than South Africa's. While the South African market was regulated to a similarly high degree 
the state provided only feedstocks and held back from direct participation further downstream 
·and from implementing a more full blown industrial strategy. This was partly in deference 
to market ideology, and it is argued, with less favourable results. 
Within the parameters of this evolving South African policy mix, the history of the 
petrochemicals and plastics raw materials sectors was played out. The primary actors in this 
history were three large firms, SASOL, AECI and Sentrachem. Their origins (SASOL and 
Sentrachem were the result of state initiatives) and evolution are tracked. SASOL, after 
partial privati~tion, increasingly became the dominant firm. AECI and Sentrachem adopted 
different strategies to deal with SASOL's expansion into 'their' traditional markets. 
The interplay of state policy and the strategies of the leading chemical fmns led to the 
industry undergoing a significant restructuring in the mid 1980s. Despite a narrower slate of 
locally available petrochemicals, the next link down the production chain, the plastic raw 
materials sector nevertheless supplanted the traditionally dominant sectors. At the same time 
the capital intensity of the chemical industry was significantly deepened. This was 
accompanied by a significant shift in the racial composition of the workforce in favour of 
whites at the expense of blacks. All of these developments have important implications for 
the future development of the petrochemical and plastic industries. 
Historical Develwment 
The origins of the South African chemical industry, like much other industrial activity, 
are rooted in the development of the mining industry. The first chemical plant built in 1896 
was De Zuid-Afrikaansche Fabrieken Voor Ontplotbare Stoffen at what is now known as 
Modderfontein, just outside Johannesburg. To this day large quantities of explosives are 
manufactured on this site. The Modderfontein plant was followed by De Beers explosives in 
Somerset West (near Cape Town) in 1901 and Kynoch explosives at Umbogintwini near 
Durban in 1909, which like Modderfontein has also grown into a large chemical complex. 
The second chemical sector to be established was the fertilizer industry in the early 
1920s. First was a fertilizer plant at Umbogintwini in 1920, established by a multinational 
company, Nobel Explosives. This was followed by a superphosphates plant at Somerset West 
set up by Cape Explosives. Thus in a short space of time the fundamentals of the industry 
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were established; three geographical anchors, Modderfontein, Umbogintwini and Somerset 
West were set in place and have continued to playa major role in chemical production. From 
an industrial point of view the explosives and fertilizer industries were the launching platform 
for the industry and continue to be major sectors in the industry to this day. 
These industrial and geographic anchors were also the foundation for the emergence 
of a large company, which for many years has monopolised important parts of the chemical 
industry. This came about firstly through a merger between Nobel's and Kynoch subsidiaries 
in 19181• In 1924 this merged company again merged with the Cape Explosives Works, 
controlled by De Beers to form African Explosives and Industries, later known as African 
Explosives and Chemical Industries and now as AECI. This took place in the context of the 
threat posed to British companies by the rise of the giant German chemical firm, IG 
Farbenindustrie. 
Four of these threatened companies (Brunner, Mond and Company, Nobel Industries, 
and the British Dyestuffs Corporation) reacted by forming a defensive cartel in 1926. That 
was quickly followed by an agreement between Imperial Chemical Industries (lCI) and the 
South African company to apply monopolistic marketing principles and to divide up markets 
between themselves. All three of the South African firms which formed the early AECI were 
British and their coming together under ICI and De Beers should not be seen apart from the 
increasing concentration taking place in the British chemical industry at the time (Innes, 
1984: 125). This concentration was not without rewards for the local mining industry which 
benefited from lower explosives prices (Ibid). Thus production in the two main pillars of the 
South African chemical industry, explosives and fertilizers, came under centralised control 
from an early stage. 
Production of these bulk or commodity type products dominated from the early days 
and continues to dominate the character of the industry. This may be contrasted for example 
with the emergence of the German chemical industry which found its early strengths in dye 
manufacturing, which is more of a speciality type product. 
The production of commodity chemicals is typically a capital intensive ·activity 
requiring large economies of scale and for this reason, as infant industries, they are often 
afforded considerable protection. Such industries are conducive to high levels of concentration 
of ownership in small economies as indeed occurred in the South African chemical industry. 
This together with protected markets did allow long term investment to occur. However the 
1. '!'he South African merger with Nobel was followed later by an international merger involving Nobel into ICI, 
which became one of the two large shareholders in ABCI. 
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coincidence of concentration and protection is not necessarily conducive to an innovative and 
efficient style of manufacturing, indeed the opposite may be the case. 
In the period leading up to World War 2, expansion of the industry was limited. 
However two seminal developments occurred which subsequently had a major impact on the 
industry. In 1932 a joint venture between Anglovaal and the British Burmah Oil Company 
called SA Torbanite Mining and Refining (Satmar) was set up to process torbanite oil shale 
for fuel. This was the forerunner of SASOL. 
Also in 1932 AECI began the synthetic production of ammonia from coal for the 
production of nitrates used in the manufacture of explosives, a chemical route used to this 
day. 
In these two developments lie the origins of the unique character of the South African 
chemical industry, its heavy reliance upon coal as a basic raw material and its pursuit of self 
sufficiency in fuels in the absence of oil and gas resources. Whilst coal based chemical 
production was also characteristic of chemical industries in other countries at that time, they 
began to move away from coal towards oil and gas during and after the Second World War. 
South Africa on the other hand has increased its reliance upon coal. 
A third company which has come to dominate the chemical industry, Sentrachem, also 
has its origins in the 1930s. In 1935 National Maize Products began production of ethanol, 
methylated spirits and solvents by fermentation of maize in Germiston. This later became 
National Chemical Products (NCP) which joined the Sentrachem group in 1967 and is still 
an important company within the group. During the Second World War (1941) the 
government built Klipfontein Organic Products (KOP) at Chloorkop near Johannesburg to 
manufacture mustard gas from chlorine and in the ·process launched the chlor-alkali industry. 
After the War production was switched to insecticides and ownership passed into the private 
sector in the 1960s when Federale Volksbeleggings (a company with its origins in the 
Broederbond) took ownership. This company became a founder member of the Sentrachem 
group. Chloorkop remains an important site for chlor-alkali production. 
The major development in the 1950s was the formation of the South African Coal, Oil 
and Gas Corporation, subsequently to become SASOL. The basis for the company was a 
licence Anglovaal had obtained from the German company Duitse Ruhrchemie for Fischer 
Tropsch (oil from coal) technology. 2 State capital via the Industrial Development Corporation 
(lDC) was added and by 1955 SASOL 1 began producing petrol from coal at Sasolburg. 
2. Fischer Tropsch technology is an indirect liquefaction of coal route. First the coal is reduced to its constituent 
gases and then in a second stage the desired gasses are synthesised into the raw materials for liquid fuels. 
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SASOL 1 had a two track system in the second, or synthesis stage of the process. One 
of these tracks used the ARGE (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lurgi-Ruhrchemie) fixed-bed process 
developed by Lurgi after the Second World War. The other track utilised a 'synthol' 
technology sourced from Kellogg Company Inc of the US.) By varying the throughput in the 
different tracks the yield could be changed. The Arge track produced more wax than motor 
fuels and although this was not in accordance with the objectives of the project, it has 
subsequently provided SASOL with a product which has been widely exported. The synthol 
track was a more efficient petrol producer and also produced methane used for industrial gas 
which was marketed through a SASOL subsidiary, Gascor, for the first time in 1967. 
Both of these technologies were superior to those used in Germany during the Second 
World War, I)evertheless they were still considered first generation technologies. Worst of 
all despite what had been a major investment, the fuel output was limited. The exact output 
has been a closely guarded secret but various estimates have put it between 4 000 barrels per 
day (bpd) and 7000 bpd.4 This is a paltry output compared with the Standard Oil refinery 
built at the same time which had a capacity of about 100 000 bpd. 
In the same year, 1955, AECI commenced production of the first locally produced 
plastic, PVC, on the Umbogintwini site and in the process integrated other plants within the 
group. This was like many PVC plants, a forward integration from a chlor-alkali plant (using 
the chlorine from the latter). Also AECI had bought Rand Carbide in 1934 and thus had a 
supply of carbide within the group and a measure of vertical integration from the outset. 
(Carbide is used in the carbide acetylene process to PVC). Although elsewhere in the world 
other PVC producers were switching from coal to crude oil based PVC, (via naphtha via 
ethylene) AECI utilized the carbide acetylene route, which did not rely on imported crude oil. 
Import substitution was beginning in earnest. It did this despite the fact that Standard Oil had 
commenced building Durban's first oil refinery in 1954 and supplied refinery gas for the 
production of ammonia in a new ammonia plant built at that time. 
These two developments, SASOL 1 and the Durban PVC plant are the origins of 
South Africa's petrochemical and plastics industry. The historical development of the 
petrochemical and plastics industry is elaborated further in a later section. 
Phosphatic fertilizer production received a big boost in 1950 when an IDC owned 
company Foskor, was established to exploit phosphate deposits at Phalaborwa. This led to 
3: This p.rocess experienced technical difficulties for a few years as it had never previously been scaled up from 
pIlot project scale. 
4. See Conlon, 1984: 15 and Rustomjee, 1986: 141. 
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AECI building a superphosphate fertilizer plant at Modderfontein in 1963 using Foskor rock. 
Foskor also made possible two Triomf Fertilizers plants. The Potchefstroom fertilizer plant 
and the phosphoric acid export plant at Richards Bay came on stream in 1967. 
Sentrachem was established in 1967 from four existing companies; KOP, principally 
owned by Federale Volksbeleggings, the Synthetic Rubber Company whose major shareholder 
was the IDC, NCP another public company using Distillers (UK) technology, and Karbochem 
a small development company with rights to SASOVs ethylene output which was another 
IDC and Federale Volksbeleggings joint venture. The three founding directors were Siegfried 
Kuschke, Chairman of the IDC, Dr Etienne Rousseau the chairman of SASOL and previously 
a chairman of Federale; and Jack Irvin the head of NCP at the time. The role of Federale 
Volksbeleggings, and the state (through the IDC) caused some to view Sentrachem as the 
Afrikaner's answer .to the more British orientated AECI (FM Special Survey, 25-5-79). 
Having brought this outline history of the chemical industry to the point where all the 
three major players, AECI, Sentrachem and SASOL are on stage, the approach will be 
changed. The development of the chemical industry is analysed from four vantage points: 
fertilizers, explosives, petrochemicals and synfuels. This approach yields some insights into 
the interrelated nature of the different parts of the industry, particularly synfuels and 
petrochemicals. This complex web of production streams is of course overlain by corporate 
ownership patterns. As the analysis unfolds insights are gained into the manner in which 
corporate. strategies respond to these interlinked production and ownership systems. 
Fertilizers 
Fertilizer has been a major sector of the chemical industry. Traditionally it was 
dominated by AECI but in the early 1970s a new and rising firm, Triomf Fertilizer looked 
set to challenge AECl's dominance. AECI, in its usual fashion, preferred a takeover to 
competition and took a 49% interest in Triomf and merged the two firms' fertilizer marketing 
and production facilities. 
By the early 1980s quantitative import controls and the operation of a cartel by 
Triomfl AECI in an agreement with Fedmis left essentially only these two producers with 90% 
of the market (Innes, 1984:211). A Competition Board decision ended the market-sharing 
agreement and other restrictive practices operated by these two producers as well as state 
regulation of the fertilizer price. This opening up of a long protected market was followed 
by a number of producers entering the market over the next few years; AECI separated from 
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Triomf in 1984 and re-entered the market under its old Kynoch brand name. Triomf 
Fertilizer, Bonus Fertilizer, Sentrachem's Fedmis Fertilizer (acquired from Federate in 1980) 
and Omnia were also active. Fertilizer production peaked in 1981 at 3,3 million tonnes. Price 
control was removed in 1982/83. A revised tariff structure introduced competition from 
imports. SASOL entered the market in 1984 with a plant in Secunda which exacerbated the 
overcapacity problems in the industry, which may be partly attributed to droughts in the early 
1980s. SASOL was a major raw material supplier to the fertilizer industry and its entry into 
fertilizer production was its first foray into competition with its customers since its partial 
privatisation in 1979. Industry observers watched with interest to see what would emerge 
from the looming battle for the fertilizer industry. 
A price war duly commenced following a 13% upswing in demand in 1986 over 1985, 
with prices in 1987 being lowered by as much as 40%. At the same time export markets in 
Brazil especially, declined. Capacity closure, mothballing and market exits were the order of 
the day. Bonus exited the market, and Triomf was liquidated. Omnia surviv~ by focusing 
on niche markets. By the end of the 1980s demand had declined to 1985 levels. Expectations 
were that the three large survivors in the local market, SASOL, AECI and Sentrachem's 
Fedmis would have to come to some arrangement. Shortly thereafter Fedmis sold its 
remaining operations to an AECI/SASOL joint venture. Triomf was rescued from insolvency 
by a mysterious offshore firm, Indian Ocean Fertilizer (lOF) , and allowed to continue 
operations for export purposes only. Subsequently it emerged that the IDC's Foskor (supplier 
of phosphate rock) and a West African government were behind IOF. 
The upshot was, that from AECI's point of view, the fertilizer business had been 
destroyed by a semi-public company which had the unfair advantage of massive state support 
or subsidy through the petrol price regulatory system. This was not the last time AECI would 
make this complaint. These events in the fertilizer market seem akin to SASOL tearing down 
the door in order to get in. However since that time SASOL has proceeded in a somewhat 
more genteel manner as it has entered into competition with its customers. Despite the battle 
between AECI and SASOL on the fertilizer front they were nevertheless cooperating, 
(although not completely happily) in the petrochemical and plastics industry (see below). 
It is interesting to note that at the time the battle in the fertilizer market was being 
played out (1986-88) SASOL was not expanding its supply of ethylene to feed AECI's 
polyethylene business which in 1988 could only operate at 76% capacity and necessitated 
imports of some 40 000 tonnes of polymer (BTl Report No. 2932:5). Lower polyethylene 
sales would of course have reduced AECl's ability to fund fertilizer losses. It is tempting to 
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speculate about the coincidence of these developments and to what extent they were the result 
of deliberate corporate strategy on the part of SASOL, but since the nature of South African 
business conduct is that such matters are not made public, one cannot be sure . 
. Explosives 
The explosives industry has dominated the chemical industry for many years. As a 
result of a long standing agreement between the Chamber of Mines and AECI, it had an 
unrivalled monopoly for many years. It is more than a coincidence that Anglo American is 
a major player in the Chamber of Mines and a 48 % shareholder of AECI. This monopoly and 
the size of South Africa's mining economy has allowed AECl's explosives sector to become 
one of the few sectors of the chemical industry which is internationally competitive (CSIR, 
1990:22). Despite this exports are a small proportion of output. 
When the Competition Board ended AECl's monopoly in 1982, new entrants were 
able to enter the market. Simultaneously AECI began a decentralisation initiative, siting 
smaller plants away from Modderfontein, its core explosives plant. In 1982 it opened an 
explosives plant in Bophuthatswana, followed by another in Welkom in 1983, another in 1985 
at Bethal, another in 1986 at Zomerveld in the OFS. The Modderfontein plant was 
modernised in 1987. National Explosives opened the way for new entrants to the industry in 
the early 1980s. SASOL's Secunda based SMX plant followed in 1986. This was the second 
industry after fertilizers in which SASOL, traditionally a raw materials supplier, moved 
downstream and entered into competition with private companies. The tussle between these 
two large players resulted, typically, in smaller producers being absorbed by them. 
Corporate stratet:ies 
These fertilizer and explosives episodes demonstrate the different approaches adopted 
by AECI and Sentrachem to SASOL's entry into markets which had largely been their 
preserve. AECI has challenged SASOL head on each time SASOL has threatened its markets. 
Sentrachem by contrast has opted to give way and relocate its activities and at the 
same time to make itself as independent as possible of SASOL's raw materials. For example 
it exited from the fertilizer industry and continued to move the company into speciality 
chemicals. In the plastics industry, by the time SASOL entered the polypropylene market it 
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had already helped to establish a propylene importing facility and set up its own propylene 
source at the SAPREF in Durban. It also diversified its PP product into different markets. 
(More on this below.) 
AECI on the other hand has its Number 4 ammonia plant at the heart of its 
Modderfontein explosives and fertilizer complex. Built in 1974 this coal based plant was 
plagued by technical problems in its early years requiring an extra boiler in 1981 at a cost 
of RlO.4 million. Latterly this ageing plant has experienced increasing maintenance costs. 
AECI will require a new ammonia facility in the near future. Meanwhile SASOL has 
revamped the SASOL 1 plant which now includes a new and much larger ammonia plant. It 
is rumoured that joint venture discussions between AECI and SASOL on ammonia 
production, floundered as a result of AECI's efforts to place the bulk of the risks at SASOL's 
door. 
AECI's strategy, or the lack of it, has resulted in a loss of market share to SASOL 
in fertilizers and explosives. Furthermore it appears likely that in future it will become 
increasingly dependent upon SASOL for feedstock for these products unless it takes remedial 
action. At the same time AECI has been tied to SASOL feedstocks for its plastic raw 
materials business (polyethylenes and PVC). AECI's plant is ageing. The average age of plant 
was almost 9 years in 1990 and has been rising since 1983 (Tison, 1991:3) largely as a result 
of limited investment. By contrast Sentrachem's average age of plant is just five years (Tison, 
1992a). 
Synfuels 
The 1973 oil crisis triggered radical changes in the South African liquid fuels industry . 
Government thinking up until that time had been focused on self sufficiency type policies and 
in so far as oil supplies were concerned it had already built SASOL 1. The oil crisis strongly 
reinforced this thinking as the price of crude oil rose from $3 to $12 per barrel. Expansions 
were quickly carried out to increase the limited capacity at SASOL 1 whilst the government 
deliberated. At this time South Africa's international political position was deteriorating as 
a result of the apartheid policies being pursued. 
The closing net of international pressure began in 1963 when the United Nations 
General Assembly passed a resolution condemning South Africa's 'illegal occupation of 
Namibia' and called upon member states to halt all oil exports to South Africa. Compliance 
with this resolution was however voluntary as only a Security Council resolution could effect 
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mandatory sanctions. In 1974 a resolution went before the UN Security Council calling for 
mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Although the US, Britain and France rallied to 
defend apartheid and used their veto to block this resolution it must nevertheless have 
weighed heavily on the minds of apartheid state planners, confronted as they were by not only 
apparently rising oil prices but also dwindling supplies as well. . 
This international pressure combined with higher oil prices hardened government 
resolve to 'go it ~one'. Finally on December 5, 1974 the cabinet announced that a second 
synfuels plant, SASOL 2, much larger than the first, would be built. This was the signal that 
changed a number of developments. This decision, made for military/strategic reasons, 
marked a major turning point in South Africa's liquid fuels history. The consequences of this 
decision have not in the past 18 years worked themselves out of South Africa's liquid fuels 
nor its petrochemical industries and seem unlikely to· do so in the next 10 to 20 years. The 
impact of this decision is multiple and will be encountered repeatedly in this study. 
Further external shocks again concentrated the attentions of the apartheid state. In 
1977 the United Nations Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa. The fall of the government of the Shah of Iran precipitated a second oil crisis during 
which oil prices leapt from $12.5 to $36 per barrel. At that time South Africa was almost 
wholly dependent upon Iranian oil. The combination of factors influenced the state to proceed 
with the construction of a third synfuel plant. The decision to build SASOL 3 (a mirror image 
of SASOL 2) was made in 1979. 
It is worth noting that the decisions to build SASOL 2 and 3 were both made during 
peaks in the international oil price and at a time when oil price projections caused a flurry 
of investigations into alternative sources of energy. Also at the time these large investment 
decisions were made the state would presumably have found solace in the gold price boom 
as a potential source of funding for its synfuel decisions. S Nevertheless some measure of the 
state's strategic concerns may be gained from the fact that no other economy of similar size 
devoted as large a proportion of investment to coal based synfuels as South Africa did. These 
two SASOL plants cost R7 000 million or R31 500 million in 1991 Rands, a very large 
investment for the South African economy (Sasol Facts, Undated: 13). 
International opposition to apartheid continued to strengthen. Further United Nations 
resolutions in December 1981 (36/172 G) and December 1982 (37/69 J) culminated in a 
General Assembly resolution on 5th December 1983 calling for the Security Council to 
5. The US $ gold price rose at an average annual rate of 35.7% and 19.1 % between 1970-75 and 1975-81 
respectively (Nattrass 1990: 110). 
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"consider urgently a mandatory embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products 
to South Africa" (38/39 J). This was again opposed by a small number of countries including 
the US, UK, France and Germany. 
This continuing international pressure contributed in 1987 to a decision to embark 
.upon yet another grand synfuels scheme, Mossgas or Mossref at a final cost of about R12 
billion. It was designed to produce petrol from offshore natural gas, piped 90 to 140 km to 
Mossel Bay. The exact size of this investment is itself a source of some controversy. 
Originally budgeted at RS.5 billion it was announced by Minister Pik Botha on 31 August 
1994 that the total cost at December 1993 was R 11.1 bn (Business Day, 1-9-94: 4). The output 
is "modest (even derisory)", (FM 13-12-91 :23). Its 'nameplate' capacity is variously 
estimated between 25 000 bpd and 40 000 bpd (Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South 
Africa, 1991, No 25:1 and FM 13-12-91:23). Most ·recent references to Mossgas give it a 
capacity of 32 000 bpd, less than 10% of local capacity (MERG, 1993:3). The magnitude of 
this scandalous decision is evident in the following comparisons. Oil industry calculations 
suggest that the cost of replacing the country's entire existing refinery capacity would be 
roughly the same (Financial Times 13-12-91). Democratic Party energy spokesman Roger 
Hulley estimated that all the houses in South Africa could have been electrified for less than 
half the cost of Mossgas (Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa, 1991, No 
25:6). SASOL has claimed that it could have expanded capacity by an equivalent amount at 
a cost of only R 500 million, ie about one sixth of the cost. At the time chemical companies 
concerned about the waste, both of money and gas, lobbied for the gas to be used to make 
petrochemicals (see below). 
The apartheid state's preoccupation with liquid fuels self sufficiency set in motion a 
train of thought in state policy circles in which military/strategic criteria were increasingly 
substituted for commercial criteria with the result that each episode was more outrageous than 
the last. Consider: SASOL 1 built in 1955 was capital intensive but of limited scale. SASOL 
2 was a large capital intensive project approved in 1974. SASOL 3 doubled it, approved in 
1979. Finally Mossgas, the ultimately absurd project, was approved in 1987, a tiny refinery 
(32000 bpd) reliant upon an uncertain gas supply built at hugely disproportionate expense. 
The increasing military dimension to these decisions is also evident in the Mossgas 
technology choice. It reverts back to the SASOL 1 ARGE type reactor in order to produce 
more diesel, because according to Bernard Smith, Mossgas Managing Director, 'the generals 
wanted more diesel' (at a press conference at the Wilderness in December 1991). (Tanks and 
other heavy military vehicles tend to be diesel powered and SASOL's synthol process had 
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experienced problems in producing diesel.) The structure of the motor fuel market had been 
altering through the latter half of the 1980s and into the early 1990s - the major change being 
a move away from diesel to petrol (see Table 4.1). As growth in the market occurs ther~ is 
relatively less demand for diesel, and assuming motor fuel producers attempt to follow the 
market, the generals would have been right to be concerned about the availability of diesel 
capacity in local refinery and synfuel plants. Of course this is not to suggest that building 
Mossgas was in any wayan appropriate means to address this change, but merely to support 
Bernard Smith's point. 
I Table 4.1 SA Motor fuel market (~) I 
Petrol Diesel Total 
1988 59.5 40.5 100 
1989 60.6 39.4 100 
1990 61.8 38.2 100 
1991 63.0 37.0 100 
1992 64.3 - 35.7 100 
Jan-JuD 93 64.7 35.3 100 
Growth 88-92 ~ p.a. 2.41 -1.69 
Source: "A"OI 
The full extent of foregone opportunities and negative consequences of Mossgas are 
still to emerge. Once all the veils of secrecy covering Mossgas and its performance are lifted, 
its continued operation is almost certain to come -under scrutiny. In the light of the foreign 
debt incurred by Mossgas most commentators have agreed that it will be the lesser of two 
evils to allow Mossgas to continue operating, rather than to close it down. One public policy 
issue which bedevils attempts to establish Mossgas' viability is what happens to Mossgas' 
product. Given its strategic nature, one might expect it to be given first preference on the 
local market. However because the crude oil refiners expanded capacity in the early 1990s 
they refused to uplift Mossgas' output at the domestic price (the IBLC - see Annexure B) and 
instead only pay a (lower) export parity price. The difference has in fact been made up by 
motorists. Part of the Equalisation Fund levy on the petrol fund has been used to pay 
Mossgas. The real issue is who should be required to export, Mossgas or the crude refiners? 
This is one of the many complex public policy issues awaiting resolution in the liquid fuels 
industry. Some other issues are touched on in later chapters. 
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Petrochemicals 
The South African petrochemical industry has its origins in the small 10 000 tpa 
(carbide acetylene route) PVC plant built by AECI in Durban in 1955. In the same year 
,SASOL 1 commenced production of liquid fuels from coal. (This ~as been discussed above.) 
In 1963 SASOL 1 branched out into petrochemicals. It used nitrogen, a by product from the 
oxygen plant, to react with hydrogen to produce ammonia, a feedstock for fertilizer, 
explosives and other products. Creosote and ammonium sulphates and various other synfuel 
by-products were also produced but SASOL did not initially venture into the production of 
commodity petrochemicals such as ethylene, propylene or vinyl chloride monomer (a 
precursor to PVC). 
South Africa's real entry into petrochemical production took place in 1965 when the 
state, through its ownership of SASOL, built a naphtha cracker at Sasolburg. Naphtha 
feedstock was imported and carried inland from Durban by pipeline. This plant's original 
design capacity was 30 ()()() tpa of ethylene which was later expanded to 45 000 tpa. By the 
1970s a second cracker had been added to bring the total capacity to 135 000 tpa. At this time 
a world scale cracker was of the order of 300 000 - 500 000 tpa. Other petrochemicals, 
styrene and C4 chemicals (butadiene) were also produced in small quantities. The butadiene 
fed the Karbochem synthetic rubber plant and the styrene fed Kolchem's (subsequently 
Sentrachem's Styrochem) 4 ()()() tpa polystyrene plant. This was typical of the import 
substitution type policies being pursued by the state at the time. 
Nevertheless the availability of at least half of the seven basic organic chemical 
building blocks was a substantial kickstart for the' petrochemical industry. By the mid 1970s 
propylene was produced as well to feed the Safripol PP plant. A fully fledged aromatics unit 
was not built, a deficiency in the industry which prevails to this day. The availability of these 
feedstocks enabled several satellite plants to be built. A flow sheet of the plants existing by 
about 1975 is shown in Figure 9. 
It is informative to compare South Africa's first petrochemical complex at Sasolburg 
with its counterpart at Ulsan in South Korea. The flow sheet for the South Korean complex 
is shown in Figure 10. It was built at about the same time as the Sasolburg complex (between 
1967-71). The South African plants were generally bigger, for example the South African 
LOPE plant , was 75000 tpa compared with South Korea's 50 000 tpa plant, and South 
Africa's HOPE was 48 ()()() tpa compared to South Korea's 35 ()()() tpa HOPE plant. Despite 
being larger than the South Korean plants they were nevertheless small in world terms. The 
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Figure 10 Flow Sheet for the South Korean Ulsan Petrochemical 
Complex 
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conventional wisdom of the day was "The South African economy is too small to justify 
competitive plants" (PM, 11-4-74:29). 
However what is striking is the wide range of petrochemicals produced by the South 
Korean complex. This wider range was made possible by the inclusion of an aromatics6 unit 
.which the Sasolburg complex lacked. Both plants followed a similar path with regard to 
ownership concentration, in that vertical integration was not present. However the South 
African complex's privately owned plants were dominated by just two companies, AECI and 
Sentrachem, whereas the South Korean complex had a much wider spread of ownership. 
The South African PVC and LOPE plants used a high pressure technology and from 
the beginning AECI experienced difficulties in operations. Used to pressures of 300 
atmospheres in the production of ammonia, these new plants required pressures of over 1 ()()() 
atmospheres. 
The limited scale of the Sasolburg complex was soon apparent. AECI applied to the 
government for permission to build additional cracking capacity in 1970 but was turned down. 
Subsequently, in the early 1970s, discussions between Shell, BP and SASOL commenced over 
the erection of a larger naphtha cracker at Richards Bay (PM, 11-4-74: 159). Naphtha was to 
be sourced from the Durban refineries, a new Trek refinery proposed for Richards Bay (never 
built) and imports, yielding 300 ()()() tpa of ethylene. 
By 1974 AECI's plastics plants in Sasolburg were operating at capacity but beginning 
to be held back by a shortage of ethylene from SASOL's limited crackers. AECI was to have 
been the major ethylene customer for the Richards Bay cracker's but in 1975 AECI decided 
to proceed with its own coal based production inland, a chemical complex to be known as 
'Coalplex'. This put paid to the proposed Richards Bay refinery and petrochemical complex. 
This decision followed hard on the heels of the state's decision to proceed with SASOL 2. 
In 1976 AECI and Sentrachem built 'Coalplex' adjoining AECI's Midland site at 
Sasolburg. The decision to relocate this petrochemical complex inland was made "with 
Government backing for strategic reasons" (AECIISentrachem, CoaJpJex, (undated) pI). 
AECI deny there were any long term agreements with the state except the promise of long 
term protection against dumping (Interview, Fraser). AECI subsequently purchased 
Sentrachem 's share in 1984. 
The change in thinking represented by these decisions, some 18 years ago, has had 
a massive impact upon the South African petrochemical industry which persists to this day. 
6. Aromatics (benzene, toluene and xylene) are the other 'half of the seven basic organic chemicals. 
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Firstly it indicated a major change in direction away from crude oil towards coal based liquid 
fuels and petrochemicals. Secondly it reinforced the Import Substitution Industrialisation 
policies being pursued by the state and embedded them in a manner that South Africa is now 
finding difficult to escape from. Thirdly it struck a long term blow at international 
competitiveness in that to shift Coalplex from a coastal location to an interior location also 
signalled higher transport costs for exports. 
More than this it represented a backward step technologically speaking. AECI's first 
PVC plant at Sasolburg used naphtha based ethylene from the SASOL naphtha crackers. The 
newer and much larger Coalplex PVC plant used the older carbide/acetylene route which was 
being phased out in the US and other countries at just that time. Although acetylene has the 
advantage of. a wider and more valuable product slate than ethylene, its demise as the 
preferred chemical building block has been largely ·as a result of the higher capital costs 
involved. Given the 20-25 year lifespan of such plants that disadvantage remains to this day. 
This technology choice also has other implications. At the heart of Coalplex are two 
large electric arc furnaces which bum lime and anthracite at about 2 ()()()Oc to produce 
calcium carbide. This energy intensive process consumes large amounts of electricity, about 
125 mega watt, enough to supply a town with all its requirements. The calcium carbide ingots 
are then used to make acetylene which is reacted in tum with hydrogen chloride to make 
vinyl chloride monomer the precursor to PVC. On the same site salt is processed in a chlor-
alkali unit to produce caustic soda and chlorine. The chlorine and hydrogen used to make 
hydrogen chloride are by-products of caustic soda manufacture. In short this is an integrated 
complex in which by-products from one process are used as inputs to other processes and 
products. 
On the face of it this route to PVC seems eminently sensible although it is both 
materials and energy intensive. South Africa had cheap electric power and the major inputs 
are coal, lime and salt. From the point of view of adding value to relatively low grade 
domestic resources it appears an attractive project? especially from an import substitution 
point of view. However its cost structure is entirely different to its crude oil based 
competitors and consequently tariff protection is needed. 
This may be elucidated if the cost structures of an oil based and coal based producer 
are compared. Put simply, in the case of an oil based producer, lower polymer prices can be 
passed upstream to the ethylene producer, beyond that to the oil refiner, and beyond that 
7. PVC production in Zimbabwe utilising this same route was under consideration in 1992. 
147 
again to the oil drilling and recovery. These upstream links in the chain can respond in 
various ways, they can vary the volume of their throughput without increasing their fixed 
costs, or they can engage in other strategies such as varying the co-product mix. On the other 
hand coal based production cannot as easily pass lower PVC prices upstream as input prices 
are fixed by the cost of mining coal. Coal based production also has fewer options to vary 
the co-product mix. For example one response to a drop in polymer prices might be to 
increase volumes and sales whilst accepting a lower margin per sales unit. Oil based 
producers can do this without additional fixed costs whereas mining based producers must 
incur additional fixed costs. 
Furthermore the price cycles of coal, lime and salt tend to follow entirely different 
paths to those followed by crude oil and naphtha and petrochemicals which tend to track the 
crude oil cycles. These cost structure problems lie at the heart of international 
competitiveness problems in South Africa's coal based petrochemical industry and apply 
equally to SASOL which is also competing with international oil based producers. 
The choices in technology in petrochemicals (and plastic raw materials) and economies 
of scale (and the attendant cost structure) have required CQnsiderable tariff protection from 
inception but have provided some measure of relief to domestic customers at times when 
international prices were high (discussed in detail in a later chapter). Real threats against the 
tariff protection regime for plastic raw materials in the early 1990s and some public pressure 
for the deregulation of the liquid fuels industry initiated a restructuring in the jiliere in which 
a further concentration of ownership occurred before international competition had any effect 
on local prices. In 1994 AECI merged its polymer and plastic interests with SASOL's into 
a new company called Polifin, in which SASOL holds 60% of the interest and AECI 40%. 
AECI again lost considerable market power in the process. (This development is covered in 
more detail in a later chapter.) 
The growth of the synfuels industry also had a large impact on the economy; in 
petrochemicals, on capital intensity, employment patterns and productivity. Indeed the synfuel 
investments are integral to the crisis being endured by the South African economy. 
The impact of the synfuels investments:-
a) On petrochemicals 
The synfuels decisions also represent turning points in South Africa's petrochemical 
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history. SASOL 2 & 3 turned the industry back to coal based feedstocks at a time when the 
economics of production over the preceding two decades had been turning international 
producers away from coal towards oil based feedstocks. Mossgas turned the country away 
from natural gas based petrochemicals to make petrol instead. 
Furthermore the slate of petrochemicals available from SASOL's Secunda plants was 
narrower than was previously the case (This is dealt with in detail in the following chapter). 
A narrower slate of feedstocks had a corresponding effect upon the petrochemical and 
polymer sectors. This is evident in a crude way in Table 4.2 which lists the number of plants 
in certain countries producing 10 basic petrochemicals and shows that by this measure South 
Africa ranks below the NICs (excluding Hong Kong and Singapore) and is roughly on a par 
with the more advanced second tier NICs, Thailand and Malaysia, both of which have 
hydrocarbon resources. Among the DMEs South Africa ranks roughly on a par with Portugal. 
It is ahead, as may be expected of the smaller Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Austria, 
and New Zealand. Australia, which has an economy of roughly similar size, has significantly 
more plants, although of course it does mine oil off the North West Shelf. 
The plant capacities are not reflected in this table, making it a rather crude measure. 
But it does demonstrate that South Africa's rather large chemical and petrochemical industry 
is confined to a relatively small number of plants. The core of South Africa's petrochemical 
industry potential lies in the SASOL facilities at Secunda. 
Despite being dependent upon a narrow slate of coal based petrochemicals and being 
restricted to a limited number of plants, the structure of the chemical industry underwent 
important changes in the 1980s. 
b) On the Structure of the Chemical Industry 
The early characteristics of South Africa's chemical industry in mining and agriculture 
have prevailed down the years and are still evident in the structure of South Africa's end-use 
markets (see Figure 11). Although it is not strictly correct to categorise sulphuric acid 
(H2S04) as a mining chemical since a significant amount is also used in fertilizer manufacture , 
this does not detract from our purpose here which is to show that mining and agricultural 
products have dominated South African chemical markets. If South Africa's chemical markets 
are compared with Europe's this bias is again evident (see Figure 12). In this figure 'other' 
includes mining chemicals and accounts for South Africa's comparatively larger share of this 
category. It is also evident in this figure that South Africa's household and personal products 
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markets are comparatively underdeveloped. 
Table 4.2 Number of Petrochemical Plants. Certain Countries 
PETROCHEMICAL 
---------------------------------------------------------
COUNTRY Ethy- PE Benz- Styrene PS Propy- PP Meth- Ammonia Urea TOTAL 
lene ene lene ane 
NICs 
HONG KONG 1 1 
SINGAPORE 1 1 1 3 
TAIWAN 4 4 1 3 1 2 15 
ARGENTINA 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 6 5 1 27 
MEXICO 6 4 3 2 3 11 3 4 6 6 48 
BRAZIL 8 10 4 3 2 6 6 3 5 2 49 
KOREA (SOUTH) 8 12 7 7 5 4 8 1 3 3 58 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Average 5 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 29 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Second Tier NICs 
TUNISIA 1 1 
PERU 1 1 2 
SRI LANKA 1 1 2 
PHILIPPINES 1 1 1 3 
COLOMBIA 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 11 
THAILAND 1 3 1 3 2 2 12 
MALAYSIA 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 13 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Average 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 6 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Develooed Market Economies 
SWITZERLAND 1 1 2 
SWEDEN 1 1 1 2 5 
GREECE 1 1 2 1 5 
AUSTRIA 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
NEW ZEALAND 2 3 1 6 
ISRAEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
FINLAND 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 9 
NORWAY 1 1 2 1 2 2 9 
PORTUGAL 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 10 
AUSTRALIA 5 4 1 1 2 4 1 3 1 22 
BELGIUM 3 8 1 1 3 2 8 2 1 29 
NETHERLANDS 4 4 2 2 4 3 1 7 3 30 
SPAIN 3 6 4 1 3 6 4 2 2 31 
UNITED KINGDOM 7 4 5 2 3 8 4 1 4 38 
ITALY 11 3 4 3 2 3 4 1 8 9 48 
CANADA 7 11 6 3 5 2 3 12 7 56 
FRANCE 12 10 7 3 6 8 7 8 4 65 
GERMANY 16 11 11 3 2 9 10 4 5 3 74 
JAPAN 16 18 20 11 12 15 20 2 7 4 125 UNITED STATES 46 35 35 16 18 41 23 13 47 25 299 ---------------------------------------------------------------Average 7 6 5 2 3 6 5 2 6 3 46 ---------------------------------------------------------------
SOUTH AFRICA 2 2 1 2 3 2 12 
Source: SMI Chemical Database 
Note: South Africa figures corrected 
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European Chemical Industry Association quoted in Financial Times, 
13-7-91. 
Note: (I) = 1986 figure. 
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Unfortunately consolidated market statistics are not available and the market structure 
in Figure 12 is distorted 'to the extent that it excludes the manufacture of polymers and plastic 
raw materials. If the demand for polymer and plastic raw materials is contrasted with the 
demand for agricultural inputs (fertilizers and pesticides) (see Figure 13) then a significantly 
different picture emerges. This shows that plastic sales overtook agricultural sales in 1978 and 
that whilst agricultural sales have declined from 1981, plastic sales, on the other hand, rose 
steadily to 1989. Growth in fertilizers and pesticides sales over the period 1972-90 averaged -
0.5 % p.a. in real terms whilst synthetic resins and plastic raw materials sales grew at an 
average of 6.7% p.a. over the same period. The longer term trend appears to be a growing 
plastics market and a declining agricultural market. Plastics raw materials grew faster, on 
average, than any other major chemical sector including pharmaceuticals, (which grew at an 
average of 4.2% p.a.) over the 1972-90 period. Plastics raw materials grew at about three 
times the rate of all manufacturing over this period. Even though plastics raw materials 
growth slowed to 2.5% p.a. over the 1980-90 period, this was still well above the 0.4% p.a. 
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Agricultural = Fertilizers and pesticides (lSIC 3512) 
Mining = Other Chemical Products (lSIC 3529) 
Figure 13 also tracks a sector referred to as 'Mining'. In fact this is Other Chemical 
Products (ISIC 3529) which includes and is dominated by explosives. Consequently it has 
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been used as a proxy for mining although it also includes other smaller products such as inks, 
matches and glues. Plastic raw material sales overtook 'Mining' sales in 1984. The latter have 
followed a declining trend since then. 
Petrochemicals and plastics raw materials have thus supplanted the historically 
.dominant sectors, agricultural and mining chemicals as the main pillar of the domestic 
chemical industry despite the fact that the bulk of the feedstocks were coal based. The reasons 
for this fundamental restructuring of the leading chemical sectors arising from the growth in 
the value of sales of plastic raw materials are analysed in a later chapter. This new, leading 
chemical sector (plastic raw materials) consequently takes on added national importance as 
a result. Future economic policy and industrial strategy should give particular attention to this 
sector. 
c) On Output. Value Added. Capital Intensity and EmplQyment 
SASOL claims that the Secunda complex has been the largest construction project in 
the Southern Hemisphere to date. At a capital cost of aboQt R31 billion in 1991 Rands, this 
may well be true. However the resulting two refineries were not especially large. Their exact 
size has been a closely guarded secret but were estimated by the Oil & Gas Journal to be 
50000 bpd each in 1984 (Rustomjee, 1986: 141). A more recent estimate gives SASOL a 
synfuels capacity of 150000 bpd (crude equivalent) and an actual refined product output 
equivalent to 120000 bpd. This is about two thirds of the original size of the SAPREF crude 
oil refinery in Durban (200 000 bpd) which was built at a fraction of the cost. 8 
The massive impact of these plants on manufacturing capital stock is evident in 
Figure 14. Because of secrecy laws separate data covering oil refineries is not available. To 
disguise it, such data is often included with other sectors. In the data base used here refineries 
are included with Industrial Chemicals. (In the Central Statistical Services data, refineries are 
usually included with Other Chemical Products, ISIC 352). 
Over the 1976-82 period when the SASOL plants were being built no major 
investments were made at any of the crude oil refineries as far as can be ascertained. In fact 
they were obliged to mothball certain equipment in order to accommodate SASOL's output. 
The capital stock figures for plastic raw materials (ISIC 3513) are included in Figure 14 as 
8. S~REF had t~ ~ecrease its size to 120000 bpd to accommodate SASOL's output. All other crude oil 
refinenes had to smularly cut back. The opportunity costs of this wasted capital should be factored into any 
attempt to calculate SASOL's social rate of return. . 
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this is usually a major sub sector of ISIC 351. This sub-sector's share of manufacturing 
capital stock increased only marginally between 1984 and 1990. Thus crude oil refineries and 
plastic raw materials can be dismissed as the cause of the major increase in the share of 
manufacturing capital stock in Industrial Chemicals over the 1976-82 period. Figure 14 also 
-shows that Other Chemical Products' (lSIC 352) share of manufacturing capital stock did not 
change significantly over the 1972-90 period. It would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
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Did this huge resource and energy intensive complex make a large contribution to 
manufacturing value added (MY A)? Figure 15 shows that the share of MY A contributed by 
Industrial Chemicals and refineries did not rise in proportion to the increase in their share of 
manufacturing capital stock. Such data as is available suggests that capital productivity in 
manufacturing has been worst in the chemical sector (see Table 4.3). The indications are that 
it has been declining since 1970. 
The impact of the SASOL plants on capital/labour ratios is also evident (see Tables 
4.4 and 4.5). It is observed in Table 4.4 that Industrial Chemicals has the highest capital 
labour ratios. This is to be expected given the capital intensive nature of this industry. 
However the ratio more than doubles between 1972 and 1980 which appears to be the impact 
of the Secunda complex. Note also the relationship between plastic raw materials (lSIC 3513) 
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and Industrial Chemicals where the ratio has increased from about 1.6 in 1972 to 2.5 in 1990. 
Figure 15 
40 
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'Industrial Chemicals & Refineries' includes ISIC 351 and ISIC 353 
Refineries. 
MVA = Manufacturing Value Added. 
What is of concern is that the capital labour ratio growth rate over 1972-90 for 
Industrial Chemicals has been more than twice that of Manufacturing as a whole. A further 
indication of the extreme capital intensity of this sector is that its capital labour ratios were 
about two and a half times those of the typically capital intensive Iron Steel and Basic 
Industries in 1990 (IDC, 1992). The bias of the tax regime towards highly capital intensive 
sectors has contributed to lower user costs of capital in these sectors (Fallon et al, 1993:66). 
Also of interest in Table 4.4 is the much lower capital labour ratios for Plastic 
Products (ISIC 356) and the fact that the ratio in this sector has been almost constant over 
the 1972-90 period. This encouraging indication, from a job creation point of view, is 
however somewhat muted by the negative annual average growth rates over the 1985-90 
period, a sign of aging machinery and lack of reinvestment, something which was supported 
by evidence from interviews in the industry. 
This very capital intensive development in Industrial Chemicals and Refineries, 
without a corresponding return in value added or capital productivity has implications for this 
study. These will be dealt with more fully in due course, but for the present it appears that 
any future development, that is concerned with the optimum utilisation of capital and labour 
in the petrochemical industry should attempt to redress the imbalance which has occurred as 
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Source: National Productivity Institute, 1989:49-69, in CWIU, 1991:10. 
Note: (a\) Determined by linear regression analysis including each year. 
Table 4.4 Capital Labour Ratios (R1000 per worker), 1990 Rands 
Sector 
PAINTS, VARNISHES AND LACQUERS (ISIC:3511) 
OTHER PLASTIC PRODUCTS (ISIC:3560) 
CLEANING COMPOUNDS AND TOILET PREPARATIONS(ISIC:3523) 
MEDICINAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS (ISIC:3522) 
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (ISIC 352) 
ALL MANUFACTURING 
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (ISIC:3529) 
FERTILIZERS AND PESTICIDES (ISIC:3512) 
SYNTHETIC RESINS AND PLASTIC MATERIALS (ISIC:3513) 
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS (ISICs 351,353,354) 
Source: IDC, 1992 data 
Table 4.5 Capital Labour Ratios, (1990 Rands) 
Annual Average Growth Rates (\) 
1972 1980 1985 1990 
15 17 21 20 
23 18 24 24 
28 30 36 36 
44 40 41 42 
42 47 49 51 
37 55 69 66 
68 79 79 86 
85 87 106 126 
93 96 172 200 
153 445 446 506 











PAINTS, VARNISHES AND LACQUERS (ISIC:3511) 1.7 
OTHER PLASTIC PRODUCTS (ISIC:3560) 0.3 
CLEANING COMPOUNDS AND TOILET PREPARATIONS (ISIC:3523) 1.5 
MEDICINAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS (ISIC:3522) -0.3 
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (ISIC 352) 1.0 
ALL MANUFACTURING 3.3 
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (ISIC:3529) 1.3 
FERTILIZERS AND PESTICIDES (ISIC:3512) 2.2 
SYNTHETIC RESINS AND PLASTIC MATERIALS (ISIC:3513) 4.3 
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS (ISICs 351,353,354) 6.9 
Source: IDC, 1992 data 
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a result of SASOVs Secunda complex. If this is to be done then future development should 
be guided towards much lower capital labour ratios than have prevailed in Industrial 
Chemicals. In the petrochemical and plastics production chain, Other Plastics Products (lSIC 
356) is the only obvious choice. Ideally activities with a higher value added per Rand invested 
-should also be the target of future development. 
However this does not suggest that it is 'abnormal' to find poor capital productivity 
in the Industrial Chemicals and Refining sectors. Nor is it 'abnormal' to find that labour 
productivity is higher than capital productivity in such sectors (see Kaplinsky 1994). It is the 
choice of technology by SASOL which is at the heart of the productivity problem. "These 
'inappropriate' technical choices have been so significant as to affect the overall pattern of 
manufacturing growth" (Kaplin sky , 1994: iii). This problem has been exacerbated by the 
virtual 'drying up' of investment in more labour intensive sectors. 
With this in mind a search for higher value added sectors in the chemical industry was 
conducted. The results are set out in Figure 16 where it is apparent that Other Plastic 
Products (lSIC 356) has consistently, over the 1972-90 period, enjoyed a higher value 
added/capital stock ratio than any other chemical sector and roughly double the average for 
all manufacturing. Of note in this figure is Plastic Raw Materials (lSIC 3513) where the trend 
for this sector is below the manufacturing average except for a period between 1977 and 
1982. This is cause for some concern because as has been demonstrated above this sector 
became the main pillar of the chemical industry from the mid 1980s. 
Did the SASOL investments make a comparably large impact on employment? Clearly 
there was some impact. At their peak the Secunda plants employed about 6 500 black workers 
in 1984. Table 4.6 sets out employment figures for the chemical and plastics industries for 
certain years. From 1972 total employment in Industrial Chemicals rose steadily to 1985 
whereafter it fell gradually to 1990. Other Chemicals followed a similar pattern although it 
peaked in 1988 at 48380. The only sector in Table 4.6 which continued to grow after 1985 
was Plastic Products, although slower than before 1985. The most impressive of the sectors 
in this table are the plastics industry sectors. Both doubled employment between 1972 and 
1990, whereas employment in manufacturing as a whole only increased by 27% over the 
same period. 
Employment in Industrial Chemicals is different from other chemical sectors in one 
important respect. It is the only one in which there has been a major change in the racial 
composition of the workforce over the 1972-90 period. In 1972 the white share of 
employment was 33% and the black share 57%. By 1990 the whites share was 46% and 
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blacks 43 %. This substitution of white for black labour (there is no change in the other race 
groups) proceeds steadily from 1972, but is accelerated between 1984 and 1986, when whites 
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The explanation for this sudden replacement of blacks by whites appears to lie in two 
areas. All of the major chemical and synfuel installations fell within the ambit of the National 
Key Points Act, which required detailed security measures to be taken and several of the 
larger sites had permanent South African Defence Force units located within their perimeters. 
It was also a period when black workers were increasingly organising into trade unions. This 
was a factor which contributed to the replacement of blacks by whites (Interview, Lloyd). In 
such an environment it is not difficult to see how white employers could come to regard black 
workers who belonged to 'communist' trade unions as a security threat. For example in 1984 
SASOL dismissed 6 500 workers at its Secunda site for participating in a political 'stayaway' 
(a political protest stay-at-home strike). It was one of the few employers to do so and may 
be seen as an attempt by the state to set an example for other employers on how to deal with 
restive black labour and trade unions. Given South Africa's strategic reliance on SASOL for 
its liquid fuel supplies it may also be regarded as an attempt ' teach workers a lesson' . Many 
of those dismissed were not re-employed. Possibly they were replaced by more docile white 
workers. Interestingly the timing of these dismissals coincides with the acceleration of white 
employment. 
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Table 4.6 SA Chemical Industry Employment 
------------------------------------------+ +------------------------- , , Employment , 
: 1972 1980 1985 1990 : 
, . --------------------------+ +----------------------------------------- . , IIndustrial Chemicals (ISIC 351, : 
'353 354 excluding 3513) 33 100 48 140 57 130 52 350 , 
loth~r Chemical Products (ISIC 352) 32 780 41 750 47 300 47 280 ! 
'Plastic Raw Materials (ISIC 3513) 5 190 8 160 11 470 10 870 , 
lplastic Products (ISIC 356) 15 900 26 700 30 200 32 900 : 
, -------------------------------+ , 86 970 124 750 146 100 143 400 : !Total _______________________________ + 
, , 
: , of Manufacturing Employment ,, 
!Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351,353,354) 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.6 
IOther Chemical Products (ISIC 352) 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.3 
:P1astic Raw Materials (ISIC 3513) 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 
:Plastic Products (ISIC 356) 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.3 
, -------------------------------+ I Total 7.7 8.8 10.2 9.9: 
+-------------------------------------~-----------------------------+ Source: IDC, 1992 
Another part of the explanation appears to lie in the increasing computerisation of 
process control which has changed the demand for skills into an area in which basic education 
for blacks has largely failed to equip them. 
The other, smaller, chemical sector, Other Chemical Products, did not experience this 
trend, indeed almost the opposite. White's share of employment fell from 37% in 1972 to 
29% in 1990 whereas black's share was 48% in both those years. Coloureds and asians 
gained at the expense of whites in this case. 
In the plastics raw materials industry (ISIC 3513) white's share of employment is 
similar in 1972 and 1990, 31 % and 32% respectively. The significant change is the decline 
in the coloured share from 24% to 14%, with increased shares for blacks and asians, 48% 
and 6% respectively in 1990. 
Black's share of employment in the Plastic Products industry is one of the highest in 
all the chemical sectors at 55% in 1990. It is also the sector in which the shares of 
employment have remained very similar over the 1972-90 period, whites at about 19 %, 
coloureds at about 22 % and asians at about 4 %. The only sector in which blacks account for 
a larger share is the cleaning compounds and toilet preparations sector (ISIC 3523) where it 
is 58%. 
This consistency is somewhat at odds with what emerged during interviews with 
managers in the plastic converting industry and what was observed during factory visits. 
Several (white) managers quite unashamedly discussed their strategies to replace black males. 
The usual reason offered was the propensity of black males to participate in 'stayaways' 
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and/or to join trade unions. One firm employed young white males as machine operators so 
that the plant could continue to produce during 'stayaways' and another employed coloured 
females for the same reason. Yet another deliberately kept a racial and gender mix in his 
workforce in the belief that it diluted the possibility of solidarity among the workforce. These 
.observations suggest that blacks may have been a declining proportion of the workforce. The 
data however shows that the proportion of blacks has been almost constant. Unfortunately 
gender based data is not available. 
d) On the Size of the chemical industry 
The size of the chemical industry has been the subject of some recent errors and 
misunderstandings. In 1990 the Department of Trade and Industry published the Report of 
the Working Group for the Promotion of the Chemical Industry (hereinafter Working Group). 
This Working Group, consisting of the major companies, AECI, Sentrachem and SASOL, 
together with representatives of the plastic converting industry, was appointed by the state to 
investigate how the industry could be developed and to see what could be done about reducing 
the growing chemical import bill. The Working Group stated that the chemical industry : 
" .. represents 10% of manufacturing industry in the USA, Western Europe and Japan -
but significantly less than 5% in South Africa." (Working Group, 1990: 18) 
This 5 % figure was used as justification for a proposal that the state provide a 'hupstoot' for 
the industry. It was also taken up and used by the financial press. However there is serious 
reason to doubt its accuracy. 
If the chemical industry is taken to mean, as is commonly the case, Industrial 
Chemicals (ISIC 351) and Other Chemical Products (ISIC 352), then it would appear that the 
leading industry experts made a rather basic error as data suggests that between 1975 and 
1989 it was more like double the 5% figure (see Table 4.7). If they were referring to only 
Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351) then they were roughly correct for South Africa. However 
in neither the US, Japan nor West European countries does ISle 351 approximate 10% of 
MVA (see Table 4.8). But ISIC 351 and 352 together do approximate 10%. There is also 
considerable difficulty in separating out petrochemicals from refineries, statistically speaking, 
because of the interrelated nature of their production. This is particularly so in SASOL's 
case. Hence if refineries are included the discrepancy between the Working Group's 5% 
claim and the data is even larger. 
Table 4.7 South Af[!can Chemigal Industr~, Cont[ibuti,on 
Manufacturing Value Added ('l 
ISIC SECTOR 1975 1980 1985 
351 Industrial Chemicals 4.50 5.63 5.70 
352 Other Chemicals 4.60 3.58 8.32 
Total 9.10 9.21 14.02 
353 Petroleum Refineries 2.95 3.55 8.25 
Total 12.06 12.76 22.27 
Sources: (1) UNIDO, 1988, Statistical Annex. 
(2) UNIDO, 1989, Statistical Annex. 







Table 4.8 Chemical Industr~, 1987; Certain Countries 
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As a result of the massive investments in SASOL is it not the case that the chemicals 
industry is overdeveloped? In Figure 17 the size of the chemical industry in various sample 
groups of countries is compared, the evidence suggests that the local industry is not 
overdeveloped, falling as it does mid way between the NICs and the 2nd tier NICs. Given 
that the industry attracted 51 % of all manufacturing investment over 1972-9<f, the industry's 
contribution to manufacturing value added, by the end of the 1980s was surprisingly modest 
(see Figure 17). This figure also shows that, at that time, the South African industry was not 
unusually large, given the country's stage of economic development. However the local 
chemical industry's share of manufacturing added was significantly larger in 1985 when just 
9. Calculated from IDC, 1992. 
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three sectors (Basic Industrial Chemicals, Other Chemical Products and Refineries) accounted 
for 22.3% of MVA. This figure had reduced to 19.5% by 1987. This 'hump' in the mid 
1980s is associated with both SASOL 2 and SASOL 3 reaching full production at the g~ant 
Secunda complex. It is tapering off as development in the rest of manufacturing takes place. 
Indeed it is partly the drying up of investment in other sectors (except basic metals) during 









l1li351 8883352 ~ 353 
~3S'~356 
351 = Basic Industrial Chemicals 
352= Other Chemical Products 
353 = Refineries synthesizers 
354= Mise Prod of Petroleum & coal 
356 = Plastic Products 
Source: UNIOO Industrial Statistics 1992 
The recent history of the fertilizer and explosives industries reveal some common 
patterns. In both cases reduced levels of regulation and trade liberalisation was followed by 
a period of increased competition. This phase was in tum followed by concentration again and 
oligopolistic production. Such patterns of development are both shaped by and instrumental 
in shaping corporate strategies. The analysis reveals the differing strategies pursued. In both 
industries AECI had been the long term major player. It vigorously defended its markets and 
in both cases it survived, although weakened, particularly in explosives as a result of 
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international developments and strategy choices by its major international partner, ICI. 
Sentrachem chose to give way or to seek alternative means of survival rather than to tackle 
the two larger companies head on. In both cases SASOL was the major interloper, gaining 
market share from ABCI and Sentrachem. 
In plastic raw materials ABCI was to some extent trapped by SASOL's control over 
its feedstocks and its own lack or strategy to escape that trap. The net result was that ABCI 
again lost market power to SASOL. 
Looked at from a different perspective, it is possible to argue that a partially privati sed 
parastatal (SASOL), because of its large public funding, has been able to intervene in 
downstream markets and crowd out some of the private companies ensconced there. Both of 
these perspectives have validity and may be viewed as interconnected strands in the unfolding 
historical fabric. 
During the 1980s South Africa had a comparatively large chemical industry which 
reached its peak in 1985 as a result of the SASOL synfuels projects. This peak was 
exaggerated by the drying up of investment in other manufacturing industries. The emergence 
of this peak was the result of a number of interrelated factors. From the mid 1970s to the late 
1980s the state intervened in two important ways. It had state companies build a series of 
mega-projects using local feedstocks that were unlikely to have been considered if only 
commercial considerations had applied. Secondly state policy, in the form of encouragement 
and the tax regime, influenced private companies to follow lSI! military/strategic type 
investments. The result of the extension of lSI into military/strategic policies is a uniquely 
coal based petrochemical industry with technology and a cost structure quite different from 
its international competitors. 
The effect of these interventions was to tum the petrochemical industry away from 
crude oil based feedstocks to coal and in the case of Mossgas to tum potential gas based 
petrochemicals into lower value petrol instead. In short they have denied the petrochemical 
industry the possibility of keeping up with world trends in feedstock competitiveness which 
is all important in petrochemicals. These major developments cannot, unfortunately be 
undone. However, ironically, there are certain important and internationally competitive 
opportunities in petrochemicals. Subsequent chapters identify opportunities to optimise these 
whilst at the same time promoting the development of higher value added and more labour 
intensive industries. 
Unless such state driven investments are continued, which appears unlikely, a return 
to investment upon a commercial basis may be expected. This is likely to result in the 
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chemical industry accounting for a proportionally smaller share of manufacturing. 
The evidence suggests that SASOL' s Secunda complex has had a major, negative 
impact on capital productivity and capital labour ratios in the chemical industry to the point 
that it has affected the overall pattern of manufacturing growth. Its contribution to MVA did 
·not nearly match its absorption of capital. 
Another important impact associated with the SASOL developments is a unique 
reconstituting of the racial employment profile within the Industrial Chemicals sector, in that 
white employment levels gained at the expense of black employment levels. It appears this 
change is associated with skill needs and political strategic apartheid factors. 
At the other end of the production chain the plastic products industry has had low 
capitallabou~ ratios that have remained relatively constant as well as consistently higher value 
added output per Rand of capital stock. Unlike industrial chemicals the racial composition of 
the workforCe has been stable. 
During the period of active state military/strategic intervention an important 
restructuring of the chemical industry took place. The traditional pillars of the industry, 
agricultural and mining chemicals, were supplanted by pl.astic raw materials as the major 
sector of the industry. Accompanying this reordering of the major sectors in the chemical 
industry during the 1980s, has been a significant shift away from the employment of blacks 
to whites in Industrial Chemicals and Refineries. This has important implications for the 
training and education of black workers as well as labour relations in a democratic state. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PETROCHEMICALS AND THE MISSING LINK 
.Introduction 
The establishment of a coal based synfuels and chemical industry in pursuit of 
apartheid's policy goals had wide ranging effects upon the commodity plastics jiIiere. In 
analysing thisjiliere through the 1980s, the approach adopted here is to begin at the upstream 
end of thejiliere and to work downstream to the more elaborately manufactured goods and 
in the case of the plastic products industry, higher value added activities, closest to 
consumers. The commodity plasticsjiliere divides conveniently into three links:-
* petrochemicals 
* plastic raw materials 
* plastic converting 
This chapter is concerned with the first of these links, pe~ochemicals. Subsequent chapters 
deal with each of the other links in the chain. 
SASOL's synfuels capacity replaced existing liquid fuels capacity in crude oil 
refineries and presumably replaced crude oil refining capacity that would otherwise have been 
built. Refinery products such as naphtha are typical feedstocks for petrochemical manufacture. 
However under apartheid, refinery capacity was closed and imported naphtha ran the same 
risk of embargo as crude oil. How then did the petrochemical sector fare in the new synfuel 
era of tbe 1980s? And how did it make the transition from crude oil based feedstock to coal 
based feedstock? What were the implications of this change? These are some of the central 
issues dealt with in this chapter. 
SASOL became a monopolistic supplier of key petrochemicals (ethylene and 
propylene). Its regulation of the supply of these petrochemicals and the impact of its actions 
on the plastic raw material industry are analyzed. It is argued that SASOL's coal based 
production route created a 'missing link' in the production chain which made polymer tariffs 
the criticallynchpin of pricing in the commodity plastics jiliere. 
It is further argued that the monopolistic and more capital intensive upstream end of 
thejiliere benefitted at the expense of the downstream end of thejiliere, with the result that 
higher value added production opportunities and job opportunities were foregone. This was 
partly a result of the pricing mechanisms which prevailed and which allowed SASOL to enjoy 
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the benefits of olefin prices which were some 20% to 40% above world market prices. 
The inextricable interlinkages between the synfuels sector and the petrochemical sector 
are exposed. It is suggested that policy measures aimed at improving the pricing structure 
which has emerged in the commodity plasticsjiliere, could benefit from a reconsideration of 
-the complex web of regulations which govern the liquid fuels industry. That is not the focus 
of this study. 1 Nevertheless a crude evaluation of this complex area is made in beginning the 
search for appropriate future policy for the petrochemical end of the commodity plastics 
jiliere. 
Under any given set of conditions only a certain amount of profit can be made over 
the length of the plastics production chain. In this sense the input price of raw materials at 
one end and the output price of final products at the other end, could theoretically be 
regarded as fixed - that is the amount of value added over the length of the chain is fixed. 
The consequence, for the businesses which comprise the various links in the production chain, 
is that there is a continual struggle to structure the chain so that as much value is added at 
'their' link in the chain as possible. This is a fundamental reason why vertical integration in 
the plastics jiliere has emerged internationally. The reasons for the failure of vertical 
integration to emerge at the upstream end in South Africa prior to 1994 are rooted in the 
history of its development. An attempt to untangle these issues is made in this chapter. 
In the latter part of the 1980s SASOL, the key player in the domestic petrochemical 
industry, made a very significant change in strategic direction. The principal reasons for this 
are explained within the context of the changing political economy within which SASOL 
operated. 
Before proceeding to the substance of this chapter the three links in South African 
commodity plastics jiliere are broadly described in order to provide a background for the 
more detailed analysis which follows. 
The Petrochemicals and Plastics Filiere: An Overview 
The plastics production chain (jiliere) accounts for about 4 % of GDP and employs 
about 40 000 people (Spindler, 1992). The plasticsjiliere may be schematised as essentially 
three links or 'stages': 
1. In 1,992 an~ 1993 when the bulk of the research for this study was carried out data on the liquid fuels industry 
was st~1I class~fi~ secret. Subsequently a considerable amount, but not aU, has become available. A thorough 
analYSIS of thiS andustry is still required. 
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1. the manufacture of petrochemicals, or olefins 
2. the manufacture of synthetic resins and plastic raw materials (mostly 
comprising polymers) 
3. the manufacture of plastic products 
These are set out schematically in Table 5.1. 




2. Poylmers Polyethylenes (LOPE, LLDPE, HDPE) 
Polypropylene (PP) 
Poly vinyl chloride (PVC) 
Polystyrene (PS) 
3. Plastic Various processes eg.injection moulding, extrusion, blow 
Converters moulding, vacuum forming etc. 
The major petrochemicals (olefins) produced in ' South Africa are ethylene and 
propylene. SASOL has a virtual monopoly on the supply of these two crucial feedstocks. It 
is the only ethylene producer. Some propylene is manufactured at the SAPREF (crude oil) 
refinery in Durban in a splitter Sentrachem had built and some is imported through Richards 
Bay Bulk Storage, but SASOL is by far the largest local producer. The ethylene and 
propylene recovery facilities at Secunda are capital intensive processes employing very few 
employees. 
Some benzene was produced locally but SASOL ceased styrene production in 1984. 
(Benzene is a precursor to styrene which in tum is the precursor to polystyrene.) The largest 
polystyrene facility (Sentrachem's Styrochem) was closed after import tariffs were removed 
in 1990. Strictly speaking benzene is an aromatic and not an olefin, however it is included 
in Table 5.1 for completeness sake. Local manufacture of polystyrene from styrene is very 
limited. Most polystyrene is imported. 
Butadiene, the other olefin building block (precursor to synthetic rubber) is wholly 
imported following the closure of the Sasolburg naphtha crackers in 1981. 
These businesses, like the next link in the chain, are 'high volume, low margin' type 
businesses whereas the plastic converting businesses are more diversified and can operate in 
more segmented markets. These facts contribute to the pressures for vertical integration in 
the jiliere. 
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Plastic Raw Materials (polymers) (ISle 3513) 
Polymers or plastic raw materials are manufactured in Secunda and Sasolburg drawing 
their major raw materials from the SASOL plants in Secunda. Ethylene (gas) is piped from 
SASOL in Secunda to the polymer plants in Sasolburg where Safripol makes HDPE and 
AECI manufacturers LOPE, LLOPE and PVC. Each firm has a monopoly. Internationally, 
high concentration ratios and oligopolistic behaviour are not unusual. The reasons for the 
emergence of this concentrated ownership structure are discussed further below as are the 
limitations it imposes upon international competitiveness and local economic development. 
SASOL has since 1990 used most of the propylene it manufactures to make 
polypropylene (PP) on site in Secunda. Some is also supplied to Safripol in Sasolburg. 
SASOL's entry into the PP market ended Safripol's long standing domestic monopoly in the 
manufacture of this polymer. 
Large volumes of plastic raw materials and polymers are imported resulting in a 
persistent trade deficit in these products with increasing import penetration to 1988 (lDC, 
Bylae 0, 1990:8). Polymers, usually in powder or granular form, are sold to the converting 
industry which manufactures a wide range of plastic products the chief of which is packaging. 
Plastic Converting Industry 
Unlike the olefin and polymer industries the converter industry is highly fragmented 
and competitive. Several technologies are employed in this industry including injection 
moulding, extrusion, blow moulding, calendering; rotational moulding, extrusion of film and 
sheets, thermomoulding, thermoforming, laminating, casting, film casting and foaming. The 
plastic products industry has also had a persistent trade deficit. There is some vertical 
integration among the polymer producers and the converting industry. AECI shares ownership 
of a joint venture called OPI which produces PVC piping and building materials. Sentrachem 
owns Mega Plastics which is the largest and most diversified plastics converter in South 
Africa which has several large plastic converting operations producing beer crates, flexible 
piping and auto bumpers among others. A summary of the jiliere is provided in Table 5.2. 
Under any given set of conditions only a certain amount of profit can be made over 
the length of the plastics production chain. In this sense the input price and the output price 
could theoretically be regarded as fiXed. Consequently for the businesses that comprise the 
various links in the production chain, striving for greater profitability also means 
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accumulating as much of the profit available in the production chain at their link in the chain. 
This is a fundamental reason why vertical integration in the plastics filiere has emerged 
internationally. The reasons for the failure of vertical integration to emerge at the upstream 
end in South Africa are rooted in the history of its development. An attempt to untangle these 
issues is made in the following section. 
Table 5.2. Petrochemicals and Plastics Industry Summary (1992) 
. Monomer/Poly Converter Comments 
mer suppliers companies 
Investment 5000 15000 1991192 replacement values 
(R mil) 
Turnover 3000 9000 1991 
Employees 2000 37500 Down 11 ~ from 42 000 in 
1990 
No. of 3 +-1000 53 discontinuations, 37 new 
firms entrants 
Source: 1; lndler, 1992 p 
In so far as the proportion of value added at each link in the production chain is 
concerned, Table 5.3 suggests that, at least during the 1980s there was a progression in the 
extent of value added per Rand invested, down the production chain from Basic Industrial 
Chemicals to Plastic Products, in so far as these data categories are representative of the basic 
petrochemicals and plastic converting industries. This progression in value added down the 
production chain has an inverse relationship with capital intensity which is to be expected. 
Table 5.3 Value Added in the South African Commodity Plastics Filiere l 
1972 1980 1985 1990 
Basic Industrial Chemicals .75 .28 .26 .28 
Synthetic Resins and Plastic Raw Materials .53 .91 .34 .38 
Plastic Products 1.69 1.95 1.63 1.60 
All Manufacturing .87 .71 .54 .60 
Source: lDC 1992. 
Notes: 1. Value added = Value added per Rand of capital stock, 1990 Rands. 
The evidence from these two tables strongly suggests that, of the three links in the 
commodity plastics filiere, the plastic converting industry is the most labour intensive and 
adds more value per unit of investment. 
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History of petrochemical production facilities and supply problems 
SASOL was partially privatised in 1979 as SASOL 2 neared completion. This changed 
the nature of the relationship between SASOL and the other leading companies in South 
Africa in a very important way. SASOL ceased to be the helping hand of the state and 
supplier of much needed petrochemical raw materials. Overnight it became a competitor and 
a supplier of raw materials. Security of raw material supply (from the state) became strategic 
vulnerability to a competitor (newly privatised SASOL). This caused some private firms to 
follow rather different strategies than would otherwise have been the case, as has been 
recorded in the preceding chapter. Sentrachem for example has strenuously avoided reliance 
upon SASOL for feedstocks and intermediate inputs. 
From the petrochemical production point of view SASOL 2 initially had mixed results. 
The small naphtha crackers in Sasolburg were shut down and replaced by ethylene produced 
in Secunda. This had the advantage, initially, of lower ethylene prices, and reduced 
fluctuations in the ethylene price. When the Sasolburg naphtha crackers were finally closed 
in 1982, ethylene prices fell to their lowest level since 1979 (AECI Annual Report, 1982). 
However there were a number of negative results of this switch to Secunda which have, for 
the most part, continued to impact upon the petrochemical industry since that time. 
There was no replacement in Secunda for important petrochemicals such as propylene 
or butadiene or styrene which had been produced by the crackers. (SASOL continued to 
produce some styrene until 1984.) Thus imports of lower value added naphtha were replaced 
by imports of higher value added propylene, styrene and butadiene to make up for the loss 
of the locally produced building blocks. 
Closing the naphtha crackers with their wider slate of petrochemicals skewed 
development towards a narrower slate of coal based chemicals. Thus all propylene had to be 
imported for several years and required investment in a special facility to do so. A small 
proportion is still imported. Styrene (for polystyrene) and butadiene (for rubber chemicals) 
manufacture had not recommenced by 1994. 
Ethylene however, was too large and costly a business to switch to imports. Since 
1982 SASOL has honoured an understanding that it would not compete downstream in 
polyethylene unless an alternate source of supply was domestically available (Interview, 
Marriot). Since no alternate ethylene sources have existed the possibility of vertical 
integration was denied. This disadvantage became increasingly important as domestic tariff 
barriers were lowered. Although SASOL honoured its 'undertaking' not to compete 
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downstream with AECI, it was eager to do so if an alternate source of ethylene became 
available (Interview, Brand). 
Not only was the slate narrowed but the supply also suffered. The Secunda ethylene 
capacity in 1982 was not much larger than that of the crackers it replaced so that by 1987 a 
shortage of ethylene had developed. Because domestic LOPE demand exceeded ethylene 
supply capacity in 1987, AECI had to import 25 000 tonnes of LOPE. SASOL, commanding 
the only potential source of ethylene, did not expand capacity despite the apparent annual 
consumption of ethylene growing by 5.4% p.a. over the 1978-1985 period (see Table 5.4). 
Oue to ethylene shortages in 1988, AECI's LOPEILLOPE operations were only able to 
operate at 76% capacity necessitating imports of over 40 000 tons of polymer (BTl, Report 
No.2932:5). 
Table 5.4 Apparent Annual consumption of Ethylene 
Metric Tonnes ('000) Percent change p.a. 






1978 1985 1990 
81 112 97) 
na na 50) 
47 72 105 
7 11 12 
135 194 264 
5.09 4.74 5.59 
6.93 6.18 7.99 
4.75 6.77 1.98 
5.76 5.36 6.31 
Notes: a\ Ethylene based PVC consumption is assumed to be 
35/150 of PVC consumption and the remainder 
carbide based. Ethylene is assumed to be 42\ of 
ethylene based pvc volumes. 
Source: Own calculations based upon Plastics Federation 
of SA Annual Reports 
Apparently SASOL allowed ethylene demand to develop by way of imports, until such 
time as another tranche could be brought on stream at satisfactory capacity utilization. 
However from SASOL's point of view, as the sole supplier, scarcity could have been a useful 
argument to keep prices up. Indeed senior officials of some companies interviewed, who wish 
not to be identified, claim that SASOL continually attempted to convey the impression that 
it could not extract any more ethylene out of its system. Then just as the market became 
desperate, it would suddenly find a further tranche of ethylene. 
Part of the ethylene supply problem may also have been the way in which SASOL 
perceived its role. Up until 1988 SASOL appears to have seen itself as a synfuel producer 
which coincidentally produced some petrochemical by-products. This changed when, for the 
first time in 1988, mention is made of a new "strategy of selective and horizontal and 
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downstream diversifications in order to enter new markets and add greater value ... " (SASOL 
Annual Report, 1988:5). 
A number of other factors may have contributed to this change in strategy. In August 
1985 a group of leading businessmen, led by Gavin Relly of Anglo American, travelled to 
Lusaka (Zambia) for a top level meeting with the ANC in exile. ~is may be seen as formal 
recognition by business of the ANC's important, if not central, role in the future of South 
Africa at that time. As pressure mounted on the apartheid regime long term planners in the 
business sector increasingly supported international calls advocating a 'negotiated settlement' 
with exiled forces. 
The nature of SASOL's business activities requires long term time horizons. It is 
reasonable to assume that a large corporation like SASOL would have monitored these 
developments. Whatever the case it appears to have adopted a stance which recognised the 
importance of the props and supports for its business provided by the apartheid state. Whilst 
determined to cling to these supports for as long as possible it also had to develop a business 
strategy which would prepare it for their possible or even probable withdrawal. This kind of 
strategy would have gained added weight from the collapse of the oil price in 1986 and a 
lower prevailing price thereafter. This effect of lower oil prices is evident in the plunge in 
SASOL's 1987 sales compared to 1986 (see Table 5.5). At the same time SASOL's sales in 
real terms were only slightly above 1982 levels between 1987 and 1989. 
Table 5.5 SASOL Turnover 
Year Rmil R mil Index 
Current 1985 Rands 1985 Rands 
1982 1 504 2 192 100 
1983 1 501 1 946 89 
1984 2 217 2 578 118 
1985 3 166 3 166 144 
1986 3 638 3 067 140 
1987 3 109 2 258 103 
1988 3 478 2 238 102 
1989 4 094 2 296 105 
1990 5 033 2 470 113 
Source: SASOL Annual Reports 
Returning to the question of ethylene shortages; these finally prompted SASOL to 
revamp one of the old Sasolburg (naphtha) crackers into a 100 ()()() tpa ethane cracker and 
ethylene recovery facility in 1988. The Secunda ethylene capacity was expanded by 30 ()()() 
tpa in late 1989. In 1991 a R115 million 90 ()()() tpa ethylene facility was commissioned at 
SASOL 3. The current total 405 ()()() tpa capacity is, for the first time, considerably in excess 
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of current demand. Annual ethylene sales to the end of June 1992 were 297 000 tpa which 
represents a capacity utilization of 73% (SASOL Annual Report, 1992: 15). Assuming a 
capacity utilization of 90%, then excess capacity is about 67 500 tpa. However a fu~er 
obstacle to unimpeded supply exists. About 75 % of the ethylene capacity is in Secunda 
·whereas the downstream polymer plants are in Sasolburg. The pipeline used to transport the 
ethylene to Sasolburg restricts the volume of ethylene that can be piped to Sasolburgl. This 
problem would need to be overcome if a rapid expansion of production in Sasolburg was 
considered. 
In addition to the vagaries of SASOL's capacity expansion timing, ethylene users have 
also had to contend with interrupted supplies. During 1989 fires at SASOL cut ethylene 
supplies to polymer users for lengthy periods. AECI lost 25 000 tonnes potential production 
(AECI Annual Report, 1989). The SASOL 3 fire, which caused 12 deaths, was a result of 
poor maintenance. At the subsequent inquest, the Secunda Magistrate found SASOL engineers 
negligent and SASOL 3 criminally liable (Inquest No. 19/91,6-3-92). In the highly corrosive 
conditions of coal chemistry, proper uninterrupted supply requires costly maintenance to 
thousands of kilometres of pipe lines. This defence, offere4 by SASOL, was rejected by the 
Magistrate. 
Given the pressure to reduce costs, maintenance costs have come under scrutiny. This 
is cause for concern as SASOL is constantly under pressure to reduce costs, an issue taken 
up below. 
The 'missing link' and vertical integration 
A critical consideration for the plastics industry is of course the price of ethylene. The 
price of ethylene can be influenced by the structure of the production chain within which it 
is produced. South Africa's ethylene production chain is unique in the world in that it has one 
less link than its oil and gas based competitors. Synthol reactors put the chemical molecules 
from coal back together again, but in new forms. SASOL regards them as their 'treasure 
chest' because they produce a wide range of useful chemical compounds. Among them are 
ethylene and propylene. This happens in one step, the crude oil refining and subsequent 
naphtha cracking stages are collapsed into one. By contrast crude oil must first be partly 
refined to naphtha and then in a second step naphtha must be cracked to olefins. The SASOL 
2. Personal communication K. Pretorius, Sasolchem Marketing. 
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process does not have naphtha as a link in the chain: (see Figure 3). 
. The importance of this is fourfold. Firstly naphtha is an internationally traded 
commodity. This allows a state, such as South Korea for example, to use its control over the 
tariffs on imported naphtha to keep petrochemical prices down. Brazil set an international 
.'world price' for its naphtha. The other source of petrochemicals is natural gas. Natural gas 
prices can also be subjected to international competition as liquified natural gas (LNG) is also 
a globally traded commodity, like naphtha. Such instruments are not available to the state in 
South Africa. There is no 'world' price for impure ethylene generated from synfuels 
manufacture. 
Secondly if polymer prices drop, there is in the South African case, less 'flexibility' 
upstream to absorb lower prices because of the 'missing link'. The first three steps in the 
SASOL process, mining, coal preparation and gasification of coal are essentially materials 
handling processes in which it is difficult to suddenly lower costs by increasing throughput. 
By contrast (and in its simplest form) it may only require an oil well valve to be opened 
wider to achieve greater throughput. In addition a naphtha cracker produces a slate of 
products. By cross subsidising products and 'managing' price changes (to the advantage of 
the firm) naphtha cracker operators have more flexibility in responding to price changes. 
SASOL on the other hand, has to look upstream for flexibility, either to coal gasification and 
synthesis operations or to coal mining itself. These areas do not lend themselves to this form 
of flexibility - it can really only come from improved productivity, which is presumably why 
SASOL has put so much effort into productivity schemes. 
Thirdly, the recovery of ethylene from the hydrocarbon streams generated by the 
synfuels process, requires comparatively little extra investment. Because SASOL's ethylene 
arises almost automatically as a product of the synthol process, it is not necessary to invest 
in a high capital cost, say R3 billion, naphtha cracker to recover ethylene. This fact, 
ironically, gives SASOL an unexpected international competitive cost advantage in times of 
low prices. At these times survival depends upon low operating costs (depreciation is 
ignored). Under these circumstances the SASOL process allows the chemical side-streams to 
be produced at a low cost by international standards. Considered over the longer term this 
advantage continues to prevail as, in the words of a SASOL manager, 'SASOL is not a 
reinvestment industry'. In other words the original capital costs of the synfuel plants are 
regarded as 'sunk' costs. 
Fourthly in synfuels plants chemical feedstocks are produced before petrol and petrol 
is made from them, whereas in a refinery it is the other way around, in the sense that naphtha 
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must first be produced and then cracked to petrochemicals like ethylene and propylene. 
The consequences of this 'missing link' for South Africa is that it is even more 
difficult for normal markets to operate and there is a correspondingly stronger case for 
industrial policy of some kind. Yet, ironically the potential exists for very low cost feedstock 
for the petrochemical industry. 
The ownership structure which prevailed during the operation of the crackers was 
perpetuated when production shifted to Secunda and along with it the lack of vertical 
integration. 
SASOL, the sole producer of ethylene, does not produce any polyethylenes whereas 
in propylene SASOL is vertically integrated having recently built a polypropylene facility. 
Sentrachem C9ntrols the other PP facility which is vertically integrated to its propylene splitter 
at the SAPREF refinery in Durban for a considerable proportion of its needs. 
Ethylene prices 
How has this peculiar process of ethylene production.impacted on prices and how have 
SASOL's ethylene prices compared internationally? SASOL Technology Managing Director 
John Marriot believes South African ethylene prices are close to North West Europe (NWE) 
prices (Interview, Marriot). Safripol believe that ethylene prices are 'not unreasonable' in 
comparison with NWE prices. However AECI, the other major consumer of ethylene, believe 
them to be 20-35 % above NWE and US prices. 
A comparison of prices in Table 5.6 establishes that South African ethylene prices 
were about 47% higher than US prices and 22 % higher than NWE prices over 1980-91. 
Given that ethylene prices are typically 50% to 60% of polyethylene prices this is a severe 
handicap for polymer producers and their customers in turn. 
Is importing ethylene an alternative? Ethylene is cryogenic (see glossary) and has seen 
little international trade for that reason until the last few years. It is to all intents and purposes 
a 'non-tradeable' and this increases the difficulty of determining an appropriate price for 
ethylene in a small market with a single producer. This important question arose several times 
in a previous discussion concerning some Latin America and South East Asian petrochemical 
industries. What is the appropriate transfer price of a non tradeable commodity in a small 
economy? Such difficult public policy issues are among the reasons for a high level of state 
involvement in upstream petrochemicals in so many developing countries and some developed 
countries. 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ • Table 5.6 ETHYLENE PRICE COMPARISON I 
!--------------+--------+--------+---------+--------+--------+ • • SA I US I SA/US I NWE I SA/NWE I 
:Year Quarter :R/tonne IR/tonne I <t) IR/tonne I t I 
+--------------+--------+--------+---------+--------+--------+ 1980 794 377 210 568 140 
1981 869 512 170 611 142 
1982 866 466 186 612 141 
1983 667 497 134 607 110 
1984 841 618 136 755 111 
1985 908 761 119 1118 81 
1986 1079 780 138 919 117 
1987 1190 673 177 900 132 
1988 1564 1427 110 1168 134 
1989 1783 1739 103 1576 113 
1990 1 1760 1396 126 1364 129 
2 1760 1292 136 1359 130 
3 1760 1265 139 1543 114 
4 1844 1556 119 2195 84 
.Average 1990 1781 1377 129 1615 110 
I 1991 1 1953 1396 140 1877 104 
• 2 1860 1140 163 1418 131 • • 3 1800 1035 174 1310 137 • • 4 1800 1181 152 1347 134 • IAverage 1990 1853 1188 157 1488 127 
+--------------+--------+--------+---------+--------+--------+ Average 1980-91 (t) 147 122 I 
• Average 1990-91 (t) 144 120 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 




In South Africa this problem was resolved by a formula linking the ethylene price to 
local polyethylene prices (SASOL Annual Report, 1992: 15). This has been seen as a form 
of wealth sharing (Interview, Blackburn). The contracts are negotiated quarterly and if 
agreement is not reached then a fixed percentage derived from long term US and NWE prices 
operates for a further quarter while continued efforts are made to reach agreement. 
This is a curious form of bargaining in which the seller has no alternative ethylene 
buyers and the purchasers no alternative source, and all of them monopolies in their own 
right in a closed market. As one polymer company representative put it, 'during the 1980s 
a lot of money was made by all parties'. 
If ethylene prices are a function of polyethylene prices, what is it then that determines 
local polyethylene prices? Traditionally domestic polyethylene prices have been import parity 
prices.3 Tariffs were ad valorem from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s at which point a 
reference price was added. The effect of a reference price is to create a floor price below 
which it is impossible to import, no matter how low the international price of polymer falls. 
This has been used to good effect by the DTI in claiming to lower tariffs whilst in fact 
3. Import restrictions also existed for long periods. 
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increasing them. For example in 1991 PP ad valorem tariffs were cut from 20% to 10% but 
at the same time the reference price was increased from 93c/kg to R2.30/kg. 
LOPE, the first polyethylene to be produced locally, enjoyed a 20% ad valorem tariff 
virtually from start up in 1965. This prevailed until 1983 when a reference price was added . 
. The tariff structure was amended again in 1987, 1989 and 1990. The pattern is similar for 
HOPE, PVC and LLOPE. AECI bases its call for protection upon the cost of ethylene. If it 
had NWE ethylene prices it would accept only a 5% tariff (BTl, Verslag No. 3037:32). The 
Board of Trade and Industry have been sympathetic to ABCl's case because: 
"Broadly considered, it must be concluded that the South African organic chemical 
industry did not develop under normal market conditions and that with reference to 
the raw materials a cost structure arose on a .higher level than would have been the 
case under more normal conditions." (BTl, Verslag No. 3037:7, synopsis (only) is 
printed in English) 
In short the domestic polymer price has been a function of the degree of tariff 
protection, which in turn has been determined as a result of the large producers lobbying the 
Board of Trade and Industry, which has been sympathetic to their cause, and who have 
determined tariffs accordingly. These reference price tariffs have set the local price of 
polymer. It is this reference price which is the critical lynchpin of pricing throughout the 
plastics chain as it works both upstream influencing ethylene prices and downstream 
influencing plastic converter's polymer input prices. Moreover since it is linked to imported 
prices it carries with it freight, insurance and wharfage costs all the way down the production 
chain and raising prices at each step. 
So the state has in effect set the ethylene price by setting the polymer price. But 
instead of doing this directly as Korea did or as Brazil did and linking it to 'world' prices, 
it has gone through the charade of tariff hearings and allowed the three large companies to 
set (by means of the tariff) the local polymer price, but at higher than 'world' prices (as will 
be demonstrated below) and thus 'damming up' value added at the upstream end of the 
production chain. The division of spoils behind this 'dam' was left to the major companies 
to sort out amongst themselves. As it turns out they have agreed to share the risks and 
benefits, how fairly is known only to those party to these secret negotiations. 
How rigorous has the state been in setting the polymer floor prices? The written 
reports of the Board of Trade and Industry are weak. They lack any rigorous analysis and 
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rely heavily upon the submissions of the applicants for international price developments and 
information on the extent of plant competitiveness. They consider only nominal protection and 
not effective protection. 
The capacity to influence government behind the scenes must have been important to 
these companies. Both SASOL and Sentrachem are historically off-shoots of state initiatives 
and AECI has also been successful in its appeals for tariff protection in the past, even over 
the heads of the plastic converting industry. 
SASOL does offer ethylene at lower prices to polymer producers for the purposes of 
manufacturing polymer for export, however the details of this are not available. This lower 
ethylene price allows the polymer producers to compete on world markets. Even though 
SASOL's (indirect) export price of ethylene is lower, larger volumes would enable SASOL 
to achieve better plant capacity utilization rates, ie it · is sold at marginal cost. The marginal 
ethylene price is the fuel/gas alternate value, that is the value it has to SASOL if it were put 
to the next most lucrative use - petrol. At 'fuel alternate value' (petrol) prices, SASOL's 
ethylene price is internationally competitive, somewhere between lower cost associated gas 
(see glossary) based producers and US prices. 
The critical question then is, did SASOL need to sell its ethylene at such high prices? 
Could they not have sold it at lower prices? 
Transfer Prices and Ethylene Qpportunity Costs 
What should the transfer price of this non tradeable commodity be when sold from one 
monopoly (SASOL) to two other monopolies (AECI and Sentrachem)? This section poses the 
question: what is the lowest price at which SASOL could have sold ethylene? 
Firstly SASOL's basic cost structure is examined. SASOL's feedstock costs are rooted 
in coal mining. Unlike international petrochemical and polymer prices, SASOL's costs are 
not linked to the international crude oil price. Consequently when petrochemical feedstock 
prices are falling SASOL's are not necessarily following suit. Indeed they are subject to 
domestic inflationary pressures which in periods of low international oil prices, such as the 
early 1990s, oblige SASOL to indulge in dramatic cost cutting exercises. For example some 
2500 employees were retrenched in mid 1992. The SASOL 1992 Annual Report is littered 
with comments such as "further rationalisation and restructuring in order to reduce operating 
costs ... "(P3). 
The point is that it is not easy for SASOL to arrange domestic input price fluctuations 
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to follow the international oil price. Equally there is a limit to which cost cutting measures 
can proceed. The SASOL 1988 Annual Report comments: 
"Although good results were achieved in the past in keeping cost escalation below the 
inflation rate, we have now reached a temporary plateau. " (my emphasis) pl. 
On the other hand it must be borne in mind that SASOL has the advantage of being vertically 
integrated in so far as coal feedstocks are concerned. These costs are very low and their coal 
mining is among the most efficient in the world. The recent commissioning of SASOL's 
Syferfontein strip mine will further lower coal mining costs. However as has been noted in 
the discussion of the Coalplex coal-based PVC plant, the price rigidities and the lack of links 
in the production chain are the constraint for coal based producers and SASOL is no different 
in this regard. From SASOL's cost structure the discussion now moves on to the nature of 
SASOL's process and the resultant yield. 
The production flow at SASOL 2 & 3 begins with coal mining. Mined coal is washed, 
fed to Lurgi gasifiers and reduced to gas. The emerging mixture of hydrogen, carbon 
monoxide and other gases is then purified and this purified gas mixture is fed into the synthol 
fluidised bed reactors where the hydrogen-carbon bonding takes place. The principal products 
yielded by the synthol reactor are shown in Figure 18' As Figure 18 shows, the largest 
Figure 18. The Principal Products from SA SOL synthol Reactors 
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proportion of products by weight is hydrocarbon gases. These include 4 % ethane (~~) the 
precursor to ethylene, 4% ethylene itself (~H4)' propane (C3HS) the precursor to propylene 
(C3~)' and 12% propylene itself and other gases (Bennet, 1990:266). To produce petrol the 
higher value gases are downgraded to lower value petrol. For example in July 1991 the 
domestic ethylene price was about R 1 860 per tonne whereas the 87 octane petrol price was 
only about R708 per tonne. Even by comparison with the lower US ethylene price of about 
R1140 per tonne, ethylene is more valuable than petrol to SASOL. As the SASOL's 
Managing Director Mr Paul Kruger has put it: 
"These feedstocks have a higher value than petrol and therefore the profitability of the 
venture is reduced by converting valuable chemicals to fuel." (Minutes of the 
Petrochemicals Industry Study Group, 10-4-89:3) 
Herein lies the clue to SASOL's poor capital productivity. In producing fuel it is not adding 
value but subtracting value! 
The nature of SASOL's operations is such that if the hydrocarbon gases emerging 
from the synthol reactor were not marketed as petrochemicals they could alternately be 
processed to petrol or industrial gas. What then is the value of petrol to SASOL and what is 
the value of industrial gas to SASOL? 
Three considerations apply: 
i) the opportunity cost of ethylene as petrol 
ii) the opportunity cost of ethane as industrial gas 
iii) the conversion/recovery costs of the ethylene and ethane 
Each one is dealt with in tum, after the inner workings of the SASOL process are examined. 
The simple comparisons of petrol and ethylene prices are, unfortunately, in the real 
world of chemical engineering, not quite so straightforward. The conversion of ethylene to 
petrol is not a simple one to one relationship, at least not all of it. Presently about half of 
SASOL's ethylene/ethane stream not sold as ethylene is processed through a catalytic-
polymerisation unit which is an efficient conversion to fuel, so a straightforward conversion 
factor of 1 is assumed. The remaining half follows a partial oxidation route with 
approximately a 0.45 conversion rate. Consequently if similar proportions are applied to the 
entire ethylene/ethane stream then the average conversion rate would be 0.75 suggesting that 
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ethylene/ethane value as ethylene is, somewhat higher than expected, approximately 2.3 times 
that of petrol. This assumes zero conversion/recovery costs. The converse applies to the 
petrol alternate value for SASOL of its ethylene. In short SASOL could have sold ethylene 
a lot cheaper than it did. 
A second source of ethylene is from ethane, piped from Secunda to SASOL 1 in 
Sasolburg, and then cracked in one of the converted old naphtha crackers. What is the 
opportunity cost of this unique light hydrocarbon/ethane feedstock? The alternative use for 
this ethane would be as industrial gas. SASOL Oil, trading as Gascor, operates an extensive 
industrial gas pipeline network in the PWV region supplying energy to industry. At 
September 1992 prices ethane's alternate value (as industrial gas) was about R917 per ton (see 
Annexure A), about one half the value of ethylene. Against this measure then the price of 
ethylene could be halved, excluding the extraction and recovery costs. One implication of 
these calculations is that as the market grows with economic development and if SASOL is 
relieved of its fuel obligations, it could become more profitable for SASOL to sell gas and 
petrochemicals, rather than petrol. The difficult question arising from this which requires 
investigation is how much synfuel would SASOL have to continue to produce in order to 
simultaneously produce chemicals? 
Extraction and recovery costs of ethylene are very difficult to gauge without access 
to SASOL's internal finances. Safripol Managing Director D. Blackburn believes that despite 
all three of SASOL's ethylene facilities being less than half the size of a world scale (500 000 
tpa) cracker they are competitive as the feedstock arises as a matter of course (Interview, 
Blackburn). That is once the SASOL plants were operating it was comparatively capital cost 
effective to extract ethylene. The authoritative on & Gas Journal reports that: 
" .. at small additional cost, the ethylene and propylene can be extracted and purified 
to standard polymer-grade feedstock." (Oil & Gas Journal, 20-1-92:53t 
The unique feedstocks used are by-products integral to the synthol process so there is no easy 
international comparison to make here to judge the competitiveness of this ethylene recovery. 
What is known is that the recovery/conversion costs could be reduced by virtue of a market 
for any methane by-product through Gascor's network. Equally this feedstock stream should 
bear its share of the synfuel capital and operating costs. Apportioning a share is very difficult 
4. Based upon a paper presented by SASOL scientists at the Achema 91 Conference, June 9-15, 1991, Frankfurt. 
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if not impossible. 
In summary, thus far it has been established that SASOL's ethane/ethylene stream is 
worth more to it as ethylene than as petrol. The next question then is, if SASOL had sold its 
ethylene at the alternate value, petrol, how would this selling price compare with international 
ethylene prices? For the time being the import parity price, known as the In Bond Landed 
Cost (IBLC) will be accepted as the value of petrol to SASOL. This is the price the oil 
marketing companies pay SASOL for its petrol which they market. 
A comparison of South African petrol prices and US ethylene prices in Table 5.7 
shows that South African petrol is on average cheaper than US ethylene by about 80% over 
the 1982-90 period. Consequently if SASOL had sold ethylene at its 'fuel alternate value' it 
would have been providing ethylene at an extremely competitive price internationally. 
Notes: 
Sources: 
+------------------------------------------------+ I Table 5.7 Comparison: RSA Petrol and 
1 International Ethylene Prices 1 
+-----------+-----------+-------------+----------+ Ethylene RSA 
1 US Gulf PETROL 1 
I R/TONNE R/TONNE I (A)/(B) 
I (1) I (\) 
YEAR MTH 1 (A) I . ( B ) I 1 
----------- ----------_1_-----------_1_---------1 
1982 466 415 112 
1983 497 381 131 
1984 618 480 129 
1985 761 703 108 
1986 780 463 168 
1987 673 399 169 
1988 1427 405 353 
1989 1739 568 306 
1990 JAN 1368 569 240 
FEB 1368 588 233 
MAR 1368 622 220 
APR 1311 637 206 
MAY 1311 608 216 
JUN 1254 561 223 
JUL, 1245 568 219 
AUG I 1219 1102 111 
SEPI 1330 1050 127 
OCT I 1488 1039 143 
NOV I 1587 827 1 192 
DECI 1592 779 204 
AVE I 1379 746 185 
1991 JAN I 1499 783 191 
FEBI 1373 727 189 
MARl 1315 610 215 
APRI 1177 624 189 
MAY I 1139 673 169 
JUNI 1104 741 149 
JULI 1047 708 148 
-----------1----------- ------------- 1 ----------1 Average 1982-90 184 
Average 1990-91 182 
1. The 'fuel alternate value' is the In Bond Landed Cost of 87 Octa 
petrol, the pri~e paid to SASOL for such product. ne 
~~~~ldson, Lufkl.n & Jenrette Securities, New York., Shell SA (pty) 
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Propylene supplies and prices 
Propylene is the other major feedstock in the South African commodity plastics chain. 
The history of propylene supplies, or rather the lack of them, must rank as one of the more 
.extraordinary parts of South Africa's petrochemical history. Fro,m the time the Sasolburg 
naphtha crackers were closed and replaced by production from Secunda in 1981, no propylene 
was produced by, SASOL until 1990 when they commissioned alSO ()()() tpa facility at 
Secunda. This failure by SASOL to produce propylene occurred despite a relative abundance 
of propylene in SASOL's system and the fact that propylene can be extracted very 
economically at the 'fuel alternative value', according to SASOL Polymers Managing 
Director Brand, (Interview, Brand). 
In so far as SASOL's relatively abundant supplies of propylene are concerned, it is 
known that the synthol reactors yield about 12% propylene. This yield is significant in that 
international competitors using naphtha feedstock typically get a 2: 1 ethylene/propylene yield. 
Yet at SASOL, if ethane is included, the ethylene/propylene yield is about 1:1.5. 
The low cost of SASOL's propylene may be judged, as in ethylene, by assuming that 
the cost of propylene to SASOL is its 'fuel alternate value' and comparing it to an 
international benchmark propylene price (see Table 5.8). This evidence suggests that 
SASOL's propylene costs (at the 'fuel alternate value') were under 70% of US Gulf 
propylene costs. 
Good commercial reasons also existed which ought to have enticed SASOL into 
propylene production. Propylene is the precursor to polypropylene (PP) which is a C3 
polymer as opposed to polyethylenes which are Ci polymers. The additional carbon atom and 
the chemical structure of PP make it a more versatile and desirable polymer. It has greater 
tensile strength and is stiffer than high density polyethylene. Its tensile strength is sufficient 
to allow it to be used in textile applications. 
Despite these considerations, for almost a decade SASOL produced no propylene. The 
reasons for this are not known but since propylene is also a constituent of petrol, it seems 
plausible that SASOL saw its priorities in petrol rather than chemicals. Whatever the reason, 
SASOL must have changed its view in about 1987 or 1988, in order to bring its propylene 
plant on stream by 1990. This follows immediately after a period during which propylene was 
more valuable than ethylene, which may have influenced the decision. At the time SASOL 
was not to know that ethylene would by 1989 have established its traditional price relationship 
to propylene. This propylene plant decision also coincides with the announcement of the new 
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value adding strategy in the 1988 Annual Report, quoted earlier. 
+---------------------------------------+ , Table 5.8 Comparison: SASOL's 'Fuel I ! Alternate va;ue' and US Gulf ! 
I Propylene Pr\ces , 
+--------+---------+-----------+--------+ I FUEL I Propylene I I 
IALTERNATEIP'mer grade I I 
IVALUE(l) I US Gulf I (A)/(B)I 
, I R/TONNE I R/TONNE I ( , ) I 
IYear I (A) I (B) I I 
+--------+---------+-----------+--------+ , 1982 415 I 550 75 
1983 381 466 82 
1984 480 618 78 
1985 703 822 86 
1986 463 614 75 
1987 399 731 55 
1988 405 1036 39 
,1989 568 1196 48 
'1990 JAN 569 841 68 
FEB 588 886 66 
MAR 622 855 73 
APR 637 883 72 
HAY 608 886 ' 69 
JUN 561 912 62 
JUL 568 959 59 ' 
AUG 1102 935 118 
SEP 1050 1047 100 
OCT 1039 1205 86 
NOV 827 , 1362 61 
DEC 779 I 1366 57 
1990 AVE 746 I 1015 74 
1991 JAN 783 I 1242 63 
FEB 727 I 1230 59 
MAR 610 I 1196 51 
APR 624 I 1177 53 
HAY 673 I 1139 59 
JUN 741 I 1104 67 
JUL 708 I 1015 70 , 
+--------+---------+-----------+--------+ 
Average 1982-90 507 783 68 
Average 1990-91 727 1065 69 
Note: 1. The 'fuel alternate value' is the In Bond Landed Cost 
of 87 octane petrol, the price paid to SASOL for such 
product. 
Sources: Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities, New York. 
Shell SA (pty) Ltd. 
Part of the reason for selecting propylene is probably to be found in the global 
restructuring of the industry which occurred following the recession in the early 1980s. At 
that point considerable cracker capacity was shut down. As was observed in an earlier 
chapter, propylene is a by-product of naphtha cracking whether desired or not, and for this 
reason traditionally had a lower price than ethylene. However as a result of the closure of 
cracker capacity and its substitution by gas based capacity (which lacked propylene 
co-product), a shortage of propylene occurred driving up the price of polypropylene. This 
period of higher priced propylene occurred at about the same time SASOL must have been 
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considering extracting propylene . 
. Through the mid 1980s the Sentrachem annual reports regularly refer to the local 
propylene supply shortage. It accordingly adopted two strategies to relieve this shortage. 
The first was to import supplementary quantities through Richards Bay Bulk Storage
l
. 
The second was to boost local supplies. A small facility to supply refinery propylene was 
built by Sentrachem in 1991 at the SAPREF refinery in Durban. This facility has only 30 000 
tpa capacity, but this is sufficient to supply 60% of Safripol's needs which are supplemented 
by imports and supplies from SASOL. 
This move by Sentrachem is typical of its attempts to avoid dependence upon SASOL 
for feedstocks. It must also be borne in mind that SASOL had begun to compete with Safripol 
in the manufacture of PP. There may also be cost advantages to Sentrachem of vertical 
integration in so far as its propylene supplies are concerned despite the fact that these supplies 
have to be moved a longer distance (from Durban to Sasolburg), than if they were sourced 
in Secunda. 
The recent propylene price history is reflected in Figure 19. It reveals that for most 
of the period between 1980 and 1990 domestic propylene prices exceeded the US and NwE 
prices for most of this period, indeed by an annual average of 29% over the 1980-92 period 




650 -j-tt-- - - ---------------1 
600 rr----7!~------/--.3.-~ 
!!o t-+--r-~;__-----I---~ 
I soo t-~'-r-----1r----1'-:=::.....---~ 
'-.. 450 ~I---+_--+-=----f.-F==~,---~ 




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 
I-lISA -- us ClU --- NWE 
Source: Safripol 
1. A joint venture between Sentrachem, AECI and Rennies, a local shipping and transpon company. 
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Following the propylene drought during the 1980s the future looks comparatively rosy. 
Estimates of SASOL's untapped propylene supplies range between 250 000 tpa and 450 000 
tpa6. Refineries, another potential source of further propylene, are undergoing a phase of 
expansions in the early 1990s which also augurs well for propylene supplies. 
Petrol Prices and SASOL's Profits 
Thus far this study has assumed the (fuel alternate value) IBLe petrol price to be the 
alternate value for SASOL's petrochemicals (olefins). This is not strictly true. The price 
which SASOL is paid for its synfuels is built up through the application of a complex web 
of regulations governing the liquid fuels industry which makes the value of petrol to SASOL 
higher than the coastal import parity price (lBLe). The chief of these, price inflating, 
elements are set out, very briefly, below. (They are explored in more detail together with 
some of the criticisms and rebuttals applicable in each case under the appropriate headings 
in Annexure B.) 
Firstly the ISLe is a theoretical cost of imported petrol at the coast and acts as a form 
of 'tarifr protection estimated to be equivalent to about 10%. This has been criticised as 
being too high and indeed the National Economic Forum's Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force 
did negotiate a reduction in mid 1994. 
Secondly the import parity principle is extended to the movement of product inland 
to Secunda. This means that SASOL is also entitled to an 'inland transport allowance', which 
is added on to the ISLe. This is the theoretical cost of ~iping petroleum products inland, 
which of course is not done for synfuel production. SASOL argue that this is their natural 
locational advantage. The amount of this 'inland transport allowance' is also in dispute. 
Petronet pipeline charges are deemed to be excessive which also acts to SASOL's advantage. 
Thirdly SASOL enjoys 'tariff protection' (comprised of levies on the retail petrol price 
via the Equalisation Fund) which has provided' SASOL with a guaranteed floor price at a 
crude oil equivalent of $23/barrel for its petrol output. 
If it is accepted that this web of regulations inflates the value to SASOL of petrol then 
it follows, hypothetically at least, that if these regulations were removed the value to SASOL 
of petrol would drop substantially. This would increase the incentive for SASOL to produce 
higher value chemicals instead of liquid fuels. If regulations such as the ISLe and the inland 
6. P Lloyd, petrochemical consultant and own calculations. 
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transport cost charges were lowered then the alternate value of olefins as fuel would drop by 
a corresponding amount. Consequently it is within the power of the state - as the body 
responsible for the liquid fuels regulatory regime - to lower the cost of major raw mat~rial 
inputs into the commodity plastics jiliere by adjusting downwards regulations governing the 
value to SASOL of its synfuels. Such a reduction would of course impact on SASOL's 
finances and profitability. A question which then arises is how reliant is SASOL upon its 
regulatory supports and could it survive deregulation of the liquid fuels industry? 
According to Davie (1991c: 13) these regulatory supports were worth R927 million to 
SASOL in 1991 which is close to its profit of R Ibn in that year. Detailed calculations by 
another source (hereinafter X) show SASOL's benefit was R1.9bn in 1991, almost double 
SASOL's after tax income in that year.7 In this case SASOL would have been cash negative 
without regulatory support. 
If the latter is true and .71% of GOP went to support SASOL as part of a total of 
R3.8bn (1.42% of GOP), in payments to the liquid fuels industry, then there is an urgent 
need for the veil of secrecy to be removed so that properly informed and more equitable 
regulations may be devised. 
The somewhat alarming picture which emerges from Davie's and another calculation 
by X, has to be tempered by the knowledge that the year in which these calculations were 
made was also the year in which anticipation of the Gulf War was associated with a steep rise 
in oil prices. Benchmark Brent crude oil prices leapt from about $18-20 per barrel to almost 
$42 per barrel in the latter half of 1990 before falling back to previous levels in early 1991. 
This in turn would have raised the IBLC and caused SASOL's sales and profits to rocket 
upwards which they did. SASOL's turnover in 1991 rose 50.2% above the 1990 turnover and 
attributable profits rose by almost 40%! (SASOL's financial year end is mid year). 
A year later, at the end of 1992, a stockbroking analyst calculated that the value to 
SASOL of only the 10% tariff protection was R440 million in 1992 and a similar amount in 
1990 (Tison, 1992). He argues that SASOL has very good prospects "even after stripping out 
the subsidy" (Tison, 1992b: 14). Former Minister of Mineral & Energy Affairs, George 
Bartlett, answering a question in parliament in March 1993, said that the total tariff protection 
given to SASOL in the 1991/92 financial year had been R 537.5 million against SASOL's 
attributable income for the year end to June 1992 of R1.1bn (Business Day, 11-3-93). In the 
previous year he claimed the tariff protection given to SASOL was R 222.5 million (Ibid). 
7. !hi~ sou~ wishes .to remain confidential due to the sensitive nature of the information and the secrecy 
legislation whIch prevaIled at the time it was made available. 
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Recently another set of figures has been made available by the Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs for SASOL's 'tariff protection', just one of the three elements in 
SASOL's support system (see Table 5.9). It should be noted that isolating the 'tariff 
protection' in this way yields the most conservative estimate of SASOL's subsidy. The 
discrepancies between the Department of Mineral & Energy Affairs (DMEA) figures and 
some of the others may be partly attributable to inclusion or exclusion of other elements of 
SASOL's subsidy such as the 'inflated' IBLC and the locational advantage. Although the 
figures provided differ from source to source, all of them are substantial as is revealed by 
comparing the 'tariff protection' with the GOP. 
Table 5.9 SASOL's Tariff Protection 
Financial Year Protection Tariff Protection as Protection as % of 
R million % offfiLC GOP a\ 
1989/90 479.5 21.1% 0.19% 
1990/91 223.3 7.2% 0.08% 
1991192 538.7 18.7% 0.17% 
1992193 629.9 20.5% 0.19% 
1993/94 1062.9 32.0% 0.28% 
ources: vel artment ot MIneral &. Ener ' AffairS p gy
South African Reserve Bank, 1994:b-5. 
Note: a\ GOP figures used are for the first of the two years mentioned in the first column. 
Deregulation of the liquid fuels industry would clearly have a major impact on 
SASOL. On the other hand SASOL has been the most profitable chemical company among 
Fortune Magazine's 'Fortune 500' and it does have the protection of the declining interest 
'safety net' clause in the SASOL 3 claw-back agreement (see Annexure B). An exact answer 
would require a major calculation which lies beyond the scope of this study and which is not 
possible on the basis of available information. 
An ancillary question which arises in the light of the massive public funding 
supporting synfuel operations, is would it not be in the public interest to simply close them? 
A rough estimate of the costs associated with a closure of SASOL is provided in 
Annexure B. It appears from these calculations that the costs of closing SASOL would be 
about 1.1 % of GOP. From a balance of payments point of view the impact would have been 
of the order of R3 billion p.a. in 1992 Rands. 
These figures outweigh the extent of public support given to synfuels. However they 
do not preclude a reduction of such support which would appear to be in the public interest 
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from the point of view of liquid fuel and commodity plastic prices. 
A re-regulation of the oil industry with much greater transparency would also benefit 
SASOL. In 1992 SASOL' s share price on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was discounted 
because investors were concerned about its vulnerability to deregulation (Tison, 1992) . 
.sASOL's image is also suffering because whenever it encounters competition it tends to face 
accusations of unfair competition and of using its fuel 'subsidy' to cross subsidise other 
business.8 A prerequisite for all of the above is a coOlplete lifting of all of the veils of 
secrecy that hang over SASOL and the oil industry. Thereafter, access to SASOL's inner 
financial workings will be necessary to determine if transfer pricing has taken place. SASOL 
remains a partially privatised business which means that the issue of confidentiality around 
information ~ffecting its competitive position arises. 
If SASOL wishes to silence its critics on the question of transfer pricing it will have 
to find a widely acceptable process of doing so without compromising its innermost business 
secrets. 
The threat of deregulating the liquid fuel industry and its impact upon the petrochemical 
industry 
There has been an increasing clamour in sections of the commercial press for the 
deregulation of the liquid fuel industry. The influential Automobile Association has also added 
its weight to the cry (see Automobile Association, 1992). The government carried out an 
extensive (but unpublished) study of the regulation of the oil industry in 1990 which found 
no reason to change (Davie, 1991b: 17). Subsequently the government has begun to reconsider 
such issues and has commenced another investigation into deregulation of the fuel industry 
(Business Day, 23-9-92:7). A number of other signs make some form of deregulation a 
plausible option within the next few years. These include statements by oil companies and the 
progressive collapse of economic sanctions against South Africa. However SASOL Executive 
Director, Du Toit, has claimed that the National Party government has given SASOL an 
undertaking that 'tariff protection' will be kept in place until the end of 1995 (Business Day, 
29-7-92:7) so it seems that at least that aspect will remain in place until 1996 unless the 1994 
Government of National Unity can find a way of extracting itself from this undertaking 
8. SASOL's attempts to break into coal exports through Richards Bay have led SA coal industry executives to 
~use. SASO~ of using its fuel s~b~idies to ~st exports. (Financial Times International Coal Report, quoted 
ID BuslDess Times 21-12-92:3). Sundar accusatIOns have been made in respect of its chemical businesses. 
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without compromising investor confidence. 
SASOL no doubt considered these demands for deregulation. From SASOL's point 
of view, if the liquid fuels industry was deregulated this could lead to lower liquid fuel 
prices. Then, as has been argued above, the price of olefins should theoretically fall thus 
.reducing SASOL's revenue. Is this likely? Representatives of SFF and CEF believe this to 
be the case (Interview, van Zyl & Roberts). Since the value of SASOL's sales would drop 
one might reasonably expect it to attempt to compensate for this by raising its olefm prices. 
There is an opposing view which differs from the preceding orthodox view. It argues 
that fuel industry deregulation will not necessarily result in lower liquid fuel prices. It is 
possible, depending upon the nature and extent of the deregulation, that liquid fuel prices 
might rise because a legal cartel has operated for many years and the habit may prove 
difficult to break. South Africa also lacks any independent 'maverick' type refinery which 
could assist in keeping prices down. 
As has been pointed out earlier, olefin prices f\ave been largely a function of the 
import parity prices of polymer which have been fed back upstream. Import parity prices are 
in tum a function of the applicable tariff. At the same .time polymer tariffs were under 
pressure from South Africa's participation in the Uruguay Round of the GAIT negotiations. 
Consequently two key props of SASOL's revenue were under threat; the value (to 
SASOL) of liquid fuels and polymer prices (under threat of tariff protection). 
These two threats Oiquid fuel deregulation and tariff reduction) also challenged 
SASOL in a third area in the early 199Os. At this time it was busy with a spate of wide 
ranging, large investments, most of which were being funded by cash flow. This might have 
forced SASOL to fund these projects from more conventional sources (debt and share capital) 
thus possibly making them less attractive projects. These projects were at different stages of 
implementation and depending upon the time at which the two threats might be realised, these 
projects could be severely compromised. Furthermore if these investments dried up the lack 
of investment might encourage the government to take a closer look at the petrochemical 
industry which might have limited SASOL's room to manoeuvre in some way. SASOL faced 
something of a vicious circle of threats. 
Overriding all of these uncertainties of course was the political uncertainty; would 
South Africa make the transition to some form of democracy and what sort of government 
might this yield? 
One obvious option for SASOL was to follow international precedent and forward 
integrate downstream into polymer production. However SASOL faced a constraint down this 
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path, its historical undertaking to AECI not to compete with AECI until an alternative source 
of olefins was available. There was no apparent prospect for this on the Highveld in the early 
1990s. Whatever strategy SASOL chose it seemed inextricably tied to AECI. 
SASOL did find an ingenious solution to its problems which commenced in 1994. 
-However before analysing this solution, it is helpful to proceed to an examination of the next 
link in the chain, the polymer manufacturing industry, and to determine what forces and 
imperatives were brewing there which may also have contributed to this ingenious solution. 
This is the subject of the next chapter. 
Conclusions 
State encouragement and intervention in the -petrochemical industry has steered the 
industry away from conventional crude oil based feedstocks towards reliance upon coal based 
feedstocks to a very large extent. State policy has placed a priority on self sufficiency in 
meeting liquid fuel needs and this has taken preference over higher value added chemicals 
which could have been produced instead. These induced chemical shortages resulted in larger 
imports. (Chemical industry trade is discussed in a subsequent chapter). Similarly the slate 
of petrochemicals available was narrowed as a result of state intervention. Coal based 
production lacks the ability of oil based petrochemical production to pass lower prices 
upstream. Consequently SASOL is likely to remain under continued pressure to reduce 
operating costs. The new Syferfontein strip mine will assist in lowering coal costs but it is 
likely that the brunt of this pressure will continue to be targeted at increasing production 
productivities. This is already a wide ranging initiative and is likely to remain so. 
Redundancies are likely to continue especially among lower skilled production workers. 
Pressure to reduce operating costs cast doubts upon the extent to which spending on health, 
safety can be made and to which real wages can be improved. 
The 'missing link' in the production chain has removed the ability of the state to 
regulate petrochemical prices by adjusting the tariff on imported naphtha as was done in 
South Korea. Because of the lack of vertical integration, and the 'missing link' in the 
production chain, the nature of the transfer pricing mechanism between the upper links has 
been crucial in determining prices for the commodity plastics production chain. 
The regulation of this crucial link in the chain has been left to the private sector who 
have met to settle the transfer price in a rather peculiar negotiating forum where there are no 
alternate buyers or sellers. The results of these negotiations were buoyed up by the tariff 
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reference price set by the state. 
State self sufficiency policy objectives, a weak state apparatus responsible for fixing 
polymer floor prices, and powerful companies having access to government's ear, have 
resulted in ethylene prices above world prices. Both ethylene and propylene prices have been 
·well above their 'fuel alternate value'. 
The inability of market forces to set optimum prices has even been acknowledged by 
the conservative Working Group: 
"It is questionable whether market forces alone will achieve the necessary objectives, 
as the circumstances in the upstream end do not comply with the conditions for a 
perfectly competitive market. This is because there are only a few major companies 
involved and the mega scale of operations represents a formidable barrier to entry into 
the industry. II (Department of Trade and Industry, 1990:31) 
They go further to recommend that "a coordinated overall industrial strategy" (p47) is 
needed. Although this appears an eminently sensible idea in the light of the foregoing 
discussion, unfortunately this has not been forthcoming from the Working Group. To some 
extent this study attempts to redress this failure. Ideally an integrated study of the entire field 
of petrochemicals. with its many and complex interrelationships is necessary. This 
unfortunately is beyond the scope of this study. 
Indeed if the results are measured against apartheid's public policy objectives then the 
results were reasonable under the circumstances. Measured from the point of view of 
economic and petrochemical industry development the reverse is the case. SASOL did not 
give petrochemicals priority and supply suffered in the process. 
In 1988 SASOL made a very significant change in strategic direction away from 
concentrating on synfuels provision and towards diversification and value adding strategies, 
which they have subsequently continued to pursue. It has been argued that the pressures for 
this change in direction are to be found in principally three areas: the changing political 
environment, threats to the regulatory regime in the liquid fuels industry and in international 
pressure to reduce key tariffs through South Africa's admission to the GAIT. 
An appropriate re-regulation of the fuel industry could have a potentially beneficial 
effect on the price of olefins. In one sense the regime of support for the synfuels and oil 
industry does provide the state with an alternative to the missing link, in that it is a policy 





THE PLASTIC RA W MATERIALS OR POLYMER INDUSTRY BEFORE 1994 
. Introduction 
This chapter moves one step further down the production chain to what is effectively 
the second stage, the production of commodity polymers, the raw materials from which 
plastic goods are made. It commences with an overview of developments in this sector and 
then proceeds to show how historical developments in the upstream link of the chain have 
influenced developments in this section of the chain up until the start of 1994 when a new 
episode in the jiliere's history commences. This more recent episode is the subject of a later 
chapter. 
The plastic raw materials industry is analyzed from three different perspectives; 
production, the capabilities of firms engaged in production and the demand, both international 
and local, for polymer. Attempts are made to explain the .changes, or lack of them, which 
occur over time and how these shaped the developments which occurred in 1994. 
Finally the changing relationship between this link of the chain and the next, the 
plastic converting industry, is analyzed and international trends compared to the South 
African trends. 
IndustrY overview 
A striking characteristic of this sector of industry is its geographical location. All of 
the major production facilities are located on the Highveld, either at Sasolburg or Secunda. 
These facilities make PVC, LDPE, LLDPE, HDPE and PP. Some polystyrene is made in 
Cape Town from imported styrene for in-house purposes by Sun Packaging, and some is 
made by Sentrachem in Germiston near Johannesburg. 
By contrast the major port and refining centre, Durban does not have a single 
commodity polymer facility. The reasons for this are historical. The first sources of olefins 
were from naphtha crackers located at Sasolburg and it made economic sense to locate the 
polymer plants near those crackers. Subsequently the second petrochemical complex, 
SASOL's Secunda complex was also located inland, immediately above its raw material 
source, the coal deposits of the Eastern Transvaal Highveld. In short the location of polymer 
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manufacturing facilities has for the most part been determined by the location of the 
petrochemical feedstocks whose location in tum was a result of import substitution and 
military/strategic policies. 
Outside of commodity polymers some petrochemical development has taken place at 
. other centres. For example the AECI subsidiary South African Nylon Spinners has a nylon 
and polyester plant in Cape Town serving the large surrounding clothing industry. Hoechst 
also has a synthetic fibre plant in Cape Town. These plants rely on imported raw materials 
as it is cheaper to import by sea than to transport them from the Highveld to Cape Town 
(Lloyd 1991a). 
Polymer manufacture has been highly concentrated. AECI has been the only producer 
of PVC, LOPE and LLOPE. Safripol has been the only producer of HOPE and was for a 
considerable period the only producer of PP until 1990 when SASOL also began to produce 
PP. Sentrachem was also the major producer of polystyrene (PS) until the removal of tariff 
protection in 1990 caused it to shut most of its Styrochem plant in 1991.1 
This section of the petrochemical industry coincides with ISIC category 3513 
(Synthetic resins & plastic raw materials, man-made fibres) and consequently some basic data 
is available to provide a general picture of developments in the industry. It is dominated by 
the polymer producers but there are also a few small producers of more exotic plastic raw 
materials. For example Solidur is a small producer of ultra high molecular weight 
polyethylene. These small facilities use much smaller scale and less capital intensive 
technologies. 
In so far as capital productivity is concerned this capital intensive sector (lSIC 3513) 
does better than the manufacturing average over the longer term than over the shorter term. 
The capital productivity measure used here is the ratio of output to capital stock. This ratio 
declined over 1972-90 at an annual average of 1.2% p.a. which is about half the rate of 
decline for all manufacturing. Capital productivity (measured in this way) improves in the 
latter half of the 1980s but does not improve as fast as the all manufacturing average ( + 1.1 % 
p.a. over the 1985-90 period, against +2% p.a.for all manufacturing2• In absolute terms the 
output/capital stock ratio is about 1.8: 1, just below the manufacturing average, over the 1985-
90 period. 
Labour output growth has been superior to capital output growth in the plastic raw 
1. There has been a peculiarity in the international polystyrene market in that on two occasions between 1983 
and 1991 the price of polystyrene fell below the price of its precursor, styrene. 
2. Calculated from IDC (1992) in 1990 prices. 
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materials industry. Output per employee increased on average by 3 % p.a. over the period 
1972-90, and by an average of 4% p.a. over the 1985-90 period, as against an average of 1 % 
p.a. for all manufacturing (see Table 6.1.). Real labour costs over 1985-90 increased by the 
manufacturing average of 0.2% p.a. In broad terms this sector appears to have followed 
general trends in manufacturing in respect of the indices just considered. In summary this 
evidence reveals that labour productivity in the polymer industry improved faster than the all 
manufacturing average. 
Table 6.1 elastics industrx: Oull!ut net emnloxee 
AnnuaJ Average Cbange (%) 
(1990 Rands) 
Plastic raw materiaJs (1) Plastic Products (2) 
Annual average change (%) 3.1 -0.6 
1972-90 
AnnuaJ average change (%) 4.2 -0.5 
1985-90 
Notes: (1) = Synthetic resins and plastic raw materiaJs (lSlC 3513) 
(2) = Other Plastic Products (lSlC 356) 





With this overview in mind the discussion now moves down from the industry level 
to the level of the individual production facilities of each of the major commodity polymer 
producers in order to make an assessment of each. By way of an introductory guide the sizes 
of the commodity polymer plants and a proxy for their price competitiveness are summarised 
in Table 6.2. 
In Chapter Four the history of PVC reached the point at which AECI and Sentrachem 
launched their Coalplex project at Sasolburg in 1967. This chapter takes up the developments 
from there. Table 6.3 provides an historical outline of the development of South African 
polymer manufacturers. 
PVC Manufacture 
In two adjoining sites, Midlands and Coalplex, AECI produced PVC in two plants 
using quite different technologies. These sites are to all intents and purposes one site. They 
comprise a horizontally integrated chemical complex producing not only PVC (a mixture of 
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ethylene 42 %, and chlorine) but also a variety of chemicals - caustic soda, chlorine, lime 
hydrate, and hydrochloric acid. 
Table 6.2 Polymer Plant Comparison 
Plant(l) Capacity 'World Scale>(l) Price Competitiveness(3) 
(1991) tpa Capacity USA (CDV) Price = 1 
tpa (1991) 
HDPE 120000 120000 to 1.7 
250000 
LDPE 90000 200 000 to 1.6 
500 000 
LLDPE 100 000 120000 to 1.6 
250000 
PP (SASOL) 120000 120000 to 1.5 
250000 
PP (Safripol) 52000 120000 to 1.5 
250000 
PVC (acetylene) 125 000 oIa 1.7 
PVC (etliylene) 35000 150000 to 1.7 
500 000 
Notes: 
1. All of the plants are located in Sasolburg except the SASOL PP plant which is located in Secunda. 
There is no widely held definition of 'World scale'. Capacities used here are estimates based on 
the views of firms interviewed and reported capacities of recently built plants and approximate to 
those used by Petrochemical Industry Study Group (see Chapter 10). These are somewhat higher 
than 'minimum world scale'(mws) estimated by Lloyd (19908) based on a 25 percentile of 550 
plants ranked by capacity. This would include some older plants which are likely to be smaller. 
His estimated mws for LDPE is about 130000 tpa, for PP to be about 80000 tpa and for PVC 
to be about SO 000 tpa. 
2. 
3. Price Competitiveness reflects the selling prices in the US Gulf and South African markets and not 
the costs of production which producers regard as confidential. Prices are the average of 1991 
prices. 
Table 6.3 History of South African Commodity Polymer Plants 
+--------+--------+----------+----------+----------+ IDate on IPolymer ILocation IOriginal I 1992 
Istream I I I capacity Icapacity 
I I I I tpa I tpa I 
+--------+--------+----------+----------+----------+ 
1955 PVC Durban 10 000 closed 
1965 LDPE Sasolburg 55 000 90 000 
1965 PS Germiston 4 000 closed 
1966 PVC a\ Sasolburg 35 000 35 000 
1967 PVC b\ Sasolburg 75 000 125 000 
1972 HDPE Sasolburg 48 000 140 000 
1974 PP Sasolburg 40 000 40 000 
1982 LLDPE Sasolburg 100 000 100 000 
1990 PP Secunda 120 000 132 000 
+--------+--------+----------+----------+----------+ Notes: a\ Ethylene route 
b\ Carbide acetylene route 
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The newer and larger 125 000 tpa plant utilises 40 · year old carbide-acetylene 
technology. This PVC technology fell into disuse in the USA in the 1960s (Spitz, 1988:407 
& 412). Only two other such plants in the world continue to operate this technology. This 
plant was built in 1976 as a part of the Coalplex complex. Originally it had a nameplate 
.capacity of 75 000 tpa which was expanded when it was 'de-bottlenecked' in 1988. 
The acetylene based plant is also the more expensive of the two plants to operate (BTl, 
1991 :42). Yet AECI chose to expand their carbide/acetylene plant rather than the other lower 
cost ethylene based plant. There are several factors which may have contributed to this 
curious decision. At this time (1987/88) SASOL was unable to meet ethylene demand and 
AECl's polyethylene facilities were forced to operate at reduced capacity utilization. 
Prospects of further ethylene from SASOL may have looked poor because the premium 
placed on fuel production and self sufficiency had been underlined by the state's decision to 
go ahead with the Mossgas project in 1987. Also at this time SASOL and AECI were 
participating in a fertilizer price war with each other. All of these factors may have 
contributed to AECI's decision to expand the higher cost route. Whatever the reasons, this 
higher cost structure has insidiously crept into the cost structure of the petrochemical and 
plastics industry over the years. 
Assessing the acetylene route is difficult as it operates as part of an integrated 
chemical complex producing caustic soda and chlorine by-products. Caustic soda consumption 
was growing rapidly at the start of Coalplex, more than doubling every 10 years. Indeed 
AECl's PVC business is 'caustic driven' (Interview, Lake). PVC manufacture is an accepted 
route of forward integration from chlor-alkali production (Spitz, 1988:397). To some extent 
caustic soda and PVC businesses are counter cyclical so they make a useful business 
combination. Disposing of chlorine is costly and in AECl's view PVC acts as one of the more 
environmentally friendly chlorine 'sinks'. The acetylene route to PVC involves physically 
aggressive conditions which have not been without industrial relations and other problems. 
Breakdowns have even caused AECI to import at times. Process difficulties, described as 
'recurrent' and 'intermittent', plagued operations in 1990 and 1991 and reduced exports 
(AECI Annual Reports, 1990: 12 & 1991: 12). 
Although not necessarily connected to the harsh operating conditions and plant 
breakdowns, some measure of the international competitiveness of this plant over the years 
is to be gleaned from the tariffs applicable. Virtually from start up import control existed, 
which amounted to a prohibition on PVC imports. This operated from 1977 until June 1990, 
although a proposal to remove it had been considered in 1983 (BTl, 1991 :41). 
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Critics have claimed that South Africa's coal based PVC plants are probably three' to 
four times more expensive than oil-based plants elsewhere in the world (Logichem Process 
MD, Schalk Pienaar, quoted in Business Day, 11-6-92:8). AECI claim that as far as 
production efficiencies in PVC manufacture are concerned they compare favourably with ICI. 
South Africa liberalised its trade regime in the early 1980s but one of the last products 
to be affected was PVC. Import controls were replaced by ad valorem tariffs and a reference 
price only in 1990. Several adjustments have occurred since then. AECI consistently exported 
PVC virtually since start up. However for the first 13 years of Coalplex's life it exercised 
a monopoly in PVC in a closed market and its prices tend to reflect that. Under such 
circumstances it would be surprising to find a highly efficient producer at the end of that 
period. 
AECI's other PVC plant is 10 years older .and was built in 1966 using ethylene 
supplied by the SASOL naphtha cracker built at that time. It is a small 35 000 tpa ICI 
suspension polymerisation process and draws ethylene by pipeline from Secunda. It is very 
much smaller than world scale. 
In all, seven grades of PVC are produced, 4 in one plant and three in the other. By 
contrast, a world scale plant would typically have half of one plant devoted to the production 
of a single grade and use the other half of the plant for four other grades. The disadvantage 
of a wide product range was off-set to some extent by a measure of vertical integration. AECI 
owned about half of the downstream of PVC converting capacity. Its plastic converting 
operations produced PVC piping, sheeting and building materials. As the only producer of 
PVC in a closed market its forward integration into converting was the source of some 
discomfort to its competitors who were denied access to PVC from other sources for many 
years because of trade barriers. As a result of rationalisation in the converting industry AECI 
has merged its interests with another firm to form a company called DPI which carries on this 
business. 
By 1992 AECI had become concerned about the future prospects for its PVC plants 
and began to investigate possible investments in a new ethylene based facility. 
The threat of tariff reductions nudged AECI into investigating an R800 million 
expansion to update to an internationally competitive technology (Finance Week, Sept. 17-32, 
1992:59). Projections at that time were that exports of 100 000 tpa would be possible. This 
was about double the current level and about equal to domestic sales. AECI MD Mike Sander 
believed it would be a business "more than capable of taking on the rest of the world" (Ibid). 
These may be taken as signals that AECI was responding to the threat of competition from 
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imports resulting from lower tariffs by investigating more efficient technologies. However 
the level of investment contemplated was somewhat out of character for ABCI which was a 
very reluctant investor in the 1980s and 1990s. The division of ICI (one of AECI's two major 
shareholders) into two companies (discussed previously) and its reluctance to invest in 
.commodity chemicals like PVC, further compounded the problem .. AECI did find a way out 
of this difficult situation in 1994, at some cost to itself, but this is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
AECI's interest in a new and more outward orientation may also account for its 
commitment to achieve ISO 9000 standards by 1993. Access to technology is always 
important even in mature businesses such as PVC. In this regard AECI has access to ICI 
technology which helps to keep R&D spending at less than 1 % of turnover. 
LDPE and LLDPE manufacture 
LDPE is one of the older plastics, discovered by ICI in the 1930s. AECI brought 
South Africa's first LDPE plant on stream at the time th~ Sasolburg naphtha cracker first 
came on stream in 1965. It is still the only LDPE plant in South Africa and utilises ICI high 
pressure and energy intensive technology. The original 55 000 tpa capacity has been gradually 
expanded, notably with debottlenecking in the early 1980s to the current 90000 tpa. Despite 
this it is sub worl(l scale leading to higher unit costs of production. In the mid to late 1980s 
the plant began to be squeezed between two forces. On the one hand a major market, the 
fertilizer bag market shrunk from about 35 million bags to about 18-19 million as a result of 
the drop in domestic fertilizer consumption. On ' the other hand fixed costs were rising at 
about 20% p.a .. AECI has over the last five years or so tackled fixed costs across a wide 
front; reducing stocks, trying to improve efficiency, long term maintenance costs, working 
capital etc. to the point where fixed costs are now rising by only 10% p.a. 
In so far as the future prospects of this plant are concerned, AECI believe that if they 
had 'world price' ethylene they would only need a 5-10% tariff protection. They do not 
believe that the plant is internationally competitive because of their ethylene cost 
disadvantage, low international prices and high capital costs. Consequently they did not intend 
investing for exports, other than for those countries accessible by road. Nevertheless the plant 
is about 80 ~ depreciated thus removing a finance burden and directing attention to operating 
costs. Technology licence fees are no longer paid, instead there is a loose agreement with 
ICI. Capacity utilization has been 90-100% in the last 2 years. There are thus signs that in 
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its remaining 10-15 year lifespan the plant could be a reasonably low cost producer if it has 
lower priced ethylene. 
LLOPE is produced using a low pressure process developed by Union Carbide. ~ECI 
was one of the first companies to license this UNIPOL technology from Union Carbide, for 
.their Sasolburg plant which came on stream in 1982. The technology is reputable, Union 
Carbide is one of the largest international LLOPE licensors. This 100 ()()() tpa plant is about 
half 'world scale' capacity but despite this it was capable of meeting twice the 1990 domestic 
demand. These limited economies of scale are estimated to bring a R75-Rl50/tonne premium 
to the polymer price (Interview, Baker). Intermittent production difficulties have necessitated 
imports at times (AECI and SASOL Annual Reports). 
AECI believed, in 1992, that in terms of plant efficiency they were in the lower one 
third of plants in the world but hoped to move to the upper third by 1993. They anticipated 
improvements in labour productivity and catalyst yield. About 10-12 scientists have been 
researching improvements to catalysts for the LLOPE gas phase process at a cost of about 
R2 million p.a .. Catalysts are manufactured on site in an attempt to improve upon the 
catalysts commercially licensed by Union Carbide. Capacity utilization was just 70% in both 
1990 and 1991, the highest yet achieved. It suggests that notwithstanding SASOL's lower 
'export price' ethylene and GElS benefits, exports were insufficiently rewarding to operate 
the balance of the capacity. Such a low capacity utilization level is disturbing as it must drive 
up unit output costs. 
In summary low density polyethylene production comprises one old and one small 
plant (with erratic production) which have not been internationally competitive. Their 
prospects, in 1993, of becoming so appeared unlikely although current efforts to improve 
efficiencies may have made survival possible. 
HOPE manufacture 
Safripol commenced HOPE manufacture in 1972 at Sasolburg, drawing ethylene from 
SASOL's naphtha cracker there. Safripol is a Sentracheml Hoechst joint venture utilising 
Hoechst technology. Capacity gradually crept up from 48 ()()() tpa to 60 ()()() tpa by 1981 at 
which point new reactor technology was introduced. This brought capacity up to 80 ()()() tpa 
where it remained until 1990 when it was increased to 128 ()()() tpa. In 1992 it increased again 
to 140000 tpa, and is scheduled to increase again to 160 ()()() tpa in 1994. The interval in 
these capacity expansions coincides with the restricted supply of ethylene available from 
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Secunda in the 1980s. Nevertheless Safripol experienced some difficulty in that as they 
exparided capacity, SASOL's ethylene production could not meet their needs. In the period 
prior to the 1990 expansion, Safripol could not meet domestic demand and had to import 
HOPE for this purpose, adversely effecting Sentrachem's finances. The 1990 capacity 
expansion replaced imports of about 20 000 tpa, a forex saving of about R 60 million at that 
time. Yet again the impact of military/strategic government policy is evident in the 
petrochemical based manufacturing economy. 
Coordination between Safripol and SASOL in bringing new capacity on stream has 
improved in recent years and as SASOL has made more ethylene available, capacity has been 
expanded. Safripol's 140000 tpa HOPE capacity is now one of the largest single HOPE sites 
in the Hoechst group. The reason for this is "The additional cost per installed ton is 
extremely low in world terms, making Safripol's production of HOPE very competitive" 
(Sentrachem Annual Report, 1989:11). Safripol's strategy is " ... to grow the number of tons 
produced, specially because of our domestic inflation problem which leads to costs growing 
faster than prices, which are governed by world inflation." (Safripol MD quoted in Finance 
Week Survey, Sentrachem, 1992:46). This together with increased availability of ethylene 
from SASOL and improved product quality have allowed Safripol access to Hoechst's world 
export markets. This in turn is sharpening its focus on productivity and qUality. 
The technology used by Safripol is one of three basic types available. All are low 
pressure processes. Safripol use the Ziegler suspension process, named after the famous 
inventor of the catalysts, Carl Ziegler. It is a slow process with reactor residence ti.mes of 1.5 
hours being common (Burdick & Leffler, 1990:285). It is this robust process which allows 
relatively cheap capacity expansions. Currently the lower cost producers use a gas phase 
process technology. The technology used by Safripol is licensed from Hoechst which is the 
world leader in HOPE. World scale R&O requires a critical mass beyond Safripol's 
resources, however it has access to Hoechst's extensive resources. New polymer grades 
developed for local conditions now account for about 15% of sales. Indeed 80% of sales is 
material 'fine tuned' to meet local conditions. Monthly reports to Hoechst Germany and a two 
way flow of key personnel assist in keeping Safripol abreast of world developments and 
standards. 
In this way Safripol efficiencies of operation and yield rank midway in the Hoechst 
range of HDPE facilities although staffing levels could be considerably reduced if necessary, 
something Safripol is reluctant to do. 
As in the case of other polymer manufacturers, Safripol efficiency is handicapped by 
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the number of grades that it makes, in this case 8 or 9, compared with 2 or 3 in a typical 
German plant. This results in Safripol spending more time on set up, producing more 
'twilight' (between grades) material and reduced operating capacity. For example effective 
capacity could be raised by 14 % if production was concentrated on one simple grade. Shorter 
.runs also dictate larger stocks. Typically one to one and a half months finished stock is held. 
Ultimately stock management dictates capacity. In efforts to optimise production and stock 
levels production is run in 'campaigns'. 
In the siege economy years of the early 1980s the company attitude was to produce 
the extra ton at any cost, without worrying too much about quality. They saw the need to 
change this approach and to address quality issues so a version of the Crosby Systeml was 
introduced in an effort to empower workers and improve problem solving. Similarly attempts 
were made to reduce racial discrimination. Training has increased, including an in-house 
literacy course. The results include a dramatic increase in quality standards, improved 
interdepartmental communication, and a 25 % reduction in the distribution budget. 
Sentrachem is vertically integrated in HOPE through its Mega group of companies 
which are large HOPE users and one of the largest plastic converter groups in South Africa. 
This downstream integration, like AECI's, provides a 'base load' for their polymer 
operations, and allows some flexibility, through transfer pricing, in determining where profits 
will be extracted from the production chain. Plastomark, another Sentrachem/Hoechst joint 
venture, is responsible for marketing and offers customers extensive technical back up. This 
cluster of production, marketing, technical resources and vertical integration has allowed 
Safripol to drive HOPE to the highest commodity polymer growth rates in the local market 
in recent years. 
Polypropylene Manufacture 
Polypropylene (PP) is one of the newer polymers and unde~standably was one of the 
later additions to polymer manufacture in South Africa. Safripol also produce PP on the same 
Sasolburg site as their HOPE plant. Two years after the HOPE start up, one production line 
was converted to a 40000 tpa PP manufacture unit (FM, SASOL Survey, 21-9-90:43). This 
has been expanded to 52 000 tpa which is only about half world scale size. However this 
disadvantage is off-set to some extent by the fact that there are advantages in operating on 
1. A variation of a total quality management process, founded on one devised by American quality management 
specialist, Philip Crosby. 
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the same site as the HOPE plant, particularly in the expensive extruding step. Utilities are 
an important cost item for polymer plants, and in this case they can be shared to a large 
extent. The Hoechst technology used is both older and inferior to the BASF gas p~ase 
technology used in the newer SASOL plant. BASF is a world leader in PP technology 
. whereas Hoechst is fourth in the world order. 
Given the limited domestic propylene supply during the 1980s it is not surprising that 
Safripol chose to develop the HOPE business rather than the PP business. There were other 
considerations as well. Ultra violet (UV) light in South African sunshine is stronger than in 
Europe which meant the PP used in Europe for crates would need so many imported UV 
stabilizers that it would have been too expensive. Consequently HOPE was developed for this 
application instead. These factors have skewed the market share in favour of HOPE at the 
expense of PP as will be shown presently. This is expected to correct itself as PP growth 
forecasts are 8% p.a. whilst those for PE are only 4% p.a .. SASOL's entry into the PP 
market in 1990 is also expected to help establish a more. typical balance between PP and PE 
market shares. 
SASOL's entry into the PP market in 1990 caused ~oechst to seriously reconsider its 
options as SASOL was now both a supplier of feedstocks and a competitor. Sentrachem' s 
strategy was to try and avoid direct confrontation with SASOL. In this case they addressed 
the strategic question of feedstocks by building a propylene splitter at SAPREF (oil refinery) 
in Durban, and took the medium term view that a range of feedstock options were likely to 
arise, particularly as a result of the capacity expansions in almost all the crude oil refineries. 
Larger refineries mean that a propylene off-take sufficient to meet Safripol's modest needs 
is a proportionally smaller share of refinery throughput. Thus they foresaw the possibility of 
avoiding reliance upon SASOL's propylene. From the marketing point of view, Sentrachem 
diversified its product range and further developed its marketing advantage in 1990 by 
building a R 5 million technical advice centre equipped with leading edge computer aided 
design facilities (Sentrachem Annual Report, 1990: 16). Furthermore it is attempting to 
maximise its vertical integration advantage. 
The most recent polymer plant to be built in South Africa is SASOL Polymers' 
120000 tpa PP plant in Secunda which also marks a turning point in the development of 
South Africa's commodity polymer industry. It is the first plant built where the bulk of 
output, some 70% in this case, was intended for export. It employs leading BASF, gas phase 
technology. However the curious aspect of this export plant is that it is built at Secunda some 
500-600 km from Durban or Richards Bay, the nearest ports. South Africa's reputedly high 
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overland transport costs will place it at a disadvantage. A decision like this, ought perhaps 
to be seen in the context of SASOL's scramble to diversify its product base. The burden such 
a decision may place upon the polymer industry in future underlines the need for transparency 
in SASOL's regulatory support and internal transfer pricing. 
This plant may be considered to be world scale although at the lower end of the 
capacity rankings of such plants. The technology choice was influenced by SASOL's ability 
to manufacture catalyst on site, thus avoiding the need to import. Operating efficiencies are 
improving rapidly. Within 18 months of coming on stream output was 10% over nameplate 
capacity. Output per employee compares favourably with other leading edge plants according 
to SASOL Polymers. As with other polymer plants the number of grades produced is an 
important issue. Originally 27 grades were produced, but by 1992 this had been reduced to 
18 grades, yielding a 10% improvement in efficiency. Nevertheless the larger number of 
grades means that 'twilight' material is budgeted at 8% whereas an internationally competitive 
plant would budget it at about 1 %. In January 1993 the number of grades was increased again 
in order to penetrate new markets in packaging fresh frozen and processed foods, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and industrial products (Business Day, 26-1-93: 13). SASOL made 
this change "To help stimulate polypropylene beneficiation in the export field, we offer our 
local customers attractive commercial incentives .... "(Ibid). This was presumably warranted 
by the low prevailing prices on export markets, and if so, suggests that low international 
prices can assist in driving the point of export further down the value added chain. 
Continuity of operations has been a problem. As with ethylene, SASOL's propylene 
supply has been irregular at times, in this case for technical reasons (SASOL Annual Report, 
1992:21). 
In summary the larger of the two PP plants is competing internationally whilst the 
other is likely to struggle if tariff protection is removed. The latter may choose to expand 
rather than close if tariffs are lowered or reduced, in view of the effort it has made to build 
the South African market. 
The ultimate test of competitiveness in globally traded commodities is price. How have 
domestic producer prices compared internationally? 
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Polymer Prices! 
In this section South African domestic polymer prices are compared with US and 
NWE prices over the last 5-10 years. In general South African prices have been between 20% 
and 60% above NWE and US prices. Strictly speaking the price comparisons which follow 
are comparisons between markets, rather than producer costs and efficiencies.2 In the South 
African case it is known that the domestic price is a function of the tariff reference price, 
which is ultimately a state decision consequent upon lobbying by the producers. However it 
may be used as an approximation for the efficiency of the local producers. In contrast the US 
and NWE prices arise in much less protected markets and consequently are a better indication 
of efficiency ~f production over the longer term. Each one is considered in turn. 
The largest volume polymer is LDPE. It is observed in Figure 20 that over the 1980 
to mid 1992 ' period domestic prices were always above US and NWE prices and that the 
difference was largest during economic downturns during the early 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Sources: ABel 
Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991 . 
1. All polymer .prices referred to in this section are Current Domestic Value (CDV) prices and not Free on 
B~ard (FOB) pnces unless so stated. FOB prices tend to be 'spot' prices which are frequently lower than CDV 
pnces. They are often regarded as 'dumped' prices. 
2. A better me~ure of a plants' efficiency would be its 'cash cost of production' or operating cost, that is its 
cost of production excludmg any reward to capital. Such data is commercially sensitive and is not available. 
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reference price which protects the local producer when international LOPE prices fall. On 
average over this period the South African prices were 59% higher than US prices and 44~ 
higher than NWE prices. This also meets the expectation that the largely gas based US prices 
would be lower than the imported naphtha based prices of NWE. Domestic LLDPE prices 
.have also been in excess of US and NWE prices, by an average of 38 % over US prices and 





















One measure of production efficiency is the difference in price between the LOPE 
price and the ethylene price. One would expect this difference in South Africa to be larger 
than in international markets and Figure 22 shows this to be the case over the 1980-92 period. 
Again when supply and demand are tight, as in 1987-88, the NWE figure is closer to the 
South African figure, but again this gap widens as international prices fall. 
Domestic HOPE prices are also higher than international prices. Again the gap 
between South African and US prices is larger than the gap between South African and NWE 
prices, on average 67% and 51 % respectively over the 1980-92 period (see Figure 23). In 
this figure the operation of the reference price support mechanism is also evident in the early 
1980s and after the 1988 price boom. HOPE follows the LOPE trend in that South African 
prices (in nominal US$) have fallen over the 1980-92 period. The gap between South African 
and international prices is also smaller during the latter part of this period than the earlier 
Figure 22 
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part, which may be attributable to the capacity expansions and efforts to improve efficiency. 
Domestic PVC prices follow the trends identified in the polyethylenes with one notable 
exception (see Figure 24). During 1988 when supply and demand were tight internationally 
the South African price was actually lower than the NWE price. The explanation for this 
.apparent anomaly appears to lie in a 1988 explosion on the Coalplex chlorine plant which 
caused it to be shut for about 8 weeks thus necessitating the import of (cheaper) PVC to 
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" The reduction in output caused by the Coalplex incident together with higher local 
demand necessitated curtailment of export sales and the import of significant quantities 
of PVC as every effort was made to meet customer requirements. At a time of world 
shortage and hardening international prices, this proved a difficult and costly 
endeavour." (AECI Annual Report, 1988: 11) 
Since AECI were unable to meet domestic demand, they imported at below import parity 
prices, and attribute their losses to their 'long term market view' and the stance of a 
responsible monopoly. Over the 1985-92 period South African prices were on average 46% 
above US prices and 23 % above NWE prices. 
The PVC/ethylene price differential shows much the same pattern as the 
LDPFJethylene differential, being consistently higher than the US price difference (see 
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Figure 25). 
Domestic PP prices have also been above international prices and trends similar to 
those identified for other polymers are evident (see Figure 26). Over the 1980-92 period 
South African PP prices were on average 75% above US prices and 69% above NWE FOB 
-prices. Some measure of PP manufacturing efficiency (or monopolistic rent) may be gained 
by comparing the differences between propylene and PP prices. The PP/propylene 
Figure 25 
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differentials in Figure 27 reveal the extent of these differences, with the South African 
difference significantly higher than the international difference: on average over the 1980-92 
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In general the problem for the domestic market is the inability of the local producers 
to follow international prices downwards in periods of low prices. This accords with the 
understanding of the production chain developed thus far. It has limited ability to pass lower 
polymer prices back up the chain. It may also be partly a function of the monopolistic 
practices in the petrochemical and polymer industry, but this is very difficult to prove 
conclusively. 
Capital costs and the lack of investment 
A prominent feature of South Africa's petrochemical history is the absence of private 
investment to create upstream petrochemical complexes. The first two crackers were built by 
SASOL (then state owned). The second complex intended for Richards Bay in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s was driven by private interests but never materialised. The various private 
investigations into synfuels projects during the 1980s also floundered on the rocks of 
government financing, or lack of it. These were the AECI mega-methanol project, the Gencor 
torbanite shale project and the Natal, sugar cane based ethanol project. On the other hand 
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investment in the polymer industry has also been entirely private (if SASOL is regarded as 
a private company in 1990). 
The local polymer manufacturers have been high cost producers and part of the 
explanation for this is the small scale of the plants and the correspondingly higher capital cost 
. component of each unit of production. Although there has been 'de-bottlenecking' and 
capacity expansion in the commodity polymers industry since the mid 1980s there has been 
only one new plant built. The rest are 10 or more years old and AECI is falling behind in 
terms of technological competitiveness and plant reliability (Tison, 1991). This is important 
because AECI produces three of the five commodity polymers. In this capital intensive 
industry where planning horizons are 15 to 20 years, this may be an area of weakness which 
would need to be addressed to put the industry on a more internationally competitive footing. 
The most oft cited reason for this lack of investment.is the cost of capital equipment and the 
tax burden. 
These concerns prompted AECI, the largest chemical company in South Africa and 
which has been conspicuous by its lack of investment in recent years, to do a detailed study 
focusing on the fiscal environment. This study concluded that: 
"the fiscal environment makes it impossible for a South African producer to invest if 
he has the same cash costs as his competitors and is disciplined by the same world 
prices. A South African project needs to have exceptionally low cash costs if it is to 
be viable, especially if it is export focused." (AECI, 1991: 15). 
In the absence of any reduction in the tax rate the study argues for a "kick start 
approach ..... .involving temporary investment incentives aimed at getting investment going 
in the interim." (Ibid: 14). This study develop~ a theme explicit in the earlier 'Report by the 
Working Group for the Promotion of the Chemical Industry' which recommended that: 
"Government ... facilitate development of the industry by appropriate incentives of an 
enabling or 'hupstoot'6 nature." (DTI, 1990:46). 
At about the same time the so-called Sander Committee, named after its chairperson, AECI 
6. 'Hupstoot' is Afrikaans for kickstart. 
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Managing Director Mike Sander, was discussing the same issue.7 His views are captured in 
the Minutes: 
"The strategy must encourage open competition all the way down the chain of industry 
in the local market, as well as creating a competitive petrochemicals industry 
internationally, which is not the case at present. 
A further objective was to make it unnecessary for government to maintain a high 
level of involvement in the industry on an on-going basis therefore Mr Sander 
believed that there was no other way of launching the strategy other than to get 
Government support at primary producing plant level - this meant either a synfuels 
project or a cracker based on gas or naphtha; Government support at this level was 
essential." (Minutes, Petrochemicals Industry Development Study Group, 10-4-89: 1) 
"Mr Sander ... further explained the philosophy of a once off support for the industry 
right at the beginning of the chain." (lbid:5) 
In this meeting the views espoused by Mr Sander were supported by Sentrachem but opposed 
by SASOL. AECI's arguments are couched in terms of international competitiveness and 
'GAIT proof support. But by that time AECI had spent considerable sums investigating a 
mega-methanol project intended to produce synfuels from coal. They had even licensed the 
technology from Mobil at considerable cost. Sentrachem were at that time investigating a 
naphtha cracker as a potential source of petrochemical feedstocks. In short both of these 
companies appear to have been vying for government blessing (and a 'hupstoot') for their 
projects. 
SASOL for its part opposed the Sander philosophy. "SASOL believed that it was 
necessary to concentrate on the downstream activities. . .. The area which really needed 
attention was the structure of the downstream industry where we have historically built small, 
uneconomic units." (lbid:4). (Considering financial viability, a case of the pot calling the 
kettle black?) Mr Du Toit from SASOL: 
7. ~s committ~ was si~lar to the Working Group and consisted of representatives of Government and large 
chenucal companIes. In thIS case representatives of the chemical industry were joined by representatives of the 
oil industry. Organised labour was again excluded. This committee, more properly known as the 'Petrochemicals 
Industry Development Study Group' , sat between April and November 1989 to identify the best means of 
developing the petrochemicals industry. 
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"disagreed with the suggestion that this could only be achieved by a Government or 
State subsidy to the primary producer. .. He believed that Government assistance 
should be in the form of capital support only for downstream plants built specifically 
for exports." (lbid:5). 
It appears from these remarks that SASOL was attempting to preserve its monopoly on the 
upstream source ?f strategic petrochemical feedstocks, and expand the market for them by 
encouraging larger downstream plants as well as securing assistance for its large PP facility 
which was under construction at that time. At the same time it appears to have been trying 
to protect its government support, as the SASOL representative goes on to point out that "A 
chemicals from coal industry could not be commercially viable at present." (Ibid) 
Thus the picture that emerges is one of the three large chemical companies squabbling 
for a share of the government purse in order to secure a 'hupstoot' (kickstart) for a project 
in their own area of interest. Put differently, there appears to be a distinct distaste for 
investments which are not shored up in some way by the public sector so as to minimise risk 
to the private investor. 
Historically the state has provided the 'hupstoots' for the upstream petrochemical 
industry in the form of the first (Sasolburg crackers) and second (Secunda) petrochemical 
complexes. These were longer term investments but over the years military/strategic concerns 
came to dominate economic policy. Private companies have taken less long term strategic 
views. Instead they have located their interests peripheral to and dependent upon state 
interests. This is not surprising given the nature of the strong state. Private companies 
investigated strategic-type projects which did not' stray too far from the state's concerns in 
the hope of attracting the state's attention but for the most part held back from investing in 
the hope that if they waited long enough they .would get assistance from the state. 
The central state's involvement in military/strategic ventures was used successfully by 
private companies as argument for concessions in the form of tariff protection. A culture of 
symbiosis with the state and its apparatuses emerged. The state's concerns were 
accommodated and a cosy relationship developed. Whilst not ideal from the private firm's 
point of view - instead they would have preferred to dictate the strategic direction as well as 
making use of public funds - it was a second best option which nevertheless allowed them to 
accumulate capital. However it appears to have lulled them into an adversity to risk. 
AECl's distaste for risk is evident in its only recent major investment, the R 1 093 
million Sua Pan soda ash project in Botswana. AECI provided only 26.5% of the capital, the 
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rest was provided by the Botswana Government, Anglo American and De Beers. The project 
is protected by a tax rebate from the Botswana Government until such time as the capital 
outlay, in real terms, has been recovered. The South African government was requir~ to 
give an undertaking that it would not allow 'disruptive' imports. Within months of start up 
AECI called upon this undertaking in an appeal to the South African government for relief 
in the form of "anti dumping tariff protection" (FM, 7-8-92:82). 
The state response to complaints about the cost of capital for capital intensive projects 
with long lead times was to introduce Section 37(e) to the Income Tax Act for export 
orientated investments. It allowed depreciation to commence with construction rather than 
production. This was later extended to other investments as well. 
Since their introduction SASOL has taken the lead in the chemical industry in 
exploiting this incentive for a number of their investments. Sentrachem intend to do so if their 
proposed petrochemical complex materialises although they are not overly impressed with it 
as an incentive (Interview, McIver). AECI has not announced any major investments other 
than the investigation into the PVC expansion. 
Installation Factors and Timine 
In capital intensive industries like petrochemicals it is not only the cost of capital that 
is important but also the speed with which it can be translated into productive assets. The 
factors which determine this are referred to here as the installation factors. They include: (a) 
the domestic construction and engineering capability , (b) obstacles to the adoption of modern 
technology and construction methods (c) long construction times (d) infrastructure. 
Of these four factors the weakest in South Africa is the limited construction and 
engineering capability, from the chemical in4ustry point of view. It does not have any 
domestic firms which participate in the international market for the construction of 
petrochemical complexes. Consequently big South African petrochemical projects tend to be 
carried out by foreign companies. In the petrochemical industry, as in other industries, there 
are benefits to firms repeating the same or similar construction projects several times. This . 
is present in the local mining sector, but in the chemical industry this benefit does not arise 
as most plants are unique to the local economy. This too encourages the use of foreign firms 
which have the benefits of repetition as well as better reputations than local firms. 
Episodes like the Mossgas construction debacle reinforce this deprecating view of the 
local plant construction industry. Unlike many other big projects a large share of work was 
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given to local contractors rather than foreign contractors. Overall the Mossgas project was 
chanicterised by gross mismanagement and huge cost overruns. In general, South Africa's 
fledgling plant construction industry does " ... not have the experience, systems or capabilities 
to manage large projects efficiently" (Edge, 1990:6). This weakness is however not fatal for 
. the industry. Indeed it may be considered an advantage in that local firms are free to utilize 
the best construction companies in the world. 
Do the chemical companies fare any better than the local construction industry? The 
only large project commissioned AECI recently has been the Botswana soda ash plant on Sua 
Pan in central Botswana. It appears to have encountered design and/or start up problems. In 
1991 an additional R31 million had to be allocated to fund a larger than expected negative 
cash flow in the start up period (AECI Annual Report, 1991:9). Several production problems 
have arisen, the development of the 'slab' necessary for the extraction of the raw material has 
taken longer than anticipated. An algae discoloured the product and lowered quality, 
particularly for the detergent industry which requires, 'whiter than white' inputs. These 
problems together with international competition means that "Soda Ash Botswana is now 
trading at a loss and shareholders are being expected to subsidise the company .. " (FM, 7-8-
92:82). 
SASOL has a better reputation for project management and bringing large projects on 
stream on time. One of its recent large projects is the propylenelPP project in Secunda 
completed in 1990. It was· built almost entirely by foreign contractors, who broke a world 
record in erection time but spared little expense in the process. Whilst companies like SASOL 
may have the necessary project management expertise, South Africa lacks the capabilities to 
actually carry out the projects themselves. Skilled labour is one indicator of this. In both the 
SASOL project just referred to and the Mossgas project, large numbers of foreign artisans 
were imported to carry out more sophisticated welding and other tasks. South Africa lacks 
the skilled human resources for this kind of work. 
It may be noted that the capital installation factors considered here are distinct from 
the capacity to operate existing facilities and/or 'stretch' their capacity. SASOL, in particular 
has claimed some success at this but this kind of technical capability is difficult to quantify. 
It arises out of a cluster of capabilities including engineering skills, information and services 
planning, associated maintenance structure, quality and safety procedures. SASOL are 
regarded by some as the superior South African company in this regard (Tison, 1992 and 
Interview, Redlinghuys). 
Timing the introduction of production in projects with long lead times is a vitally 
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important skill because "Start up at the bottom of the price cycle can result in an impaired 
financial situation for the lifetime of the plant" (Vergara & Babelon, 1990:67). This ability 
to ' read the world markets' may cost SASOL dearly in its propylene/PP project. It rushed 
construction in order to enter world markets during 1988-89 when prices and capacity 
utilization were peaking. Unfortunately SASOL was somewhat late and the early years of the 
plant life span were being spent exporting into depressed international markets where 
recovery of only operating costs is the order of the day. The project was based on PP prices 
of $800ltonne whereas in mid 1992 they were about $600/tonne and exports, which are 70% 
of output, were 'not recovering full costs' (Interview, Brand). A large group like SASOL can 
probably endure although other expansion plans may be slowed. In fairness many other 
companies internationally also misjudged the length of the global recession in the early 199Os. 
South Africa's major chemical companies 
The capital installation and technical capabilities of the large South African companies 
are just one dimension of their general ability to cope with the ever changing business 
environment. This section examines certain financial and growth trends by comparing the 
three large South African companies with leading international chemical companies. 
Three companies SASOL, AECI, and Sentrachem dominate the upstream end of the 
plasticsjiliere and also dominate the local chemical industry. SASOL's operating profit and 
total assets are more than twice the sum of the other two combined (see Table 0.1). Engen 
a locally owned crude oil refining and marketing company is included for comparison 
purposes. The relative size of three South African chemical companies has already been 
compared with their international rivals in Chapter Two, Part One where they were seen to 
be relatively small. 
The polymer operations conducted by the three South African firms are just one part 
of their businesses. SASOL is mainly a refining company and should more properly be 
compared with Engen, the only other local refining company listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. This comparison starkly reveals SASOL's weakness, its comparatively poor assets ' 
to turnover ratio (Table 6.4). However, internationally, capital productivity measured by asset 
turns, has been low among the leading chemical firms , even during the 1987-89 boom years, 
emphasising the capital intensive nature of the industry (see Table 0.2). SASOL is somewhat 
below the top 20 firm average over this period. AECI is consistently better. This may be 
accounted for by AECI 's conspicuous absence from investment projects in South Africa over 
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+---------------------------------------------------------+ 
ITable 6.4 Comparison of SA Chemical and Oil Companies ! 
I I 
+---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
ISentra- IAECI ISASOL I Engen I 
I h I I I I 
IC em I I I I 
I 18/91 112/91 16/92 18/91 I 
+---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
ITurnover (Rm) I 2275.4 5280.0 7853.9 6098.4 I 
10perating Profit (Rm)1 235.0 402.0 1758.6 463.6 I 
ITotal Assets (Rm) I 2016.9 4028.0 12495.8 3733.1 I 
I Employees I 8319 24100 30300 3693 I 
ISales/employee (Rm) I 0.27 0.22 0.26 1.65 I 
IAsset turns I 1.1 1.3 0.6 1.6 I 
+---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
Source: Company Annual Reports 
Table 6.5-. Capital Productivity: Asset Turns of the Top 20 
International Chemical Companies Compared with 3 South 
African Chemical Companies (Ranked by 1990 Sales) 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 




I Company Rank 1986 1987 1988 1990 I 
+---------------------------~------------------------------+ 
BASF 1 0.73 .0.69 0.69 0.66 
Hoechst 2 0.76 0.77 0.75 
Bayer 3 0.70 0.65 0.66 0.61 
ICI 4 0.80 0.88 0.86 0.84 
Du Pontl,2 5 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.65 
Dow Chemical 6 0.57 0.60 0.67 0.57 
Rhone-Polenc 7 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.55 
Ciba Geigy 8 
Elf Aquitainel,2 9 0.75 
Enichem 10 0.67 
Shell 11 0.72 0.79 0.79 
Atochem 12 1.01 1.07 1.09 
Akzo 13 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.78 
Sandoz 14 0.80 
Exxon 15 0.88 0.92 1.04 0.92 
Monsanto 16 0.59 0.63 0.67 
Mitsubishi Kasei 17 0.53 0.34 0.55 
Solvay 18 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.56 
Sumitomo Chem 19 0.55 0.52 0.63 0.62 
Merck & Co 20 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.77 
+-----------------+----------------------------------------+ I Average I 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.69 I 
+-----------------+----------------------------------------+ I I I 
I I I 
ISASOL I 0.63 0.56 0.60 0.70 I 
lAECI I 1.39 1.41 1.44 1.56 I 
ISentrachem3 I 0.53 na 0.76 1.45 I 
+-----------------+----------------------------------------+ 
Sources: Chemical Insight's Company Analysis (1987), 11th Edition Chemical Insight's Company Analysis (1988), 12th Edition Chemical Insight's Company Analysis (1989), 13th Edition 
Chemical Insight's Company Analysis (1991), 15th Edition 
Company Annual Reports 
Notes: 1 Chemicals only 
2 Excluding intersegment transfers 
3 Annualised 
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the 1986-90 period and its largely depreciated assets. Sentrachem's asset turns have improved 
as it has divested itself of its more commodity-type (fertilizer) businesses, written off loss 
making synthetic rubber assets and moved towards more speciality chemical type business. 
There is supportive evidence of this low capital productivity in the age of plant. Between 
1989 and 1992 AECI's average age of plant was between 10 and 11 years. Over the same 
period Sentrachem's average age of plant fell from 6 years to 5 years (Tison, 1992a). 
Sales growth, or the lack of it, during the 1984-90 period is the key difference 
between the South African companies and the top chemical companies (see Table 6.6). The 
leading 20 chemical companies achieved an annual average sales growth rate of 10.2 % p.a. 
over 1984-90, whereas SASOL only achieved a 0.5% p.a. growth rate, (both in real US $) 
or a decrease of 0.7% p.a. in real Rand terms. The other local companies did better although 
they achieved still less than half the growth rate of the leading firms. 
Labour productivity among the three South African firms was lower than the average 
for the leading 20 international chemical firms by some indicators (see Table 6.6). For 
example, sales per employee, in 1990 and 1984, were less than half the top 20 average. A 
comparison with leading Brazilian companies also shows .. the South African firms to have 
lower sales per employee, between a half (Sentrachem) and a third (SASOL) of the Brazilian 
average (see Table 6.7). Measured by sales per employee Brazilian firms are much closer to 
the leading international companies. 
However if the wage differentials between South Africa and the developed economies 
are factored in then it is apparent that average wages in South Africa are 4 to 5 times lower 
than the average for the leading firms (Table 6.6). The change in average wages over the 
1984-90 period is significant. Average wages in the leading companies increased by an 
average of 10% p.a. whilst those for the South African companies by less than half that. This 
is revealing, particularly in view of SASOL's complaints about unskilled and semi-skilled 
wage levels, over the 1991-92 period. For example in the 1991 SASOL Annual Report the 
Chairman has this to say: 
"It is my view that in comparison with the newly industrialised nations, South Africa 
has succeeded in pricing itself out of the market in terms of its remuneration of semi-
skilled and unskilled workers." (SASOL Annual Report, 1991:4) 
rable 6.6 Top 20 International Chemical Companies, Ranked by 1990 Sales Compared with 3 South Africa Chemical Companies (1990 prices) 
1990 
:ompany Sales Employ- Sales/ Ave. 
ees employee wage 
$m $ 
IASF 31,195 172,890 180,433 55,964 
loechst 30,017 171,000 175,538 50,787 
layer 27,863 134,647 206,934 52,378 
:CI 24,909 132,100 188,562 40,529 
IU Pont1,2 22,268 113,235 196,653 
lOW Chemical 19,773 94,141 210,036 61,095 
:hone-Po lane 15,483 91,571 169,082 
:iba Geigy 15,459 68,900 224,369 52,298 
If Aquitaine1,2 14,323 62,100 230,644 
nichem 13,363 56,924 234,752 45,488 
hall 12,703 52,685 241,112 
.tochem 10,297 52,640 195,612 
.kzo 10,229 49,000 208,755 43,063 
andoz 9,703 45,671 212,454 46,235 
xxon 9,591 42,500 225,671 
on.anto 8,995 41,081 218,958 53,163 
itsubishi Kasei 8,949 39,988 223,792 
olvay 8,265 38,791 213,065 49,023 
umitomo Cham 7,865 37,756 208,311 72,046 
erck , Co 7,672 36,900 207,913 54,054 
verage 15,446 76,726 208,632 52,009 
""SOL 1,945 33,200 58,583 11,023 
ECI 1,944 25,600 75,946 13,722 
antrachem3 816 8,589 95,008 14,155 
(1990 Rands) 
R mil R R 
~SOL 5,033 33,200 151,593 28,524 
~CI 5,031 25,600 196,523 35,508 
Intrachem 2,112 8,589 245,848 36,629 
)tasl 1 Chemical. only 
2 Excluding inter.egment transfers 
3 Annuali.ed 
4 Include. .alarie. and related benefit. 
Wage./ Sales 
Sale. 




























1984 (in 1990 US $) Annual Averaqe Chanqe 1984-90 (') 
Employ- Sale./ Ave. Wage. Sales Employ Sale./ Ave. Wage. 
ee. emplo- wage Sale. -ee. employ wage Sale. 
yee. $ m -ee. 
115,816 139,279 27,735 0.20 11.6 6.9 4.4 12.4 3.3 
177,940 88,144 24,896 0.28 11.4 -0.7 12.2 12.6 0.6 
174,755 96,615 26,551 0.27 8.7 -4.3 13.5 12.0 2.6 
115,600 124,962 21,501 0.17 9.5 2.2 7.1 11.1 3.8 
124,893 159,706 1.9 -1.6 3.5 
49,800 288,330 48,737 0.17 5.5 11. 2 -5.1 3.8 2.1 
79,230 84,440 21,683 0.26 15.0 2.4 12.3 
81,423 103,804 29,065 0.28 10.6 -2.7 13.7 10.3 2.2 
15.4 
27,700 186,364 19,939 0.11 17.2 12.8 3.9 14.7 7.7 
6.5 
66,100 88,410 22,969 0.26 9.8 -4.9 15.4 11.0 2.1 
38,036 94,525 27,059 0.29 18.0 3.1 14.5 9.3 -2.2 
1.8 
50,754 165,787 41,849 0.25 1.1 -3.5 4.7 4.1 -0.6 
14.6 
43,527 102,565 23,695 0.23 10.8 -1.9 13.0 12.9 2.7 
14.3 
34,800 128,647 38,591 0.30 9.4 1.0 8.3 5.8 -2.4 
84,312 132,256 28,790 0.24 10.2 1.4 8.7 10.0 1.8 
33,200 56,901 8,386 0.15 0.5 0.0 0.5 4.7 4.2 
26,800 64,136 11,574 0.18 2.1 -0.8 2.9 2.9 0.0 
8,527 72,302 12,262 0.17 4.8 0.1 4.7 2.4 -2.1 
(1990 Rand.) 
R R 
33,200 158,216 23,317 0.15 -0.7 -0.7 3.4 4.2 
26,800 178,334 32,183 0.18 0.9 1.6 1.7 0.0 
8,527 201,040 34,096 0.17 3.5 3.4 1.2 -2.1 
Source. I Chemical In.ight (1991) Company Analy.i., 15th Edition 
Chemical In.ight (1985) No. 326, Late September. 
Company Annual Report. 



























































































1) Union Carbide subsidiary 
2) BASF Paints subsidiary 
3) Annualised 
* = state owned 
Chemical Week 4-12-91:42 
Company Reports 
Although the comparison is made with newly industrialising countries, the underlying reasons 
for blaming wage levels may be identified in Table 6.6 which shows SASOL's average wage 
costs to have risen at 4.7% p.a., over the 1984-90 period, faster than its local competitors, 
but only at half the rate of the top 20 average (all measured in 1990 US $). The faster rise 
in SASOL's wages may be attributed to the fact that SASOL employees at its largest Secunda 
works negotiated their wages as part of a trade union for the first time in 1984 and in the 
ensuing years achieved a measure of success in raising minimum wages to AECI and 
Sentrachem levels. 
It appears that the real cause of SASOL's complaint lies in unit labour costs (wage 
costs per US $ of output) which although considerably lower than those of the leading 
companies, grew at more than twice the rate of the leading companies over 1984-90. The 
major factor contributing to this appears to be stagnant sales, not the increase in labour costs. 
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In short, the top 20 firms were able to offset higher wages by growth in sales. The growth 
in unit labour costs at AECI and Sentrachem were among the lowest in the sample of 23 
firms. 
This analysis supports the view presented earlier concerning SASOL's disadvantageous 
cost structure and the need for it to follow a strategy of changing its product mix to increase 
the proportion of higher value added products. The end of apartheid and sanctions may 
facilitate this change for SASOL in that the pariah price South Africa has had to pay for oil 
is expected to fall away and fuel self sufficiency will be less of a policy priority. 
Nevertheless SASOL's perception that wages paid to lower skilled workers are too 
high, is fairly widely held within the business community. Whilst it is not possible to explore 
this perception in full here, it may be helpful to point out that wages have enjoyed a declining 
share of value added, in the more capital intensive parts of the chemical industry (see 
Figure 28). Black wages, if considered as a proxy for less skilled workers, have also declined 
marginally, as a share of value added over 1972-90. 
Domestic and International Plastic Markets. recent ~rowth trends 
The per capita consumption of plastic is a crude indicator of the level of development 
in a plastics market and that market's potential. South Africa's total per capita consumption 
of commodity polymers in 1989 was roughly on a par with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
and Latin America (see Table 6.8). This is only one fifth of the US per capita consumption. 
Overall South Africa's demand growth for plastics over the 1983-90 period has been slower 
than the world average and the African average (see Table 6.9). Neverthele~s domestic 
demand for plastic raw materials and plastic products has been growing faster than South 
African manufacturing as a whole over the period 1972-90. The annual average growth rates 
over 1972-90 for manufacturing, plastic raw materials and Plastic Products were 2.5%,3.7% 
and 8.2% respectively (calculated from IDC, 1992 in constant 1990 prices). 
Historically the growth pattern over this period in South Africa among the different 
commodity polymers, was roughly in step with the world trends; PP and HOPE were the two 
fastest growing polymers in South Africa and globally (see Table 6.9). The only polymers 
in which South Africa experienced faster than world average growth was LOPE and LLDPE. 
This accords with the facts: ethylene was the most readily available olefin in South Africa 
over this period and the local market was protected. South Africa's somewhat lower PP and 
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+------------------------------------------------------------+ 
: Table 6.8 Plastic Consumption : 
: kg/capita : 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 
LDPE+ HOPE PP PVC PS Total All : 
LLDPE (1)-(5) Plast-: 
I ( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ics: 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 
: USA a\ 17.7 15.2 12.6 15 9.7 70.2 
: Japan a\ 13.0 7.4 14.8 15.2 9.7 60.1 
:West Europe a\ 15.2 7.4 8.2 12.9 6.6 50.3 
: Korea c\ 8.3 7.2 10.7 9.9 7.0 43.1 
: Malaysia d\ 6.3 < 2.8 2.5 2.1 13.7 
lEast Europe a\ 3.7 1.6 1.7 4.3 1.8 13.1 
South Africa b\ 3.7 2.7 1.7 3.2 0.7 12.0 15.0 
Soviet Union a\ 4.5 < 0.6 2.0 1.5 8.6 
Latin America a\ 2.5 1.3 1.4 2.4 0.8 8.4 
Thailand d\ 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.6 5.2 
Indonesia d\ 1.4 < 1.1 0.5 na 3.0 
China a\ 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.2 2.3 
India a\ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.7 
Taiwan e\ na na na na na na 16.7 
World a\ 5.7 < 2.3 3.5 1.6 13.1 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 





< included in LOPE + LLDPE 
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Sources: Polymer apparent consumption from Plastics Federation of 
SA, Annual Report 1990. 
Population from Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1991. 
Interview, Wamsley. 
Republic of China, 1983. 
Vergara & Babelon, 1990. 
ICEF, 1992. 
+---------------------------------------------------+ 
I Table 6.9 Demand. Annual Average Growth I 
: 1983-90 I 
I I I (percent per annum) I 
+---------------------------------------------------+ 
I WORLD AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA I I +---------------------------------------------------+ 
ILDPE + LLDPE 5.6 6.7 6.0 
IHDPE 8.7 5.7 6.8 
Ipp 10.1 14.9 9.3 
I PVC 5.2 4.8 2.3 
IPS 6.6 9.5 5.5 
lABS/SAN 5.7 17.0 0.6 
+---------------------------------------------------+ I Total 6.8 7.2 5.3 I 
+---------------------------------------------------+ 
Sources: Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:IV.112 
Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:11.11 
Plastics Federation of SA Annual Reports 
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discussed earlier. South Africa had particularly low. growth rates in engineering polymers 
(ABS and SAN), an issue to be discussed shortly. 
The differential growth rates among the commodity polymers also accords with the 
demand pattern (see Figure 29 and Figure 30). These figures reveal the unusually large share 
of the South African market occupied by polyethylenes in 1989, higher than for all other 
countries and regions in the sample. They also reveal the unusually small share of the market 
held by PP and PS, again on account of the poor domestic supply. Now that SASOL has a 
large PP plant on stream it may be expected that the historical imbalance against PP will be 
corrected over a period of years. Tariff protection on PS manufacture has recently been 
removed and it may also be expected to gain in market share. But what of engineering 
plastics? 
Engineering plastics do in some cases compete with commodity polymers in certain 
applications but in general they represent part of a new round of substitution of more 
conventional matarials by advanced materials. Global sales of engineering plastics have been 
expanding at about 8-10% p.a. against fairly slow growth for plastics as a whole (3-4% p.a.) 
in Europe for example (UNIDO, 1990:278). However in South Africa the opposite trend is 
evident. Over 1980-90 commodity polymers' share of the total polymer market grew from 
77% to 82% whilst the share held by all engineering polymers shrank from 3% to 2% (see 
Table 6.10). But in the shorter term there is evidence of this trend reversing. Over the 1985-
90 period, engineering polymer growth rates switched from -3.2% p.a. over 1980-85 to 
+8.2% p.a. over 1985-90. This was faster than the commodity polymer growth rates of5.5% 
p.a. in the latter period. This more recent upswing in demand for engineering polymers may 












Polymer apparent consumption from Plastics Federation of SA, Annual Report 1990. 
Population from Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1991. 
Interview, Wamsley. 
Republic of China, 1983. 
Vergara & Babelon, 1990. 
ICEF,1992. 
Figure 30 
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Polymer apparent consumption from SA Plastics Federation Annual Report 1990. 
Population from Development Bank of Southern Africa (1991) 
S Wamsley, Focus on Chemicals 
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Abridgement of Development Plan for Downstream Sector of ROC Petrochemicals Industry of 
Free China 
Vergara & Babelon (1990) 
ICEF (1992) 
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+--------------------------------------------------------------+ ITable 6.10 Apparent Consumption of Commodity, Engineering ! 
1 and Other Polymers in South Africa I , , , 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 1980 1985 1990 --Annual Change '--I 
, Percent 80-90 80-85 85-90 1  
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
ICommodity polymers 77 80 82 0.6 0.7 0.5 1 
IEngineering polymers 3 2 2 -0 .. 9 -4.8 3.1 1 
IAll other polymers 20 18 16 -2.5 -2.3 -2.6! 
1 Total 100 100 100 , 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 1 Metr ic Tonnes (' 000) 1 
+--------~-----------------------------------------------------+ ICommodity polymers 320 361 471 3.9 2.4 5.5 1 
IEngineering POlymers 11 9 13 2.4 -3.2 8.2 1 
'All other polymers 85 82 91 0.8 -0.7 2.2 1 I Total 416 451 575 3.3 1.7 5.0 1 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Sources: Plastics Federation of South Africa, Annual Reports 
Notes: 1. Commodity polymers • LOPE, LLOPE, HOPE, PP, PVC & PS 
2. Engineering polymers - .SAN, ABS and polyamides (nylons) 
programme from mass to value based incentives in recent years. Despite this the local 
automotive industry's share of engineering plastics consumption is well below global 
percentage figures. (pSA, August, 1992:29). 
These data provide an indication of the type of plastic converting industry which has 
existed in South Africa: one focusing on lower value added type products using the 
commodity polymers but beginning to change towards increasingly sophisticated applications. 
Within the engineering polymer market certain trends are evident. Among engineering 
plastics internationally, nylons are the most important materials (Wittcoff, 1992 & UNIDO, 
1990:277). In South Africa their apparent consumption grew at 6.3% p.a. over 1980-90, 
slightly slower than the engineering polymers as a group.IDomestic consumption of other 
engineering polymers, ABS and SAN, declined at -4.5% p.a. over 1980-90, but this negative 
trend was dramatically reversed to +8.9% p.a. over the 1985-90 period (Ibid). 
Although the market share of 'all other polymers' continued to shrink between 1985 
and 1990, there was nevertheless a turnaround in the historical pattern of declining volumes, 
from -0.7% p.a. over 1980-85 to +2.2% p.a. growth over 1985-90 (see Table 6.10). The 
declining market share is a result of the much faster volume growth in commodity and 
engineering polymers. 
Thus it emerges that the South African market is not developing in step with the 
developed economies and some NICs and . has only belatedly begun to experience a shift to 
engineering plastics which are still only 2 % of the market. By comparison they accounted for 
1. Calculated from Plastics Federation of SA, Annual Reports, apparent consumption data. 
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about 3 % of world polymer volumes (a 50% difference in engineering plastic volumes) in 
1988 (UNIDO, 1991:341). South Africa has followed a pattern typical of developing 
economies in which commodity polymers are more important. Domestic demand then suits 
the nature of the existing production facilities. This suggests that South Africa may more 
easily find markets in developing countries which are higher cost producers than South 
Africa. 
In preparation for the future, attention needs to be given to the supply of ABS and 
SAN polymers as they appear to be the fastest growing. South Africa has a relative 
abundance of propylene, a precursor to acrylonitrile which is used in the manufacture of 
engineering plastics such as ABS (acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene) and SAN (styrene-
acrylonitrile). However the other petrochemicals needed such as styrene (from benzene) and 
butadiene are not manufactured locally as there has been no aromatics facility in South 
Africa. The lack of suitably priced feedstocks and the lack of an integrated approach to the 
petrochemical industry have probably contributed to this state of affairs. 
There are signs that this may be beginning to be corrected. SASOL has announced 
plans to build a 75 000 tpa acrylonitrile plant scheduled to come on stream in 1995 (Business 
Day, 9-3-93). Most of its output is destined for its new acrylic fibres plant in Durban but 
some will be exported. This holds potential for local ABS production although world capacity 
utilization predictions, if correct, make this seem unlikely before the year 2000. 
Historically the polymer manufacturers have been inwardly focused and geared to 
serve certain parts of the local market, or rather a wide range of local markets, in many 
sectors of the economy. In Table 6.11 the end-uses of domestically produced polymer are 
contrasted with the West European demand pattern. This reveals some significant differences. 
A comparatively high proportion of domestic PP is used in fibres. In Chapter One the 
global growth in PP textile applications was noted. This trend has been even more noticeable 
in South Africa. Domestic growth in this area has been very rapid, 8.2% p.a. by volume over 
1984-89.2 The most significant feature of the local PP market is the large proportion which 
goes to the textile industry, some 44% in contrast to the West European figure of 27%, and 
the world average of 29% (Interview, Scott). PP textiles are used in heavy duty packaging 
applications associated with mining and agriculture, geotextiles, cement reinforcement, fIlter 
cloth, and carpet yarns. Although such products are not the most sophisticated PP products, 
they may represent South Africa's 'natural' comparative advantage in PP uses. Lovegrove 
2. Calculated from data in De Voest, 1990:7. 
(1990) sees this PP substitution and penetration as only 'the tip of the iceberg'. 
Table 6.11 Polymer End Use Comparison 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
I IWestern European polymer ~nd use (1990) I 
I (percent) I 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
I LOPE LLOPE HOPE PVC PP I I 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ IFilm & Sheet 72 80 16 19 17 
IInjection moulding 6 8 26 0 47 
IExtrusion Coating 8 0 0 S 8 
IBlow moulding 3 1 42 9 2 
IWire & Cable S 1 1 9 0 
IPipe and Conduit 3 3 12 30 0 
I Other 4 8 4 29 1 
I Fibres 0 0 0 0 27 I ________________________________________ + 
: 100 100 100 100 100 I I 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ Source: Wittcoff 1992. 
+----------------------------------~-----------------------+ ISouth Africa polymer end use (1991) (percent) a/ I 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ I LOPE LLOPE HDPE b/ PVC PP I 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ IFilm & Sheet 79 63 19 22 16 I 
I Injection moulding 5 9 34 0 40 I 
IExtrusion Coating 7 0 0 0 0 
IBlow moulding 3 3 33 16 0 
IWire & Cable 1 7 0 14 0 
IPipe and Conduit 0 2 6 3S 0 
I Other 4 17 2 12 0 
I Fibres 0 0 6 0 44 I ________________________________________ + 
I 100 100 100 100 100 I 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ Sources: AECI, SASOL, Plastomark. 
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Notes: a/ domestic production only and excluding exports 
b/ 1992 figures 
A second feature of Table 6.11 is the larger proportion of PVC used to make bottles 
(blow moulding) in South Africa, almost double the proportion used in Western Europe 
indicating a concentration on packaging applications. Bottle applications are exaggerated, 
partly a result of the fewer number of grades produced locally and partly as a result of the 
local development of grades of PVC suitable for bottle applications. Both PVC 'wire and 
cable' and 'pipe and conduit' show higher proportions of polymer used in these applications 
in South Africa, indicative of agricultural and infrastructural applications. South Africa lacks 
PVC and PP extrusion coating grades. Consequently these grades are imported for important 
markets such as footwear, automobile upholstery and certain types of flooring. LLDPE film 
and sheet usage in South Africa is below West European levels as a result of larger 
application in 'other'. This 'other' is typically lower value added and packaging products 
aimed at primary sectors of the economy. According to interviewees aware of this demand 
pattern, export efforts would best be directed at countries like Israel and Turkey where a 
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demand for such products exists. 
From the foregoing discussion one can begin to shape an understanding of South 
Africa's historically poor export performance in Plastic Products. This is not solely 
attributable to higher polymer prices in South Africa. Indeed a range of issues has contributed 
to this bias against exports. These are dealt with in later chapters., Trade patterns, historical 
and potential are also the subject of a separate chapter. 
Growth in Commodity Polymers explained 
It has been observed above that commodity polymers have outstripped engineering 
polymer growth rates, as is typical of developing countries. What are the end-uses and 
markets in South Africa which have accounted for this phenomenon? 
The major markets for plastics according to the Plastics Federation of South Africa 
are shown in Table 6.12 (regrettably they do not have data for the early-1980s). The most 
striking features of this table is the large proportion (41 % in 1990) of plastic devoted to 
packaging and the small proportion used in building and construction. In practice this figure 
will be somewhat larger than the 7% recorded, as much of 'Electrical' will be plastic cable 
sheathing, some of which is used in the building and construction industry. 








Toys and leisure items 


















Source: Plastics Federation of SA, Annual Report, 1990 
Packaging's share of total polymer consumption is open to question. Based on BMI 
(1991) figures packaging's share of total polymer consumption was 47.6% in 1990, up from 
34.5% in 1980.3 The BMI data is very detailed whereas the Plastics Federation data is 
3. Calculated from BMI (1991) and Plastics Federation of SA Annual Reports, various years. 
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unsupported and consequently the BMI data will be used here. 4 
In order to discover the historical pattern of commodity polymer end-use, Table 6.13 
compares packaging and non-packaging applications over 1980-90. Engineering and other 
non-commodity plastics are not material as they account for less than 1 % of plastic packaging 
(BMI, 1991:79). The results are most illuminating. Overall growth of commodity polymer 
volumes averaged 3.9% p.a. which is considerably higher than GDP growth, but in packaging 
applications the growth rate was more than double this, 9% p.a. In contrast, consumption by 
non packaging applications was slightly negative, -0.1 % p.a. Thus a significant shift in end 
use markets for commodity polymers occurred. In 1980 only 35% of commodity polymer was 
used in packaging. By 1990 this had increased to over 56%. 
In short, all growth in domestic commodity polymer consumption between 1980 and 
1990 was in packaging. The polymers with the fastest growth in packaging were HDPE and 
PP,.which suggests that Plastomark, Safripol's marketing arm, was aggressively marketing 
its products in packaging applications. One packaging firm interviewed volunteered that 
Plastomark was a very aggressive monopoly. It did not discount PP prices for export until 
SASOL began PP production and offered such discounts. . 
Does this mean that South Africa has become a packaging intensive society? Plastics 
Federation Executive Director, Bill Naude, claims that "SA uses more plastic carrier bags per 
capita than any other country" (Business Day, 18-11-91:10). 
In comparison to Australia and the UK, a larger proportion of South Africa's plastic 
is used for packaging (see Table 6.14). However this does not necessarily mean that South 
Africa is an unduly packaging intensive society. In the Federal Republic of Germany, plastics 
represented 14% by weight and 27% of the total value of packaging materials (UNIDO 
1989:284). The figures were almost identical for South Africa in 1990; 13.5% by weight and 
29.5% of the total value of packaging materials (BMI 1991:38). 
The explanation for these apparently contradictory data appears to lie, not in 
packaging, but in the other applications for which plastic is used. South Africa uses a much 
smaller proportion of plastic in building and construction than either the UK or Australia (see 
Table 6.14). This difference accords with South Africa's lower standard of housing. If so, 
a mass housing programme may be expected to increase the demand for plastics. 
4. The Plastics Federation did not respond to a letter querying the discrepancy between their figures and the BMI 
figures. 
Table 6.13 SA Commodity Polymer Growth Rates and Market Shares, Packaging and Non Packaging Applications 
Apparant Consumption (Tonnes) 
Packaging Non Packaging 
POLYMER 1980 1985 1990 1980 
lOPE + LlOPE 58,000 65,985 116,185 35,500 
HOPE 21,735 61,935 81,600 51,665 
PP 10,000 18,790 29,830 28,100 
PVC 13,580 18,230 24,900 83,920 
PS 8,810 11 ,055 12,190 9,090 
Total 112,125 175,995 264,705 208,275 
Share of commod-
ity polvmer (%) 35.0 48.8 56.3 
Sources: Calculated from data in: 












1990 1980 1985 
30,815 93,500 112,000 
23,400 73,400 71,500 
39,170 38,100 45,000 
98,100 97,500 111 ,500 
14,310 17,900 20,500 
205,795 320,400 360,500 
43.7 
----- - -- -- ----




147,000 7.2 -1.4 
105,000 14.1 -7.6 
69,000 11.5 3.4 
123,000 6.3 1.6 
26,500 3.3 4.6 











+------------------------------------------------+ • I 
ITable 6.14 Plastlc Markets. I 
I 1989 I 
I Percent of Total Market 
~-----------------------+--------+---------+-----
I I SA I Australia I UK 
I +--------+---------+-----
1 Packaging 43 I 32 36 
I Electrical/Electronic 8 I 8 10 
IBuilding & Construction 8 I 23 25 
I Agriculture 7 I 4 2 
I Transport/Automotive 7 I 6 6 
I Household/domestic 14 I 14 13 
I Other 13 I 13 8 
I +--------+---------+-----
1 Total I 100 I 100 I 100 
+-----------------------+--------+---------+-----+ 
Source: BMI, 1991:78 
British Plastics Federation 
Returning to the plastic packaging market, a breakdown of the types of packaging used 
is also informative (see Table 6.15). South Africa's plastic packaging market is concentrated 
in bags and packets and thus appears relatively underdeveloped, compared to Australia, in 
bottle (up to 5 litre) applications. 
+----------------------------------------------+ ITable 6.15 Plastic Packaging by Pack Type. I 
I 1991 (% of Total Market) I 
I I 
I I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+ IPack Type IAustralial SA I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+ 
IBottles (up to 5 litre) 32 I 19 I 
IBags/packets of film 32 I 43 I 
I Pails/Drums/Crates 6 I 5 I 
I Caps/Closures/Seals 8 I 5 I 
IOther rigids 8 I 11 I 
IOther types I 14 I 11 I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+ 
I TOTAL I 100 I 100 I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+ Source: BMI, 1991:82 
Plastic packaging is usually categorised in one of two categories, rigid or flexible. In 
South Africa flexible packaging has been the larger of the two. It accounted for about 60% 
of the packaging market in 1980 and in 1990.s Within the flexible packaging market the 
product areas which have experienced significant gains in the proportion of polymer used are 
shrink and pallet wraps, monofilm bags and form/fill/seal (FFS) applications (see Table 
6.16). The latter are typically used in packaging food items such as rice, beans, maize meal, 
etc. and also for chemicals and fertilizers. Pallet and bundle shrink wrap has grown at a 
spectacular annual average growth rate of over 15% p.a. between 1985-90 (BMI, 1991:58). 
5. Calculated from BMI, 1991. 
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Retail check out bags have been an area of comparatively slow growth (2.6% p.a.) over this 
period. Their share of packaging plastic fell by one third between 1980 and 1990. Thus it 
appears that the major growth areas have been in packaging for lower value added foods~ffs 
and in industrial packaging applications. 
+--------------------------------------------------------+ ITable 6.16 Flexible Plastic Packaging Consumption, SA ! 
I ( Percent) I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+---------+ IPack Type I 1980 I 1990 11995 est. I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+---------+ 
IHeavy duty sacks I 19 I 11 11 
IWoven sacks & pockets I 13 I 15 14 
IShrink & pallet wraps I 22 I 28 29 
IMonofilm bags/FFS I 21 I 26 28 
IRetail check-out bags I 21 I 14 14 
10ther bags I 4 I 5 5 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+---------+ 
I TOTAL I 100 I 100 I 100 I 
+--------------------------+---------+---------+---------+ 
Source: 8MI, 1991:55-57 
These demand patterns have implications for export prospects across a range of 
industries. To the extent that South African plastic pri~s are higher than world prices, 
packaged exports will be adversely affected, albeit marginally in many cases. If palletised 
goods are exported they are usually wrapped in some kind of plastic sheeting. Consequently 
if manufacturing exports increase so will the demand for plastic packaging. However there 
is a proviso to this which concerns final destination. The EEC has adopted strict plastic 
packaging regulations and alternate packaging material may replace plastic to some extent in 
EEC markets. 
The type of food products being bagged and wrapped in plastic are unprocessed or 
marginally processed type products. These include trays of cool drink and food cans which 
are also usually wrapped in plastic. The cost of this type of packaging has implications for 
the cost of living for lower income groups. Equally, food exports into Africa are likely to be 
these kinds of products and accordingly plastic packaging costs will need to be competitive. 
The rapid urbanisation of lower income groups in South Africa has been accompanied by a 
burgeoning informal sector which in tum has added further impetus to the trend to smaller 
pack sizes (FM, Packaging Special Report, 21-8-92:57). 
The implications for trade policy of these findings may be noted here. Over 40% of 
all plastic consumption is packaging which is an intermediate input to other manufacturing 
processes. Accordingly any export incentives for packaging users should ideally be structured 
in such a way that packaging manufacturers can also benefit, because there is considerable 
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need for assistance to the plastic converting industry if it is to become more internationally 
competitive, as we shall see later in this Chapter. 
International polymer markets and export potential 
Export potential is an important consideration in inducing firms to move towards 
internationally competitive production. In capital intensive process industries like the polymer 
industry, economies of scale are critical. The limited size of the South African market, 
together with the state's import substitution strategy, resulted in plants lacking the economies 
of scale enjoyed by internationally competitive plants. Policies encouraging investors to move 
towards 'world scale' plant size will only be meaningful if it can be demonstrated that 
markets exist for the output from such 'world scale' plants (assuming other preconditions for 
export such as world priced feedstocks are also available).6 
Potential markets could be of two types: for plastic raw materials or a larger domestic 
plastic converting industry intent upon exporting. The prospects for both of these are 
discussed in this section. There is evidence to suggest that in.ternational markets exist for both 
polymer and Plastic Products, the major concerns in this study. Data collection and 
processing on the structure of international demand is another of the aspects of this industry 
which appears to have been largely privatised. Data in the public domain are scarce. Much 
of the analysis of polymer markets here relies upon a commercial source, Parpinelli Tecnon, 
one of the leading firms in this activity, because there is very little else available. Data on 
the diverse markets for plastic products is even more difficult to come by. Consequently 
certain products had to be used as a proxy for the industry. 
International Polymer Markets by polymer type 
It has previously been observed that there has been growing international trade in 
chemicals. Plastic raw materials are a convenient point in the production chain at which to 
participate in trade as the materials are often in granule or powder form which make for high 
volumes per shipment container. 
The major markets for virgin polymer, by polymer type, are evident in Table 6.17. 
The two leading polymers in 1990 were PVC and LDPE, however by 2005 PP is expected 
6. Historical trade patterns and export markets are the subject of a later Chapter. 
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to replace LOPE. The three polymers which experienced the fastest growth rates over the 
1983-90 period are LLOPE, PP and HOPE (see Table 6.18). The same three polymers are 
also projected to continue growing faster than the others, albeit at a slower rate. LDPE, one 
of the older polymers is expected to reach maturity over the 1990-2005 period with limited 
growth. 
Table 6.17 World Virgin Commodity Polymer Demand by Polymer Type 
(million tons) Ranked by 1990 volumes 
Product 1983 1990 1995 est. 2005 est. 
PVC 12.5 17.8 20.5 26.5 
LDPE 11.3 14.0 14.4 15.9 
PP 6.4 12.6 17.1 27.7 
HDPE 6.4 11.4 14.3 20.9 
LLDPE 1.5 4.7 7.8 15.3 
Note: (est.) - estlmted 
Source: Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:"11.11 
Table 6.18 World Thermoplastics Product Summary 
+-------------------------------------------+ 
Annual Average Growth 
(percent per annum) 
1983-1990 1990-1995 1995-2005 
I (est.) (est.) I 
+-------------------------------------------+ LOPE 3.1 0.5 1.0 
LLOPE 18.3 10.4 7.0 
HOPE 8.7 4.6 3.9 
PP 10.1 6.3 5.0 
PVC 5.2 2.9 2.6 
PS 6.6 3.1 3.0 
ABS/SAN 5.7 5.6 3.5 I 
+-------------------------------------------+ ITotal 6.8 4.0 3.6 I 
+-------------------------------------------+ Note: (est.) = estimted 
Source: Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:1.1 & 11.11 
These differential growth rates are giving rise to a restructuring of polymer market 
shares (see Table 6.19). A clear trend is evident in which the older polymers, PVC and 
LDPE are relinquishing market share to the newer polymers, PP, HDPE and LLDPE. The 
preceeding review of South Africa's production capabilities suggests that South Africa is 
better equipped to compete in the PP and HDPE markets than in other polymers, such as 
LLDPE. 
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Table 6.19 World Virgin Commodity Polymer Demand, Percent share, 
Ranked by 1990 Share 
1983 1990 1995 2005 
est. est. 
PVC 33 29 28 25 
LDPE 30 23 19 15 
PP 17 21 23 26 
HOPE 17 19 19 20 
LLDPE 4 8 10 14 
100 100 100 100 
Note: (est.) - estlmted 
Source: Parpinelli Tecnon, 199: 11.11 
. . 
The closest potential export markets for South African producers are other African 
countries. African demand for commodity polymers has grown faster than the world average 
over 1983-90 at an average of 7.2% p.a., despite a GDP growth rate of only 1.8% p.a. over 
1981-87 (United Nations, 1992: 11). Commodity polymer demand in Africa is forecast to 
continue to grow faster than the world averages over 1990-95 and 1995-2005 (Table 6.20). 
Table 6.20 African Thermoplastics Growth 
+-------------------------------------------------------+ 
Annual Average Growth 
I (percent per annum) I 
+-------------------------------------------------------+ 
1983-1990 1990-1995 1995-2005 I 
I (est. ) (est. ) I 
+-------------------------------------------------------+ ILOPE + LLOPE 6.7 4.3 5.1 
I HOPE 5.7 5.2 5.7 
Ipp 14.9 9.4 7.8 
I PVC 4.8 4.6 3.8 
Ips 9.5 7.9 5.8 
lABS/SAN 17 7.2 3.9 I 
+-------------------------------------------------------+ I Total 7.2 5.8 5.5 I 
+-------------------------------------------------------+ Note: (est.) = estimted 
Source: Parpinelli Tecnon 1991:IV.112 
Africa is forecast to beeome the main importing region by the year 2005 (parpinelli Teenon, 
1991:ii.29). South Africa ought to be in a position to meet some of this demand as it 
dominates the production of thermoplastics in Africa. In 1990 South Africa commanded 
87.5% of African polyethylene capacity, 83% of African polypropylene capacity, 38% of 
African PVC capacity and 100% of African polystyrene capacity (Parpinelli Teenon, 
1991 :Iv.112). 
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International Polymer Markets by Region 
The major regional markets for virgin JXllymer are closely correlated with the level 
and/or rate of economic development. These are Western Europe, the USA, East Asia and 
Japan (see Table 6.21). 
Table 6.21 World Virgin Commodity Polymer Demand by Region 
(million tons) Ranked by 1990 volumes 
Region 1983 1990 1995 est. 200S est. 
Western Europe 13.7 20.S 23.2 29.7 
USA 11.8 17.9 20.6 27.0 
East Asia 4.0 8.3 11.S 18.0 
Japan S.O 8.1 9.6 12.4 
Eastern Europe 3.7 S.l 6.0 9.3 
Latin America 2.S 3.9 5.4 8.8 
South AsiaIPacific 2.0 3.8 S.8 10.5 
Africa 1.1 1.7 2.3 3.9 
Canada 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.4 
Middle East 0.8 1.1 1.7 3.0 
Totals 45.6 72.2 87.9 125.2 
Notes: (est.) = estimted 
Figures include PS and ABS 
Source: Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:11.11 
The per capita consumption of plastics is far lower in the less developed countries 
(LDCs) and newly industrialising countries (NICs) than in the developed market economies 
(DMEs) suggesting a JXltential for market development (see Table 6.8). Similarly the LDC 
and NIC markets are predicted to experience higher growth rates, 6.6% p.a. and 5.2% p.a. 
respectively, compared with 2.7% p.a. for the DMEs between 1990 and 2005 (parpinelli 
Tecnon, 1991:1.2). 
Outside of Africa considerable demand exists in markets into which South Africa could 
and does eXJXlrt in the Asia Pacific region (Table 6.22). Africa and South Asia/Pacific are 
the regions which are forecast to have the largest net imJXlrts between 1995 and 2005. East 
Asia will also remain an imJXlrtant imJXlrter. South Africa's 1991 exJXlrts of JXllymers 
amounted to 145 700 tonnes (IDC), just 3.4% of the 1990 imJXlrts into Latin America, 
Africa, East Asia and South Asia/Pacific, and this excludes markets in North America and 
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Europe. Domestic exports are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. 
Table 6.22 Net Regional trade in Thermoplastics 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------(thousand tons) 
1995 2000 2005 1983 1990 
(est. ) (est. ) (est. ) 
Latin America -403 -399 -407 -352 
-375 
Africa -701 -763 -1004 
-1327 -1919 
East Asia -1138 -1478 -854 -919 
-928 
-1029 -1654 -1444 -1674 -1745 South Asia/Pacific -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
source: 
Notes: 
Parpinelli Tecnon, 1990:11.29 
a) negative indicates imports 
b) (est.) = estimted 
C) Data are for six commodity thermoplastics. 
If the regional markets are disaggregated further by polymer type and reduced to 
imports only (rather than net trade volumes) it is evident that (in 1990) the major world 
importing markets were Western Europe, South Asia/Pacific and East Asia (see Table 6.23). 
Given South Africa's geographic location, the latter two are probably the best prospects for 
exporters. 
Table 6.23 1990 Polymer Imports (million tons) 
LOPE PVC PP HOPE Totals 
Western Europe 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.2 
South AsiaIPacific 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.9 
East Asia 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.9 
USA 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 
Latin America 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Africa 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Middle East 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Canada 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Japan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Eastern Europe 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Totals 3.0 2.0 1.9 1.6 
Source: ParpIDelli Tecnon, 1991: 1 .30 
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International Markets for Plastic Products 
Although raw polymer in powder or granule form is a convenient form for export 
purposes, the higher value added products are those which have been fabricated from plastic 
raw materials. Given the diverse nature of converted plastic products, data are difficult to 
come by. If 'Articles of Plastic NES' (SITC 893) and 'Plastic packaging, containers, lids' 
(SITC 8931) are used as a proxy for converted plastic goods, then it is possible to identify 
major trends in the world market economies. Rapid growth over the 1984-88 period is the 
most obvious (see Table 6.24). As may be expected Europe and the USA are the major 
importers. There may be potential for South African exporters in these markets. How have 
these markets varied over time? Table 6.25 shows that while Europe remains the major 
importing region, its share of imports has declined whilst imports into Asia and the USA have 
increased over the 1979-88 period. 
Table 6.24 Trade in Plastic Products 
World Market Economies 
('000) US $ 




1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1984-1988 
Imports 9063041 9863538 12811972 16557534 20000413 17.2\ 
Exports 7625714 8653585 11456458 14559042 18171380 19.0\ 
SITC 8931 Plastic packaging. containers. lids. 
Imports 215960 2304768 3034313 3912944 594000 22.4\ 
Exports 1984109 2071812 2774372 3583736 4509982 17.9\ 
Source: United Nations, 1990, Vol 2., pp227 & pp788. 
Table 6.25 Imports of Articles of Plastic NES (SITe 893), 
Share of World Market Economy (%) 











If these data are disaggregated further it is possible to identify those countries which 
experienced a rapid growth in imports of plastic produts over the 1984-88 period with several 
countries imports growing at over 20% p.a. These are identified in Table 6.26. Among those 
countries with more rapid growth in imports are several high wage European and 
Scandinavian countries. Countries which experienced significant ~rowth (over 20% p.a.) in 
imports over the 1984-88 period and which South African firms may consider as export 
targets are: Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco, India and the 
Philippines. Countries such as Japan and the Asian NICs may appear unlikely targets for 
South African exports, however they have experienced rapidly expanding imports and there 
may well be niche markets where South African products may be marketed. The data exclude 
many of the centrally planned or previously centrally planned economies which are also 
potential markets for South African plastic products .. 
In summary there would also appear to be large and rapidly expanding international 
plastic product markets into which South Africa may be able to export. 
Having established that international markets exist and sketched the proflle of the 
domestic market; consideration now needs to be given to capacity utilization projections so 
as to gauge the extent of opportunity. There is widespread agreement in the trade journals to 
the effect that world polymer markets will begin to recover from the current recession in 
1995/6. This is evident in the capacity utilization rates forecast for the 1990-95 period (see 
Table 6.27). Ironically the older and slower growing polymers such as LDPE and PVC are 
forecast to experience higher capacity utilization rates to 1995 which should be to the benefit 
of South African producers as these are the older plants in South Africa. If the capacity 
utilization projections are correct, and these are notoriously difficult projections to make, then 
overcapacity will exist in SAN and ABS polymers through the mid 1990s which bodes well 
for low priced imports of these engineering polymers. However the prospects of domestic 
SAN or ABS production beginning without some form of state assistance or protection do not 
look promising before the turn of the century. 
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Table 6.26 ImJ2Qrts of A£ticles of Plastic N~S {SITC 893) 
Million us ~I Ranked b~ 1988 Values 




1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
USA 1695 1990 2499 3099 3580 16.1 
Germany 853 884 1258 1686 2097 19.7 
France 764 832 1215 1628 2060 21.9 * 
UK 684 170 1015 1325 1706 20.1 * 
Netherlands 546 615 873 1141 1196 17.0 
Belgium-Luxembourg 392 416 603 792 1017 21.0 * 
Italy 276 312 446 599 735 21.6 * 
Switzerland 287 310 459 594 649 17.7 
Canada 504 541 597 709 613 4.0 
Sweden 244 268 348 462 606 20.0 * 
Japan 143 153 219 334 535 30.2 * 
Austria 180 188 269 361 482 21.9 * 
Hong Kong 147 184 216 331 455 25.4 * 
Norway 141 158 249 315 365 20.9 * 
Australia 190 193 213 257 342 12.5 
Denmark 132 146 236 294 315 19.0 
Spain 33 42 66 - 90 283 53.5 * 
Singapore 122 113 132 169 243 14.9 
Ireland 113 124 163 211 243 16.5 
Finland 87 97 134 186 239 22.4 * 
Mexico 146 183 33 40 184 4.7 
Saudi Arabia 206 162 121 118 148 -6.4 
Korea Republic 53 50 76 87 145 22.4 * 
Malaysia 83 58 36 99 122 8.1 
SA Cu.to •• Union 47 34 66 55 91 14.2 
Israel 45 45 69 90 80 12.4 
Greece 29 31 41 56 70 19.6 
Portugal 15 14 31 59 62 33.3 * 
United Arab Emirat 41 50 45 58 61 8.2 
New Zealand 34 37 47 58 60 11.9 Yugoslavia 20 19 26 34 58 24.2 * Thailand 39 38 53 92 54 6.6 Egypt 33 29 33 38 41 4.0 Kuwait 38 30 35 41 38 -0.2 Indonesia 21 17 24 18 33 9.7 Brazil 20 15 23 30 33 10.6 Turkey 11 14 23 27 32 24.9 * Chile 18 15 17 20 32 12.1 Iceland 11 13 20 30 30 22.8 * Iraq 50 49 -38 32 30 -9.7 India 10 12 23 28 29 23.5 * Libyan Arab Jamahi 29 18 18 26 27 -1.2 Bahrain 12 31 30 32 26 16.9 Morocco 9 17 18 20 26 24.2 * Philippines 8 7 11 40 23 23.8 * Algeria 37 35 36 21 20 -11.9 Pakistan 16 18 15 12 19 4.2 Nigeria 12 11 18 18 19 10.4 Trinidad & Tobago 29 23 20 17 12 -15.8 Oman 18 22 22 20 10 -10.4 Total 8 668 9 434 12 283 15 899 19 376 
Source: United Nations, 1990, Vol 2., pp227 Note: * = > 20\ 
-------------------------+ +-------------------------------------I Table 6.27 world Capacity Utilization Rates ! 
, (percent), 
, ------------------------+ +--------------------------------------1983 1990 1993 1995 2000 2005 I 
, (est.) (est.) (est.) I 
~--------------------------------------------------------------+ I LOPE 81 87 85 84 87 89 
I Flexible 73 88 72 69 79 90 
I HOPE 83 89 79 80 88 92 
\PP 84 89 77 79 86 92 
I PVC 75 84 82 83 89 92 
IpS 69 84 79 80 84 89 
!ABS/SAN 79 73 71 72 79 87 
,--------------------------------------------------------------+ lworld Average 78 86 79 79 85 91 I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: (est.). estimted 
Source: Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:11.5 
Upstream and Downstream. the chan&in& relationship 
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Increased trade in Plastic Products during the 1980s has been observed above. This 
provokes the question: is this part of a longer term trend, what is this trend and how does 
South Africa's development compare? 
One approach to identifying the changes in production underlying this trade trend is 
to measure, over time, the relationship between the downstream sector and the upstream 
sector of the industry. In this case, a proxy for the downstream plastic converting industry, 
the Plastic Products industry (ISIC 356) has been expressed as a percentage of the upstream 
Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351) sector (which includes plastic raw material production). Table 
6.28 measures the value added ratio of Plastic Products to Industrial Chemicals in a sample 
of countries over a period of years. Data are unfortunately not available for all the sample 
countries listed in Annexure E. In smaller economies the establishment of a single world scale 
plant can have such a large impact as to cause large fluctuations in the data. For these and 
other reasons data for certain countries have been excluded, viz Hong Kong, Cyprus, Peru 
and Sri Lanka. However the data for the sample of DMEs are of better quality and the size 
of these economies, for the most part, is sufficient to absorb capacity additions which would 
cause large fluctuations in smaller economies. In these larger economies such as the USA, 
UK, Japan and Germany a clear trend is evident over the 1970-90 period. Plastic Products 
share of manufacturing value added (MV A) has increased relative to Industrial Chemicals. 
In the UK for example the ratio increased from 20% to 50% and in Japan from 31 % to 76%. 
In countries which are known to have followed deliberate industrial strategies such as South 
Korea, Taiwan and Israel this trend is even more apparent. It is also apparent in certain of 
the second tier NICs, Indonesia and Uruguay. This trend represents an expansion of 
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downstream, higher value added, type activities relative to upstream more capital intensive 
production. Exceptions to this trend are the Scandinavian countries where the relationship has 
been static or declining. A possible explanation for this may lie in the limited size of these 
economies and where an additional petrochemical complex would significantly affect the 
relationship. 
Table 6.28 Value Added Ratio: Plastic Products to Industrial 
Chemicals {SIC 356lsIC 3511 
(percent) 
Countr;t 1965 ~ ill.L 1980 lW.- 1990 
NICs 
Argentina 45.3 42.4 46.4 35.5 
Brazil 35.7 44.8 56.9 58.2 39.1 
South Korea 10.4 15.6 16.0 36.0 55.6 55.8 
Mexico 30.0 25.4 33.7 25.7 24.3 
-Singapore 78.2 75.0 91.1 159.6 74.0 
Taiwan ~ 81.1 142.1 147.5 159.3 149.5 
Average ll.&... !L..L a.L 78.9 64.7 102.6 
2nd Tier NICs 
Columbia 46.5 41.8 46.3 
Indonesia 22.1 16.0 17.1 40.8 
Jordan 0.0 0.0 135.2 115.8 91.8 
Malayasia 0.0 43.8 37.3 89 . 1 14.9 
Morocco 15.8 9.2 
Phillipines 15.1 20.7 54.2 28.6 31.9 
Thailand 86.3 114.9 63.2 55.2 Tunisia 3.7 14.3 30.0 43.2 74.8 Uruguay 67.5 38.0 116.2 94.5 ~ Average hL 36.4 60.8 59.5 ~ 63.9 
DMEs 
Australia 39.4 70.0 92.1 85.8 82.3 44.8 Austria 27.1 32.5 35.5 42.3 36.9 28.5 Belgium 24.3 23.4 27.3 33.9 28.4 Canada 20.8 39.4 40.8 40.3 64.4 45.4 Denmark 71.3 57.0 52.7 48.5 59.6 58.8 Finland 25.0 40.0 22.2 29.5 29.9 25.9 France 51.2 49.2 49.0 47.7 51. 7 55.4 Germany(West) 26.7 32.3 31.9 43.7 34.0 43.6 Greece 53.6 64.3 73.S 115.5 63.7 92.2 Iceland 65.3 58.4 107.2 121. 7 Israel 60.3 74.3 67.8 82.8 91.5 124.6 Italy 145.7 26.6 24.5 43.3 56.8 Japan 21.4 31.4 56.0 68.6 80.7 76.2 Netherlands 19.9 17.6 17.5 20.9 19.1 22.8 New Zealand 89.8 102.4 73.3 78.8 102.9 Norway 45.5 37.7 34.7 29.9 Portugal 37.9 45.0 55.1 87.5 38.3 Spain 37.5 51.3 38.4 54.7 46.9 43.8 Sweden 61.5 40.0 38.2 40.8 39.6 37.3 Switzerland 21.9 22.8 40.9 UK 20.5 22.2 44.9 42.1 50.2 USA l§.:..L 27.6 29.7 37.4 57.1 Average ll.:.L 40.4 ~ 44.4 55.2 ll.:..L 52.1 
South Africa 30.3 28.7 35.2 31.4 35.6 
Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics, 1992. 
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It is difficult to determine from the South African data whether this trend has been 
marginally present or not, as the ratio hovers between the 30% to 35 % level. It is known that 
there are problems in many South African data bases with ISIC 351 and ISIC 352 as the 
secret refinery sector (lSIC 353) is usually hidden in one of these two categories. In 
Figure 31 another data set shows the relationship between Plastics Raw Materials (lSIC 3513) 
and the next link down the chain, Plastic Products (lSIC 356). In this figure Plastic Products 
MV A as a proportion of plastic raw materials is declining over time. The upstream sector has 
been growing relative to the downstream sector, quite the opposite of the trend evident in the 
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The expansion in trade of Plastic Products and the historical shift in the relationship 
between upstream and downstream sectors has industrial strategy implications for South 
Africa which are taken up in the final chapter. 
Conclusions 
The foregoing discussion provides a basis for the development of a general view of 
the plastic raw materials link in the production chain up to 1993. A slow process of 
restructuring was gaining momentum as plant sizes increased towards 'world scale', driven 
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by tariff reductions or the threat of them. At the same time a more outward orientation was 
emerging which is likely to have a favourable impact on quality and efficiency. Newer plants 
have better technology, but even the older ones could be more competitive if they had access 
to world priced olefins. 
All of the polymer plants attempt to serve the domestic market. As a result they 
produce a larger number of grades than their international competitors resulting in lower 
efficiencies and reduced quality consistency. Plant optimisation becomes a trade-off between 
the length of production runs and stocks. The dilemma polymer producers face is that in 
order to develop local markets they need to increase the number of grades, whilst plant 
optimisation demands the opposite. Ironically within this weakness, (a larger number of 
grades) lies a potential strength. This potential strength lies in the growing world tendency 
to produce materials that meet customers' specific needs, for example through the 
development of 'speciality grades'. As Ken Sinclair from the US consultancy SRI 
International puts it: 
"Mastering the business procedures required to deliver just the right material at 
competitive cost will become central to the success of future polyolefin materials 
companies." (Quoted in Eisberg, 22-6-92: 19) 
Better manufacturing practice in terms of faster changeover times between grades and less 
'twilight' material production in the process may be the key to lower costs which may yield 
access to new markets. 
South African polymer manufacturers have had some success in the modification and 
development of known catalyst systems, improving yield and adapting products for local 
conditions. In future R&D requirements are likely to continue to focus around the further 
development of existing catalyst and reactor systems, that is building upon known operations, 
rather than the more expensive and difficult exploration of entirely new areas of the unknown. 
The weakest areas of commodity polymer production appear to be LDPE and LLDPE 
where lack of economies of scale and the absence of any announced plans for investment are 
cause for concern, particularly in view of the fact that together, these are the largest volume 
commodity plastics in the domestic market. AECI appears to have followed a strategy of 
entering domestic polymer markets early, and building sufficient capacity to warrant 
production to be monopolistic whilst sheltering behind trade barriers. Since these businesses 
could continue operating without major new investment nor substantial research expenses, 
245 
they could, in the Boston Consulting Group terms, become 'cash cows' which were 
'harvested'. In general AECI was, in the early 1980s, 'milked for dividends' when a very 
small proportion of earnings was retained by the company (FM, 24-1-92:25). This was 
despite the fact that the conglomerate shareholders, Anglo American and ICI, presented 
themselves as long term investors. AECI may need to be nudged into a more competitive 
mode by industrial policy ~easures. Almost inevitably some investment will be required. 
In a comparison of local and international chemical companies, SASOL stands out by 
virtue of its poor increase in sales over the 1984-90 period and its very poor asset turnover 
ratios. Compared with the leading 20 international companies the three large South African 
chemical companies have poor labour productivity but low average wage costs. SASOL' s unit 
labour costs .grew at twice the rate of the leading international companies in the sample 
whereas AECI and Sentrachem had the lowest growth. rates in unit labour costs in the sample. 
South Africa's plastic demand pattern reflects its per capita income distribution. The 
great bulk of demand is for commodity polymers. Engineering polymers occupy a small (2 %) 
but recently faster growing, market share. 
International polymer demand projections show export potential in a variety of markets 
including those which South Africa has exported to in the past. Africa is predicted to become 
a large importing region in future. South Africa's geographical advantage could be 
strengthened if it gains political acceptability among African countries. There has been strong 
gro~th in trade in certain converted plastic products during the 1980s. This suggests that 
potential export markets exist for plastic converters. The major markets are in Europe and 
the USA in which South Africa's relatively low wages (in dollar terms) should give it some 
advantage. This point is pursued in a later chapter. 
In the domestic market a significant shift in end use markets for commodity polymers 
has occurred. The proportion of commodity polymers used for packaging expanded from 35 % 
to over 56% between 1980 and 1990. In fact all growth in domestic commodity polymer 
consumption between 1980 and 1990 was in packaging. South Africa's plastics market is 
skewed in favour of packaging applications at the expense of housing and construction 
applications. 
Polypropylene has experienced rapid growth in textile applications. Much of this 
serves packaging needs for the mining and agricultural industries. 
There is evidence to suggest that in a range of countries the trend has been for the 
share of MV A contributed by the downstream, higher value added sector, Plastic Products, 
to increase relative to the upstream sector. In South Africa the evidence suggests that the 
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trend has been static or in the opposite direction. The reasons for this are several and 
interrelated. The dominance of military/strategic state policy has had repercussions on the 
industry. It led private companies to develop competing proposals designed to accommodate 
such policies in the hope of a 'hupstoot' from the state. Attention was thus focused at the 
upstream end. This together with uncompetitive polymer prices for downstream producers has 
led to the 'underdevelopment' of the Plastic Products industry with the consequent loss of 
employment opportunities. This industry is considered in more detail in a subsequent chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN INGENIOUS SOLUTION - POLIFIN 
Introduction 
The South African petrochemical industry entered a new era on lst January 1994 when 
a new joint venture between SASOL and AECI, Polifin, came into existence. Polifin is the 
product of a number of forces acting upon SASOL and AECI which have been analyzed in 
preceding chapters as well as some new forces which came into being in 1993. Before 
proceeding to identify the new forces and to analyze what Polifin means to e commodity 
plasticsjiliere it is as well to take stock of the petrochemical industry as it was in 1993. 
By 1993 the major proportion of South Africa's petrochemicals were sourced from 
SASOL's unique oil from coal process. Indeed SASOL straddled a 'watershed', with petrol 
and liquid fuels flowing in one direction and petrochemicals in the other direction, the one 
intimately and inextricably interconnected with the other. ,In both directions different state 
regulations propped up SASOL's sales and profits, allowing it, from 1988 onwards, to 
embark upon an ambitious investment spree, largely down the more profitable petrochemical 
path. 
In Chapter Five various forces were identified which began to build up pressure upon 
the main players in the petrochemical and polymer industries. In the face of these pressures 
SASOL's strategy from 1988 was to embark upon a new strategy of diversification into higher 
value added chemicals. It has been suggested that the reasons for this included an assessment 
of the changing political circumstances evolving in South Africa in the late 1980s and 
SASOL's recognition of the extent to which it stood exposed and vulnerable if an 
unsympathetic government should come to power. 
On the business front SASOL faced pressures as a result of the collapse of the oil 
price in 1986 and its inability to lift sales above the plateau they had reached in the late 
1980s. Simultaneously SASOL was under pressure from customers to invest in more olefin 
extracting investments but at the same time hamstrung in its ability to vertically integrate 
downstream by its 'understandi~g' with AECI that it would not compete in polymer markets 
until a further source of olefins became available and there seemed little prospect of that. This 
'understanding' cut right across the most obvious path (polymers) for SASOL's new strategy 
of diversification into higher value added chemicals. Consequently it was almost inevitable 
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that some form of accommodation would have to be reached with AECI, its major 
petrochemical customer. 
In addition to these pressures SASOL had, in 1990, embarked upon its own polymer 
business (the PP plant). This and its other chemical businesses faced a number of threats from 
South Africa's engagement in the GAIT negotiations. l Its tariffs could be lowered and 
perhaps more seriously, it could face countervailing measures (in terms of the GAIT rules) 
against its exports of chemicals, if it was found to be receiving a subsidy. It would be a 
relatively simple argument to make to suggest that motorists contributions to SASOL's 
income, via the Equalisation Fund, of between R 500 million and R 1 billion p.a. constituted 
a subsidy. 
AECI~s polymer businesses were also threatened by the pending GAIT agreement. 
Through the 1980s AECI had largely declined to invest in these businesses and indeed, had 
been accused of 'milking them for dividends'. It has also been shown that whilst none of 
these businesses was internationally competitive in their own right, they were further 
hampered in this objective by the high cost of olefins purchased from SASOL. In the case of 
PVC, a material for which demand was expected to grow in the post apartheid reconstruction 
phase, AECI was employing a dated technology. Simultaneously with these developments, 
AECl's major technology partner, ICI, and one of its two major shareholders, decided, in the 
light of the changing international environment, to split itself into two companies and to begin 
a process of disengaging itself from commodity chemicals. For AECI this meant that ICI was 
reluctant to continue part ownership of the polymer businesses, just at the time when AECI 
was investigating a new PVC technology and plant which would need investment capital. 
Given AECI's declining share performance, shareholders did not seem to be a likely source 
of capital either. 
These then were some of the pressures acting upon SASOL and AECI which came to 
a head in the early 1990s. This chapter discusses these pressures and the industrial 
restructuring industry which occurred as a consequence. 
Possible chan~es in the Liquid Fuels Industry Reeulatory Reeime 
The possibility of a change to the regulations governing the liquid fuels industry 
1. The general requirement for participation in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations was a commitment 
to a ~3 % reduction in manufacturing tariffs over five years. There are of course many exceptions to this general 
requirement. 
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strengthened in 1993. Political developments had unfolded; a new government was in place,. 
sanctions had been lifted and some of apartheid's most closely held secrets were coming out 
into the open, included among them, those concerning the liquid fuels. 
In May 1993, the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs made public considerable 
information about the industry and its regulation and called for public commenf . . 
On 15th September 1993, the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs implemented 
a 7 cents per litre (c/l) increase in the petrol price. This led to a public outcry, public 
demonstrations and blockades by taxi operators and a threatened strike by organised labour. 
As a result the National Economic Forum set up a Liquid Fuels Task Force, (LFTF) which 
began to negotiate a reduction in the petrol price as well as a new regulatory regime for the 
industry. In the LFTF SASOL has had to defend itself (and its subsidiaries) against its 
competitors (the crude oil refiners) and against organised labour, and against a new 
government searching for additional funding for its Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. 
From the commodity plastics jiliere point of view, possible changes to the liquid fuels 
regulatory regime constitute an opportunity to influence the pricing structure at the upstream 
end and it remains to be seen whether this will materialise or not (explained below) . 
. Polifin 
A new joint venture company between SASOL and AECI, called Polifin, was agreed 
in principle in mid 1993 and came into formal existence at the beginning of 1994. It creates 
a vertically integrated petrochemical and plastics business holding the potential for 
internationally competitive prices for certain commodity polymers. Polifin embraces all of the 
first link (petrochemicals) in the production chain and most of the second link (polymer 
manufacture) . 
SASOL contributed its ethylene and propylene facilities as well as its polypropylene 
plant, while AECI contributed its polymer plants (PVC, LDPE and LLDPE) in Sasolburg as 
well as its chlor-a1kali facilities there, various related plants and importantly, its downstream 
plastic converting subsidiaries. SASOL owns 60% of Polifin and AECI the remainder, based 
upon the assets each brought to Polifin. Polifin is planning to close AECI's unprofitable 
2. N.othing in the information mad~ availa~le th~ far seriously jeopardises any of the facts used in this study 
despite the fact that most of the penod dunng which the research for this study was carried out fell within the 
'sec~t' period of the liquid fuels and petrochemical history. For example the refmery capacities mentioned 
earlier are for the most part correct or close to the figures now available. 
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carbide acetylene PVC plant and to invest, in 1996, in a new ethylene based PVC facility. 
The effect of Polifin's establishment is to create a considerable measure of vertical 
integration in the commodity plastics filiere. This will start from petrochemical production 
(ethylene and propylene) through polymer manufacture to certain important converting firms. 
The international trend towards this type of arrangement (because it enhances 
competitiveness) was identified in Chapter Two. Safripol (the HDPE and PP producer) has 
been left out of the new arrangement leaving it exposed and somewhat vulnerable. 
The advent of Polifin will impact on developments at both the upstream and the 
downstream ends of the commodity plasticsfiliere. At the upstream end, barriers to entry are 
raised and SASOL's subsidy is 'inherited' by Polifin (discussed below). At the downstream 
end the access of small producers to fair polymer prices is at stake. Each of these points is 
elaborated on below. 
At the upstream end of the filiere the pricing of petrochemicals (ethylene and 
propylene in South Africa) at the point of entry to the filiere is critical as these costs cascade 
all the way down the filiere. SASOL has resolved this issue by contracting to sell its 
appropriate hydrocarbon streams at the 'fuel alternate value'. The price comparisons made 
earlier show this to be very competitively priced feedstock, on average about 80% below US 
Gulf ethylene prices. 3 
A brief, somewhat technical digression is necessary at this point. The gas stream 
which SASOL will sell to Polifin is impure ethylene, largely ethane (c;H6). The ethane 
stream has to be cracked, by Polifin, to ethylene (c;H4), a relatively cheap process. The 
beauty of making the transfer of ownership from SASOL to Polifin at this stage, and not one 
stage later, ie ethylene, is that it is easier for SASOL to argue that the 'fuel alternate value' 
is the correct price to be paid for this gas stream. 
This ingenious 'fuel alternate value' arrangement has a number of important 
implications. Firstly, competitors who contest for Polifin's markets will have to do so in the 
knowledge that Polifin has access to feedstock at prices low enough to sustain low polymer 
prices for extended periods. This in turn makes the costs, for an intruder intending to capture 
Polifin's markets, very high, especially in view of Polifin's vertical integration which gives 
it the flexibility to counter low prices in one area with higher prices in another. In short the 
barriers to entry in the commodity plastics filiere have been raised considerably. 
Secondly, in so far as the domestic market is concerned, Safripol (the other major 
3. In practice this percentage should be reduced by the costs of cracking and purification. Nevertheless the result 
would be very cbeap ethylene. 
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olefin customer) is placed at a considerable disadvantage, in that it will now have to buy its 
ethylene and propylene from its major competitor, Polifin. Understandably Safripol made 
much of this in its representations to the Competition Board and won, in return, an 
undertaking from Polifin, that Polifin would not discriminate in its pricing between its own 
subsidiaries and Safripol. The formula for setting the prices Safripol pays for ethylene and 
propylene will be left unaltered. Consequently Safripol's olefin prices will depend upon 
import parity pricing which in tum depends upon the extent of tariff protection. The 
advantage for Safripol is that if polymer tariffs are lowered it can pass some of the costs back 
upstream to Polifin. 
This is something of a hollow victory for Safripol in that it is excluded from the real 
benefits Polifin creates for its owners. The advantage of vertical integration is that the source 
of profit may be switched from one point in the production chain to another, as circumstances 
dictate. Polifin obtains its raw materials from SASOL at about 80% below US Gulf prices, 
(less small processing costs) and then markets its polymer at about 50% above US prices 
(local prices being a function of the tariff). This difference represents considerable sums of 
money and is a strong argument for the removal of tariffs on Polifin's polymers. In short, 
if in the pre 1994 scheme the olefin price formula operated as a 'dam' of value added in 
SASOVs favour, now under the 1994 arrangement, this 'dam' will be shifted one stage 
further downstream to Politin. 
Raised barriers to entry impact upon the possible sources of South Africa's next 
tranche of petrochemicals. It would appear that the next petrochemical facility in South 
Africa, if it intends to contest the local market, will have to be decided upon in consultation 
with Polifin and largely with its consent. The need for Polifin's consent could be avoided in 
two scenarios. 
Firstly if a petrochemical complex could be built primarily for export then a minority 
of its output could contest for the domestic market. Secondly if the domestic petrochemical 
and plastic market grows and a new petrochemical complex is delayed until Poltin can no 
longer satisfy the entire local market, then an opportunity may exist for a new entrant to 
compete. This is likely to be several years after the year 2000. 
At face value, the advent of Polifin offers hope for downstream plastic converters: 
"The merger will place the joint venture in a position to offer world competitive 
prices to downstream producers for higher value added exports" (SASOU AECI 
Merger, briefing document, June 1993:2) 
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However these hopes will only be realised if tariffs are reduced; something which Politin 
expects. Representations on the need to reduce tariffs were made to the Competition Board 
by the Association of Plastic Processors of South Africa (APPSA) and the Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union. If Polifin is shelter~ behind high tariffs then as the local monopoly it may 
be expected to charge whatever the market will bear. In the course of the preceding analysis 
the tariff on polymer was identified as the critical lynchpin of the pricing structure in the 
jiliere. 
The Board's stance was that such considerations were matters of trade policy and 
industrial policy which were beyond its purview. The joint venture was approved without any 
such requirement. In consequence the patterns of the past will be perpetuated - a large(r) 
commodity plastics monopoly will continue to live, comfortable within its protected domestic 
market - unless tariffs are reviewed by the Board of -Tariffs and Trade. 
During that period downstream converters will continue to be held captive by Politin's 
polymer pricing policies without recourse to imported polymer at world prices and so the 
opportunity for lower commodity polymer prices may be lost. This despite the fact that 
Polifin should be able to compete adequately without protection in view of its cheap 
hydrocarbon streams at the upstream end. It remains to be seen whether the Board of Trade 
and Industry will lower the polymer tariffs or not. 
Equally important for plastic converters is the pricing policy Politin will follow in 
respect of its own subsidiaries and their competitors. Part of the rationale for vertical 
integration is after all the opportunity for intra-firm transfer pricing. If Polifin gives its 
subsidiaries favourable polymer pricing (not prohibited by the Competition Board), which 
seems a reasonable expectation, then they may gradually take over their competitor's 
businesses and concentration will be increased. The Competition Board also rejected this 
argument on the basis that such conduct would first need to be proved and secondly that 
discriminatory pricing is acceptable in accordance with the internationally accepted principle 
of similar prices for similar volumes. In practice this will mean that small converters will 
continue to pay higher unit prices than large ones and will remain handicapped to this extent. 
Whilst the solutions to such issues are not necessarily simple, these Competition Board 
rulings do illustrate the importance of synchronising competition policy with industrial 
strategy or policy. 
Returning to the upstream, the advent of Polifin also raises important public policy 
issues related to SASOL's subsidy. SASOL's decision to sell hydrocarbon streams to Polifin 
at the 'fuel alternate value' has several implications. It suggests that SASOL is prepared to 
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share with AECI some of the windfall profits that have accrued to it from the price paid for 
its assets at privatisation but more importantly from its regulatory support. AECI as a 
chemical company has been considerably reduced in stature, having lost control of a 
considerable proportion of its business. On the other hand it will have access to profits, from 
what are expected to be profitable facilities in Polifin, which may. improve its market rating. 
SASOL will increase in stature in chemicals and also have an outlet for its excess ethylene 
capacity, in the planned PVC plant. It may also improve operating efficiencies and throughput 
at the ex-AECI polyme~ plants by bringing to bear its considerable skills in this area. 
The structure of Polifin' s raw material pricing scheme also signals SASOL's emerging 
corporate strategy, particularly in relation to its core synfuels business. In Polifin SASOL has 
separated out its petrochemical facilities into a separate company following the route of its 
fertilizer and explosives businesses, but going one step further, in that it intends to list Polifin 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). It has also announced that it intends to launch 
its crude oil refinery (NATREF) as a separate company on the JSE. These arrangements 
relate to SASOL's downstream businesses. In so far as the upstream is concerned, oil 
companies have accused SASOL's coal mining operations of inflating the price of coal to 
SASOL. 
Such moves to relocate profits away from synfuels operations are leaving the synfuel 
activities increasingly isolated and hamstrung, from a financial point of view. Hamstrung in 
the sense that the synfuel operation is now bound by commercial agreement to sell more 
valuable petrochemicals to Polifin at the 'fuel alternate value' which is less than their 
'theoretical' commercial value. In short the synfuel operation will be subsidising Polifin. The 
significance of this is that whereas in the past only the synfuel operations were subsidised, 
now that subsidy has been extended to Polifin as well by virtue of the 'subsidised' 'fuel 
alternate value' petrochemical price. 
It has been argued that SASOL's synfuel impact upon the economy is too large to 
allow it to be closed. If it requires a subsidy or some other form of protection (to remain 
operational) then a part of this subsidy/protection will in effect be passed on to Polifin. This 
will mean that the subsidy/protection will have to be larger than might otherwise have been 
the case without the contractual obligation to supply Polifin at the 'fuel alternate value'. 
Worse still, those who pay the subsidy/protection (motorists?) will, indirectly and unwittingly, 
be contribu~ng to the profits of Polifin and the wealth of its shareholders. Given the extent 
of public outcry about the petrol price, those responsible for designing a new regulatory 
regime involving a subsidy for SASOL are likely to be unable to justify anything more than 
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a mediocre profit for its synfuel operations. If this is so, Polifm cleverly perpetuates the 
subsidy and wealth transfer function but through a new mechanism at one step removed. In 
short the public will continue to subsidise big business, now SASOL and AECI, in Polifin. 
This 'public interest' issue was also considered by the Competition Board to be beyond its 
purview. 
In addition the commercial viability of the synfuel operations will also be reduced if 
in fact it is paying its coal mining subsidiary inflated prices for raw materials (coal). The 
pattern that is beginning to emerge is one in which SASOL appears to be deliberately 'ring 
fencing' its synfuel operations with commercial supply agreements and prices unfavourable 
to the synfuels operation. Thus if an investigation into the viability of the synfuels operations 
and their need for some form of subsidy or protection took place, the synfuel operations 
would appear in a poor light, so increasing their prospects of some form of support. 
But from SASOL and AECI's points of view Polifin is an ingenious solution from 
which both will gain something. SASOL at last has a way into the broader polymer business 
which it has been keen to develop (Interview Brand). AECI has a significant shareholding in 
a business which is likely to make money and will also benefit from the indirect subsidy 
passed along by SASOL. AECI's position in other chemical markets such as chlorine is also 
strengthened against their other competitor (Sentrachem). 
The dangers for Politin in the 'fuel alternate value' pricing mechanism is that its 
international competitors may accuse Politin of benetiting from a subsidy and may also launch 
counter vailing measures or anti-dumping charges under the GAIT rules. SASOL's reply, 
which is not entirely without merit, is likely to pose the question: what then is the appropriate 
price at which it should sell its oletins? The 'fuel alternate value' formula has the 
straightforward defence that, indeed if those gas streams were not used for chemicals they 
would be used for liquid fuels as has happened in the past. That would carry the debate onto 
the treacherously complex ground of the myriad regulations of the liquid fuels industry which 
SASOL know well but would take considerable unravelling for the uninitiated. 
Nevertheless the most obvious and vulnerable point for SASOL and Politin is the 
'tariff protection' which SASOL receives from motorists via the Equalisation Fund. It may 
be expected that SASOL will try to have this subsidy restructured into a more acceptable form 
such as conventional tariff protection, in this case on crude oil imports. This will raise costs 
for the crude oil refiners and they may be relied upon to oppose this. Higher costs will be 
passed on to motorists and they too may object. Another option would be to 'ring fence' the 
crude oil refineries and regard them as 'off shore' for tariff purposes and to impose a tariff 
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on refined products at the refinery gate. There are other options too but a discussion of these 
takes' us beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to note that the complex interrelations 
between the petrochemical and liquid fuels industries and their evolving ownership patterns 
may be expected to continue to complicate efforts at sound industrial policy. 
Until the latent threat of GAIT measures against Polifin are resolved they may 
influence its marketing strategy. Obviously such a threat only exists to the extent that it 
exports polymer. In a global context the scale of Polifin's polymer exports are too small to 
seriously disrupt large markets thus giving it a measure of protection. If there is growth in 
the local market SASOL may then be expected to compete more vigorously for that market. 
This may put it on a collision course with Safripol in PP markets and possibly HOPE markets 
if SASOL invests in HDPE. It may also build in a reluctance to export polymer which at first 
glance may seem threatening to South Africa's chemical trade imbalance, but may also hold 
an opportunity to relocate exports one link further down the production chain to the plastic 
converting industry. 
Conclusion 
Pricing is crucial to the future of a plastics industry. This makes it important to view 
the commodity plastics jiliere as an entity. Taken together the two new developments 
accompanying the advent of Polifin - increased vertical integration and advantageous 
feedstock prices - do hold new opportunities in that they begin to advance the jiliere closer 
to internationally competitive pricing and a more vibrant downstream industry. However for 
a truly dynamic jiliere to materialise, several other important issues need to be addressed if 
the objective is to pass the advantages which exist downstream to the more labour intensive 
and higher value added plastic converting industry. Polymer tariffs will be a key element 
among these issues. 
The advent of Polifin also raises once more, unfortunately in a more complex fashion, 
important public policy issues relating to the nature of the SASOL enigma. 
Finally the Polifin episode has demonstrated the limitation of the Competition Board 
as it is presently structured. If industrial policies are to be pursued then a way will need to 




THE PLASTIC CONVERTING INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The final link in the commodity plasticsjiliere is the plastic converting activity which 
is spread through a number of industries, from packaging to automobile components and 
construction. This plastic converting industry is the subject of this chapter. The Plastic 
Products Industry (ISle 356) spans the bulk of these activities and is a statistically convenient 
category. For these reasons it is frequently used as a proxy for the plastic converting 
industry. However some plastic converting also takes place in the automobile and auto 
components industries, the glass industry (which also makes car bumpers and attachments) 
and in the household chemicals and pharmaceutical industries (bottles) among others. 
It has earlier been established that this link of the chain is where the most value is 
added and where the capital labour ratio is lowest. It has also been the link furtherest from 
the focus of military/strategic interventions and state concellls although it has not escaped the 
indirect impact of same. Other than this it has not been the subject of any particular state 
policy intervention, other than manufacturing wide initiatives. In this way it was nurtured and 
developed within the prevailing protective lSI policy framework. In latter years it has 
benefited, to some extent, from initiatives designed to assist exporters1• This lack of a 
specific and targeted developmental policy appears to have stunted the development of this 
sector in comparison with Taiwanese and South Korean initiatives which have targeted such 
labour intensive sectors for expansion. Indeed the lSI mind-set appears to be deeply embedded 
in the attitudes of many managers. This has been compounded by the structure of production 
costs that has prevailed historically. 
Opportunities for much needed job creation exist in this sector. This chapter explores 
some of these and begins to identify policy areas which are dealt with more fully in the final 
chapter. The last chapter grapples with the difficult and complex changes to state policy 
necessary if the Plastic Products industry is to be energised into a flourishing and innovative 
industry. 
If manufacturing is to be the base of economic development for the future then 
1. ~ 1978 the V~ Huyssteen Committee's proposals were implemented with the adoption of a system of 
~IS~ce Categones (A-D) to exporters. This was replaced by the General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) 
m ApnI1990. 
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fabrication industries producing more elaborately manufactured articles are likely to be 
instrumental in such development. The vast range of products produced by the Plastic 
Products industry make it imperative that this industry be advanced and efficient. Appropriate 
measures designed to try and bring this about will have to based upon a thorough knowledge 
of historical development of this sector. 
At the same time this sector provides many basic wage goods, such as packaging and 
building materials. If in future it is intended that the primary beneficiaries of industrialisation 
are to be the most disadvantaged in society then such goods will have to become available at 
lower cost. This will require enhanced efficiency of production and the adjustment of other 
factors which have raised costs in the past. 
In this chapter the size of the Plastic Products industry (lSIC 356) is compared with 
a sample of other countries to assess its past performance and the possibilities for future 
growth. Historical manufacturing efficiency and productivity trends are established and a 
comparison of labour productivity is made with countries which export into South Africa. 
Various other aspects of the industry such as concentration, cooperation and manufacturing 
practice are explained and/or discussed with a view to assessing how vibrant the plastic 
products industry is and what potential it may have. Obstacles to exports that have developed 
over time and other factors which are leading some firms to increase exports are also 
identified as well as areas of potential export growth. 
The issues which emerge in this discussion are drawn together in the conclusion where 
determinants of future industrial policy for this industry are established. 
The field work and interviews referred to in this chapter are based upon interviews 
with representatives of a random sample of thirty firms in the plastic converting industry 
conducted in 1992. Details of this survey are given in Appendix F. In addition several leading 
figures in the industry were also interviewed. 
The South African Plastic Products Industry «SIC 356> Compared Intemationally 
The plastics converting industry has been characterised by far greater diversity of 
technologies and markets served than the polymer industry. It is also more labour intensive 
and more fragmented. Plastic products serve a wide variety of markets so growth tends to be 
constrained by GDP growth unless a lower cost structure allows substitution for traditional 
materials (metal, glass, cement, wood etc) or exports. The ISIC category which most closely 
approximates the plastic converting industry is Plastic Products (ISIC 356). It is used here 
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as a proxy for the plastic converting industry . 
. The Plastic Products industry's contribution to manufacturing value added is about 
2 %, similar in share size to second tier NICs and developed market economies (see 
Figure 32). The NICs stand out in this figure by their average contribution to MVA was over 
3.5% in the late 1980s. This suggests that the possibility exists, theoretically at least, for 
South Africa to almost double the size of its plastic products industry. In all three categories 
of countries, NICs, 2nd Tier NICs, and DMEs, Plastic Products' share of MVA rose over 
the 1975-89 period, as it did in South Africa. As Table 8.1 shows the average annual growth 
rates in plastic products value added in South Africa was inferior to the NICs and the 2nd tier 
NICs over 1975-80 period. Over the 1980-89 period South Africa's performance was worse 
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UNIDO, Global Reports, 1988/89, 1989/90, 1990/91, 1991/92, Statistical 
Annexes. 
Notes: The values used in the graph above are the averages of the countries 
listed under each heading: 
NICs. 2nd Tier NICs DMEs DMEs continued 
Argent~na Columbia Australia Japan 
Brazil Cyprus Austria Luxembourg 
Hong kong Indonesia Belgium Netherlands 
Kor~a Jordan Canada New Zealand 
Mex~co Malayasia Denmark Norway 
si~gapore Morocco Finland Portugal 
Ta~wan Peru France Spain 
Ph~lippines Germany Sweden 
Sr~ Lanka Greece Switzerland 
Thailand Iceland UK 
Tunisia Israel USA 
Uruguay Italy 
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Table 8.1 Annual Average Growth in Plastic Products aSIC 356) Value Added 
(percent p a ) .. 
1975-80 1980-89 
NICs 15.4 3.5 
Second Tier NICs 10.9 6.1 
DMEs 7.4 8.0 
South Africa 8.7 1.2 
Note: Value added an nomanaJ u:> ~ 
Source: UNIDO Global Reports, Statistical Annexes various years 
Ownership and concentration 
The South African plastic converting industry emerged as a significant sector of 
manufacturing during the period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s. Much of the skill 
necessary to develop the industry came from immigrant workers, mainly from Europe and 
Germany in particular in the 1950s (The Star, 24-10-91:25). Indeed these immigrants tended 
to dominate the industry and became such a tight knit group that they became known 
colloquially as the 'kunststoffen mafia' (polymer mafia). 
Control began to shift as the local chemical conglomerates began production of 
polymer locally. AECI entered the PVC market in 1955 and subsequently began to develop 
downstream interests in the converting industry. Rapid expansion of the PVC converting 
industry through the 1960s brought about two dominant groups, AECI (AE&CI as it was 
then) and Duropenta Industries. AE&CI absorbed a number of its smaller competitors and the 
recession in 1971 allowed it to take over its mai~ rival, Duropenta. It promptly shut down 
three Duropenta factories. 2 AE&CI's turnover rose by 200% and its market share from 25% 
to 41 %, of the remainder only 14% was met by local production, the balance was imported 
(Innes, 1984:211). This corporate strategy of absorbing the competition was continued in the 
1980s when AECI's plastic piping dominance was challenged. This led to a joint venture 
when the AECI subsidiary was joined with Paxit Pipekor to form a new company called DPI. 
The degree of concentration involved led to a Competition Board hearing which ultimately 
approved the deal in November 1987 (Business Day, 18-11-87:1). 
This process of sectoral concentration in certain sectors of the Plastic Products 
industry is similar to the type of concentration in the international pharmaceutical industry, 
where no one producer has a very large share of the total market but at the level of individual 
2. This pattern is typical of AECI corporate strategy and was repeated again in the paint industry in the 1980s. 
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product markets just a few companies typically control that market. 
If one takes into account AECI' s corporate strategies in the paint, plastic raw materials 
and other industries in which it operated, the evidence suggests that AECI drew heavily upon 
a classic static industrial organisation model where strategy is a quest for monopoly rents 
achieved either by locating in sectors where competition is weak or initiating changes to 
industry structure in order to reduce competitive pressures. 
Larger firms in the sample tended to operate in markets with a high degree of 
concentration (see Table 8.2) and to rely upon their market power or the financial 'muscle' 
of their parent companies to maintain their market dominance. The inability (or 
unwillingness) of larger firms to export during the 1980s meant that the only opportunity for 
expansion lay in the local market, a further imperative to increased concentration of 
ownership in key sectors. Market dominance and -the resultant diminution of expansion 
opportunities may well drive such firms to export as the possibilities of further domestic 
expansion are exhausted. Such a situation was outlined by one of the larger packaging firms 
interviewed. This suggests that there may be a relationship between concentration in the local 
market and the propensity to export. If so policy mak~rs face the difficult intersection 
between competition policy, export promotion policy and appropriate pricing in monopolised 
or oligopolised domestic markets. 
The largest single market for plastic is in packaging, which absorbs almost 50% of 
all polymer. Packaging is a multi-medium industry including paper, metal, glass and other 
materials. In 1990 plastic accounted for almost 14% of packaging by volume and 29% by 
value (BMI, 1991:vi). The companies which dominate the packaging industry are active in 
most materials. In 1991 three companies, Nampak, Kohler and Consol, accounted for 65% 
of packaging sales. Each one is ultimately controlled by a conglomerate; Barlow Rand owns 
Nampak, Gencor owns Kohler and Anglovaal is the ultimate shareholder of Consol. The 
largest packaging firm, Nampak, claims to be one of the largest packaging companies in the 
world and held 42% of the market, Kohler had 13% and Con sol had 10% (FM, Nampak. A 
corporate report, 4-9-92: 14). This concentration has been accompanied by anti-competitive 
practice. The Nampak executive has admitted to being part of an 'informal cartel' in the 
packaging industry until 1985 amid allegations of underhand methods used to keep a new 
entrant, Marathon Packaging out of the market (Sunday Tribune, 9-2-92). 
In plastic packaging the concentration is not as pronounced. In the larger, flexible 
market, the largest seven firms accounted for 46.7% of sales and 44.8% of plastic packaging 
volume. The leading three firms, Consoi, Kohler and Nampak were among the top six 
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Table 8.2 Market Share. Concentration and ownership 
+--------------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I I IProduct I I I 
\ I Product I Market I I I 
lco. Industry I Market I share , \ Firm\OWnership! 
I Ishare , Itop 4 ISizel I 
I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ I I IL I I I 1 \ PP woven I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 2 \white goods I I Ina IConglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I I I a Ina I I 3 I Import Agent I I I n I I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 4 lauckets I ? I ? Is I Indiv I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 5 IOesigner items I small I ? Is I Indiv I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 6 I Jobbing I? I? \ S I 2 I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 7 Icustom moulding I? I IS I Indiv I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 8 IEngineering products I 60-65 I 60-65 Is I Indiv/MNCI 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
I 9 IFabrication I I Is 124\ GERMAI 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
110 ILow cost sanitation I I Is \ 3 \ 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
III IAuto components \ 80 I 100 \S I 3 \ 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
112 IH/hold appliance partslsmall I ? IS I Family I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
113 I Various, auto, h/hold Ismall I ? . \S I 2 I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
114 I Packaging I? I ? I M I Conglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
115 IFlooring I 100 I 100 1M IUK MNC I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
116 IAuto components I 55 ITop2-90 1M I 3 I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
117 ICustom Packaging I large 1>85 1M IConglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
118 IPackaging I I 801M I Family I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
119 I Packaging, bottles I small I ? 1M I Family I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
120 IFlexible Hosing I 60 I 100 1M IConglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
121 IRigid sheet I Top2=801 1M \Conglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
122 \Packaging I ITop5=85 1M \ Family I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
123 I Packaging 11of2 big I I M I MNC I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
124 IPlastic Pipe systems I 46 I 100 1M Iconglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
125 IF/wear, PVC fabrics I I 100 IL I Family I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
126 I packaging, crates I 70 ITop2=1001L IConglom 1 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
127 Ipackaging IL I IL I 5 I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
128 IPackaging IdominatelTop2=85 IL IConglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 
129 IPackaging reel-reel I 75-80 I 90+ IL IConglom I 
+---+----------------------+--------+--------+----+---------+ 




(Ibid:45). In the smaller, rigid market, the top 6 firms accounted for 53.7% of sales and 
53.4 % of the volume. Nampak is the only one of the three largest packaging firms which was 
not among the top six rigid plastic packaging firms. 
In summary the largest market for polymer is not as concentrated as packaging in 
general nor as concentrated as certain other product area in the plastic converting industry. 
Indeed there are segments of the industry in which cut-throat competition is prevalent. 
The lower barriers to entry in injection moulding make this a convenient point of entry to the 
industry for newcomers. Whilst a process of concentration was taking place in some parts of 
the industry, fierce competition among many small firms was developing in parallel. The 
number of participants in the industry doubled from 507 in 1985 (Manufacturing Census, 
1985) to appr~ximately 1000 in 1992 (Spindler, 1992). 
The dichotomous emergence of highly concentrated markets along with extremely 
competitive markets coincided with declining productivity and suggests that there may be a 
correlation between these two trends. 
Productivity 
Evidence suggests that productivity in the converting industry may have been 
declining. Various sources were consulted and whilst there are differences between them they 
all display a similar trend, static or declining productivity. 
Output per employee has declined on average by 0.6% p.a. over the period 1972-90 
whilst that for all manufacturing has grown by 1 % p.a. (see Table 6.1). This trend is also 
evident in the National Productivity Institute (NPI) datal (NPI , 1989:49 & 63), although 
Murray (1991) of the NPI finds that labour productivity in 1989 was unchanged compared 
to 1970. The physical volume of production has increased faster than employment over the 
1977-89 period. However over the 1985-89 period this trend was reversed, resulting in the 
physical volume of production per employee falling at an average of 1.5 % p.a. (see Table 
4.30). Real wages also declined over the 1985-89 period at an average of 0.2% p.a. (IDC, 
1992). 
Since the plastics converting industry is a relatively labour intensive industry 
(compared to other sectors of the chemical industry), an attempt was made to generate a 
rough guide to South Africa's relative international competitiveness in labour productivity 
1. Note: the work of the NPI has been challenged from several quaners and should not be given great weight. 
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against a sample of countries over a number of years. The sample countries selected are the 
major sources of plastic products imports into South Africa. This may give some indication 
of how the local industry will cope with reduced tariffs under the GATT agreement arising 
from the Uruguay Round. 
Tab l e 8.3 SA Pl ast i c Pr odu c t s: Labour Productiv ity 
+----- ------------------------- ---------------------------+ 
I Phys vol Emp loy - I 
I Prodn ees I I (1) ( 2 ) (1) / ( 2 ) I 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ 
IAverag e g r owth pa (~) 1 977 - 89 4. 6 3.9 0 .7 I 
I ------------------------------+ 
IAverage g r owt h pa (%) 1 98 5- 8 9 0.4 1. 9 -1 . 5 I 
+--------------------- ------------------------------------+ 
Source s : (1) South African Stat i st ics 19 90 pp12 .56 & 12.58 
(2 ) IDC 1 992 
The methodology followed involved according ratios to sample countries relative to 
the USA and in this way gaining a relative index of competitiveness among the sample 
countries. Domestic output and total labour costs in domestic currencies were converted to 
US $. A three step process was employed as follows: 
Step 1: ($) Output (i) divided by 
No. of Wkrs (i) 
($) Output ( USA) 
No. of Wkrs (USA) 
= Relative output per worker (Table 4 . 31) 
Step 2: Wage Bill ($) (i) 
No. of Wkrs (i) 
divided by ($) Wage Bill ( USA) 
No. of Wkrs ( USA) 
= Relative wage per worker (Table 4.32) 
Step 3: Relative output per worker 
Relative wage per worker 
Where: 
= index of competitiveness (Table 4.33) 
(i) 
($)Output 
No . of Wkrs (i) 
i s the i th country 
is the gross national output of 
the Plastic Products Industry 
(ISIC 356) in current US $. 
is the number of workers employed 
in the Plastic Products Industry 
(ISIC 356) in country (i). 
Table 8.4 Manufacture of Plastic Products NES (ISIC 356) 
Index of Gross output per Employee, USA-1 
(Ranked by 1985 index order) 
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IMF International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1991 
Table 8.5 Manufacture of PlastlC ~[oducts NES (ISIC 356) 
Ind~! of ave[age Wages, USA = 1. 
(Ranked by 1985 index order) 
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
China 0.06 0.06 
Thailand 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.11 
Malaysia 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.12 
Korea, Republic of 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.19 0.29 
Hong Kong 0.20 0.27 0.23 
South Africa 0.27 0.28 0.50 0.25 0.35 
Singapore 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.30 
Austria 0.34 0.63 0.90 0.51 0.89 
Italy 0.32 0.55 0.80 0.52 1.13 
United Kingdom 0.41 0.53 0.S8 0.55 0.96 
Israel 0.33 0.39 0.77 0.56 0.58 
Belgium 0.39 0.77 1.06 0.56 
Germany, Federal Republic 0.53 0.88 1.22 0.66 1.24 
Netherlands 0.64 1.03 1.30 0.67 1.08 
Japan 0.30 0.58 0.80 0.68 1.08 
France 1.49 0.88 1.56 
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics 
Exchange rates from World Bank (STARS) and 
IMF International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1991 
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Table 8.6 Manufacture of Plastic Products NES (ISIC 356) . Index of Competitiveness, Relative Output/relat1ve Wage, 
USA 1 (Ranked by 1985 index order) 




0.75 0.82 0.87 France 
Germany, Federal Republic 1. 06 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.85 
South Africa 1.29 1.27 1.lS 0.96 1.07 
Austria 1.37 1.07 0.97 0.99 0 . 98 
United Kingdom 1. 04 0.90 0 . 92 0.99 0.98 
United States 1. 00 1. 00 1. 00 1.00 1. 00 
Hong Kong 0.94 1. 03 1.12 
Singapore 2.19 1.29 1. 58 1.15 
Netherlands 1.15 0 . 91 1. 04 1.22 1.21 
Israel 2.44 2.27 1.27 1. 34 2.27 
Belgium 1.67 1.35 1.28 1.34 
Japan 2.02 1.39 1. 53 1.43 1.29 
Malaysia 2.25 1.67 1.87 1. 53 
Italy 1. 53 1.22 1.18 1. 54 1.47 
Korea, Republic of 2.36 2.01 1. 90 2.01 1. 93 
Thailand 1. 53 0 . 84 1. 73 2.02 
China 12.20 5.85 
Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics 
Exchange rates from World Bank (STARS) and 
IMF International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1991 
Unfortunately data for Taiwan and Switzerland were not available. Data for certain 
other countries for certain years were also not available. It may be observed in Table 8.4 that 
between 1970 and 1990 South Africa's gross output per employee ranked consistently in the 
lower third of the sample. In Table 8.5 it may be observed that ranked by average wage, 
South Africa performed similarly to the previous table, that is at the head of the lower third 
of countries in the sample. In short these results suggest that South Africa has had relatively 
low output per employee and relatively low wages. When these factors are combined in Table 
8.6 in an index of competitiveness, it may be o~served that South Africa is in a roughly 
similar position, at the head of the lower third of countries in the sample with the exception 
of 1980 when it does best, moving about half way up the rankings and in 1985 when it does 
worst moving to third lowest in the rankings. What this result suggests is that South Africa's 
low wages may still give it a small advantage over high wage countries like France and 
Germany, but that it may have been less competitive than China and developing countries in 
the sample. 
As pointed out above these results are more a rough guide than a definitive 
calculation. This is because the results are distorted by variations in exchange rates between 
the currencies of individual countries relative to the US $. An improved methodology, as used 
by Capdevielle et al (1982) for example, would employ trade weighted exchange rates. 
Unfortunately the IMF and OEeD indexes of key cost and price measures upon which they 
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base their investigation are only available for selected developed countries and similar 
calculations for South Africa do not appear to have 'been performed. Ideally comparisons of 
the type shown above should standardise the capital and labour components of productivity 
but this is a major task; the Szirmai & Pilat (1990) study for example required a set of 
calculations extending to some 200 pages. 
Capital productivity is also problematic and declining although the Plastic Products 
industry made better use of capital than manufacturing on average. Again a range of sources 
reveal a similar trend. The output/capital stock ratio (the value of output per unit of capital 
stock) is about 5.2: lover 1985-90, more than two and a half times that for all manufacturing. 
However this superior performance has been in decline. NPI data show that capital 
productivity in plastic products has declined at an average of 1.3% p.a. over the period 1970-
88, albeit slower than the rate of decline for all manufacturing (-2.8 % p.a.) (NPI, 1989:49 
& 63). IDC (1992) data for 1972-90 reveals a decline by .09% p.a., again slower than 
manufacturing'S decline of 2.1 % p.a .. Whilst manufacturing'S output/capital stock ratio has 
improved by an average of 2 % p.a. over 1985-90, that for plastic products has continued to 
decline at an average of 0.3 % p.a .. Although there are differences in the statistics they all 
point in the same direction, that of declining capital productivity. 
Further evidence of this is available from price and output data. Domestic polymer 
prices have been rising slower than the inflation rate since the mid 1980s as a result of lower 
international oil prices (see Figure 33). Yet plastic products and end-user prices have risen 
faster than inflation. Table 4.30 shows that the price indices for plastic bottles and bulk 
plastic products have risen faster than the inflation rate. These diverging price trends suggest 
a declin~ in efficiency in the converting industry which Brand attributes to a combination of 
old or inefficient machinery or idle machine time (Interview, Brand). Some support was 
found for this view in interviews where one manager summarised the position with the remark 
'we are the world's best maintainers of old machinery'. Table 4.31 summarises responses in 
the sample of interviews and reveals a considerable proportion of the machinery to be about 
10 years old. 
The phenomenon of an ageing capital stock is also confirmed by the President of the 
Plastics Federation of South Africa, Curtis, who has said that "the average age of our 
converting capacity is way behind that of overseas tI (Quoted in Engineering News, 5-2-
93:30). 
Figure 33 
SA POL Yt.€R PRICES VRS CPt 











10~980 1982 tiS. tl81S '9S8 t990 1992 
'9S1 1983 1985 19S7 1989 1991 
1--'" 
Source: Plastomark 
Note: 4 Polymer average is the average of LDPE, HOPE, PVC & PP. 
Table 8.7 Price Indices. Selected Materials 
(1990-100) 
+------------------------------------------------------+ Increase I 
, 1972 1990 % p.a. I  
+------------------------------------------------------+ IPlastic in bulk forms 8.8 100.0 14.5 I 
IPlastic Bottles 4.4 100.0 18.9 I 
ICPI 10.4 100.0 13.4 I 
+------------------------------------------------------+ I 1985 1990 I 
+------------------------------------------------------+ IPlastic in bulk forms 41.0 100.0 19.5 I 
IPlastic Bottles 35.6 100.0 22.9 I 
ICPI 49.1 100.0 15.3 I 
+------------------------------------------------------+ 
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Note: Plastic in bulk forms includes monofill type 
packaging but excludes tapes and yarns. 
Source: Statistical News Release P0142.4 (24-3-92), CSS, 
Pretoria, Table 2.2, pp60. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (1990: 19) however reports that generally world 
class technology is used. Examples do exist such as Mega Plastic's beer crate making 
operation which they claim is the fastest in the world. It certainly has new equipment. 
Consol's injection moulding factory in Durban producing rigid packaging has also been fully 
automated (The Daily News, 27-2-87). 
However the Department's finding may have been influenced by the nature of the 
plastic industry representatives who sat on the Working Group. They were from the larger 
companies. The interviews conducted revealed pockets of world class technology but it was 
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Table 8.8 Age of Plastics converting Machinery 
+ + -------------------------+ +-------------------------- ---- --------I I I 
I I I I I I I I 
I I I I ! Co. Industry I Finn I Machinery Age , I 
I I +---------------------------------+ I I 0 10 I I I Size I < 3yrs 3-6 yrs 6-1 yrs > yrs I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ I I I I I I I 1 IPP woven IL I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ I I I I I I I 2 IWhite goods Ina I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ I I I I I I I 3 IImport Agent Ina I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ I I I I I I I 4 IBuckets IS I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
I 5 ICesigner items IS I I 33 I I 66 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
I 6 IJobbing Is I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
I 7 ICustom moulding Is I I I 78 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
I 8 IEngineering products Is I I ' 100 I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
I 9 IFabrication Is I 70 I 30 I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
110 ILow cost sanitation Is I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
III IAuto components Is I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
112 IH/hold appliance partslS I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
113 IVarious, auto, h/hold Is I I 45 I 45 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
114 IPackaging 1M I I 11 I 11 I 78 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
115 IFlooring 1M I I I 50 I 50 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
116 IAuto components 1M I 50 I 20 I 30 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
117 ICustom Packaging 1M I I I 10 I 90 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
118 IPackaging 1M I 18 I 18 I I 64 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
119 I Packaging, 1M I 10 I 50 I 40 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
120 IFlexible Hosing 1M I 10 I 15 I 30 I 45 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 121 lRigid sheet 1M I 20 I 40 I 40 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
122 IPackaging 1M I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
123 IPackaging 1M I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
124 IPlastic Pipe systems 1M I 15 I 80 I 5 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
125 I Footwear, IL I 20 I 40 I I 40 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 126 I Packaging, IL I 47 I I I 53 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
127 Ipackaging IL I I 15 I I 85 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
128 IPackaging IL I 15 I 60 I 15 I 10 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
129 IPackaging IL I 10 I 20 I 10 I 60 I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ 
130 ICable IL I I I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+------+--------+---------+-------+ Sample Average 26 38 30 58 
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neither uniform nor widespread. 
. Other evidence from interviews suggests that those firms planning to export are 
reinvesting to upgrade machinery and in the process jobs are being shed: This appears to be 
one of the unfortunate and, if left to employers alone, unavoidable consequences of increased 
international competitiveness. 
The increased number of small firms which have entered the industry also has 
implications for productivity. Typically small firms enter the industry with second hand 
equipment, lack R&D resources, capital and other requirements for efficient firms. On the 
other hand such entrants to the industry are providing employment which is desirable. An 
industrial strategy will need to straddle both of these aspects. 
Productivity in the converting industry is, all other things being equal, a function of 
machine cycle times. Newer machines generally have faster cycle times than older machines. 
Being internationally competitive then requires keeping up to date with developments in 
machinery and regular purchases of new equipment. To some extent local adaptations of 
machinery can overcome the disadvantage of older machinery. In blow moulding for example 
some 50% to 70% of the total machine cycle time is accounted for by cooling. If cooling can 
be speeded up, the cycle time is shortened and productivity improves. A minority of the firms 
interviewed had attempted to equip their machines with additional cooling devices, so there 
would appear to be considerable potential for this option short of acquiring new machinery. 
Considerable under-utilization of capacity also exists. Interviews provided two insights 
into the reason for this. Because the exchange rate has been declining the cost of imported 
machinery has been rising. Th~s some firms seek competitive advantage by not running their 
machines to full capacity and 'husbanding' them so that capital outlays will be required less 
frequently. The other source of capacity under utilization is time lost to rework, set-up, 
change over time and stoppages of work for technical reasons. Most of the firms interviewed 
did not work over weekends, sometimes for reasons of trade union resistance to this practice. 
It is difficult to draw generalisations from the interviews conducted because such a 
wide range of technologies and firm size were covered. However many interviewees stated 
that their defect and scrap rates were higher than would be the case in Europe. Many of the 
firms interviewed did not seem to see the importance of these issues to productivity. The few 
that did were also active in speeding up cooling times, speeding up change over times etc. 
and also gave the impression of being the most dynamic firms. It is difficult to determine 
what made some firms appear more dynamic than others. The impression gained from 
interviews was that the quality of the management and their understanding of new or 'world 
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class' manufacturing techniques was an important factor. In addition one firm stated that the 
basis of their competitive advantage was their access to tool making skills (in this case all 
Germans and Englishmen) , the fact that they employed a German technical person and that 
they monitored machinery developments continuously. 
The evidence presented above suggests that the age of ~achinery is handicapping 
productivity but that opportunities also exist to improve productivity without large scale 
reinvestment. 
Scrap rates and defect rates have not only impacted on capital productivity , but they 
are fundamental to the industry's cost structure. Murray (1991) found that 54% of all costs 
were concentrated in the raw materials. This accords with responses gained during interviews, 
although of course there is considerable variation depending upon the process employed. 
Scrap is in some instances unavoidable for example. when holes are punched but in many 
cases it arises from edge trim and flash , or colour variations and incorrect set-ups. Nearly 
all are related in some way to quality assurance and can be reduced by focusing on the root 
causes , again without considerable outlays of foreign exchange or capital. 
To approach productivity issues in this way will not avoid investment entirely. 
Investment in training is unavoidable if productivity and quality issues are to be addressed. 
If strategic unionism emerges in the industry this is likely to be the path it would follow as 
it leads to skill gains for workers. It is also likely to sustain employment levels in the short 
term in that it will limit the introduction of new, labour shedding, machinery and equipment. 
Employers on the other hand are more likely to opt for recapitalisation, automation 
and labour shedding strategies in the belief that this will give them greater control over 
production and higher efficiency. Such strategies will also require some training of key 
personnel. Between these two diverging paths there are of course numerous opportunities for 
compromise between employers and organised labour. 
The review, in this section, of productivity in the Plastics converting industry is 
suggestive of declining productivity. However before a firm statement could be made about 
total factor productivity a more detailed analysis is required than has been possible here. Such 
an investigation could usefully probe the existence and nature of a relationship with declining 
capacity utilization and whether or not any causal relationships exist between the market 
structure and productivity. 
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Export Competitiveness : Obstacles and Opportunities 
The Plastic Products industry has since the 1970s been a very weak exporter. The 
obstacles to successful exporting which have emerged are discussed in this section. Those 
identified by interviewees are summarised in Table 4.30. A major obstacle is the domestic 
price of polymer which makes up about half of the costs of production. Polymer prices have 
been discussed in an earlier chapter. 
I 
Table 8.9 SA Converting Industry Export Competitiveness 
Input I Advantage I Disadvantage I 
Capital goods *Good at maintaining old machines * All imported at world prices + freight 
*Duty and surcharge payable 
Tooling *SA tool steel: inferior quality 
*Size limit 650x650x650 mm, so big tools 
imported 
*Local market cannot justify big tooling 
investment 
*Local steel prices are import parity 
Polymer *Standard grades reasonably good *High prices approx. 20·30% above NWE 
quality prices 
*Some local PP inferior 
S1cills *Toolmalcer wages only 20%·30% *Number of highly skilled toolmalcers limited 
of German rates in $ terms *General shortage, have to import 
Technology * At the leading edge in certain *Technology agreements limit exports to 
products eg PVC hose, check-out Southern Africa 
bags and crates 
Utilities *Cost of land, buildings, *Transport costs to the coast 
infrastructure 
Macro economics *High inflation rate 
Trade regimes *Sanctions in some countries 
*Tariff barriers in Africa 
Local Market *Coproduct diversity & combining *Too small to provide a base for exports 
technologies *Possible 'package' of (small runs) 
services from co-operating 
competitors 
Scale *Smaller producers lack skill & resources to 
export 
Source: Interviews. 
It was to be expected that exporting firms would make use of GElS, given the fact that 
many of the products exported from the plastic converting industry would qualify for the 
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highest GElS incentives. This was the case in so far as the larger exporting firms are 
concerned, indeed it was critical to their export successes in Europe and the US. However 
some small firms which were exporting, albeit limited volumes, were either unaware of GElS 
or chose to avoid the paperwork and payment delays associated with GElS. 
Capital goods 
All the firms in the sample used imported machinery, for the most part of West 
European, Japanese or Taiwanese origin as South Africa has only a very limited machine 
tools industry. Importing machinery puts South African producers at a disadvantage because 
although they pay the same price as machinery importers in other countries, local firms must 
add freight charges , customs duty and surcharge which means that by the time machinery is 
installed in a South African factory it is at a higher cost than international competitors. In 
addition the declining value of the Rand is an important contributory factor leading to the 
ageing of capital stock. These factors have contributed to placing South African converters 
at an increasing disadvantage relative to those economies which have developed machine tools 
sectors. 
Many of those interviewed were distrustful of the domestic machine tools industry. 
However one firm interviewed had begun to build its own blow moulding machines which 
they regarded as on a par with German machines in so far as quality was concerned. The 
local industry periodical , PSA, also records a firm , Elvinco, as producing its own blow 
moulding machines. It describes them as "solid but simple, being intended largely for the 
African/Third World type market where machine minders are not overly skilled." (PSA, 
October, 1991: 14) Both this company and the one interviewed intended to consider exports 
once they had met their own needs. 
Tooling is a critical component in this industry particularly so for injection moulding 
where the mould is the focal point of design and skill. Some respondents found locally 
produced tool steel to be of inferior quality. For very large moulds the maximum local 
650mm cube size steel is inadequate, necessitating imports. 
Although computer aided design (CAD) has had a large impact on tool design it is not 
so easily translated into a machined steel mould. Consequently there remains a significant gap 
in the tool making production chain for skilled labour at the stage of mould making. This 
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could be exploited by relatively cheap (in US $ terms) South African labourl. One converter 
is doing so and exporting moulds to Nigeria with NWE as a future target. However the extent 
of such developments are likely to hinge around South Africa's ability to address skill 
formation issues, which are considered in the next section. 
There is also a growing international market in rented tools which could be penetrated. 
Historically the crucial mould making skills have been provided by European 
immigrant workers and indeed this is still the case to a considerable extent. However with 
the declining exchange rate over the last 10 to 15 years many have returned to Europe whilst 
others have reached retirement age (The Star, 24.-10-91 :25). This shrinking skill base 
including a Shortage of skilled tool and die cutters was identified by all but two respondents 
(see Table 4.31). It is also the reason why several of the larger firms interviewed source their 
tools overseas. It may also be that the large number of small firms in the industry lack the 
resources to take on apprentices, leaving the larger firms and the state to carry the burden, 
a less than satisfactory situation as it turns out. One Johannesburg respondent volunteered that 
recent advertisements for apprentice tool makers had not elicited a single response! He was 
also frustrated by the fact that although some of his black workers were 'very good' they 
were illiterate and he knew of no institution to develop their skills. Another firm has 
responded to this lack of training facilities by sending people overseas for training. Clearly 
this sector is just one more that has been hampered by apartheid's absurd education policies. 
The location of skills may also help to · explain South Africa's historically poor 
performance in exports of plastic products. Some officials of the Plastics Federation of SA 
point out that much of the manufacturing and design skill base in the industry resides in the 
small firms which lack resources and incentives to export. In contrast, the Federation officials 
believe, the larger firms which have the resources to compete internationally lack this skill 
base. Some interviews in the sample confirmed this view. 
Recently published World Competitiveness Reports have found that South Africa had 
no particular advantages in any area of competitiveness. In fact it found that South Africa's 
weak human and skill resources were the biggest detractors from its competitiveness. Many 
respondents stated that poorly skilled blacks inhibited productivity. One firm pointed out that 
1. This appears to be largely a function of the Rand 's declining value against other major currencies. 
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O Plast ic Converting Industry, Skills and Training Table 8.1 _ 
+-- - --- - --- - ---- - --- - - - -- - - +- -- -+ - --- - - - - --- +-- -- --- - -~- --~----~ 
I I I Shortage 1\ IAttltudel I I I I I 
I I lof tool I I to .. I I Co . Industry I Firm l making I Tools I tralnlng I, 
I I Size I skills? I made Ilevy I 
~ - --+----------- - -- - - -- - - - - +- - - - +- - - - - - -- - --+--- ~ ---- - ~- - - -- - - -+ 
I 1 I PP woven I L I I I unaware 
I 2 IWhite goods Ina Iyes , LOCallY Ina 
3 I Import Agent Ina IYes na Ina 
I S I? I? I ? 4 Buckets I . I · I . 
5 Designer items IS IYes Locally 10K 
6 Jobbing I S I unaware 
7 Custom moulding IS IYes ILocally I unaware 
8 I Engineering products IS INO IIH I unhappy 
9 IFabrication li S Ino Ilocally I 
10 ILOW cost sanitation IS I I good 
11 IAuto components S II Yes I IH I opposed 
112 IH/hold appliance parts S Yes IH OK 
1
1
13 Ivarious, auto, h/hold S IYes Locally OK? 
14 l Packaging M IYes HQ 
15 I Flooring I M I good 
16 I Auto components I M lYe,s IH ? 
17 'I Custom Packaging 1M Iyes HQ (JHB ) OK 
18 IPackaging 1M I opposed 
19 Packaging, 1M IYes + IH unaware 
20 Flexible Hosing 1M IYes IH IOK+ 
21 Rigid sheet 1M IYes lo/seas l, ooKK 
22 Packaging 1M Yes I Locally 
23 IPackaging 1M Some O/seas I 
24 IPlastic Pipe systems 1M Yes (1) I IH IOK+ 
25 IF/wear, pvc coated fab ll l I Ina 
26 I Packaging, crates L Yes IIH+O/seas IOK+ 
27 packaging \ L I I 
28 IPackaging \L yes I ? I ? 
129 I Packaging reel-reel IL IYes Ilo/seas IOK+ 
130 ICable IL IYes (2) IH Ina 









( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 




Respondent unaware of Plastic I ndustry 
Tra i ning Board l evy. 
Respondent more than satisfied with 
introduction of Plastic Industry Training 
Board l evy. 
Technologi sts spec i fically 
Supply of tool makers in Pietermaritzburg and 
Port Elizabeth sat i sfactory 
new machinery imported from Europe had to be downgraded or made less sophisticated so 
that its operators could operate it. 
The decision by the newly established Plastic Industry Training Board (PITB) to 
impose a 0.75% levy upon all employers' wage bills in the industry from 1992 signals the 
fact that organised employers have finally come to appreciate the urgency and seriousness 
of the problem in this sector. The need for an industry wide levy was reasonably well 
accepted by most of the firms in the sample (see Table 8.10) and is an important step 
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forward for the industry. However judging by opinions aired by several respondents, the 
Federation did not adequately inform and clarify the issue with all of its members. Many 
of the concerns raised could have been satisfied by a clear explanation. 
Some of the concerns expressed arose out of the manner in which training developed 
in the industry. In the absence of any larger training or skills enhancing scheme larger 
companies set up and developed their own training schemes at their own expense. They are 
reluctant to see these replaced by industry schemes, partly because they believe they are 
better trainers than the PITB. On the other hand small firms have tended to do very little 
training and in effect their training costs have been subsidised by the larger companies, who 
would now like the burden to be equitably shared. Small firm resistance is not only focused 
on the costs of the levy but also underpinned by the, not unrealistic, fear that they will be 
unable to fully utilise the PITB scheme and that they will now be subsidising the larger firms. 
The advent of the PITB is an encouraging and important initiative in the industry but, 
unfortunately, it has been tarnished by the failure of the employer organisation to involve 
those whom they expect to educate. Organised labour was not consulted at all about the 
establishment of the Training Board. This is not surprising as many respondents were hostile 
to and condemnatory of trade unions. 
There is already a reluctance by the government to register training boards which do 
not include representatives of organised labour and this should be a requirement for all 
training boards. Once represented on the PITB organised labour might give careful 
consideration to proposing that all employees in the industry make small contributions. My 
experience in the industry suggests that those who pay are more likely to demand that they 
get their money's worth. 
Despite these shortcomings the establishment of the Training Board is a step forward 
and provides a basis upon which to build skills in the industry if its shortcomings can be 
corrected. 
In its early years it appears that the PITB will concentrate upon production skills 
which are designed to improve manufacturing practice and efficiencies. However there are 
two other crucial skill areas which also need to be addressed; artisan training and industrial 
design training. 
The majority of respondents interviewed regarded locally trained artisans engaged in 
tool and die manufacture as inferior to West European artisans, although a minority claimed 
that some were as good as their European counterparts. The historical shortage of artisans 
created by the racial barriers to entry for blacks obviously needs to be corrected. However 
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the lack of lifelong training for artisans also needs to be corrected. The increasing entry of 
blacks into the artisan market may help to galvanise the predominantly white (and often 
bigoted) artisans to advance their skills. Indeed this appears to be contemplated by NUMSA 
in its recent grading proposals to the Metal Industrial Council in which it demands two 
additional artisan grades above artisan level. This pragmatic approach does have the 
disadvantage of perpetuating the racial pecking order in the skills hierarchy, at least in the 
short to medium term. 
Industrial design skills also appear to be in short supply in general and in particular 
to small firms who lack the resources to make use of the scarce supply that has existed. At 
a broad level increasing the supply of industrial design skills appears to be an important 
requirement n~cessary to energise the plastic converting industry. The mechanism of delivery 
of such skills to small firms is more complex and requires more detailed research. 
Nevertheless 'some tentative suggestions are made in the final chapter. 
In summary skill formation must rank high on the list of prerequisites for the creation 
of a dynamic and innovative plastic converting industry with particular attention to be paid 
to small firms. 
The role of the domestic market 
Most producers in the industry aim to serve only the local market. The domestic 
market holds both limitations and opportunities. A limitation imposed by the domestic market 
is that batch sizes are generally smaller than those undertaken by international competitors. 
Larger markets justify larger batches and investment in technology designed to reduce set-up 
and changeover times. In addition producers in DMEs have tended to segment their markets 
to a greater extent and are thus able to concentrate on fewer products, further reducing the 
time spent on set-up, changeover and inventories. Nevertheless large production runs are not 
a panacea for international competitiveness. One respondent claimed to have 'Rolls Royce ' 
quality machinery and production runs of internationally comparable length, and yet was still 
unable to match Taiwanese producers despite their shorter runs and poorer quality machinery. 
Local producers with a wider range of products do have some advantages. They can 
offer a better 'package' deal. One large firm interviewed has used this to advantage in 
cooperation with other firms and was optimistic about more similar deals. In one extreme 
case a firm 's limited scale of operation was the basis of competitive advantage; a vacuum 
forming process is used , involving tooling costs of only R25 000 whereas larger volume 
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business would require injection moulding technology with tooling costs of R800 000. This 
respondent has been a successful exporter into US markets for several years. However this 
advantage appears restricted to small niche markets. 
Several respondents reported that the local market was too small to justify investments 
of world scale capacity, and that consequently they did not envisage the possibility of exports . 
Indeed exports were not considered at the time the investments were made. However one firm 
encountered was in the process of making a large investment with output destined for export 
but using imported (tariff free) polymer. 
Managers' attitudes have been influenced by the inward looking industrial policies and 
political isolation of apartheid and it is to be expected that this has influenced their attitude 
to exporting. Almost all respondents appeared to assume that significant sales in the domestic 
market would be a prerequisite for any export effort. There appeared to be no thought of 
making exports the major part of the business, which is perhaps understandable given 
historical polymer prices in South Africa and the anti export bias of the trade regime. 
Lack of Cooperation 
Lack of economies of scale can be compensated for to some extent by institutionally 
induced changes to market structure. In certain cases dynamic comparative advantage is 
associated with large firms in, for example, South Korea and northern Germany. On the other 
hand it has been demonstrated in Taiwan and mid-Italy that industrial dynamism is also 
possible by small and medium enterprises. The Italian performance is frequently held up as 
an example; it has been one of the largest net exporters of clothing, footwear and furniture 
even though during the mid-1980s average firm sizes in these industries were just 5.3 , 17 and 
5.7 employees respectively. 
Analysts of these phenomena have suggested that it is the type of firm and the 
relations between them which are more important than mere size. In particular cooperation 
among small firms in such areas as marketing, purchasing and design has demonstrated that 
it is possible to achieve efficiencies in these areas without the infrastructure typical of the 
large-scale hierarchical firm. 
Unfortunately cooperation in the South African industry has been hampered by a 
number of factors. Small firms are very wary of cooperation amongst themselves as theft of 
intellectual property is an ever present danger. They are also wary of the bigger polymer 
manufacturers upon whom they depend for credit and prompt delivery. This suspicion extends 
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to the Plastics Federation as it tends to be controlled by the larger converters and polymer 
producers. But underlying these factors is the intense competition among smaller producers 
and the relatively low levels of profit attainable at this link in the production chain as a result 
of the historically uneven distribution of profits along the production chain. 
On the other hand , Curtis , the President of the Plastics Federation of SA, has implied 
that a lack of cooperation among firms is not a problem, even in that most difficult of areas, 
between large firms and small firms: 
"Converters and raw material suppliers are co-operating and certain converters are 
also getting together to mount export campaigns." (quoted in Engineering News , 5-2-
93:30) 
Only limited evidence of cooperation was encountered among the firms interviewed. Indeed 
some reported just the opposite. For example certain export orders have been so large that 
they have been beyond the capacity of anyone firm. However because firms could not 
cooperate to meet such orders they were lost. 
Low entry barriers. competition and profits 
Lower entry barriers in some sections of the industry such as injection moulding exist 
by virtue of the durability and price of second hand machinery. This ease of entry is both an 
advantage and a disadvantage. It is advantageous in that persons with artisan qualifications 
who have worked in the industry find it comparatively easy to branch out on their own. The 
fact that historically the vast majority of such cases were whites should not, but may well , 
detract from the possibilities that would exist for historically disadvantaged groups if training 
in the industry became more colour blind. Some evidence was encountered to suggest that 
younger persons branching out into business on their own, after some service in the industry , 
benefitted from a mentor in some form. Given that much of the experience in the industry 
is in white hands, racism may limit prospects for blacks attempting to follow this path. 
The maintenance of old machinery and the introduction of imported second hand 
machinery appears to have resulted in an ever increasing supply of machinery and increasing 
competition for limited markets. To survive in markets with this type of 'cut throat' 
competition some firms disregard factory regulations so as to undercut those that comply. For 
example one small firm only employs casual labour for up to the three day limit set out in 
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the Metal and Engineering Industrial Council Agreement so as to avoid having to take 
workers on as full time employees thus saving on the tax and other levies which are 
applicable. Such conditions make for precarious profitability in markets where this occurs. 
The missing dimensions which prevent such sectors playing an energising role in 
economic development are at least twofold. Firstly a policy environment which encouraged 
an export orientation could reduce the level of competition for the domestic market and even 
foster cooperation between small firms. Secondly certain constraints among many small firms 
(design and technical skills) limit their innovative capacity and ability to generate new 
products and markets, leaving them to contest existing markets. 
Manufacturing practice 
Some indication of the sample's proximity to 'world class manufacturing' may be 
gleaned from the fact that only one firm placed emphasis on accounting practices emphasising 
efficiency2. Similarly only seven firms in the sample claimed to practice JIT (see 
Table 4.32). It was not possible to verify these claims but other indicators suggested that not 
all of them were entirely valid. Some firms would like to practice JIT to keep down their raw 
material inventories but complained that polymer was not available on a daily delivery basis. 
In so far as quality standards and systems are concerned the sample suggests that these 
tend to be more common among the larger firms. Surprisingly four of the firms were using 
the ISO 9000 system and three of these were exporting, suggesting some coincidence i'n the 
occurrence of these two indicators. 
Inventories in general appeared large, but there were all sorts of explanations for 
them. Some Durban plants were dependent on consignments of raw material from the 
Transvaal of a certain size which pushed up raw material stocks. Large finished stocks were 
associated with exporters and those who used rapid response to orders (from stocks) as a 
marketing tool. In other cases powerful customers made the retention of a certain level of 
finished stocks conditional upon granting the order. 
Respondents were asked to estimate how far their operations were from the 'world 
leading edge' in a general question encompassing technology and practice. Very few 
respondents were able to claim that they were at the leading edge. Most estimated that they 
were about 10 years behind. Some of the local products which appear to be more 
2. See Bessant (1990) in this regard. 
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Table 8.11 Exports and Manufacturing Practice 
+--------------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
I I I 1\ I 
I IDirect I 
Ico. Industry FirmlExports ~ Quality IJIT I 
I Size of sales Standard I I 
I +---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
, 1 Ipp woven IL' IIS09000 Iyes I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
, 2 IWhite goods Ina I I I' 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
, 3 I Import Agent Ina , I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
I 4 'Buckets Is I nil I 'no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
I 5 IDesigner items Is I nil I I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
, 6 I Jobbing I S I I NO I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
I 7 I Custom moulding Is' nil' I no , 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
I 8 I Engineering products Is' <3 I I no I 
+---+-------------- --------+----+--- --------+--------+-----+ 
I 9 'Fabrication Is Iv SMALL ' , Ino I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
110 'Low cost sanitation Is INIL lown Ino I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
III IAuto components Is I I Own I yes I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
112 IH/hold appliance partslS I I I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
113 ' Various, auto, h/hold I S I nil I ' I no I 
+-- -+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
114 IPackaging 1M INIL ISABS01571no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
115 I Flooring I M I NIL I own I yes I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
116 IAuto components 1M I nil I I yes I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
117 ICustom Packaging 1M Inil I own Isome I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
118 IPackaging 1M 110-15 lown Ino I 
+---+-------------- --------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
119 I Packaging, bottles 1M I nil I I I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
120. I Flexible Hosing 1M I 5 I I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
121 IRigid sheet 1M I <5 I I no I 
+---+------------------ ---- +----+- ---- ------+--------+-----+ 
122 IPackaging 1M I nil I Iyes? I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+----- -- -+-----+ 
123 I Packaging \ M I <2 I IS09000 I I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
124 IPlastic Pipe systems 1M I 13 \IS09000 I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-- ---------+--------+-----+ 
125 I Footwear, IL 17- 8 IIS09000 Iyes I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
126 I Packaging, IL I nil I I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
127 Ipackaging IL I 10-12 Ina Iyes I 
+---+--------------------- -+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
128 IPackaging IL I substantial I own I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+--------+-----+ 
129 IPackaging IL I 10 I I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+--------- --+--------+-----+ 
130 I Cable I L I <3 I I no I 
+---+----------------------+----+-----------+------ -- +---- -+ 
Source: Interviews. 
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internationally competitive (although not necessarily manufactured by world best practice 
plants) include retail check-out bags. This is partially attributed to their invention in South 
Africa some years ago. The character of domestic demand appears to have played a role in 
expanding this market; a large proportion of local shoppers use public transport and require 
robust packaging to carry their groceries. In response special gr~des of HDPE have been 
developed locally. Substantial exports are made and if polymer were available at 
internationally cO".lpetitive prices at least one firm would attempt to become a 'world player' 
in the retail check-out bag market. 
Packaging is the largest single user of plastic. Innovation in packaging across the 
world has been driven by the changes in the gender composition of workforces and locally 
by the great need of the large supermarket chains to merchandise. Kohler Chairman Ian 
Will is has made some bold claims about the quality of the local packaging industry; 
"We are better, by a long way, than the United States." (FM, Packaging Special 
Report, 21-8-92:61). 
Van Leer, a global packaging group, claims that it is "At the leading edge of technology .. " 
(Van Leer brochure, undated) 
Despite these claims Kohler's Willis detects a 'slight weakness ' in South Africa's 
packaging industry, particularly in the manufacturing processes: 
"There are three sources of creativity - the design house, the ad agency and the 
packaging company itself. The tendency is for these to be in descending order of 
creativity, but in ascending order of practicality." (Ibid) 
One of the constraints inhibiting the advance of packaging, is the unsophisticated 
material handling processes used by packaging customers. This for example has required 
heavier gauge bottles than would be the case in NWE. As a consequence 'downgauging ' 
(producing the same item with less polymer but with the same strength) innovations have been 
hampered. . 
In ad~ition to those leading edge technologies mentioned above the relatively high 
proportion of PP used in bulk material packaging suggests South Africa may have potential 
in this area. Good quality plastic pressure pipe is also made in South Africa. Domestic 
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swimming pool cleaning equipment is one of the industry's bright stars in recent years with 
exports to many countries. 
Technolo~y Learnin~ and Innovation 
According to Amsden (1989) in order to compete, late industrialisers are dependent 
on the assimilation and adaptation of imported technology, in other words on learnin~. 
Attempts were made during interviews to determine whether this process was taking place or 
indeed whether genuine new technologies and products were being developed. One large firm 
interviewed had developed and patented several new products in South Africa. They had not 
gone further to try and market or licence these products because of the cost and difficulty of 
enforcing patents. 
Historically South Africa has produced a number of innovative world beating products, 
for example, plastic retail check out bags and the polystyrene trays inside boxes of fruit. One 
small firm interviewed claimed to be at the leading edge of low cost township sanitation 
systems. This firm spent a higher proportion of sales on R:&D than any other interviewed. 
It had entered into a joint venture with the CSIR and was jointly developing technology with 
their help. Unlike most other firms this firm was licensing its technology outwards to other 
countries. Other local success stories are swimming pool cleaning equipment and Richard 
Bibins' patented wall hairdryer and shaver units (PSA, September, 1992:37). 
Mono Containers, a Nampak subsidiary, is considering exporting its locally developed 
(foam) cup-making technology to Europe with a view to serving the European market from 
Europe (FM, Nampak, A corporate report, 4-9-92:54). Nampak operates one of the largest 
and most diverse packaging research units in the Southern Hemisphere. It employs 44 staff 
including 22 graduates and 6 diploma graduates and has links with a major international 
packaging research centre run by Carnaud Metalbox in the UK (lbid:64). Plastic Concepts, 
a small firm employing 10 people, has produced 100 new products between its start up in 
1986 and 1991 (The Star, 24-10-91:25). There is thus evidence of some capacity to innovate 
and develop new products and technologies. 
Several firms, particularly those involved in producing more technologically advanced 
products, were licensees of foreign technology. But for most small and medium sized firms 
which generally lacked any formal R&D capacity, this took place informally through the 
activities of the leading persons in the firm. Their learning activities typically included 
reading the trade journals, attending seminars and most importantly making overseas visits 
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to developed economies, usually in NWE and the US. Such visits regularly included attending 
trade s·hows and exhibitions and other attempts to keep abreast of the latest developments. 
This ability, as one interviewee put it, 'to steal with our eyes' during international visits and 
adapt this knowledge for their own use appears important but is very difficult to measure. 
There does appear to be some relationship between firm size and innovation. Phillip 
Townsend Associates Inc conducted a series of studies of the US plastic converting industry. 
Among a sample of 1 103 US firms they found that much of the innovation in PVC came 
from firms using between 4 500 and 22 000 tonnes per annum (Modern Plastics, July, 
1987:61). Among a sample of 1 100 LLPDE and LDPE users they found that the most 
innovative firms were those using 11 350 to 22 700 tonnes per annum (Modern Plastics, May, 
1987:63). These are described as 'mid-sized' firms in the study but in South Africa this is the 
scale of some of the largest plastic converting firms, most of which are linked to 
conglomerates. 
From the information available it appears that in South Africa both small and large 
firms are innovative to some extent. Consequently an industrial strategy will need to 
accommodate this duality. Technology learning capabilities i.n the plastic converting industry, 
as with several other aspects, exist in certain firms but on the whole do not appear to be 
widespread, leaving much room for improvement. 
Research and Development 
Currently polymer and plastic research is confined to two levels. At the more abstract 
level there are two universities which have polymer institutes, Stellenbosch and Pretoria. The 
problem to be addressed at this level is the low number of graduates. 
At the next level, a more industry-specific problem-solving level, two kinds of 
facilities exist. One is the CSIR which has a limited capacity (20 researchers) in the Polymer 
Programme. It sometimes enters joint ventures with small businesses. The other are the 
research facilities offered by the polymer producing companies. Sentrachem's polymer 
marketing is done by Hoechst who have recently established a technical assistance centre for 
plastic converters which is able to draw upon Hoechst's vast international experience. As 
competition among the polymer producers increases it is likely that one form it will take is 
this kind of service. Demand for such services is also likely to increase as firms move into 
more R&D intensive type activities. 
Internationally the chemicals and plastic converting industries are increasingly taking 
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on the role of providing services to customers (see Klasch, 1989 and CEFIC, undated). This 
requires a high level of vertical cooperation along the filiere in R&D. This cooperation 
needs to commence at an early stage of product design development. Such collaboration and 
joint development will need to be facilitated and encouraged. 
Conclusions 
The plastic products industry accounts for a similar proportion of MV A as the DMEs 
and the second tier NICs but about half that of the NICs. Accordingly the possibility exists, 
theoretically at least, for South Africa to almost double the size of its plastic products 
industry. This would require a large expansion in exports. 
Although productivity in the industry has been declining, data suggest that in terms 
of labour productivity South Africa has been more competitive than some high wage countries 
which export into South Africa. However in this respect it is less competitive than most of 
the countries which export into South Africa. The industry's historical base of imported 
skilled labour appears to be shrinking. This together with th~ poor level of skills, consequent 
upon the historical neglect of this crucial area, is beginning to be addressed at an industry 
level by organised employers. Although most respondents were in favour of an industry 
training board the rather unpolished manner in which the levy was implemented and the 
exclusion of organised labour may detract from its prospects of success. Skill formation in 
production skills, industrial design skills and relevant artisan trades are likely to be important 
determinants of development in the Plastic converting industry. 
Capital productivity is also declining with ageing machinery. Despite the productivity 
trends identified, improvements to manufacturing practice and skill levels could off-set these 
to some extent without resorting to recapitalisation. Nevertheless some recapitalisation is 
needed but currently this is inhibited by the political situation and the declining exchange rate. 
Despite the general ageing of capital stock, pockets of leading edge technology exist. 
Some firm-based R&D capacity has existed but for the most part R&D spending appears to 
have been low or informal and difficult to measure. R&D has been informal in many firms 
but this should nevertheless be nurtured so as to off-set the dwindling skill base. 
The structure of firms in the industry may be separated into two groups: the larger 
firms which for the most part are subsidiaries of conglomerates or MNCs and the small and 
very small , typically family owned businesses. All these firms have needs for services such 
as , R&D, financial , marketing expertise and technical advice. These can be met in either of 
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two ways. They can be met from within the hierarchical firm or the services typically 
provided by the hierarchical firm can be provided from outside of the firm by an 
infrastructure intended for this purpose and possibly organised on a cooperative basis. The 
coexistence of hierarchical and small firms does not have to be mutually exclusive as has been 
shown in Taiwan. A strategy to accommodate these differences is advanced in the final 
chapter. 
In summary a wide variety of factors will need to be addressed if the Plastic 
converting industry is to break with its recent historical trajectory. Key among these will be 
access to plastic raw materials at world prices (or lower), access to lower cost capital goods 
and a considerable effort to enhance skills and improved manufacturing efficiencies. Insights 
gained from the limited sample of firms interviewed suggest that the more dynamic firms, in 
a broad sense, were characterised by one or more of the following features; design skills, 
'world class manufacturing' skills (includes complementary accounting skills) and larger firms 
with the capital necessary to purchase top quality machioery. 
Consequently a strategy to dynamise the plastic converting industry should focus 
heavily upon design, artisan, and operator skills, as well as Jnanagerial training in the nature 
of 'world best practice' manufacturing. 
As these supply side issues are addressed an export orientation for the industry 
becomes increasingly feasible. The means and mechanisms through which the state could shift 
support to this industry are discussed more fully in the final chapter. Suffice it at this stage 
to point out that export incentives have been an important aid to some, particularly larger, 
firms. To bring small and medium sized firms within the fold of potential exporters, 
incentives will need to be less demanding of working capital on the part of the firm. 
The advantages for the state to shift its support from the upstream end of the filiere 
to the Plastic converting industry are several. The propensity for employment creation is 
greater and the barriers to entry (in certain sectors) are lower. A sophisticated plastic 
converting industry is also a prerequisite for any manufacturing strategy which seeks to 
develop more elaborately manufactured product industries. This is because plastic parts and 
packaging are associated with a vast number of manufactured products. 
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CHAPTER 9 
TRADE IN PLASTIC RA W MATERIALS AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 
Introduction 
South Africa has experienced an historical trade deficit in chemicals. Indeed it was the 
persistence of this phenomenon which was instrumental in prompting the Department of Trade 
and Industry to convene the Working Group for the Promotion of the Chemical Industry in 
1990. Although the lSI model did work well in lowering imports in the 1960s and 1970s it 
began to falter in the 1970s as the impact of resource diversion for military/strategic reasons 
began to tell. Earlier chapters have discussed the impact of this strategy upon the oil and 
petrochemical industries and the manner in which the South African chemical industry has 
lagged behind world trade trends. 
The balance of payments is a constraint upon economic development in South Africa 
and the chemical industry contributes significantly to this difficulty. In 1990 chemical imports 
were R 6.6 billion accounting for about 15% of total imports (Commissioner for Customs and 
Excise, 1990). In this year imports were about 2.7 times the value of exports (Ibid). 
Petrochemicals and plastics accounted for almost half of these imports. Consequently 
strategies to develop manufacturing will need to take account of the impact they are likely to 
have on chemical imports, given the wide dispersion of chemical intermediates into so many 
industries. Equally any proposed strategy to develop parts of the commodity plastics jiliere 
must take account of the impact it may have on trade and what contribution it can make to 
reducing or reversing the chemical industry trade imbalance. 
This chapter begins at a general level in reviewing some of the emerging issues in 
international trade and its rule book, the GAIT. It proceeds from there by narrowing the 
focus on South Africa and reviews South Africa's chemical sector trade and the changing 
nature of its production base before examining in more detail the trade flows and trade regime 
for plastic raw materials and plastic products. It concludes with specific and detailed 
discussion on the nature of the tariff regime for plastic products. 
Very little attention is given to trade in olefins as the only one produced locally 
(propylene) that is also traded is imported in limited quantities, tariff free. None is exported. 
Ethylene is neither imported nor exported. 
The challenges facing South African firms wishing to enter international trade markets 
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in the post apartheid era are manifold. It will require not only coming to terms with GATT, 
new quality standards and environmental issues, but also managing the changes these forces 
will require on the shop floor. It is suggested that these issues come together in a nexus of 
issues at shop floor level and in so doing create an historical window of opportunity for trade 
unions to improve the lot of shop floor workers. 
The two stages of the commodity plasticsjiliere which account for virtually all trade 
are, plastic raw materials and plastic products and for this reason the discussion in this 
chapter proceeds under these two headings, firstly trade in polymers (SIC 3513) and 
thereafter trade in plastic products (SIC 356). 
It is argued that trade policy issues are important levers in a package of instruments 
required to r~ress the historical imbalance in the commodity plastics jiliere which has 
favoured the upstream at the expense of the downstream. This .could benefit important 
consumer groups and expand exports from further along the value adding chain, in this case 
plastic products. The linkage between tariffs and domestic pricing is further clarified and 
suggestions are made about possible tariff reform where no alternative mechanism can be 
found to keep domestic prices down. A need for better quality information is identified and 
a proposal to address this need is made. 
Before proceeding a comment on trade data is necessary. Four separate sets of data 
on South Africa were consulted in this study: IDC (1992), data provided by the Central 
Economic Advisory Service, data from the Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics and a set of 
data specially prepared by the IDC for this study. The IDC (1992) data is limiting in that 
trade between the South Africa and the 'independent homelands' (the TBVC states) is treated 
as external trade. In addition none of the data bases has any consistency with any of the 
others. It was possible to check for internal consistency in only one of these data sets and this 
was lacking. Data specially provided by the IDC were used for the more detailed discussion 
as they were the only detailed data available which could be classified in ISIC industry sectors 
relatively easily. However the data presented should be treated with some circumspection for 
the reasons given. 
International Trade and ISO 9000 
The rules of international trade are governed to a large degree by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Some 90% of world trade is conducted under the 
auspices of GAIT agreements. 
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Traditionally international trade discussions have focused upon tariff and non tariff 
barriers to trade. However in recent years additional issues have begun to gain a higher 
profile. Raised environmental awareness has introduced environmental considerations. into 
trade issues. As DMEs have come to rely for their competitive advantage upon knowledge 
rather than production, the protection of intellectual property has come to the fore. This was 
evident in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Also, the increasing globalisation of 
production and marketing has brought forth a demand for consistency in the quality of 
products. This issue is relevant for South African exporters, both in the effect it has on 
product quality and on workplace organisation. 
If a producer has to modify his/her products so that they can be sold in another 
country, that producer faces a technical barrier to trade. There are three types of technical 
barriers: national regulations, national standards and· certification. 
Differences in national regulations arise for example from differing measures designed 
to protect public health, safety or the environment. Food products for example are 
particularly prone to such standards. 
Secondly differences exist in national standards, for example, metric and non metric 
measurement systems. Thirdly testing and certification procedures to ensure a product 
conforms with national standards or regulations may also differ. 
Attempts in the EC countries to harmonise standards had made such little progress by 
1984 that a decision was taken to change the approach from trying to define the technical 
details of the product to trying to specify its objectives. It is this type of approach which 
appears to underpin the work of the International Standards Organisation (ISO). The ISO 
comprises 90 national standards institutes from 41 countries. Its overall purpose is to promote 
smooth and equitable growth in global trade and improve international communication and 
collaboration. Based in Geneva, the ISO developed a series of standards published in 1987. 
These include ISO 9000, 9001, 9002, 9003, and 9004. Most registrations in the chemical 
industry are for 9002 but for ease of reference here the generic term 'ISO 9000' will be used 
for all. 
These ISO 9000 codes are essentially quality auditing procedures. However they are 
not to be equated with quality management. Rather ISO 9000 ensures "that the controls are 
in place for suppliers to produce to the specification agreed with the customer." (Giles & 
Williams, 1991:31). Put differently, ISO 9000 is an "international protocol for documenting 
operating procedures in establishing a quality system". (Chemical Week, April, 1992:30). 
ISO 9000 is more of a mechanism than a goal in quality management, that is, it is not so 
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much concerned with attaining high levels of quality but rather with achieving consistency at 
a given quality standard. 
To become registered a company has to submit to third party checks and audits by 
authorised standards institutions. In South Africa the South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS) is so authorised. 
EC countries were quick to adopt ISO 9000 standards to facilitate trade between 
themselves. The US has been slower but with the approach of European unification, US 
chemical producers rushed for ISO 9000 registration. Japan has been even more cautious, 
since they already have such high quality standards. Nevertheless the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (Mm) is considering adopting the ISO standards. 
Implementing ISO 9000 can take considerable resources. The cost of an audit ranges 
from US $ 10 000 to $ 20 000 and the documentation of operations can take two years, which 
tends to discriminate against small and medium enterprises. Du Pont has made extensive 
efforts to measure the results of implementing ISO 9000. At one European site it recorded 
a production cost drop of 10%, an output increase of 10%, an on-time delivery increase from 
70% to 90%, an improvement in first-pass yields from 70% to 92% and a rise in final 
assembly yields from 92% to 96%. (Chemical Week, 29-4-92:49). 
For South African exporters, particularly those targeting the EC market, ISO 9000 
certification appears almost unavoidable. Indeed a number of the sites owned by the larger 
firms are in the process of seeking ISO 9000 registration, aiming for competitive advantages 
in foreign (and domestic) trade. If the globalisation of the industry continues, as it appears 
it will, the importance of international standards can only increase. ISO 9000 has several 
other advantages which may also contribute to better manufacturing practice. These include, 
reduced rework and maintenance costs, streamlined production, company-wide standardisation 
of operations, and expedited customer and government agency inspection. (Chemical Week, 
29-4-92:42). 
A further advantage in ISO 9000 is that it can lead to improved functioning of 
environmental programmes, in those firms which have them. In early 1993 the ISO began 
establishing an environmental management system (SABS, 1993). At the same time the SABS 
was preparing a code of practice based on ISO 900 1 for local environmental management 
systems, and will feed its ideas into the ISO. 
In addition, following the ISO route holds out potential advantages for organised 
labour in the following ways. Introducing ISO 9000 requires a company to involve employees 
at all levels of the firm, not only in documenting the procedures, but also in critically 
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evaluating them. As the Witco Vice President puts it "Line workers buy into the program as 
they begin to critique procedures." (Quoted in Chemical Week, 29-4-92:44). It is in this 
nexus of issues that potential for greater shop floor industrial democracy lies for trade unions 
in that it offers shop floor workers an opportunity to influence the nature of work and the way 
in which it is organised. In addition clearer identification of tasks performed will make for 
easier identification and recognition of skill competencies and job grading which are the 
fundamentals of proper wage bargaining. Health and safety issues, which are often 
inseparable from work organisation and environmental issues, can be infused into the process. 
There is thus a nexus of issues and opportunities involved here flowing from ISO 
9000: international trade issues, manufacturing quality standards and the workplace 
reorganisatio.n and manufacturing systems which accompany it, environmental concerns, 
employee involvement and industrial democracy and. health and safety issues. 
As firms adopt ISO 9000 (or similar systems) there is thus an historical window of 
opportunity for organised labour to improve its lot. Whether organised labour is able to seize 
this opportunity and exploit it creatively remains to be seen. 
The nexus of issues here also presents industrial strategists with a number of options. 
Should the introduction of production systems designed to ease access to international markets 
be left to firms and if so will they be able to manage the industrial relations risks which 
accompany attempts at work reorganisation? Could small firms wishing to introduce such 
systems not be assisted with financial support in some way? Would it not be beneficial if 
trade unionists trying to cope with these new issues received some training on these subjects 
and/or some financial assistance in order to develop appropriate responses? If so industry may 
be spared an uninformed resistance to change bY'organised labour. 
Such questions . merely scratch the surface of a large cluster of interrelated industrial 
policy issues which are relevant for all manufacturing and which fall outside the scope of this 
study. What is clear, even from this rather cursory discussion, is that the salient features of 
policy initiatives to address these issues should be an emphasis on the integration and 
coordination of the various thrusts. 
Overview. Chemical Industry Exports and Imports 
The crisis in South African manufacturing is manifest in its export structure. The 
predominance of primary and intermediate goods stubbornly refuses to give way to more 
elaborately manufactured exports. Hence manufacturing's share of all exports in 1968 and 
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1987 was a little over 37% whilst mining's share grew from 46.7% to 57% over the same 
period (Kahn, 1991a:Table 5). 
In 1990 South Africa's chemical exports were valued at R 1.9 billion and accounted 
for about 3.5% of total exports (SAFfO). Exports of Chemicals over 1972-87 hovered 
between about 17.5% and 18.5% of all manufacturing exports before falling to just over 15% 
in 1990 (Hirsch, 1992:9) 
Overall the South African chemical industry has lagged behind world trends in the 
proportion of sales exported. This proportion hovered between 5% and 9% from the early 
1970s to 1990 (see Figure 7). The two sectors concerned here (plastic raw materials and 
plastic products) fit this general pattern. Exports of plastic raw materials (lSIC 3513) as a 
proportion of sales hovered between 3 % and 5 % over the 1972-90 period and between 0% 
and 2% for Plastic Products (ISIC 356) for the same period (lDC, 1992). In all South Africa 
only had a positive trade balance in three out of twelve chemical industry categories in 1990 
(see Figure 34) resulting in an overall negative chemical trade balance. This profile remained 
typical of the industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s although certain sectors replaced one 
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Bell (1992) identifies a significant decrease in the average annual growth rate in 
chemical exports from 17.3% p.a. over 1970-80 to 3.2% p.a. over 1985-90 (measured in 
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34 Soaps detergents 
3S Starcbes glues 
33 Cosmetics 
37 Pbotographic materials 
32 Tanning & dyeing 
30 Pbarmaceuticals 
38 Miscellaneous cbemicaJs 
39 Plastics, articles thereof 
29 Orgarrics 
Source: Department of Trade & Industry 
exports. They are concentrated in just three of eleven categories, 'organic', 'inorganic' and 
'artificial resins & plastics and articles thereof, which together account for 65 % of all 
chemical exports (see Table 9.1). It is the third of these three categories ('artificial resins & 
plastics and articles thereof) which embraces the lower two links of the plasticsjiliere. But 
before moving on to these links in more detail the structure of organic and inorganic exports , 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
ITable 9.1 SA Chemical Industry Exports. 















1980 1985 1990 p.a. I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
28 Inorganic Chemicals 55 37 
29 organic Chemicals 4 15 
30 Pharmaceutical products 4 6 
31 Fertilizers 3 8 
32 Tanning & Dyeing extracts, paints inks 7 6 
33 Essential oils, perfumery, cosmetics 1 1 
34 Soap, washing preparations, waxes 2 1 
1 35 Albuminoidal substances, glues, enzymes 1 1 
36 Explosives etc 5 3 
38 Miscellaneous chemical products 6 9 












14 1. 5 
---------------
TOTAL 100 100 100 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Source: Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics, Jan-Dec 1990. 
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are examined a little more closely to search for the origin of the decline in export growth just 
referred to. 
. Inorganic exports have long been the mainstay of South Africa's chemical exports but 
through the 1980s their share of exports has declined from over half of chemical exports to 
about 36% by 1990, an annual average growth rate of -4% (in nominal Rands) which, 
allowing for inflation, is a substantial decline in real terms. In Chapter Four the decline of 
the agricultural and explosives sectors was recorded. If the trends apparent in Table 9.1 
continue, organic exports will overtake inorganics to become the leading export category. 
This table also shows an increase in fertilizer exports from 1980. This is probably a result 
of poor domestic demand as no new capacity was installed over this period. 
Inorganic exports rest on a narrow range of items - just 6 of the 53 categories (of 
exports) accounted for over 70% of the value of exports (see Table 9.2). This narrow base 
rests upon an equally slender production base. For example titanium oxides originate from 
SA Tioxide near Durban which is an old plant well below world scale utilizing an 
environmentally suspect technology. Phosphoric acid exports largely originate from Indian 
Ocean Fertilizer at Richards Bay using phosphates from Foskor the state owned phosphate 
rock mining company in Phalaborwa. This plant is also more than 20 years old. The 
remaining sectors in Table 9.2 are also closely linked to mining activities. In short the largest 
category of South Africa's chemical exports tend to be lower value added type commodities, 
with a strong mining base. 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ I Table 9.2 SA Inorganic Chemical Exports, 
I Percent of CCN 28 (current prices) I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ ICCN CATEGORY 1989 1990 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 28.04 Hydrogen, nitrogen rare gasses 8 11 I 
28.09 Phosphoric acids 16 8 I 
28.23 Titanium oxides 7 10 I 
28.25 Inorganic bases metal oxides 22 16 I 
28.25 .03 Vanadium oxides & hydroxides 19 16 I 
28.35 Phosphates 2 10 I 
---------+ TOTAL 76 71 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics, Jan-Dec 1990. 
Bell (1992) offers as the explanation for the much slower growth in chemical exports 
over 1985-90, the considerable excess capacity which existed worldwide in commodity 
chemicals during the 1980s (Bell, 1992:22). This together with declining world commodity 
prices suggests that South Africa would benefit from a greater emphasis on higher value 
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added and/or more elaborately manufactured production for export. 1 In the jiliere under 
consideration here, plastic products offers that opportunity, provided a suitable industrial 
strategy is followed. 
Organic chemical exports grew at about the inflation rate over 1980-90 (see Table 
9.1). Like inorganic exports they rest upon a similarly narrow base, just 4 of the 42 trade 
codes account for about 60% of exports in the organic category (see Table 9.3). The phenols 
and ketones which account for about 40% of these exports originate mainly from SASOL and 
the furfuryl alcohols from the small Smith Chern plant at Sezela, south of Durban which uses 
sugar cane bagasse as its feedstock. Again the backward linkages into mining and agriculture 
are evident. 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 1 Table 9.3 SA OrganiC Chemical Exports, 
1 percent of CCN 29 (current prices) I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ ICCN CATEGORY 1989 1990 1 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ 
129.05 Acyclic alcohols, methanol, butanols 8 11 1 
129.07 Phenols, phenol alcohol 16 10 I 
129.14 Ketones, acetone 21 33 1 
129.32 Heterocyclic compounds, furfuryl 12 11 1 
1 -----------+ 
1 TOTAL 57 66 1 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics, Jan-Dec 1990. 
Exports of plastic raw materials and articles of plastic also rest upon a narrow base, 
in this case 5 of the 26 trade codes account for about 75 % of the exports in this category 
CCN 39 (see Table 9.4). Some 60% of exports from this category are polymers, 
unbeneficiated plastic raw materials, which originate from just 5 plants. 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ ITable 9.4 SA Plastics and Articles Thereof. Exports, 1 
1 percent of CCN 39 I I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ ICCN CATEGORY 1989 19901 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 139.01 Polymers of ethylene 11 14 
139.02 Polymers of propylene 1 18 
139.04 Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 46 29: 
139.23 Plastics packaging, lids, bags crates etc 9 7: 
139 • 26 Miscellaneous plastic articles 6 7 i 
: -----------+ 
I TOTAL 73 75 I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------! 
Source: Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics, Jan-Dec 1990. 
~. Data discussed in a p~evious chapter. dem~nstrated that the Plastic Products Industry was a higher value added 
mdust~ than the Plastic Raw Matenals mdustry but this need not be the case for all plastic convert· 
operations. mg 
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In summary South Africa's chemical exports rely on a very narrow production base, 
a significant proportion of which has questionable international competitiveness. Much of 
South Africa's chemical exports are linked to mining, particularly if SASOL's and AECl's 
coal feedstocks are taken into account. They are predominantly lower value added type 
products. The higher value added type products such as pharmaceuti~s, household consumer 
items such as soaps and detergents, inks etc account for very limited proportions of exports. 
Explosives, South . Africa's one fully world scale chemical sector also makes a very limited 
contribution to exports. 
The value of South Africa's chemical imports have exceeded exports for many years, 
although the import penetration ratio for chemicals fell from 25 % in 1965 to 15.1 % in 1985 
(Kahn, 1991a:Table 1). Exports have been about one third of imports since 1980 although 
this ratio has ameliorated somewhat since 1990 (see. Table 9.5). In 1990 chemical imports 
were R 6.6 billion - about 2.7 times exports.2 Petrochemicals accounted for almost half 
(48%) of all chemical imports in 1990 (plastic raw materials and plastic products accounted 
for 21 % and organic chemicals for 27%). The next largest category accounted for just 12% 
of chemical imports. 






1981 1982 1983 1984 
0.23 0.23 0.31 0.26 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
0.38 0.38 0.4~ 0.34 
T98o-90 data: Monthl I ulJetln of Trade :>tatlstICS. Y 
1991 data: Commissioner of Customs and Excise, RSA. 





Consequently any attempt to reduce South Africa's chemical trade imbalance might 
find it worthwhile to concentrate on the organic chemicals and plastics industries where the 
largest imbalance exists. An additional advantage is that, to a large extent, these sectors form 
part of one production chain. This study focuses on some of the more important chemicals 
within the wider petrochemicaljiliere. 
The changing composition of chemical exports identified here makes it more 
2. This and subsequent figures in this paragraph are calculated from Monthly Bulletin of Trade Statistics 
January - December, 1990. ' 
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important, from a trade point of view, that the decline in inorganic exports is off-set by 
growth in exports from other chemical sectors. Similarly the larger objective of turning the 
negative chemical trade balance into a positive one needs to be borne in mind in the 
examination of the plastics filiere trade patterns and in identifying opportunities for its 
expansion. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed examination of trade issues in the commodity 
plasticsfiliere, it is appropriate to consider certain developments in the arena of international 
trade which will have to be addressed by firms wishing to penetrate world markets in the post 
apartheid period. 
Synthetic Resins & Plastics Raw Materials OSIC 3513) 
This industrial sector has had a long standing negative trade balance which grew at 
an average of 4.1 % p.a. between 1969 and 1990. The import growth rate slowed to 0.2% 
p.a. over the 1985-1990 period as the growth rates for imports and exports slowed. (see 
Table 9.6). The positive aspect of this recent change is that exports grew faster than imports 
thus reducing the negative trade balance.3 Figure 36 illustrates the trade imbalance over the 
1969-89 period in the last two links of the plasticsfiliere; plastic raw materials (lSIC 3513) 
and plastic products (lSIC 356).4 The value of exports of plastic raw materials (lSIC 3513) 
is between 4.4 and 5.1 times the value of plastic products (lSIC 356) exports (see Tables 9.7 
and 9.13). In other words raw materials are being exported rather than beneficiated products. 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ I Table 9.6 Plastic Raw Materials Trade I 
: Average Annual Growth Rates (') (1985 Rands) I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ ISynthetic resins, plastic raw materials (SIC 3513) I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ I 1969-90 1969-87 1985-90 I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ I Exports 12.6 11.2 10.9 
I Imports 5.1 6.5 2.1 
ITrade Deficit 4.1 6.0 0.2 I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: CEAS 
3 .. If th~ reader ~nds these. tren~ unlikely at first glance, it may be helpful to point out that they are 
~nthmetlcally poSSible and, an thiS case, a function of the relatively large share of trade accounted for by 
Imports. 
4. The s~tistically. co~venient category, ISle 356 Plastic Products is again used in this chapter as a proxy for 
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The explanation offered by business for the limited chemical exports has been 
summarised as "raw materials at uncompetitive prices, the high cost of capital equipment and 
the heavy tax burden." (Sentrachem Annual Report, 1990:7). To this can be added the olefin 
supply problems identified in an earlier chapter and the trade regime (discussed below). 
The improvements in plastic raw materials exports, post 1988, are largely accounted 
for by increased exports of LOPE, HOPE and LLOPE and SASOL's PP plant coming on 
stream in 1990 (see Table 9.7). 
The value of PVC exports, long the mainstay in this industry, has declined after the 
1989 high in international chemical prices in line with international price trends. PVC exports 
may increase again if Polifin proceeds with its announced PVC expansion. Until then PVC 
exports may be expected to decline further if tariff protection is lowered (see below) and if 
international prices continue declining. Prices fell so low in 1990/91 that AECI considered 
closing 36 000 tonnes capacity suggesting that they are not amongst the lowest cost producers 
(Interview, Fraser). Currently the lowest cost producers are the large US plants built during 
the 1989 boom. 
AECI's (now Polifin's) LOPE and LLOPE plants also made sizeable contributions to 
exports. Although they have benefitted from an increased ethylene capacity after 1988 they 
look set to decline. Recent exports of LOPE were a result of displacement in the local market 
by low cost Turkish imports possible in terms of a preferential trade agreement with Turkey. 
LOPE deep sea exports will cease with the Turkish trade preference agreement in 1993 
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(Interview, Baker). Thereafter AECI only envisaged exporting into Africa because they saw 
no long term strategic advantage, no cheap gas based feedstocks, limited local markets and 
a capital cost disadvantage. This was despite the fact that SASOL assists exports with a lower 
ethylene price and in some instances where long term market considerations apply, were 
prepared to go below the 'fuel alternate value' price for ethylene~ 
Table 9.7 Synthetic Resins and Plastic Raw Materials: Exports. Certain Items 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ I EXPORT QUANTITIES ('000) TONNES I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ 
lITEM 1988 1989 1990 1991 I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ Ipp 1.2 0.4 35.0 62.4 
I PVC 26.7 63.1 53.9 44.6 
I LOPE 1.9 3.9 7.0 17.6 
I HOPE 1.2 1.2 2.8 9.9 
IVINYL ACETATE & OTHERS 9.5 3.9 12.4 8.1 
ILLDPE 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.6 
Ips 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 
I NYLONS 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
I POLYURETHANES 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 
IpOLYCARBONATES 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
lABS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
+--------~-----------------------------------------------------+ Source: IDC 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ IEXPORTS FOB VALUE R/MIL I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ lITEM 1988 1989 1990 1991 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ PP 3.8 1.9 56.4 114.2 
PVC 70.3 126.2 93.2 82.9 
LOPE 6.6 10.6 14.4 37.9 
VINYL ACETATES & OTHERS 24.4 14.7 40.2 25.0 
HOPE 4.0 3.4 9.5 23.6 
PS 3.3 5.0 4.8 4.9 
LLDPE 2.0 0.5 2.2 4.8 
NYLONS 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.5 
POLYURETHANES 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.8 
POLYCARBONATES 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 
ABS 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
COLUMN TOTALS -------------------------------+ 116.6 164.7 223.1 296.0 I 
-------------------------------+ 
193.6 251.3 285.3 396.0 I TOTAL SIC 3513 EXPORTS 
-------------------------------+ SHARE OF SIC 3513 EXPORTS (%) 60.2 65.5 78.2 74.8 I 
+------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: IDC 
GElS export incentives are applicable to polymer exports at Category 2 level (lower 
value added type products) but are not regarded as significant as the payments are very 
limited. Due to economies of scale and the need to keep capacity utilization high, polymer 
plants probably would have exported without GElS incentives. This is an example of a 
weakness in GElS: the payment of export incentives to firms which would have exported in 
299 
any event. 
In an earlier chapter the extent of foreign technology licensing for the processes used 
in polymer production was discussed. In some cases these have expired, such as PVC~ but 
in others they still operate, certainly this is the case with SASOL's new PP plant. In this case 
it was obvious that it was to be an export plant and any limitations arising from BASF's 
technology license were presumably overcome. 
ABCI and Safripol are linked to international partners, ICI and Hoecsht respectively. 
These linkages are important in gaining market access in that they allow the local producers 
to 'plug into' the global marketing networks of large companies provided that the quality of 
the product is adequate. Both ICI and Hoechst have restricted exports of polymer from ABCI 
and Safripol respectively at times, for quality and other marketing reasons. This is now 
changing in Safripol's case as quality has improved aad they have had some of their material 
marketed in prime European markets. ICI's withdrawal from commodity chemicals and the 
advent of Polifin, with SASOL as the major shareholder, may reduce the importance of ICI 
linkages in facilitating access to world markets. 
PVC exports have been chiefly to the Far East and .aong Kong, presumably destined 
for China. Most of the PP is exported to the Far East, Africa and the Middle East. 
Petrochemical capacity has grown rapidly in recent years in the Asia Pacific region, much 
of which is low cost gas based. This has been compounded by the large wave of (naphtha 
based) Korean petrochemicals which have come on stream in the early 1990s. Nevertheless 
potential for expansion of polymer exports into that region ~xists. But competition is likely 
to be fierce. However China is one of the largest importers of polymer, a situation likely to 
continue for some time if its balance of payments· permits. China imports about one third of 
the world's 1.5 million tonnes of PP traded annually. Market access is eased by MNC joint 
venture partners and the comparatively small South African volumes which do not pose a 
serious threat to the major producers. 
Africa is an obvious market for South Africa but it is notoriously risky and difficult 
business, in particular securing payment in internationally accepted currencies. Market access 
is also difficult as a result of tariffs in some cases and difficulty in penetrating the 'inner 
core' of persons who conduct much of the trade. Much trade in Africa relies upon informal 
contacts. S Exploiting market potential in Africa will in all likelihood require innovative 
financing or barter or counter trade arrangements because about half of most African 
5. D ~oss, <m~rtunities for .tw~ way Chemical trade in sub-Saharan Africa, Opportunities for Export of 
Cheoucals, Senunar of SA institution of Chemical Engineers, 26-2-92, Johannesburg. 
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country's foreign exchange is used to service foreign debt. 
. Although South African exports occur from a narrow base, the same is not true for 
imports. The 11 polymer types in Table 9.8 account for only about 40% of the value of 
imports in this industry whereas they account for about 70% of the exports. This may be 
partly attributed to the absence of an aromatics (petrochemical) unit and the consequent need 
to import aromatic based plastics. 
Table 9.8 Synthetic Resins and Plastic Raw Materials: 
Imports certain Items 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I IMPORT QUANTITIES ('000) TONNES I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ lITEM 1988 1989 1990 1991 I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ I PVC 38.2 18.1 17.5 40.5 
I NYLONS 29.1" 25.4 26.2 24.6 
I LOPE 38.6 12.4 9.0 22.1 
Ips 17.4 7.7 9.5 15.8 
IPp 23.9 24.1 12.9 11.5 
lABS 0.0 7.9 9.3 8.4 
I HOPE 39.7 23.9 10.5 7.3 
IVINYL ACETATE & OTHERS 6.4 5.7 27.4 6.1 
I POLYURETHANES 5.2 4.9 4.4 5.0 
I POLY CARBONATES 2.2 2.9 2.1 2.5 
ILLDPE 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.3 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: IDC 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ IIMPORT FOB VALUES R/MIL I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ lITEM 1988 1989 1990 1991 I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I NYLONS 141.8 153.4 161.0 160.5 
I PVC 136.0 74.6 71.7 121.5 
I LOPE 117.3 38.0 23.3 59.7 
IPS 75.8 32.4 39.4 57.9 
I POLYURETHANES 39.3 42.7 45.6 53.3 
'ABS 0.0 43.3 47.3 45.7 
PP 72.4 69.0 37.4 30.8 
VINYL ACETATE & OTHERS 23.6 23.8 88.3 25.8 
POLYCARBONATES 15.7 27.7 20.3 25.4 
HOPE 112.6 67.6 30.1 22.3 
LLDPE 4.1 4.4 2.4 2.4 
-------------------------------+ COLUMN TOTALS 738.5 576.8 566.7 605.3 I 
-------------------------------+ TOTAL SIC 3513 IMPORTS 1521.5 1541.6 1429.0 1628.4 I 
-------------------------------+ % OF TOTAL SIC 3513 IMPORTS 48.5 37.4 39.7 37.2 I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: IDC 
The composition of polymer imports represents the mirror image of the preceding 
discussion on exports. A large share of imports has been accounted for by the more exotic 
polymers such as nylons, and the engineering plastics such as ABS and polycarbonates which, 
with limited exceptions, are not manufactured in South Africa. Also imported are a large 
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number of speciality grades. This again highlights the dilemma faced by local polymer 
producers as to the appropriate number of grades to produce. 
It also highlights wider industrial strategy concerns for manufacturing. South Africa 
has a relatively diverse manufacturing sector which means that the demand for a wide range 
of chemicals and plastics exists. Consequently, with the chemical industry in its current 
condition, any rapid expansion of manufacturing is likely to be accompanied by an equally 
rapid rise in chemical and plastic imports and any attempt to expand manufacturing should 
take this into account. An alternative is to develop a comprehensive program to develop the 
chemical industry first or together with any effort to develop manufacturing. This would 
require a much broader based study than the rather limited one undertaken here. 
Withi~ the limited focus here on the commodity polymers, one of the incentives to 
import is the differing degree of vertical integration which exists linking the plastics raw 
materials industry and the plastic converting industry and the pricing arrangements which 
accompany it. Plastic converting subsidiaries which are part of a vertically integrated firm 
are usually obliged to buy polymer from within the group, whereas competing converters, not 
vertically integrated, seek competitive advantage in lower priced imported polymer when it 
is available. Vertically integrated chemical conglomerates may give preferential pricing to 
their downstream subsidiaries. This is a real concern for others trying to compete downstream 
and a difficult dilemma for competition policy. Promoting exports of plastic products may 
require vertical integration which will in tum encourage imports by others not vertically 
integrated unless mechanisms can be put in place to remove a price advantage for imported 
polymer and fears of differential pricing by local polymer manufactures can be put to rest. 
This would be facilitated by a clear distinction in the pricing system and the trade regimes 
applicable to the domestic and export markets. 
Trade regime: Synthetic Resins and Plastic Raw Materials aSlc 3513) 
" .... most of our chemical plants are still sized for the internal market and not for 
exports. The effect of this strategy is that plants are not world scale sizes and we lose 
the economy of scale and therefore have to consistently fight for higher protection. " 
JH Fourie, General Manager SASOL Limited. (my emphasis) (Fourie, 1992:3). 
Most of the plastics raw material industry developed under the lSI policy and was 
protected by tariffs or import prohibitions from imports. During the 1980s the state 
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introduced a wide ranging deregulation of trade which led to the removal of non-tariff 
barriers and a reduction in tariffs for this industry. This section analyses the details of these 
developments in respect of commodity polymers. 
At the outset it is worth noting that not all tariffs are the result of industrial policy 
imperatives. For example the 10% ad valorem tariffs on ethylene and propylene which 
applied from before 1965 until their removal was recommended (in late 1991), were imposed 
for fiscal reasons and not industrial or trade reasons. (BTl, 1991: 19). This also applies to the 
various import surcharges which have been imposed from time to time. 
A review of the history of the trade regime for the commodity polymers reveals that 
almost without exception significant tariff or non-tariff protection was introduced from the 
commencement of production. (see BTl, 1991) This is acknowledged by the major companies, 
for example AECI records that: 
"Import control has been the major factor behind the rapid expansion of the South 
African (chemical) industry in the past two decades." (AECI Annual Report, 1982: 12) 
This accords with the strategy of import substitution being pursued at the time. In 
1982 the state announced its intention to abolish all forms of import control. This was the 
beginning of South Africa's second and most significant trade liberalisation episode (Bell, 
1992). The announcement led to a discussion at the Plastics Federation industry committee 
concerning the removal of quantitative trade restrictions which had been one of the sources 
of polarisation between polymer producers and converters. This committee comprised a 
representative each from AECI, Sentrachem and SASOL and three from the Plastic 
Converters Association. The Plastics Federation President Mr Roger Cockram was pleased 
with the results of these discussions at the time: 
"The plastics industry committee recorded a major achievement in industry 
cooperation when it submitted to the Board of Trade and Industries a document 
formulating the basis on which polymer manufacturers were willing to see the 
elimination of import control. The industry is now awaiting the government's 
decision." (Rand Daily Mail, 11-11-83) 
It proved to be a long wait. 
At this time AECI's annual reports stress the need for the careful dismantling of non-
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tariff barriers and it was not until mid 1990 that import control on PVC was finally removed. 
According to AECI the failure to substitute import control with adequate 'anti-dumping' 
measures led to significant decreases in profitability and promptly led AECI to make 
application for 'anti-dumping' measures (ABCI Annual Report, 1990). Consequently, despite 
eight years warning, AECI still seems to have been inadequately prepared for the opening of 
its closed monopoly market to competition. The protection granted by government is typically 
an ad valorem tariff together with a reference price.6 There are no additional special anti-
dumping provisions. 
LOPE production began in 1965 and in 1966 a 20% ad valorem tariff was introduced 
in addition to import control. For many years AECI was granted the only import permit. In 
1983 the 20% ad valorem tariff was strengthened by a reference price (of 93c/kg less80% of 
the FOB price) for the first time. This coincided with .the discussions concerning the removal 
of import control. In 1987 this tariff was raised to 17Oc/kg less 90% and the ad valorem tariff 
lowered to 10% where it has remained since. Import control on LOPE was removed in 1988. 
The removal of import restrictions in South Africa ended the polymer monopolies' blissful 
existence in a closed market. This coincided with a peri04 of high international prices and 
tight supply. Shortly thereafter as international prices began to fall AECI was granted 
additional tariff protection. The reference price was increased again in 1989 to 27Sc/kg less 
90% and then lowered again in the same year to 255c/kg less 90%. The trade regime for 
HOPE has followed a similar pattern. 
In 1991 the PP ad valorem tariff was cut from 20% to 10% but the reference price 
increased from 9Oc/kg to R2.30/kg. Ad valorem duties tend to be lower than tariffs in 
countries from which South Africa imports and are used as evidence of South Africa's move 
to liberalise trade (BTl, 1991). As has been pointed out this is illusory in view of the 
reference price mechanism. 
Producers regard reference prices as 'anti-dumping' measures. They point out that 
even a small share of the world's traded polymer could meet the entire domestic demand. 
There is validity in this claim. Indeed just 0.025% of the 1990 world trade in LOPE could 
have met domestic demand.7 
6. A ~ference price creates, through the use of a formula, a 'floor price' below which the price of imported 
ma~nal cannot go. On the other hand, if international prices rise, then the amount of tariff to be paid reduces 
until the ad valorem percentage based tariff begins to apply. 
7. Calculated from, Parpinelli Tecnon, 1991:11.29 and Plastics Federation of South Africa Annual Report 
. 1991:8. ' , 
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The early cooperation in the plastics industry committee on the removal of import 
controls appears to have waned as it failed to bear fruit for the converters. One suspects that 
the three large companies may have been active in lobbying the government in order to delay 
the removal of import controls. 
The combination of import controls, surcharges for fiscal purposes an~ reference price 
tariffs have all contributed to high Effective Rates of Protection (ERP). The ERP 
distinguishes between the nominal protection applicable to a traded good and the protection 
afforded to the value added created in the course of production. It is defined as: 
"the excess of the remuneration of domestic factors of production (domestic value 
added), obtainable by reason of the imposition of tariffs and other trade barriers, as 
a percentage of value added in a free trade situation." (Balassa & Schydlowsky, 
1968':349) 
For an explanatory discussion of the concepts of comparative advantage and effective rate of 
protection see Annexure C. The high levels of ERP in the. plastics industries are evident in 
Table 9.9. According to the studies referred to in Table 9.9 these two plastic sectors were 
among those with the highest ERP. A recent study by Belli et al (1993) also found the two 
plastics sectors being considered here to have high rates of effective protection. Synthetic 
Resins and Plastic Raw Materials had the second highest ERP of the 76 sectors measured by 
Belli et al. 
Table 9.9 Effective Rates of Protection (%) 
I Sector I 1984/5 a\ I 1988 b\ I 
Synthetic Resins, Plastics and Man-Made Fibres 143.2 348 






Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, Pretoria, quoted in Holden 
(undated). 
IDC (1990), Bylae D, Aanhangsel 09. (available in Afrikaans only) 
All of the three ERP studies referred to here concur that the ERP for the upstream 
sector (plastic raw materials) was significantly higher than the downstream sector (plastic 
products). The level of nominal tariff protection afforded each successive stage in a 
production chain is usually higher than the preceding stage (Grubel 1971:4). If a normal 
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cascading of nominal tariffs down the production chain had applied, one would have expected 
the ERP lower down the production chain to be higher than for the upstream sectors. The fact 
that the reverse is the case here, is suggestive of the kind of tariff reform which may be 
required to improve the prospects of the plastic converting industry. It also demonstrates the 
point that tariffs on inputs are equivalent to taxes on the users of those inputs. As a result it 
is likely to be difficult for exporters of plastic products to be competitive on world markets. 
These studies ranking the effective rates of protection across industries are useful. All 
other things being equal, it is reasonable to anticipate that resources would be pulled towards 
those sectors with higher levels of effective protection and away from those with lower levels 
of effective protection. This is indeed what has happened in the commodity plasticsjiliere as 
has been argued in preceding chapters. The evidence in Table 9.9 confirms this view. 
The importance of the tariff on polymers has .been highlighted in preceding chapters 
where it has been argued that it is in fact the lynchpin of pricing up and down the production 
chain. In an endeavour to test this argument further the Effective Tariff Protection on 
polypropylene was calculated (see Annexure C). The net foreign exchange costs of tariffs on 
polymer is also determined. These calculations are preceded by an introductory overview of 
the concepts of comparative advantage and domestic resource costs. 
The calculations in Annexure C strengthen the argument identifying polymer tariff as 
the critical lynchpin of pricing and the need for a careful review of these tariffs. 
If exports of plastic products are to be expanded, producers will need access to world 
priced polymer. Consequently the real issue to be faced is, should the trade regime allow 
domestic producers to be exposed to the full severity of notoriously cyclical commodity 
prices? . A solution may lie in two directions; firstly increasing vertical integration (and 
unlocking the value added being accumulated by Polifin) or a pricing system which has the 
same effect, and secondly shifting the bulk of exports one link further down the chain. These 
possibilities are taken up in the final chapter. 
It is worth noting in passing that many of the additives, stabilizers, etc. used in 
polymer manufacture carry a 10% tariff despite not being produced locally. 
The state has announced its intention to remove or lower tariffs on polymer. What 
effect would this have? Would it improve the international competitiveness of the industry as 
the conventional view holds? The effect is not easy to predict. One view is that dumped 
polymer would close down uneconomic units and lead the three major producers to vertically 
integrate to the point where within 5 years they would own 90% of the converting industry 
(Interview, Brand). AECI on the other hand point out that a lowered differential between 
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domestic and export prices will serve to allocate increased importance to polymer exports 
which would tend to increase exports. This does not seem convincing given the pricing 
structure in the industry. 
Whilst polymer producers are quick to condemn dumping and to call for protection 
against it, they, like their international competitors, practise dumping. Polymer producers 
have followed a two tier pricing system with export prices considerably lower than domestic 
prices: 
" ... more often than not exports take place at prices which do not recover full cash 
cost (direct costs excluding depreciation) of production. A lower price in the internal 
market could therefore render projects with an export bias uneconomic." (OTI, 
1990:32) 
This view is supported by Belli et al (1993). They measured the anti-export bias of plastic 
raw materials and recorded a negative result both with and without GElS using domestic input 
prices (see Table 9.10).8 This means that the value ad~ed in production for export is 
negative. In short, domestic prices, supported by the reference price system, have subsidised 
exports which have made higher capacity utilization rates possible. This has some bizarre 
consequences. One plastic converter interviewed re-imports South African polymer from . 
Zimbabwe because prices are lower than domestic prices. 
In the light of these facts it would appear that the sensible thing to do is to phase out 
exports of plastic raw materials and to convert that material locally and to export instead 
higher value added and/or more elaborately manufactured plastic products. Strategies to 
achieve this are considered in the final chapter. 
A second implication of these findings is that the removal of tariffs may well have the 
combined effect of increasing imports M.Q reducing exports if the removal of tariffs is 
unaccompanied by other measures. Such other measures are also explored in the final chapter. 
Table 9.10 shows that the anti-export bias in Other Plastic Products without GElS is 
also negative, indeed the highest negative value of the 70 manufacturing sectors measured. 
Even with GElS there is an anti-export bias. Belli et al's measurements underscore the need 
for a radical restructuring of the price structures in the plastics jiliere if exports are to be 
expanded. 
8. The anti-export bias coefficient is a measure used to compare the effects of domestic policy on incentives to 
export. See note to table. 
Table 9.10 Anti-export Bias Coefficients 
+-----------------------+----------------+----------------+ , IAnti-Export Bias!Anti-Export BiasI ! I with GElS I without GElS I 
, +-------+--------+-------+--------+ 
: Sector II(w) II(d) II(w) II(d) I 
+-----------------------+-------+--------+-------+--------+ 
ISynth. Resin & Plastic I I I I I 
'Raw Materials I 2.76 I -5.48 I 4.44 I -3.13 I 
:Other Plastic Products I 0.86 I 1.27 I 3.13 I -16.37 I 
lAll Manufacturing I 0.82 I 1.03 I 1.30 I 1.89 I 
+-----------------------+-------+--------+-------+--------+ 
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Notes: a) I(w) = Value added calculated assuming exporters can 
purchase input at world prices. 
b) I (d) = Value added calculated assuming exporters can 
purchase input at domestic prices. 
c) The coefficient indicates the extent to which policies increase 
value added in production for the domestic market compared with 
the extent to which policies increase value added in production 
for exports (vis-a-vis hypothetical free trade conditions). If 
policies raise value added for domestic production more than for 
export, the anti export bias coefficient is greater than one. If, 
on the contrary, policies render exports more attractive than 
domestic production, the anti-export bias coefficient is less than 
one. If the value added for domestic or export production is 
negative, the coefficient is negative also. 
Source: Belli et aI, 1993, Table 6. 
The efficiency of the trade regulating administration is important, particularly in view 
of the volatile international commodity prices. Several polymer producers and converters 
interviewed complained that the trade authorities respond slowly to international price changes 
and are unable to effectively police the existing regulations. They also allege corruption 
among customs officials. On the other hand long term investments require a knowledge of 
the tariff regime and the period for which it will operate. A system such as Malaysia's which 
is transparent and has a degree of 'automaticity', leaving little to official discretion has much 
to commend it (Vergara & Babelon, 1990:88). 
Trade: Plastic Products OSIC 365) 
The plastic products industry has had a consistent negative trade balance for many 
years. It grew at an average of over 4 % p.a. for the period 1969-90 despite exports growing 
faster than imports (see Table 9.11 and Figure 36).9 Exports accounted for between zero and 
2% of the value of production over the period 1972-90 (lDC, 1992). Considering the 1969-87 
period in Figure 36, the trend is a gradual decline in imports and exports. The surge in 
9. Calculated from Month Bulletin of Trade Statistics, January-December, 1990. 
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imports and exports in 1988 is attributed to the introduction of the Harmonised Tariff Code 
system in that year. 10 This also partly accounts for the rapid growth in exports over the 
1985-90 period shown in Table 9.11 and also detected by Bell (1992:Table 5) although he 
does not mention the tariff code reclassification. Given the data available it is difficult to 
determine what trends were operating over 1985-90, although from 1988 to 1990 it appears 
that exports increased and imports marginally decreased. 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ I Table 9.11 Trade in Plastic Products NEC (ISIC 356) I 
! Average Annual Change (') (1985 Rands) ! 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ ! 1969-90 1969-87 1983-87 1985-90 ! 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ I I 
I : 
!Exports 7.9 5.2 26.8 29.1 I 
!Imports 4.8 -0.9 -0.4 23.2 ! 
!Trade Deficit 4.4 -1.9 -4.4 22.4 ! 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ Source: CEAS 
South African plastic products export growth over the 1983-87 period, when better 
data are available, was 26.8% p.a. albeit off a very low base (see Table 9.11). This compares 
well with world growth in similar exports over 1984-88 of about 18% to 19% p.a. (see Table 
6.24). This data suggests that South Africa did participate to some extent in the surge in the 
world trade of plastic products in the mid to late 1980s, despite its handicaps. 
Exports of Plastic Products 
Two introductory remarks are necessary at the outset. Firstly much of plastic 
consumption is in the form of a very wide variety of packaging, which if exported would be 
categorised as the product packaged, not as plastic products. Other plastic products which are 
exported are auto components and textiles (eg carpets and synthetic fibres) which are captured 
under separate tariff and industry data headings. This makes it difficult to identify the full 
extent to which plastic has been exported. Secondly plastic products may, for convenience, 
be divided into two classes; tradeables and non-tradeables. Hollowware such as empty bottles 
and containers and some pipes may be regarded as non-tradeables as they amount to 'shipping 
air' in the trade jargon. 
South Africa has consistently had very low exports of plastic products for a long time. 
10. G van Wyk, IDe statistics office, personal communication. 
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An attempt was made to determine if this has been true for other economies. Table 9.12 
shows the proportion of plastic products exported from a sample of countries during the 1980s 
(see notes to table). Compared to this sample South Africa has had unusually small exports 
of plastic products. This reinforces the view that there are serious impediments to exports of 
plastic products which will need to be removed if exports are to ~xpand. 
Turning now to more detailed trade datall , they show that the largest category of 
plastic products exports is a miscellaneous category described as 'Other'. And the largest sub-
group within this code is unfortunately also described as 'other'! (see Table 9.13). No 
detailed data appear to exist for this 'other'. It is believed that 'other' includes one of South 
Africa's fe'.V success stories, swimming pool cleaning equipment. Kreepy Krauly for example 
exports 75 % of its OUtpUt.12 One small firm interviewed was engaged in the most unlikely 
export of golf tees to the USA! These are presumably also classified as 'other'. 
The destinations for exports give some idea of the markets in which South Africa has 
been competitive. These are listed in Table 9.14. Southern African countries are the recipients 
of a large proportion of exports. Interestingly South Africa has been able to export some 
'Other' and some pipes, tubes and fittings into the USA . . 
One way of determining how internationally competitive plastic product exports have 
been is to measure the extent to which they are exported into DMEs. Western Europe is taken 
here as a proxy for DMEs. Some 21 % of South Africa's 'Other' exports went to Western 
Europe. In the 'Closures' group 40% was exported to the UK, largely Nampak plastic bags 
of various types. Tubes and pipes, being hollow, are more costly to transport, only 10% 
going to Europe. Bathroom fittings apparently travel better with almost 70% of exports going 
to Europe, mainly Austria and Germany. Less than 2% of 'Floor coverings' went to Europe 
whilst 27% of 'Tableware & kitchenware' went to Europe. This is the largest proportion of 
any category exported to Europe and supports the view expressed by some interviewees that 
South Africa's tableware and kitchenware is of high qUality. At least one of the major local 
producers of these items has also introduced wide ranging measures which will take it closer 
to world class manufacturing standards (Interview, Thee). 
11. Unless otherwise indicated the following discussion deals with 1991 exports. 
12. Kreepy Krauly, Marketing Director, 14-1-93. 
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Table 9.12 Exports of Articles of Plastic NES as pro;rrtion of Plastic 
Products NEC (ISIC 356) Gross Output (percen 
countr~ 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Hewly industrialising COuntries 
ARGENTINA 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.9 
BRAZIL 12.9 
KOREA REP. 5.1 5.2 7.4 8.3 9.0 
MEXICO 4.8 5.6 1.2 2.1 4.8 ------------------------------------
Average 4.9 4.0 3.0 3.7 6.9 
Second tier Hewly Industrialising COunties 
COLOMBIA 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.4 1.2 
CYPRUS 32.3 30.5 34.7 33.3 12.2 
INDONESIA 0.3 0.0 1.6 2.0 0.9 
JORDAN 37.8 27.2 21.0 17.9 12.1 
MALAYSIA 11.3 10.1 12.1 13.3 15.0 
PHILIPPINES 7.0 8.3 8.6 7.0 11.1 
SRI LANKA 25.3 48.9 61.0 16.3 8.9 
THAILAND 13.1 11.5 9.6 15.1 19.2 ------------------------------------
Average 16.1 17.3 18.8 13.3 10.1 
Developed Market Bconoaies 
AUSTRALIA 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.5 1.5 
AUSTRIA 25.4 26.0 26.3 25.3 27.4 
BELGIUM 44.8 43.9 42.9 41.5 40.3 
CANADA 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.9 12.2 
DENMARK 54.7 55.2 55.0 55.3 54.3 
FINLAND 30.3 31.1 29.5 31.6 27.1 
FRANCE 9.4 9.7 9.1 9.6 9.6 
GERMANY,FR 13.6 15.1 15'.4 15.5 16.2 
GREECE 4.0 2.8 2.9 3.6 2.4 
ISRAEL 12.4 12.9 15.6 9.9 
ITALY 12.5 13.8 13.2 12.1 10.0 
JAPAN 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.3 
NETHERLANDS 36.8 37.3 35.2 35.1 36.2 
NEW ZEALAND 8.3 8.0 7.6 7.4 5.3 
NORWAY 12.4 11.3 10.9 11.9 13.8 
PORTUGAL 4.3 5.7 6.5 8.7 9.3 
SPAIN 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.7 
SWEDEN 33.7 34.2 36.3 35.5 34.4 
UK 8.0 8.5 8.2 8.1 8.0 
USA 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.4 
------------------------------------
Average 16.2 16.3 16.2 16.4 16.3 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.9 
Sources: 
1. National gross output from UNIDO Industrial Statistics, February 1992 
for ISIC 356, Plastic Products NEC. 
2. Exports from United Nations International Trade Statistics Year Book, 
1988, Vol 2, New York, Table 893 page 227, Articles of Plastics NES. 
This is not an ISIC category and there is thus not a complete overlap 
with ISIC 356. This is not critical as the object is not to determine 
absolute proportions of gross output exported but to determine whether 
South Africa is a relatively large or small exporter of plastic products 
or not. 
3. Exchange rates from International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1991, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
~ 
1. Results were affected by currency devaluations, in Brazil for example, 
and led to anomalous results being excluded. 
2. South African exports are for the Southern African Customs Union but do 
not materially affect the results as comparisons with other data sets 
reveal very similar results. 





t~ Table 9.12 continued. 
Results for Singapore (in the Newly 
ranged between 27% and 35% and were 
effect upon the average. 
industrialising countries group) 
excluded due to their distorting 
- -------------------------------+ +---------------------------- - , 'Table 9.13 Plastic Products Exports (ISIC 356), FOB, R/mil , 
, -----------------------------------+ +--------------------------'HS CODE DESCRIPTION 1988 1989 1990 1991: 
, --------------------+ +-----------------------------------------3926 OTHER 9.8 15.9 22.4 25.5 
3923 CLOSURES & BAGS 18.1 25.0 23.1 22.2 
3917 TUBES PIPES HOSES & FITTINGS 4.0 5.9 0.8 10.0 
3922 BATHROOM FITTINGS 1.1 2.1 3.5 6.6 
3918 FLOOR COVERINGS 4.6 5.0 4.7 5.3 
3924 TABLEWARE, KITCHENWARE 2.1 1.8 3.6 4.4 
3925 BUILDERSWARE 1.1 0.9 0.9 2.6 
-----------------------------+ TOTAL 40.9 56.5 59.0 76.6: 
+-------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Source: IDC 
Table 9.14 Plastic Product Exports Destinations (1991) 
HS Code Description Destination of largest values 
3926 Other Zimbabwe, UK, USA, Australia. 
3923 Closures UK, Southern Africa. 
3917 Tubes Pipes and fittings Southern Africa, USA, Hong Kong, Australia. 
3922 Bathroom fittings Germany and Austria. 
3918 Floor coverings Southern Africa. 
3924 Tableware Southern Africa. 
3925 Buildersware Southern Africa. 
Source: IDC 
What this suggests is that notwithstanding South Africa's high cost structure, there is 
an, albeit limited, capability to export into sophisticated product markets. Similarly there is 
a capability to export mining, agricultural and infrastructural type piping and fittings into 
regional markets which stand to benefit from regional peace and reconstruction initiatives. 
What is not captured here are the PP exports which would probably be classified as textiles. 
At least one major textile group, Romatex, is exporting PP based products because they have 
been more competitively priced (Romatex Annual Report, 1992:7). 
Many exporters of plastic products are taking advantage of GElS and auto industry 
export incentives. Plastic products qualify for GElS benefits at level four, the highest level. 
Some large exporters said that they could not export without GElS assistance. This is not 
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surprising given the extent to which most polymers are above world prices. 
Another factor which is important in determining the prospects for exports of plastic 
products is the level of tariff barriers faced in the target countries. Some large exporters 
believe that if South Africa's GATT status is revised to that of a developing country, the 
lower tariffs applicable will make it much easier for them to ~netrate NWE and other 
markets. 
Would ex~rts grow if polymer prices were reduced to NWE levels? Two plastic 
converting firms in the sample interviewed gave unqualified affirmative answers to this 
question. Both were large and already exporting. Typical of the remainder of the responses 
were qualified answers along the lines of: 'yes if we could make money/find the productlbe 
competitive'. The question put to firms was deliberately phrased as 'NWE levels' because that 
is the level of pricing Sentrachem suggest will be possible if they proceed with their Mossel 
Bay cracker project. However as has been pointed out, US Gulf prices are generally lower 
than NWE and given the large volumes of petrochemicals coming on stream in Korea, it is 
likely that in the next few years, Far East spot market prices may be even lower than US 
Gulf prices. 
Export restrictions as a result of technology licensing are an important consideration. 
Several interviewees claimed that the restrictions on exports imposed by technology licencing 
agreements was a significant barrier to exports. One large foreign owned packaging company 
stated that they have no intention of exporting. Since most of these licences originated in the 
developed economies this tended to deny South African producers access to these markets. 
This view is confirmed by Mr Curtis, the President of the Plastics Federation of South 
Africa: 
"In many instances local companies in the plastics industry are restricted from 
exporting to the more lucrative world markets by their technology agreements" .. 
(Quoted in Engineering News, 5-2-93:30). 
Such restrictions give added weight to the need for local producers to find innovative 
ways of building upon the licensed technology they already have to produce new products and 
technologies. However there are firms which have found ways to avoid some of the export 
restrictions in technology agreements. For example Nampak's subsidiary, Tuf~ag at Isithebe, 
has recently entered into a licensing agreement with Bowater of the UK for the production 
of PP woven bags (a growth area in the industry), "Tuftbag now looks set to penetrate more 
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decisively the export markets in Australia, South America, Asia, and the rest of Africa." 
(PM, Nampak, A corporate report, 4-9-92:28) In doing so "Tuffbag has stuck to the short-
run, added value, big-bag end of the market, which appears to be the most profitable sector" 
(Ibid). 
Imports of Plastic Products 
Import levels of plastic products (lSIC 356) have hovered between 2 % and 4 % of 
domestic demand since 1972, excluding the period after 1988 when the trade codes were 
altered (lDC, 1992). Although imports have been at a relatively low level they have still been 
approximately twice the value of exports. 
A disaggregation of imports (see Table 9.15) reveals the largest single item as the 
mysterious 'Other' (code 3926) again, and within that category the equally mysterious 'other' 
is the largest sub-category. Another sub-category within '.Other' which is identifiable are large 
values of cassettes and protective clothing. 'Tubes pipes hoses etc' (code 3917) imports are 
dominated by sausage casings (nearly 40%) destined for t~e food industry and pipe fittings 
(21 %). In code 3923, 'Closures & bags' stoppers, caps, lids and bottles account for just over 
half of the value. Presumably these are speciality type containers for cosmetic, pharmaceutical 
and hair care type products. In 'buildersware' the main import is venetian blinds. 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ ITable 9.15 Plastic Products Imports (ISIC 356), FOB, R/mil I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ :HS CODE DESCRIPTION 1988 1989 1990 1991 I 
+----------------------------------~---------------------------+ 
3926 OTHER 70.8 74.2 69.9 82.2 
3917 TUBES PIPES HOSES & FITTINGS 35.5 41.5 49.6 66.4 
3923 CLOSURES 27.4 31.2 34.1 41.9 
3924 TABLEWARE, KITCHENWARE 10.2 13.0 13.2 19.1 
3918 FLOOR COVERINGS 11.4 14.2 13.2 18.7 
3922 BATHROOM FITTINGS 3.5 4.3 5.2 7.1 
3925 BUILDERSWARE 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.1 
-----------------------------+ TOTAL 161.2 181.0 187.4 237.6 I 
+--------------------------------------------------------------+ Source: IDC 
The origin of these imports was largely NWE, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and the 
US. This would appear to approximate world trade patterns; Europe and Asia account for 
76% and 19% respectively of world exports of plastic strips etc (SITC 58343) and for 78% 
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and 12% respectively of plastic packaging, containers and lids (SITC 8931)" 
. These are the countries South African producers will have to compete against in export 
markets. The fact that these countries are able to land and sell their plastic products in South 
Africa despite the transport costs and tariff payments is a measure of the degree of 
improvement that will be necessary for South African producers to compete. 
Tariffs for the plastic convertin~ industry 
Tariffs are typically 20-30% ad valorem together with a reference price for those tariff 
lines which have had tariffs imposed. This level is generally higher than that applicable to 
polymers, presumably to off-set the effects of the reference pricing system for polymers. It 
seems reasonable to assume that a reduction in tariffs without other changes, would lead to 
inefficient producers exiting the industry and increased imports in the short term. Several 
firms interviewed did not know if there were tariffs applicable to their products or not but 
larger firms, threatened by cheap imports, were acutely aware of the relevant tariffs. 
Tariffs, as has been amply demonstrated in South East Asian countries, may be 
utilised to promote efficiency and competitiveness among domestic producers. It is thus 
necessary to consider what changes may need to be made to the existing tariff regime for the 
plastic converting industry. 
In the following sections tariff categories are examined to determine the tariff structure 
as well as recent trends in trade. In some cases possibilities for changes to the tariff structure 
are highlighted. 
Each tariff code (at the 4 digit level) is considered in turn. 
HS CODE 3926 Other articles of plastic 
This code is the largest source of imports and exports of plastic products. Within this 
code 4 sub codes account for most of the imports and interestingly, most of the exports. 
These 4 sub codes all have a 30 % tariff and 5 % surcharge, except one which is tariff free 
(39269015). In real terms, over the 1988-91 period imports have shrunk by 6.4% p.a. and 
exports increased by 14.4% p.a., a very promising trend. There appears no reason to change 
this structure on the basis of the information available. 
1. Calculated from United Nations, 1990, Vol 1, pp781 & 454. 
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HS CODE 3925 Buildersware of plastics 
This code accounts for the smallest volume of trade in the plastic products industry. 
It has a 30% tariff and 5% surcharge. In real terms, over the 1988-91 period imports have 
shrunk by 13.0% p.a. and exports increased by 5.5% p.a., again an encouraging trend. The 
main imports are venetian blinds and the main exports 'other'. The bulky nature of the 
products may make significant tariff reductions possible. This would also be in the interests 
of a large low cost housing programme as this would have the effect of lowering domestic 
prices which are typically set at import parity. Local venetian blind manufacture warrants 
investigation. 
HS. CODE 3924 Tableware. Kitchenware and other household articles 
Despite a 30% tariff and a 15% surcharge; imports (60% from the Pacific Rim 
countries) have grown, in real terms by 5.4% p.a. over 1988-91. Exports also grew over the 
same period by 8.5 % p.a. in real terms. Generally the quality of South African products is 
considered good, indeed that may be the problem. They may, in some instances, be superior 
to the Pacific Rim goods which serve the same purposes. It appears that at least some local 
producers are aiming at the higher end of the market (27% of exports were to NWE) and that 
the Pacific rim .imports are aimed at the lower end of the market. More detailed research is 
needed. 
HS CODE 3923 Bags. bottles. closures. stoppers. and lids 
This is the third largest category of imports. The main import codes in this section 
have a 30 % tariff and a 5 % surcharge. Over the 1988-91 period exports shrunk by 5.1 % p.a. 
and imports (66% from Europe) grew by 0.3% p.a. in real terms. This is largely packaging, 
bottles and lids, presumably of a more elaborate or specialist kind. It does not seem from an 
environmental point of view desirable to increase imports of plastic packaging. However 
much of it packages food and other consumer items and in the interests of bringing these 
costs down for low income consumers, lower tariffs should be considered. The packaging 
business and the major producers in it appear large enough to make the necessary adjustments 
to become more competitive over a period of time. 
Technology agreements restraining exports appear to be prolific in the plastic 
packaging industry. As a bargaining lever, reduced tariffs could be withheld from countries 
which refuse to allow these agreements to be modified to allow exports from South Africa. 
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HS CODE 3922 Bathroom fittings 
The main source of imports here has a 30% tariff and 5 % surcharge protection. 
Imports over 1988-91 have grown at 7.4% p.a. and exports at 42.2 % p.a. in real terms. This 
most favourable export trend is unfortunately among one of the smaller codes. 
HS CODE 3918 Floor coverings 
The 2 largest sub-codes in this category, accounted for 87 % of imports and have a 
20% and 30% tariff, respectively, together with a reference price and both have a 5% 
surcharge. The source of imports is split almost evenly between Western Europe on the one 
hand and Korea and Taiwan on the other. Over 1988-91 imports have grown at 2.1 % p.a. 
whilst exports have shrunk by 6.6% p.a. in real terms. 
It is necessary to consider the background , to this sector in order to place the 
suggestion which follows in perspective. There have been only three producers of cushion 
flooring in South Africa. All three were multinationals. ,In response to a proposed merger of 
two of these three producers the Competition Board allowed the merger on the understanding 
that tariffs WOUld, in future , be lowered. The remaining (two) producers employ less than 200 
employees and tend to focus on the upper end of the market. The production process utilises 
imported raw materials and outdated equipment which was also imported. The size of the 
local market is less than 40% of the size needed for minimum efficient scale of production. 
The Taiwanese and Korean imports are particularly competitive in the lower end of 
the market. Indeed, one code (39181035) accounted for about 60% of imports over the last 
3 years. There is no local production of products competing at this lower end of the market 
and yet there is a 30% ad valorem tariff and a reference price. In the interests of lower 
income consumers it would seem reasonable to remove the tariffs on code 39181035. 
Alternatively, since a major new investment is needed to produce efficiently this 
business area seems to be a suitable target for an industrial restructuring package which might 
include IDC financing and in the process perhaps a wresting of control of this sector away 
from the MNCs which currently dominate it. If a world scale capacity plant were installed 
local polymer manufacturers may be persuaded to manufacture the raw material locally. At 
the same time exports may be possible after restructuring. A restructuring package would be 
particularly appropriate in the context of a rapidly expanding housing sector. 
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HS CODE 3917 Tubes pipes hoses and fiuines 
This is the second largest category of imports. Imports in this code group encompass 
a wide variety of pipes, fittings and sausage casings. Almost all the codes with tariffs in this 
section are 20% or 30% together with a reference price and a 5 % surcharge. Imports have 
grown at 5.5% p.a. and exports by 13% p.a. in real terms over 1988-91. Local producers 
make good quality pressure pipe (with mining applications) and PVC piping. 
If a mass housing programme takes off, scales of production should increase for 
products with housing applications. This should allow tariffs to be reduced for bulky and less 
easily transported items such as rigid piping. The high level of concentration in rigid piping 
suggests that tariffs can be relatively easily used to regulate domestic prices. 
Export Incentives 
To promote export led economic growth, successful East Asian economies have 
allowed direct exporters access to intermediate inputs at world prices. This has meant that 
they were able to choose between locally produced or imported intermediate inputs. Imported 
inputs were tariff free. This included capital goods. The practice in South Africa is only to 
allow tariff free imports for those items which are not locally produced. Even this tariff free 
access is not without difficulty. 
First a firm must register as an exporter with the Board of Tariffs and Trade which 
requires proof of this status and is a 'very involved' process. 14 Registering as an exporter 
entitles a firm access to the customs duty draw back system. This provides for duties paid on 
imports of intermediate inputs to be recovered once proof of exports is available. This 
disadvantages small exporters in that they must carry the burden of working capital costs until 
they are able to recover the duty some six to twelve months later. In order to circumvent this 
expense a firm could apply for an exemption of duty. Such an application has to satisfy the 
Board of Tariffs and Trade that: imported inputs will only be used for the export of the end 
products specified, that using imported inputs is justified, and that local producers cannot 
supply the inputs, together with an estimate of the amounts involved. 
Indirect exporters (suppliers of intermediate inputs to final exporters) in East Asia also 
had access to their intermediate inputs at world prices, that is tariff free. They too were free 
to choose between local and imported intermediate inputs. In addition intermediate exporters 
14. SAFTO representative, Durban 7-1-93. 
318 
also benefited from export incentives such as soft loans, technical assistance and short term 
credit. The mechanism used for achieving this was the domestic letter of credit. This is a 
kg! 'back to back' letter of credit whereby the indirect exporter is able to raise finance upon 
the 'collateral' provided by a final exporter's letter of credit. IS In South Africa banks have 
little regard for letters of credit, chiefly because they can be very technical and detailed and 
a failure by the supplier to meet one of the requirements can lead to the loss of the export 
order or large penalties. Consequently they prefer post dated cheques. Local banks may be 
prepared to open a credit in favour of an indirect exporter on the strength of an irrevocable 
documentary credit from overseas. However even if an indirect exporter clears this hurdle 
the way is still not open to import intermediate inputs tariff free. This requires permission 
from the Board of Tariffs and Trade. According to the Board of Tariffs and Trade it is 
possible, although rare, for an indirect exporter to be given a duty free permit. If both the 
direct and the indirect exporters apply such an application 'will be considered'. 16 
The General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) introduced in April 1990 offers cash 
payments to exporters which are graduated according to the level of beneficiation of local 
products. The local content requirement in GElS means that.exporters have to choose between 
the duty drawback/exemption scheme or GElS. The major weakness of GElS is that exporters 
are tied to locally produced intermediate inputs which are often set at local domestic prices 
thus disadvantaging the local exporter. 17 However some polymer manufacturers do make 
polymer available to converters for export purposes at (discounted) 'export prices', which are 
confidential. The impression gained from field work is that for most polymers such 'export 
prices' lie somewhere between the (higher) local domestic price and the (lower) actual export 
parity price for such polymer. PVC for example is sold to exporters at 75% of the domestic 
market price. 
Theoretically polymer exporters should be indifferent about selling their products on 
export markets or to local converters (for export purposes) at export parity prices. Hence the 
possibility exists within the current industrial policy and trade regime to redirect material to 
15. Such local "back to back" letters of credit are to be distinguished from those typically available in South 
Afri~. If a South African exporter does not produce the goods itself, and if slhe has an irrevocable documentary 
credIt from overseas, t~en th~ exporter's bank may be prepared to open a credit in favour of the producer on 
the. strength. of ~e credIt ~ecelved from overseas. This typically applies to export agents rather than to suppliers 
of tntermedlate tnputs as tn East Asian NICs. 
16. Mr Bester, Deputy Director Board of Tariffs and Trade, Pretoria, telephonic interview, 27-1-93. 
17. Earlier Chapters have established that local market polymer prices are typically set at import parity level. 
C~nsequently and as a result of relatively high tariffs, local prices are significantly higher than international 
pnces. 
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more elaborately manufactured products for export. 
In summary the structure of the trade regime for exports is designed more to protect 
local producers than to facilitate exports. In addition almost all interviewees in the industry 
complained about the inconsistent and ad hoc nature of the state's development plans and the 
accompanying range of incentives. This has caused many to lose confidence in these schemes 
and the trade regime. 
Conclusions 
Whilst the end of apartheid and South Africa's engagement with GAIT are bringing 
about an increased outward orientation of the chemical industry simultaneously with a 
restructuring of that industry, it is argued that there . are also other more subtle imperatives 
flowing from these changes affecting the workplace shop floor. The increasing globalisation 
of production and marketing has brought forth a demand for consistency in the quality of 
traded products which is expressing itself in the form of ISO 9000 quality consistency 
auditing procedures. 
The adoption of ISO 9000 systems is increasingly becoming a prerequisite for exports 
into Europe and other developed countries. The adoption of these trade directed systems 
brings together a nexus of issues on the shop floor; manufacturing quality standards and the 
workplace reorganisation and manufacturing systems which accompany such systems, 
environmental concerns, employee involvement and industrial democracy and health and 
safety issues. In this nexus there lies a wealth of opportunity for more subtle and people 
orientat~ industrial policy instruments of the 'soft technology' type. It is also argued that the 
adoption of ISO 9000 systems presents organised labour with an historical window of 
opportunity. 
The detail of such packages of policy instruments are beyond the scope of this study 
although it seems clear that through careful attention to coordination and interconnections, 
much could be done to improve the quality of export manufacturing and the quality of shop 
floor life. As an added bonus there may even be positive environmental spin offs. 
Overall the South African chemical industry has lagged behind world trends in the 
proportion of sales exported. The chemical industry has also had a long standing negative 
trade balance. Within chemical exports just three trade codes account for 65% of exports. 
Inorganic chemicals has been the largest of these but its share has declined through the 1980s 
as a result of declining exports. The source of these exports is a narrow production base 
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which has questionable international competitiveness. Much of South Africa's chemical 
exports are associated with mining, minerals and agriculture, particularly if the coal 
feedstocks used by SASOL and AECI are taken into account. They are predominately less 
elaborately manufactured type products. Hence industrial strategy should attempt to increase 
exports from further along the value adding chain, ideally to the most labour intensive points. 
The changing composition of exports through the 1980s has resulted in petrochemicals 
becoming increasingly important. SASOL has a number of export orientated projects under 
construction, such as its alpha olefins facility, which may be expected to reinforce this trend 
in future. 
The main feature of plastic exports is that plastic raw materials exports far exceed the 
export of plastic products. By itself this is an opportunity to expand plastic products exports 
by giving plastic converters access to this material at export parity prices to produce higher 
value added products for export. This would benefit South Africa as plastic raw material 
exports have negative value added. There may also be financial benefits for polymer 
producers which are making losses on exports. 
The history of the trade regime reveals the reluctance of the polymer producers to 
relinquish their cosy protected status and to face world competition. Tariff reform which has 
occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s has encouraged restructuring in the polymer 
manufacturing industry. This in turn, is changing the composition of plastic raw materials 
exports. As restructuring takes place traditional exporters, reliant upon higher protected 
domestic prices, are being replaced by other somewhat more internationally competitive 
exporters. However even the latter are still reliant to some extent upon protected domestic 
markets for profitability. New exporters (SASOL's PP and Safripol's HDPE) are taking over 
from long standing exporters (eg. AECI's PVC). Plastic raw material imports are far more 
widely based than exports and reflect the lack of domestic aromatics production. 
Further evidence presented strengthens the importance of the polymer reference price 
in determining pricing in the jiliere. All indications are that tariffs for plastic raw materials 
will be a key lever in any industrial strategy. However it needs to be borne in mind that 
reducing nominal tariffs on polymer without a corresponding reduction for plastic products 
using such polymer, will result in greater protection for manufacturers of plastic products 
than they enjoyed before. 
Exports of plastic products have been a much smaller proportion of sales than a 
sample of NICs, second tier NICs and DMEs. Notwithstanding South Africa's high cost 
structure, there is an, albeit limited, capability to export into sophisticated product markets 
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which provides a base upon which to build export expansion. On the basis of the sample 
interviewed most plastic converters are reluctant to export and will require considerable 
assistance and incentives. 
The impediments to exports of plastic products are chiefly the cost of intermediate 
inputs, technology agreements and the trade regime. All require attention. It has been 
suggested that in order to promote exports, both direct and indirect exporters should have the 
option to access their intermediate inputs from tariff free imports rather than cash incentives 
such as GElS which will encounter difficulties with GAIT regulations. 
If local polymer were available at export parity prices or a price approximating world 
prices, and some form of export incentive scheme such as GElS remained in operation, then 
the latter should only be applicable for domestically sourced polymer, as there appears to be 
no merit in unnecessarily increasing the consumption of imported polymer. In short what is 
required is a small advantage in favour of locally produced inputs rather than the absolute 
preference given in the past. 
The vast number of types of plastic products produced locally and imported makes 
setting appropriate tariffs difficult. There may be many tariff lines on which tariffs are paid 
but where there is no domestic production of the item concerned. Tariff reform is required 
in particular in one area. The category 'other' is the conduit for much of the imports and 
exports of plastic products and greater clarity is needed about the nature of these products. 
Those setting tariffs need to be frequently updated with information on which plastic 
products are being locally produced in order to better manage tariffs. This is necessary 
because the practice of import parity pricing requires that tariff levels be kept as low as 
possible in order to keep the cost of living down. A better system for the collection of these 
data would allow a faster response time by the authorities to changed circumstances. 
There are only about 1 000 participants in the industry and with an address list from 
the Plastics Federation it should not be too difficult to set up a cheap computerised data base 
of what is being produced, imported and exported so as to better inform those setting tariffs. 
The threat of tariff removal would act as an incentive to firms to respond. 
Such a venture may also be self funding to some extent if it also developed a plastics 
products 'Yellow Pages' function for those seeking sources of supply. This idea is similar to 
the CSIR's Chemdata publication which is intended to achieve the same objective for the 
chemical industry. 
Further suggestions to correct the historical imbalance in the commodity plasticsjiliere 
are made in the final chapter as a part of the industrial strategy options for the jiliere. 
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CHAPTER 10 
PETROCHEMICALS IN SOUTH AFRICA: FUTURE OPTIONS 
Introduction 
South Africa lacks proven reserves of crude oil and significant natural gas resources 
as well as proximity to large markets which make exports of petrochemicals an unlikely 
development strategy. This chapter argues that there are other reasons in addition to these that 
reduce the prospect of a large petrochemical industry developing in the short term. 
Nevertheless a growing economy will need the wide range of products that have their origins 
in the petrochemical industry. In addition it is a strategic industry with long lead times and 
planning horizons. Consequently it is important to identify what prospects exist for meeting 
such demand and what the accompanying advantages and disadvantages are likely to be. 
Accordingly this chapter outlines a research agenda for more modest options for the 
petrochemical industry with some of the attendant advantages and disadvantages. In the 
process recent state initiatives to determine' future strategy for the petrochemical industry are 
criticised. Similarly the different interest groupings punting each of the future options are 
identified and discussed. 
It is argued that it is undesirable to leave the development trajectory of the 
petrochemical industry to competing private interests which must ultimately put their own 
interests before those of the country. Finally a framework for the process of restructuring 
SASOL to meet social policy objectives different from the previously dominant 
military/strategic ones is outlined. 
Could South Africa opt to be a major player in petrochemicals in the short term? 
Could South Africa, despite being poor in hydrocarbon resources (apart from coal and 
coal bed methane) opt for a large petrochemical sector like other hydrocarbon poor NICs such 
as Taiwan and especially South Korea? 
South Korea for example, has "no discernible advantages in producing 
petrochemicals", but has recently embarked upon a headlong rush into large petrochemical 
projects (The Economist, 1992, Vol 322:7750, p87). Ethylene capacity, as a result of the 
construction of 6 naphtha crackers, soared from 505 000 tpa in 1989 to 3.2 million tpa by 
the end of 1992 (Ibid). This veritable petrochemical flood has been attributed to two factors. 
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The recent deregulation of the tightly regulated and compartmentalised petrochemical 
industry, and the fierce rivalry between the South Korean Chaebols (Tanzer, 1991:60). It is 
still too early to tell whether this huge initiative will be successful or not. 
As has been discussed earlier, the key factors needed to succeed in petrochemicals are 
guaranteed supplies of competitively priced hydrocarbons and cQeap capital. South Africa 
meets neither of these requirements, leaving aside for the moment the various potential but 
as yet unproven . hydrocarbon reserves or processes. (These are essentially: natural gas 
offshore at Mossel Bay, direct liquefaction of coal technology and coal bed methane gas). 
South Africa does have large proven reserves of cheap coal but the capital costs in producing 
petrochemicals from coal have been prohibitive to date. When further factors are considered 
such as proximity to major markets and construction capabilities (both of which South Korea 
has) the picture appears gloomier still. Current world overcapacity and low profitability in 
petrochemicals are a further reason to be wary of investments in large expansions of capacity. 
However this is an industry with longer planning horizons than most and overcapacity does 
occur periodically in this commodity chemicals business. 
Given the correct mix of industrial policy and macro economic environment there is 
no a priori reason why in due course, giant projects similar to those recently undertaken in 
South Korea, if on a lesser scale, could not be tackled in South Africa. 
However this is unlikely in the short term at least. There are several reasons for this 
in addition to those already mentioned. Firstly adequate research may not exist.) Research 
within the larger companies may well be able to fill this gap, only they regard it as 
confidential. Presumably these companies do share their research when they undertake joint 
ventures from time to time. For example AECI and Sentrachem built Coalplex as a joint 
venture. Recently AECI and SASOL jointly took over Sentrachem's fertilizer plant at 
Phalaborwa. SASOL, AECI and Engen in the late 1980s, undertook joint research into the 
direct liquefaction of coal, at the Central Energy Council's bidding. (The results remain 
secret.) The advent of Politin may be expected to bring to bear the combined expertise of 
SASOL and AECI experts in this area. 
However participating in the ownership of individual plants or joint R&D efforts for 
particular chemical complexes is quite a different matter from collectively pooling available 
knowledge for the purposes of determining an industrial strategy for the South African 
1. The ~st recent ~ublication on the industry, Enigma Marketing Research's latest report, The Chemicals 
Industry lD South Afnca, may have filled this gap to some extent. At a cost of R 4 469 it bas not been available 
to me. 
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petrochemical industry. Too many vested interests and corporate rivalries get in the way. This 
failure is starkly apparent in the Report of the Working Group for the Promotion of the 
Chemical Industry. This report although acknowledging the need for an industrial strategy, 
fails to develop one, other than to plead for a government 'hupstoot' (OTI, 1990). Corporate 
rivalries also limited the possibility of an optimum petrochemical strategy emerging in the 
work of the 'Sander Committee' (petrochemical Industry Study Group) as has been discussed 
in Chapter Six. Although the Sander Committee went further than the Working Group in that 
it did elaborate calculations in an effort to identify the best route forward for liquid fuels and 
petrochemicals (they are virtually inseparable strategies) it was regarded as only a 'screening 
exercise' in order to "indicate a direction. The rest was up to the Industry itself" (Minutes 
of the Petrochemical Industry Study Group, 24-11-89:4). 
This is indicative of a lack of direction offered by the state at the time in so far as 
petrochemicals and liquid fuels were concerned. Despite the massive interventions in the form 
of SASOL and Mossgas, something of a vacuum appeared to have developed in the state's 
ability to look forward to future developments in this industry. Perhaps the mounting criticism 
of Mossgas had made the state less bold. The initiative for the establishment of both of these 
committees arose from (then) Deputy Minister Dr Theo Alant's concern with the chemical 
industry trade imbalance. The practical work and calculations were performed largely by a 
team of AECI researchers. In Japan this type of analysis would be done by MITI. 
Unlike MITI no attempt appears to have been made by the state to forge a consensus 
over the actual way forward. It would seem that the ideology accepted by the group was that 
put forward by Sander at the outset (see Chapter Six) which amounts to a commitment by the 
state to a 'hupstoot' at the upstream end for a project/s to be determined by the private sector 
and open competition all the way down the chain. This despite the understated 
acknowledgement by the Working Group that: 
"It is questionable whether market forces alone will achieve the necessary objectives, 
as the circumstances in the upstream end do not comply with the conditions for a 
perfectly competitive market." (OTI, 1990:29) 
For reasons which have emerged in previous chapters and which will be expanded in 
this chapter, it is most undesirable to leave the future of the country's petrochemical industry 
to a small number of companies which ultimately must put their own interests before those 
of the country as a whole. There are a variety of reasons for this, some of which are briefly 
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identified here. 
. The petrochemical industry is a source of primary inputs to a wide range of industries. 
A private business must tailor its investments in this area to meet its business strategy, either 
local or international or both. This may require such facilities to be located overseas (such 
as Sentrachem' s proposed purchase of certain petrochemical facilities in Australia) which 
impacts upon the balance of payments and job creation. In short the criteria and objectives 
of national development and private enterprises do not necessarily coincide and where the 
social costs of divergence between these two are high, government needs to be cautious about 
leaving 'the rest up to the Industry itself. These dangers are discussed further in a more 
detailed assessment of the various private sector proposals. 
In South Africa's case where state involvement in exploration (Soekor) and synfuels 
and petrochemicals (SASOL, Coalplex and Mossgas) has been massive, a whole 'raft' of 
regulations have been developed to keep these enterprises afloat which cannot suddenly be 
terminated. Yet on the other hand their continued existence gives rise to criticisms of 'cross 
subsidy' and a reluctance to invest by those who will not benefit from such regulatory 
support. Alternatively successful calls for deregulation may lead to a wastage of resources. 
In the petrochemical industry the stakes for the country are large and so are the risks. 
A state role of at least 'concerned stewardship' seems appropriate. 
A prerequisite for a national industrial strategy is a comprehensive and detailed 
analysis of South Africa's capabilities across the wide range of petrochemicals and their 
derivatives, together with an assessment of international markets and competition, import 
propensity and export potential. Regrettably such a task is beyond the meagre resources of 
the present study. 
Secondly a political policy decision would be necessary to devote the very considerable 
capital and other resources necessary, to such a major petrochemical growth strategy. This 
is unlikely to be a popular decision in the foreseeable future for at least two reasons. Public 
perception of the chemical industry has been badly tarnished by the state's ventures into 
SASOL and Mossgas, despite the fact that these are not really chemical plants, but rather 
refineries producing liquid fuels. Mossgas in particular has attracted unanimous condemnation 
as a 'white elephant' in the media not only because of the processing route chosen (gas to 
liquid fuels) but also due to the fact that construction costs were (in real terms) approximately 
double the initial amount approved. Worse was to follow. First a consultants' investigation 
in 1993 found just 12 years worth of gas and later in 1994 Mossgas reported that only two 
years supply remained without further investment (see below). Such a political policy decision 
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will, without very strong justification, also prove unpopular with those who are concerned 
about unemployment levels and the very capital intensive nature of large petrochemical 
projects. 
From the vantage point offered by this study it is possible to make some general 
observations about more modest options for a future South Afri~ petrochemical industry. 
Since this has not been the central focus of this study it does not pretend to supplant the 
research needs described above, but merely offers a framework within which such research 
could be conducted. The crucial strategic question to be answered by such research is, where 
will South Africa source its next one or two tranches of petrochemicals'l2 In seeking answers 
to this question, as is indicated below, researchers will have to look to geographic locations 
both within South Africa and outside of South Africa, and to the various options in types of 
feedstock available such as coal, crude oil, natural gas etc. 
More modest o.ptions for the petrochemical industry 
There appear to be six possible petrochemical indu$try strategies for the sourcing of 
feedstocks and/or raw materials. Four of these options are unlikely to result in world beating 
low cost producers. One makes this claim although it is yet to be proven whilst another seems 
too uncertain to rely upon. In short these are: 
1. Leapfrogging upstream petrochemical production and importing the petrochemicals 
and polymers required. 
2. New development in coal based petrochemicals. 
3. Further development of SASOL, Secunda into petrochemicals. 
4. Developing a petrochemical centre based upon imported feedstocks. 
5. Gas based petrochemicals utilising off shore gas at Mossel Bay. 
6. Await developments in the Southern African region. 
Each option is dealt with in turn below. A further option, building a purely export orientated 
petrochemical complex is not considered as those interviewed were unanimous that such a 
2. Tran~he as used ~ere means a .certain capacity of petrochemicals. In capital intensive industries with large 
econolDles of scale bke petrochelDlcals the capacity is usually large. The exact plant capacity of a petrochemical 
co~lex is a function of many variables, feedstock type, co-product benefits, technology etc. By way of example 
the SIX Korean naphtha crackers recently completed are 350000 tpa. The benefits of economies of scale above 
about 300 000 tpa are not very large, although some crackers are double that size. 
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project was not commercially viable. 
Those options which involve the building of additional capacity all face the difficult 
issue of timing, or a trade-off of risks in deciding when to bring such a plant on str~. It 
is likely that potential investors will vie with each other in a race to bring the next tranche 
on stream.) The trade-off of risks which investors face is between winning the race (and 
'cornering the market') on the one hand and the amount and period over which exports have 
to take place - in the context of a race it may be assumed that the winner will have to 
commence production before domestic demand can absorb all of the plant's output and that 
the balance will have to be exported (at lower prices). The larger the proportion which has 
to be exported and the longer the period over which exports have to take place, the lower the 
returns on the investment may be. 
1. Leapfrogging upstream petrochemical production and importing the 
petrochemicals and polymers required. 
This option envisages dispensing with further petr~ltemical production and importing 
the necessary petrochemicals or derivatives/polymer. This may be possible if a large 
speciality chemicals industry existed which could add value to intermediate commodity 
chemicals and export the result. Unfortunately this does not presently exist. 
I am not aware of any economy of comparable size which has attempted, as a matter 
of deliberate policy, to leapfrog basic petrochemicals in its development plans. Certainly there 
is no lack of arguments against such a strategy: reliability of supply, strategic importance, 
large inventories etc. South Africa has by default, consequent upon the military/strategic 
nature of SASOL and Mossgas, been obliged to pursue this type of leapfrogging approach, 
especially in so far as aromatics based petrochemicals and engineering type plastics are 
concerned. The result, as has been shown, is a costly import bill and a trend away from 
engineering type plastics to commodity plastics. Petrochemical feedstocks for the synthetic 
fibre industry is an example. In order to produce PET (polyester) its precursors 
(monoethylene glycol and terephthalic acid) are imported. This together with less than half 
efficient minimum scale plants, led to a 173% tariff (of the reference price type) on staple 
synthetic yarn (Levy, 1992:32). 
One country which is attempting something of a leapfrogging approach is Japan (see 
~. Sentrachem's media strategy since the late 1980s has consistently sent strong signals to competitors that they 
mtend to be a part of the next group to invest in petrochemicals in South Africa. 
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Spitz, 1988:528). Always reliant upon imported naphtha, government planners in the 1970s 
decided that the petrochemical industry faced viability problems in the long run. This 
appeared to lead to the view that naphtha feedstocks could be leapfrogged and petrochemical 
intermediates imported. This assisted in overcoming land shortages and environmental 
problems. However the threat of unsecured feedstock supplies was overcome by significant 
investments in oil rich gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, accompanied by agreements to 
purchase output. This is regarded as a form of international vertical integration (Oman, 
1989: 107). 
The Sander committee treated this ('leapfrogging') option as their 'base case' against 
which were compared six other options. The methodological approach used was a 
comparative, rather than an absolute, assessment of the alternatives, projected over 25 years 
from 1990 to 2015. The results were viewed from. two perspectives: a foreign exchange 
analysis and a total cost analysis. They concluded that the 'leapfrogging' or 'base case' was 
not the most favourable option. 
For these reasons as a kmi term strategy leapfrogging appears to be less than optimal. 
However as a short term or intermittent strategy the pros~ts seem better. At least it leaves 
open other options. Indeed intermittent leapfrogging is partially dictated by the large 
economies of scale of petrochemical production. This leads to imports of chemicals growing 
in between tranches of petrochemicals coming on stream. This is so because any new 
investment is likely to require the local market to absorb a significant proportion of output. 
Consequently there may be intervals between the point at which local supply meets demand, 
and a future point when the market has grown sufficiently to warrant a further investment. 
In the interval imports may have to make up the difference. 
2 New development of coal based petrochemicals 
At current crude oil prices of $16-$20 a barrel, new synfuels and indirect liquefaction 
of coal based petrochemical projects cannot compete, not because of the price of coal but 
because of the heavy investment necessary to extract petrochemicals from coal. Projections 
suggest that oil prices will not reach a level justifying further synfuels investments in the 
short to medium term. 
This scenario precludes further petrochemical sources from new 'greenfields' indirect 
liquefaction of coal based investments in the short to medium term. 
The Sander Committee research came to a similar conclusion. They examined four 
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Coal based synthetic fuels case assuming 40% self sufficiency maintained by 
the construction of four new synfuels plants, methanol as a fuel. 
A variation of B. 
Chemicals from coal based synfuels plants. That is 400 000 tpa of chemicals 
from each of 4 synfuels plants yielding the full range of olefins (C2S to C4S). 
Chemicals from coal. Methanol would be produced from coal and converted 
predominantly into chemicals via a modification of AECl's Methanol To 
Chemicals (MTC) process. 
These were found not to be the best options, all of them ~ing negative according to the net 
present value (NPV) analysis conducted. They are summarised in Figure 37 where each of 
the letters (B,C,F,G) above are represented by a line on the graph. 
The direct liquefaction of coal may prove to be different. Both the direct and the 
indirect (synthesis) liquefaction of coal were pioneered in Germany and used there extensively 
during World War 2 in the production of liquid fuels. The difference between the direct and 
indirect processes lies mainly in the extent to which the chemical structure within coal is 
broken down. The direct route leaves most of the original aromatic chemical units intact. 
Whereas in the indirect (synthesis) route (used by SASOL) coal is first reduced to its basic 
components (carbon monoxide and hydrogen) before being catalytically synthesised to the 
desired products. 
Research and development on the direct liquefaction of coal has continued in South 
Africa, more recently in the form of the Weskem project (see Lloyd, 1991b). As a result of 
SASOL's (synthesis) process, aromatics are almost entirely absent from its process. This has 
led to a national shortage of aromatics and growing imports of these products and their 
derivatives. The Weskem project is intended to meet this need through the direct liquefaction 
of coal into a 200 000 tpa aromatics complex at a cost of about R3.6bn (October 1990 values) 
(Ibid: 7). 
This is not yet a commercially proven technOlogy, unlike SASOL's indirect 
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Notes to Figure 37. 
1. Each line represents an option as follows: 
A. Base case - refinery expansion 
B. Coal based synthetic fuel case - 40% self sufficiency via conventional fuels. 
C. Coal based synthetic fuel case - 40% self sufficiency - methanol as a fuel. 
D. Conversion of fuel streams to chemicals at SASOL Secunda 
E. Steam cracking of liquids to produce chemicals 
F. Chemicals from coal based synfuels plants. 
The relevant options are discussed in more detail in the text. 
2. The discount rate was not recorded in the assumptions made. The South African government's Central 
Economic Advisory Services usually uses a discount rate of 8 %. 
liquefaction route. The Weskem project is 'very close' to commercial viability" However 
its location in the North West Transvaal (because of the particular kind of coal required) 
means that it will largely be orientated to import substitution for the Reef. This will 
disadvantage a plastic converting industry orientated towards exports. Nevertheless if it is 
commercially robust without high tariff protection or subsidies then there would seem no 
inherent reason why it should not proceed and obviate rising import costs provided that 
exporters needs were also catered for. It would also further exacerbate the geographically 
dispersed nature of the industry. 
A third potential source of hydrocarbons may also prove viable in time. This involves 
the extraction of what is commonly referred to as 'coalbed gas', (coalbed methane) which 
could theoretically be converted into petrochemicals. European countries have a long history 
of producing and using gas associated with coal mining. However interest in developing this 
resource independently of coal mining is a recent development. In the US 5 ()()() coalbed gas 
wells are currently in operation. According to a recent National Energy Council study the 
highest potential exists in the Waterberg basin in the northwest Transvaal and the southeast 
portion of Transvaal coalfield near Paardekop-Amersfoort. 
In summary South Africa has very large coal reserves as a potential source of fuels 
and chemicals. The economic viability is likely to be a function of dwindling global oil 
supplies, coal processing technology and the exchange rate if the Rand continues to decline. 
3 Further development or SASOL into petrochemicals 
This position has been advocated by Lloyd (1991a). The thrust of his argument is to 
further expand and develop SASOL petrochemical potential to provide those basic 
4. Personal communication P Lloyd, Industrial and Petrochemical Consultants (Pty) Ltd., 22-1-93. 
332 
petrochemical building blocks currently missing from SASOL's slate of products. He suggests 
that "we potentially have most of the feedstocks we need .. " within SASOL (Lloyd, 1991a:4). 
This could be achieved by relieving SASOL of its responsibilities to produce fuel, and 
altering the support regime or subsidy to favour petrochemical production rather than 
synfuels. The cost of this altered subsidy, he believes, would be about the same as the costs 
of the current synfuels support/subsidy system. Presently SASOL's petrochemical products 
are not directly subsidised. However, they have, as backing, considerable support from the 
regime of support for synfuels. 
The effect of Lloyd's proposal would be to increase oil imports to make up the loss 
in synfuel output. Conversely chemical . imports would be reduced and replaced by SASOL 
petrochemical. production. In short, it is a proposal to substitute lower cost crude oil imports 
for more costly chemical imports, which on the face .of it sounds like a good idea. 
The difficulty with Lloyd's (1991a) proposal is that it ties the petrochemical industry 
even more closely to SASOL's coal based cost structure. It would locate these plants, 
presumably, inland close to SASOL. This may be a handicap if in future, a switch had to be 
made to imported feedstock. It is possible that at a future point in time SASOL could switch 
to imported feedstocks of crude oil, transported inland by extending the existing pipeline 
which currently covers most of the distance. This would require SASOL's Secunda works to 
be converted into a conventional refinery and/or naphtha cracker complex, like its current 
Natref refinery in Sasolburg. SASOL's decision to prospect for oil in the Namibian off-shore 
fields may represent a strategic exploration of this option although it is more likely an attempt 
to secure regional supplies for its Natref refinery. However from the petrochemical and 
plastics industrial strategy point of view, a more export orientated sector would ideally be 
located at the coast rather than inland and consequently industrial strategy should be 
encouraging a gradual relocation of this industry to the coast. 
In addition, if it is intended that private enterprise should invest downstream of 
SASOL's petrochemical feedstocks, as Lloyd implies, then he would appear to have 
overlooked the concern major competing firms have in making investments downstream of 
SASOL. 
Some of SASOL's competitors which are also customers for its feedstocks are , 
whether rightly or wrongly, serious about developing independent feedstock sources. They 
find it strategically unacceptable to be in competition with their feedstock supplier. This 
difficulty could be overcome by limiting SASOL's downstream. involvement (and forefeiting 
the advantages of vertical integration) or by returning SASOL to its pre-privatisation public 
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utility role. 
A further difficulty with Lloyd's proposal is the geo$raphically dispersed nature of the 
industry, a point he himself makes. He also, correctly, draws attention to the synergies that 
exist for petrochemical producers in close proximity to each other and interconnected by 
pipelines. 
All of these reasons suggest the need for South Africa to identify a place which is 
ideally going to be developed as THE future petrochemical centre for South Africa. The 
choice of locations in turn depends upon the view taken of likely future feedstock sources. 
In short, either oil or coal. Coal means an inland location and oil a coastal location. The 
volume of coal required tends to dictate that the complex be sited near the coal source and 
in South Africa most proven coal reserves lie inland. Given the economics of coal chemistry, 
South Africa seems best advised to opt for imported feedstocks (oil, LPG etc) notwithstanding 
the declining exchange rate. This then dictates a coastal location, either Richards Bay or 
Durban due to their proximity to the PWV. Durban already has an existing refinery 
infrastructure, but it may lack sufficient land near the existing refineries. 
If SASOL could produce BTX aromatics based . upon its Secunda operations at 
competitive prices, then presumably they would have done so by now. Yet such plants do not 
feature among the list of plants announced to date, despite the fact that SASOL is not averse 
to import substitution type plants, as a matter of policy (SASOL Annual Report 1991). 
The final, and most weighty, difficulty with Lloyd's proposal is that it relies upon the 
maintenance of the support/subsidy for the liquid fuels industry which we have seen is of the 
order of R 1 billion p.a. possibly for a good many years to come. The value of the imports 
saved, in Lloyd's estimate, would have been at least R325 million in 1990. If so then even 
if adjusted for inflation, it would be more beneficial to end SASOL's subsidy and to continue 
importing petrochemicals. The impact upon the balance of payments of scrapping SASOL 
entirely makes such an option extremely unlikely. 
The Sander Committee investigated the option of converting fuel streams to chemicals 
at SASOL Secunda (Case D). It was found to be the best option (of those considered) for the 
long term development of the chemical industry, and in terms of NPV analysis had the best 
returns. It is not clear from the minutes and supporting documents of the Sander Committee 
whether the synfuel support regime was assumed to continue to operate or not. The projection 
was based on ethylene and propylene only, with some ethylene glycol and derivatives coming 
on stream in 2006, which means that the lack of the other olefins and aromatics would not 
be solved if this option were followed. 
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Nevertheless a variation of this position has of course been pursued by SASOL. In 
recent years it has expanded capacity in ethylene and propylene and is currently developing 
a world scale alpha olefins plant along with various other projects. SASOL sees further 
expansion of its facilities as the way forward for South Africa (Interview, Marriot). 
Currently SASOL has ethylene and propylene capacity considerably in excess of 
domestic demand. Is there potential for further capacity of these olefins? There is but at a 
price. Further potential for ethylene extraction from the Secunda plants would require 
utilising a more costly route than that currently used (Interview, Marriot). Potentially there 
is also a relative abundance of further propylene, which could probably be extracted at more 
competitive prices than ethylene. Whether they are world competitive or not will have to be 
determined at the time such investment is considered. In the context of reduced support for 
synfuels as suggested above, exploiting this potential will require a commercial decision by 
SASOL. 
Whether or not SASOL further expands olefin capacity, currently it is the major 
source of olefins and is likely to remain so until at least 1996. This then requires an industrial 
strategy in the short term if the plastics jiliere is to become more internationally competitive. 
4 Developing a petrochemical centre based upon imported feedstocks 
As we have seen, a most remarkable feature of the petrochemical industry is that this 
giant industry is reliant upon just 2-3% of crude oil processed for its feedstocks (Shell 
International Petroleum Company, 1966: 194). An obvious implication is that in future as 
global oil resources become scarce, the relatively small petrochemical off-take and the higher 
value added products it produces, are likely to assure the petrochemical industry of feedstock 
supplies. 
During 1993 the IDC were persuaded that a conventional cracker at a coastal location 
was a good option to investigate and invested some 2 800 person hours in this project. It also 
indicated a commitment to underwrite about 50% of the envisaged R 7.8 billion costs. 
A petrochemical processing centre, based upon imported feedstocks could be 
established at the coast, possibly Durban or Richards Bay, for the following reasons. To 
produce petrochemicals a conventional oil based route would be naphtha sourced from oil 
refineries which, when cracked, yields a wider slate of products than are currently available 
from the indirect liquefaction of coal. The long term trend against naphtha feedstock in favour 
of lighter feedstocks (eg gas) was arrested after the 1986 oil price crash and the rapid growth 
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in demand for propylene, which is available in much lower proportions from lighter 
feedstocks than from naphtha. The choice of feedstocks for South Africa will require careful 
study, but the international trend seems to favour flexibility of feedstock choice to offset 
fluctuations in price and supply (Vergara and Babylon, 1990). 
Recently a strategy has been advanced by Exxon which calls for increased back 
integration into refineries (see Heathcoate, 1992). Essentially they argue that the broad 
diversity of feedstocks available from refineries, and the feedstock flexibility this offers, 
together with other synergies, make for increasing cost advantages if basic chemicals units 
are integrated into large refineries. Should this prove to be a strategy with local application 
then our attention is directed to South Africa's largest crude oil refineries, Genref and 
SAPREF in Durban. Genref appear to share the Exxon view and have intimated in public 
statements during 1991 and 1992 that when their current phase of capacity expansion is 
complete they will be looking to enter the chemical market. The clearest view of their 
thinking emerged in a newspaper report in January 1993. Engen Chemicals General Manager 
Peter Sutherland is reported as saying that it would be premature to set up a major ethylene 
cracker before the end of the century, an obvious tilt at the Sentrachem proposed Mossel Bay 
cracker and a warning to the IDC who are rumoured to support the Sentrachem proposal. In 
its place Sutherland invokes a "world-wide swing towards smaller plants which extract 
chemicals out of the hydrocarbon stream" and argues for extracting smaller volumes, more 
in line with domestic demand, from the refining process (The Daily News, 21-1-93:18). 
Either Genref or more likely, the two refineries together, should have adequate 
capacity to produce sufficient feedstocks necessary to meet local demand in basic 
petrochemical building blocks utilising plants of sufficient economies of scale as to warrant 
only limited tariff protection. 
The Sander Committee's Case E, labelled 'Steam cracking of liquids to produce 
chemicals', envisaged a new refinery at Richards Bay (due to a land shortage in Durban) with 
an associated naphtha cracker built in 1993, followed by a further cracker in 2009, followed 
by a further refinery in 2011. The crackers would be world-scale yielding 600 000 tpa of 
ethylene with a wide range of products including one of the aromatics, benzene from which 
styrene would be made. The feedstock would be surplus gas oil from the local refmeries and 
supplementary imported naphtha. 
This option (Case E) was the only other option to show a positive NPV and led the 
Committee to conclude: 
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"For the cases considered in the study, the total cost and NPV analysis showed that 
the best options for the long term development of the chemicals industry in South 
Africa were either the steam cracking of liquids or the conversion of existing fuels 
streams at SASOL Secunda to chemicals production." (Minutes of the Petrochemical 
Industry Study Group, 24-11-89:3) 
If left to the market this option may require a remarkable degree of co-operation 
among competing firms. For example it might require the co-operation of Shell and BP (the 
owners of SAPREF) and Engen who for their own commercial reasons may not be 
comfortable with such an arrangement. It would also mean increased penetration by large 
multinationals and a conglomerate (Engen is a part of the Gencor Group) into one of the 
strategic commanding heights of the economy. Furthermore, a Durban or Richards Bay based 
naphtha cracker would obviate the need for a gas cracker in Mossel Bay. Sentrachem has 
invested considerable research expenditure on their Mossel Bay petrochemical complex 
proposal which they are presumably reluctant to abandon without reward. In short, either a 
remarkable level of co-operation will have to be forthcoming from some unlikely quarters or 
state intervention will be required as has so often been the case in other countries (Vegara and 
Babylon, 1990). 
Since the petrochemical industry occupies a 'commanding heights' position in the 
economy careful consideration ought to be given to the opportunities afforded foreign 
investors in this area. In a globalised industry such as chemicals, MNCs are the primary 
source of technology and access to markets. However they are also an important mechanism 
for the transfer of wealth from developing economies to developed economies. A balance has 
to be found in gleaning what is useful for South Africa from MNCs whilst not allowing them 
to dominate the local market. Other developing and industrialising countries have exercised 
control in various ways. South Korea for example, which currently has about six times the 
petrochemical capacity South Africa has, severely limited foreign direct investment and has 
only recently allowed up to 50% without state approval (Asia-Pacific Chemicals, June, 1992 
and Balassa, 1991). Given South Africa's location within the global petrochemical industry, 
further foreign direct investment ought to be limited to minority shareholdings. Alternatively 
arrangements such as operate in India could be introduced. It requires foreign exchange 
leaving the country in the form of dividend repatriations to be balanced by export earnings 
over a period of seven years (Patel, 1992: 14). In general Wade's (1991) prescription appears 
appropriate: welcome MNCs but direct their sales towards exports and their input purchases 
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towards local suppliers (Wade, 1991:363). 
Unfortunately South Africa's signature of the Marrakech Agreement (arising from the 
Uruguay Round of the GA'IT negotiations) precludes an explicit linkage between foreign 
investment and exports. However it would appear that the same result could be achieved if 
it were approached indirectly by the creation of other conditions w~ich did not explicitly refer 
to export requirements. Such arrangements require further investigation. 
The involvement of foreign investors in the off-shore financing of local projects also 
requires careful consideration. There has been considerable capital flight from South Africa 
in recent years by conglomerates such as Anglo American, De Beers and Rembrandt. The 
chemical conglomerates are not immune to this disease. Overseas investment and the 
utilization of off shore borrowing to finance local projects are just two possible mechanisms 
through which capital flight may take place. Sentrachem the proponent of the Mossel Bay 
cracker, a focus of our attention in the next section, is exploring both of these possibilities. 
Indeed the recent attempt by Sentrachem to purchase the Australian company Chemplex for 
between R330m and R490m, caused such concern that the then Minister of Finance (Keys) 
threatened to halt" or limit such outflows (Business Times, 22-11-92:2 and Business Day, 23-
11-92: 1). Sentrachem invoked the 'international diversification' argument to justify its 
intentions. This may not appear unreasonable in the context of a globalised chemical industry, 
however it is difficult to distinguish which of the company's intentions were uppermost in 
their minds, shifting capital off-shore or international diversification. Reports of foreign 
funding for the proposed Mossel Bay petrochemical complex range from $250 million to $400 
million (ECN, 9-9-91 and Business Day, 15-8-91:1). 
These considerations suggest that considered state policy is required in respect of 
foreign investment in the 'commanding heights' of the petrochemical industry. Similarly 
caution is needed if the state is to avoid extending the dominance of the upstream end of the 
industry at the expense of the downstream. There is a wealth of experience in Latin American 
countries, South Korea and Taiwan amongst others to be drawn upon in this regard. A study 
of the latter two in particular yields insights into the complex process of achieving the desired 
balance between upstream and downstream industries. 
5 Gas based petrochemicals utilising off shore gas at Mossel Bay 
The discovery of natural gas at Mossel Bay should have been good news for the 
domestic petrochemical industry and the country's economic growth, because utilising it for 
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chemical manufacture would have been a more productive use of this natural resource. Alas, 
the exigencies of military/strategic policy decreed that the gas be used for liquid fuels instead, 
and large amounts of capital have now been sunk into the Mossgas refmery. The existence 
of this refinery makes it more difficult to determine the future optimal use of this gas. 
Sentrachem has been the main proponent of a proposal to use the gas, or a share of 
it, for chemical purposes. They have proposed a gas cracker associated with the Mossgas 
synfuel refinery and have spent considerable sums on research into the various options 
ranging from a R 500 million ethane cracker to a R 6 billion combi cracker. A decision was, 
happily as it turns out, delayed until the CEF had completed an investigation to determine the 
extent of the gas fields off Mossel Bay and whether or not they could support petrochemicals 
as well as the Mossgas refinery. 
The Deloitte & Touche Management Consultants' investigation found just 12 years 
worth of gas for Mossgas, not sufficient to meet its planned operational life (Financial Mail, 
6-8-93:64). Consequently Sentrachem's hopes of building a gas cracker for petrochemical 
production at Mossel Bay have been crushed for the time being and until, if ever, suitable gas 
reserves are found. 
Should sufficient gas supplies be found to justify the investment, it is worthy of careful 
consideration. Careful scrutiny of its impact upon the balance of payments and social rates 
of return is needed, particularly if local gas feedstocks have to be supplemented by imported 
feedstocks. (See Annexure C, page 408 in this regard). A preliminary calculation made by 
Sentrachem at my request shows the Local Cost of Foreign Exchange to be 2.50 RlUS$, a 
more favourable figure than the current 2.80 to 3.00 RlUS$ exchange rate. Unfortunately 
several discussions with Sentrachem concerning the assumptions made could not overcome 
Sentrachem's need for confidentiality and thus this figure has very limited validity. 
The lynchpin of this project would have been the transfer price of gas and other 
feedstocks from Mossref to the cracker. This gas is a scarce resource and its selling price 
would need careful consideration and public debate with a view to ameliorating the burden 
of Mossgas on the fiscus. 
IfSentrachem's proposed gas cracker project had proceeded they anticipated exporting 
about 70% of output. National considerations suggest that such a resource based approach, 
which amounts to exporting large volumes of precious natural gas, in the initial years at least, 
into often heavily traded and cyclical global commodity markets, is a less than optimal path 
to follow. It would be far better to beneficiate this to plastic products and to export those. As 
this study has shown Sentrachem's simple expectation that the plastic converting industry 
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would blossom of its own accord merely because somewhat cheaper polymer was available 
is wide of the mark. Rather a package of factors conducive to growth and development in the 
plastic converting industry such as is detailed in the final chapter will be even more n~sary 
and urgent if and when a gas cracker is built. 
Further exploration for gas may yield better results but timing will be crucial. Unless 
the unforseen materialises it appears that if a gas cracker is built it will miss the widely 
anticipated global economic upswing in 1995/6, an optimal time at which to bring such a 
project onstream. 
An argument against such a gas based source of petrochemicals is that it would yield 
the same narrow band of petrochemicals as is currently the case. This may, from South 
Africa's national perspective, be sufficient reason to opt instead for a liquids (eg. naphtha) 
cracker even if it is less profitable than a gas cracker· from an individual firm point of view. 
A related proposal was to abandon Mossgas as a petrol refinery and convert it instead 
into a petrochemical complex. This would require SASOL, as the licensor of the technology, 
to waive its right to prohibit manufacture of petrochemicals. It would be a more productive 
use of the gas but would require the courage to write off C\ large investment and to invest a 
further, although much lesser amount, to make the conversion. This is not a new suggestion. 
An earlier confidential proposal by certain chemical companies to halt the construction 
of the Mossgas refinery and to replace it with a chemical complex was rejected by the De 
Waal Committee (set up to·consider this proposal) in the following terms:s 
"From the analysis above it is clear that all these projects are unattractive from an 
investor's point of view. The Mossel Bay gas project is only socially acceptable, for 
the case where the real oil price increases by 2% per annum. The analysis does, 
however, show that at this point in time the Fuels project is more acceptable from the 
community's point of view and until a better proposition for the use of the gas is 
identified that the fuels project should continue." (De Waal Committee Report, 
1991:6) 
In this analysis the nearer the Mossgas refinery came to completion the more remote 
became the possibility for 'a better proposition for the use of the gas'. 
A petrochemical complex at Mossel Bay is suitably placed for exports. However it is 
5. What ~an South Africa do about Mossgas?, A view compiled by industries associated with synthetic fuels 
and chelDlcals, August 1991. 
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disadvantaged relative to domestic polymer markets and the additional transport costs would 
need to be taken into account. 
A related but important point concerning a possible petrochemical complex (either in 
addition to the existing refinery or instead of it) is the prospecting associated with it. This is 
intimately bound up with the Mossgas refinery itself. Currently the parastatal, Soekor, has 
conducted their prospecting behind a thick veil of secrecy, in association with various dubious 
international concerns. The costs to the fiscus, via the Central Energy Fund - R835 million 
between 1965 and June 1987 (Soekor, 1987:7) - of these activities and the returns there on, 
(one small refinery, just one eighth the size of SAPREF, at disproportionately high cost) 
requires very careful public scrutiny. This necessitates the removal of legislation making such 
public scrutiny illegal. Indeed continued hydrocarbon prospecting in South Africa's unyielding 
waters requires serious review particularly in the light of the most recent reports on the 
Mossel Bay gas fields. Originally the gas fields were expected to have a lifespan of some 20 
years. In 1994 this figure was revised to 12 years and later revised again to only a two year 
lifespan. A further investment of approximately R600 million (1994 Rands) would be required 
to extend their life for a further 3 to 8 years (Business Day 18-10-94 & 24-10-94). 
This revelation has awakened renewed interest in a petrochemical complex based on 
imported feedstock. The CEF, IDC and Sentrachem are investigating a new variation of this 
proposal. They contemplate converting Mossref into a small crude oil refinery integrated with 
a petrochemical complex which would use as one of its feedstock streams the remaining gas 
at a cost of R 2.4 billion and R 4 billion respectively (Businesss Day 6-9-94 and 7-9-94). 
Ultimately, whether or not chemicals constitute the future optimal use of the Mossgas 
gas, will be a function partly of technological "development in gas extraction and also, 
hopefully, a careful estimation of the social rates of return to be expected therefrom. 
6 A wait developments in the Southern African region. 
The additional factor introduced into the discussion under this heading is the question 
of (Southern African) regional trade balances and regional economic development. A variation 
of option four (developing a petrochemical centre based upon imported feedstocks) involves 
a coordinated energy and petrochemical approach in the Southern African Region. 
Following the unbanning of political organisations in South Africa political 
developments in the Southern African region began to move steadily towards economic 
cooperation. In August 1992 the Southern African Development Coordinating Council 
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(SADCC) countries signed the founding documents for the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)6. Following this the energy sector of SADC adopted a draft Protocol 
on Energy Cooperation in March 1994 to promote regional cooperation in this sector. 
Three developments in the sub-continent deserve monitoring. Prospecting off the 
Namibian coastline, the Phande natural gas fields in Mozambique and developments in the 
Cabindan oil basin in Angola. Favourable developments in these areas may hold out hope of 
one of the key requirements being met: a guaranteed and competitively priced supply of 
hydrocarbon feedstocks. 
To meet South Africa's petrochemical needs Angola could sell either crude oil or 
naphtha or plastic raw materials to South Africa. In 1994 Angola's production facilities could 
not produce " sufficient volumes of naphtha and limited their potential sales to crude oil. 
However if peace were to break out in Angola and economic development took place, it is 
conceivable "that its refinery capacity could be expanded making naphtha exports possible and 
ultimately investment in a petrochemicals complex associated with a refining complex may 
occur making possible exports of plastic raw material to South Africa. 
Such developments would help to balance Angola's" trade account with South Africa. 
Cabindan oil output is largely tied to US markets by the US oil companies which operate that 
field and because of the price premium Angola's crude can command in the more 
environmentally concerned US. But South Africa has had negotiations to purchase Cabindan 
crude (Bamber, 1991:38) (although the outcome is not known) and South Africa may become 
a more quality sensitive crude oil purchaser with the scheduled introduction of lead-free petrol 
in 1996. 
It is unfortunate that the only certain supply of oil in Southern Africa (Cabinda) is so 
bedevilled by political uncertainty that major investments there appear unlikely for the 
foreseeable future. 
In so far as Phande gas is concerned SASOL entered into a pact with the 
Mozambiquean state owned Hydrocarbon Company (ENH) for the exploration of natural gas 
deposits at Phande in Southern Mozambique in 1992. The project envisages transporting the 
gas by pipeline to South Africa (Reuter News Service Africa, 27-2-92). In this context it is 
interesting to note that SASOL has also carried out an "extensive study of the economic 
factors for a synfuels plant based on natural gas. A dry natural gas feed for the production 
of synthesis gas was assumed." (O&GJ, 20-1-92:56). Phande gas is apparently 'dry' gas that 
6. ~e SADC co~ntries are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swazdand, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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is largely methane and lacking in ethane and propane, according to the head of Sentrachem's 
Strategic Raw Materials Project (Interview, McIver). Later, in 1994 the SADC launched a 
large study into the region's natural gas potential which may herald regional cooperation in 
this area in future. 
SASOL and Engen are involved in prospecting for oil off th~ Namibian coast. Overall 
there appears sufficient commercial incentive for South African firms to invest in searching 
for a regional supply of hydrocarbons as much as their sense of political risk will allow. 
In summary amongst the six options identified here, three large rival South African 
chemical/fuel corporations are each pursuing their own corporate strategy in answer to the 
question: where will the next tranche of olefins come from? The three strategies pull in three 
different directions. SASOL says SASOL. Sentrachem says a Mossel bay gas cracker and or 
an integrated crude oil refinery/petrochemical complex. Engen says a refinery based complex. 
The important point is that each corporation, for its own strategic reasons, is attempting to 
pull the country down its particular path, irrespective of what may be in the best interests of 
the country. Advocates of the 'free market' will find nothing amiss and pay tribute to the 
constructive competition emerging here. 
However it is not quite so simple. Public funds and public interest are involved, 
directly or indirectly. The IDC is preparing to commit large sums of public money to a 
petrochemical complex. SASOL is partly owned by the IDC and has had IDC participation 
in some of its recent projects. Engen might too require IDC participation. Tax benefits in 
terms of Section 37(e) have been made available to several SASOL projects and for the 
Mossel Bay gas cracker, if it proceeds and either one may require tariff protection at some 
point. In so far as private capital is concerned, large projects such as these, would remove 
significant proportions of investment capital from the available pool. There is also the issue 
of monopolistic rent which may be extracted by those who straddle commanding heights with 
limited or no competition. 
The crucial question is, should this reach of the commanding heights of our economy 
be left to corporate rivalry or are there not social and economic reasons for the state to direct 
and set forth the direction development should take in this strategic area more deliberately 
and in more detail than the Sander Committee did? This has certainly been the case in Japan 
and the successful NICs. Wade (1991) in his analysis of successful East Asian economies 
found that: 
"government 'led' rather than 'followed' the preferences of private market agents in 
the heavy and chemical industries... Within 'high-intervention' industries, (state) 
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leadership episodes are concentrated at the stage of creating distinctly new capacities 
(whether in new or existing industries), especially when such creation faces large 
indivisibilities or other entry barriers" (Wade, 1991:303 and 304). 
South Africa is now at the conjuncture when a similar decision must be made to bring 
on stream new petrochemical capacity in the next few years. It is also appropriate for the 
state to lead this episode, for the reasons just canvassed and for the following additional 
reasons. 
The issue is really who will decide and how will the decision be made? One way or 
another a decision will be made. Should it be state or should it be left to private enterprise? 
In considering an answer it needs to be borne in mind that the configuration of the larger 
scale upstream sector influences the configuration of. risks and opportunities for the smaller 
scale downstream sector. 
In retrospect it can be seen that the South African state has 'led' forcibly, in the local 
petrochemical industry. The first petrochemical complex (the Sasolburg naphtha crackers) in 
the 1960s was in pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialisation policy. The second (Coalplex) 
was both lSI and strategic. The third much larger intervention (the SASOL Secunda complex) 
was driven by military/strategic considerations. The fourth, Mossgas was the ultimate in 
military/strategic investments. 
Is this history of intervention involving commercially unwise decisions made for 
military/strategic reasons by an embattled regime, sufficient reason, in the emerging new 
political dispensation, for a more democratic state to abandon intervention in this key strategic 
area? It would appear not. Indeed since the (apartheid) state (albeit an illegitimate one) 
pursued a high level of intervention in the petrochemical industry and is largely responsible 
for its present unsatisfactory situation, is it not then incumbent upon the state to now extract 
or lead the industry from this and to redirect it into a more viable development trajectory? 
My tentative views on the direction which ought to be pursued have emerged in the 
foregoing discussion. However it is to be stressed that these are no substitute for the detailed 
research, costing and calculation which must precede selection of anyone, or combination 
of these options, and which may well arrive at different conclusions. Furthermore the largely 
intermediate input nature of much of the chemical industry means that petrochemical industry 
development should not be divorced from wider development strategies for manufacturing. 
The difficult process of extracting the industry from its present predicament comprises 
essentially two restructuring tasks. Firstly to move away from the internationally 
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uncompetitive sub-world scale plants which have emerged as a result of import substitution 
policies. Secondly to progressively remould those parts of the industry which are coal based 
away from coal and towards alternative and more internationally competitive feedstock 
requirements. There is of course some overlap between these two objectives. 
In so far as the rust of these tasks is concerned, tariff reductions and the threat of 
tariff reductions have already brought about some restructuring. Some plants have closed and 
others have expanded capacity and in some vertical integration of ownership has occ.urred. 
An industrial strategy to facilitate this process across the entire chemical industry is beyond 
the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that considerable dislocations to job security are 
arising which suggests that a concerned state will want to make this process as painless as 
possible. A tripartite industry forum would be a useful beginning. 
The second task is no less difficult in view of the huge sums of public money 
originally invested in coal based plants and the current large institutional shareholdings in 
companies like SASOL and AECI. SASOL towers above AECI in its impact on the economy 
and accordingly most of our attention should be directed to it. SASOL requires a structural 
adjustment programme perhaps along the lines of that carried out by the Dutch State Mines 
(now DSM) in the early 1960s. It transformed this coal mining and chemical (initially coal 
based) company into the current DSM, a respected international chemical company. The 
Dutch government gave considerable attention to the impact of the changes on the regional 
economy and to job security and skills transformation. A number of fortunate circumstances 
eased this transition. There was a reasonably high level of co-operation between the company, 
the state and organised labour. However the critical element appears to have been state 
assistance in the form of low interest loans (Interview, de Wit). 
The transformation of SASOL could follow four processes, which are identified in 
outline here. Some further detail emerges in the subsequent discussion around industrial 
strategy for the commodity plastics jiliere. All four processes could begin concurrently but 
each successive process is likely to have a longer life span than its predecessor. 
Phase One must result in the removal of the veils of secrecy, both corporate and 
statutory, which prevent the citizens and motorists of South Africa knowing the extent to 
which they are supporting SASOL's mega profits and the oil industry through the petrol 
price. Without these facts planning is extremely difficult. However obtaining the necessary 
data from SASOL (the only possible source for certain key information) will not be easy 
because SASOL will have an obvious vested interest in ensuring the outcome suits its 
objectives. A key element of such an investigation would be to determine the extent of 
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transfer pricing between SASOL's synfuel operations and its various subsidiary and related 
companies. Needless to say what follows is based upon such information as is available and 
may well need to be revised once all the facts are to hand. 
Phase Two provides for an immediate prohibition upon further investments by SASOL 
in new projects which depend upon the coal based synfuel process until the cessation of the 
synfuels support and the re-regulation of the fuel industry has been achieved. Are-regulated 
fuel industry would presumably relieve SASOL of its obligations to produce fuels and its 
subsidy. Phase Two could run concurrently with Phase One. Indeed it may provide the 
leverage necessary to achieve the goals of Phase One. Once the liquid fuels industry has been 
re-regulated (and the subsidy issue clarified) further investments in new projects based upon 
the synfuels process should be allowed to proceed subject to the following conditions: 
a) they should provide the most competitive option available to South Africa. 
b) as far as possible no subsidy of any kind or tariff protection should be relied 
upon for the viability of such projects. 
c) new projects should be intended to husband the synfuels process into its 
twilight years whilst simultaneously using it as a platform for the emergence 
of a reorientated and vigorous company. For example there may well be 
further reserves of propylene which could be competitively extracted. 
Certain of the notions in these conditions may appear contradictory, such as being 
'internationally competitive' whilst 'husbanding' at the same time. It is unavoidable that the 
judicious management of this national asset will require grappling with these sometimes 
contradictory imperatives. Difficult decisions will have to be made. 
Phase Three will require a process of monitoring SASOL over a period of years in 
a re-regulated environment. This may require subsidies and/or some other form of state 
intervention. 
Phase Four will concern a plan for the final phasing out of synfuels. It may involve 
consideration of the merits of nationalising SASOL in order to give effect to the gradual 
phase out of coal based synfuels. During the course of Phase Two it is likely that some form 
of tripartite planning body will be set up to consider the shorter term restructuring options. 
Having accomplished such a task it could shift its attention to the longer term task of planning 
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for the eventual closure of the synfuel plants at Secunda and the activities which will replace 
them . . 
Conclusions 
This chapter has discounted the possibility of a major petrochemical initiative or 
episode for the South African economy in the short to medium term. It has reviewed recent 
state initiatives to determine a direction for petrochemicals in South Africa. These were 
criticised for not having gone far enough to be meaningful and for leaving such important 
matters to be determined by corporate rivalry. 
If this conclusion is contrasted with recent developments in South Korea it may be 
criticised, in that it may be argued that state deregulation of the petrochemical industry has 
brought about a massive wave of investment and capacity expansion in a short period of time. 
However it should be borne in mind that in South Korea'.s first two petrochemical complexes 
there was much state involvement and that the recent episode has arisen in the context of 
competition between six major producers, orientated largely towards exports. This level of 
investment as well as both domestic and international competition is a far cry from South 
Africa's situation in the early 1990s. 
By contrast South Africa's second petrochemical complex (SASOL Secunda) arose by 
default from military-strategic synfuel considerations very different from the competitive 
commercial-strategic. petrochemical considerations which prevailed in South Korea. 
Furthermore there is no prospect of the kind of competition evident in South Korea emerging 
from the options considered in this chapter. Indeed only one of the projects is designed to be 
largely export orientated. In short it is argued that South Africa's petrochemical development 
is still in its infancy and has not yet reached the stage of development at which competition 
is better able to overcome the problems of economies of scale, concentration and foreign 
ownership. 
An important public policy issue has been raised in this chapter concerning the extent 
to which the petrochemical commanding heights of the economy should be allowed to develop 
as a consequence of corporate rivalry or alternatively the extent to which the state should be 
involved in shaping this direction to the benefit of the nation. The extent to which direct or 
indirect state support may be required and the lessons to be learnt from East Asian NICs add 
weight to the argument that the state should not lightly withdraw its guiding hand in this 
matter. 
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A framework for further research on the larger, longer term questions of 
petrochemical industry strategy has been identified. The strategic position of the 
petrochemical industry and the nature of the options identified form part of the argument 
made for the necessity of more deliberate and meaningful state direction in these matters than 
has resulted from the recent state initiatives. In the fmal chapter the form or process through 
which the state should intervene is addressed. It argues for the involvement of the major 




CONCLUSIONS. INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY OPTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The role of government is not only to push the process by coordinating 
upstream industries, but also to lower entry barriers at the downstream 
end to facilitate the induced response. 
Robert Wade, Governine the Market, p354 
Introduction and Broad Policy implications 
This chapter sets out strategy options for the.commodity plastics jiliere in the short 
term. Longer term options depend heavily upon the source of the next tranche of chemical 
building blocks which is unclear at this stage. In the short to medium term and until such time 
as there is domestic competition for Polifin's virtual monopoly on the olefin supply, a 
deliberate strategy is needed to optimise the development of the commodity plastics jiliere. 
Once there is competition in olefin manufacture, the strategy options below will need to be 
reviewed, not because the existence of competition will necessarily obviate existing problems, 
but because the nature of the problems will have altered. 
In a broad sense a choice has to be made between an upstream-led or downstream-led 
developmental path for the commodity plastics jiliere, although ideally the objective would 
be to try and get the balance between the upstream and the downstream 'right' within the 
constraints of pressing social and economic needs including high levels of unemployment and 
large disparities in wealth. 
The strategy proposals which follow have a twin thrust: lowering intermediate input 
prices as part of a package of measures designed to dynamise the more labour intensive 
plastic converting industry, whilst at the same time maximising the potential of existing 
facilities, where cost effective, and adding as much value as possible in the process. Such 
objectives include maximising employment opportunities at lower capital costs, but with 
reasonable wage levels in a context of higher levels of investment. Concurrent broad 
objectives are raising productivity and an improved trade performance. 
Despite South Africa's lack of oil resources and meagre natural gas resources, the 
analysis in previous chapters has shown that there has been a history of resource based capital 
intensive development at the upstream end of the jiliere and that this has been strengthening 
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relative to the downstream plastic converting industry. The plastic products industry has the 
advantages of greater value added and employment generating capacity per unit of capital 
stock employed. These are important considerations in the light of high and increasing levels 
of unemployment as well as underdeveloped exports from the plastic converting industry. 
Plastic articles play an important role in the lives of the WOr. Domestic commodity 
plastic markets are dominated by packaging, much of it around basic foodstuffs. Dire levels 
of poverty in Sou~h Africa make basic foodstuff costs a critical concern for humanitarian and 
social stability reasons. The contribution made by plastic products to mass housing and 
improved lifestyles will be many and more varied than the few examples which may be 
canvassed here. A broad consensus around the need to provide electricity to large numbers 
of low income households has emerged. Since the generating capacity exists, low cost 
infrastructure will be crucial to the success of this pr-oject. At the street and dwelling level, 
much electrical cabling and wiring is plastic coated, often with pvc. This represents about 
20% percent of the materials cost of electrical cable manufacture (Interview, Meiring). The 
supply of potable water to large numbers of low income dwellings is also much needed. At 
the dwelling level plastic piping and plumbing fixtures are often competitive with competing 
materials such as metals and asbestos-cement. Plastics also play an often discrete but 
indispensable role in the furnishing of modem homes in a wide variety of applications from 
crockery and cutlery to kitchen appliances. In addition plastics are employed in a vast number 
of applications in mining, manufacturing and agriculture, where lower priced plastic may 
filter through basic cost structures and impact upon the cost of living. 
Cogent reasons therefore exist for much greater attention to be given to the 
development of downstream sectors in the jiliere. This implies husbanding, nurturing and 
dynamising the plastic converting and fabrication industry, strengthening it and expanding it 
whilst at the same time targeting internationally competitive prices for its products on both 
the domestic and international markets. Caution however is necessary to avoid a reversal of 
the present situation in which downstream producers would come to dominate the jiliere as 
heavily as upstream producers have in the past. Later in this chapter a tripartite institution 
responsible for the formulation of industrial policy is proposed. This mechanism, including 
employer representatives from all links in the chain, is intended, inter alia, to monitor and 
avoid continuing imbalances. 
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Assumptions for an industrial strateey for commodity plastics 
Before embarking upon a more detailed discussion of policy options certain 
assumptions need to be stated. Industrial strategists have before them, theoretically at least, 
a full armoury of policy levers and instruments with which to pursue their ends. To 
operationalise these successfully usually requires a sophisticated and fine-tuned bureaucracy. 
To the extent that this bureaucracy does not exist, the industrial strategist's armoury is 
reduced. Such a bureaucracy appears to exist in certain industries in South Africa, such as 
the liquid fuels industry. But for the most part it will be assumed that this level of 
sophistication does not exist elsewhere at this stage, implying that it needs to be built and 
accordingly policy suggestions made here will take this into account. However it need not 
necessarily be built along the lines of the overweening and stifling stereotype. Rather the state 
should be facilitative in creating the 'space' for institutions and organisations of civil society 
to interact with business and the state more readily. For example the state could avoid 
significant costs in policing environmental regulations by creating the legal 'space' within 
which trade unions and environmental organisations could. take up breaches of regulations. 
However it is acknowledged that such roles accorded to civil society are not appropriate in 
all cases. For example implementing a science and technology policy will require revitalising 
much of the national innovation system. This type of approach to state bureaucracy underpins 
the suggestions which follow. 
Certain assumptions also have to be made about macro economic policy. The 
assumption here is that a stable real exchange rate policy will be pursued, endeavouring to 
create a more predictable environment for exporters. 
Policy Framework 
The policy suggestions which follow are cast within three broad variables: 
• The cost structure within the jiliere 
• Human resources and technological capacity 
• The institutional environment 
The first concerns the basic cost structure in thejiliere and suggests ways in which the cost 
of key inputs could be lowered or improved, principally raw materials, capital and labour. 
Environmental costs are also considered. In tandem with these suggestions trade policy is also 
advocated as a means to both reduce the cost of key inputs and to reorient plastic products 
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producers towards improved export performance. In doing so it is recognised that in the short 
term at least, this will have to be done from behind a barrier of tariff protection. Competition 
policy is crucial to this endeavour particularly in this jiliere, which at one end is dominated 
by monopolies and at the other has certain markets characterised by cut-throat competition. 
Simply delivering low cost key inputs to the jiliere will be insufficient to make it a 
more dynamic industry. Proactive development of the other key areas of international 
competitive advantage will need to be addressed. This second variable embraces strategies to 
develop human resources and technological capacity. 
The third variable concerns the institutional environment for policy formation and 
industrial relations within which the developmental strategy suggested here may be played 
out. The remainder of this chapter elaborates the three policy framework variables in the 
order in which they have been outlined here. 
The Cost of Inputs 
The regulatory regime which has prevailed in recent years appears not to recognise 
the connection between the upstream end of the jiliere and the downstream end. Consequently 
export promotion is organised chiefly around GElS incentives which focus on the final 
exporter and neglect the upstream arrangements. At the same time state and/or motorists 
and/or taxpayers have also been supporting SASOL, Polifin and the crude oil refining cartel. 
In between these two links in the production chain (petrochemicals and the plastic converting 
industry), tariffs are supporting the polymer manufacturers whilst at the downstream end 
tariffs are protecting prices for the plastic converting industry. 
If however the plastics production chain is seen as just that, a chain made up of 
interconnected links, then it is possible to explore the possibilities for removing state (and 
citizen) support at three points in the chain (SASOL, polymer tariffs, and GEIS), and at the 
same time reduce input costs and create the conditions in which a more dynamic jiliere might 
emerge. Part of this process will involve redistributing advantage lower down the chain. For 
an industrial strategy focusing upon exports and national reconstruction, the objective must 
be to insert raw gas and olefins into the upstream end of the jiliere at below world prices and 
to ensure that this advantage is passed all the way along the chain to plastic converters. 
In exploring the options available for lowering the cost of key inputs to the commodity 
plasticsjiliere each of the four principle considerations are considered in tum; raw materials, 
capital, labour and energy. The discussion of raw material costs follows the direction of value 
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adding chain, ie. it commences at the upstream end of the chain and works its way 
downstream to plastic products. Feedstocks are key determinants and they are dealt with first. 
However before considering options which may exist to lower input prices at the upstream 
end, the implications for the liquid fuels industry of using changes to the regulations to the 
liquid fuels industry as a lever to lower key petrochemical input prices are considered. 
Petrochemical input prices and the liquid Fuels Industry 
Lowering petrochemical input prices into the commodity plastics jiliere requires 
consideration of the complex interrelationships between the liquid fuels industry and 
petrochemical prices. SASOL is at the heart of the complex interrelationships between the 
liquid fuels industry and the petrochemical industry in South Africa. Previous chapters have 
shown how petrochemicals in South Africa are inextricably bound up with the liquid fuel 
industry. The state's preoccupation with 'strategic' considerations in the fuel industry 
distorted the petrochemical industry and indirectly raised petrochemical prices. Ironically 
public money in the form of taxes and fuel levies were used to do so. Indeed, in one sense, 
the way in which the state has set up SASOL's support regime makes it operate as a wealth 
siphon, siphoning wealth away from motorists and taxpayers and into the pockets of SASOL 
and its shareholders. The extent of this redistribution of wealth needs to be brought into the 
public domain urgently for obvious public policy reasons. I But it also has a direct bearing 
upon the choice of a path for petrochemical development, depending upon the economic 
viability of SASOL without its regime of support. Furthermore the structural unemployment 
crisis is .being exacerbated by SASOL's spate of capital intensive investments made possible 
by its regime of support. SASOL's superior profit performance is largely attributable to the 
support it receives through the liquid fuels regulatory regime. SASOL shareholders also 
require clarity about the extent to which their investments are at risk. Many of these shares 
are held on behalf of large numbers of pension fund and insurance policy contributors. There 
is thus urgent need for a comprehensive study of SASOL in order to determine the social 
rates of return yielded by this mega-investment and the appropriate levels of protection. Such 
an investigation is beyond the scope of this study. 
The advent of Polifin introduced the era of 'fuel alternate value' pricing into the 
1. ~arious interested groups attending the National Economic Forums Liquid Fuels Task Force. with different 
motives. attempted to do so. The National Economic Forum comprised representatives of organised business 
organised labour and government. • 
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upstream end of thejiliere. Since the prices of the raw gas streams which Polifin buys from 
SASOL are tied to the base petrol price, the first option to consider is the possibility of 
lowering the base petrol price. This would have the twin advantages of lowering a basic 
energy cost to the economy as well as inserting lower priced petrochemical priced feedstocks 
into the jiliere. 
The base petrol price has essentially three elements as set out in Figure 38. The price 
at which the oil industry uplifts SASOL's synfuels comprises only elements (2) and (3) in 
Figure 38. Lowering the IBLC will also impact upon the crude oil refining industry. The 
IBLC represents their 'refinery gate price' thus lowering it will reduce refinery margins. This 
is possible as it is known that refineries in Western Europe have survived with very low 
refinery margins. However refiners there compensate for these low margins by vertically 
integrating down to the retail sector. This is not currently permitted in South Africa. The 
point is that tampering with the IBLC has potentially very large knock-on effects in the rest 
of the liquid fuels industry. 




$21.1 Ibbl oil price 
r==~ 
(2) Inland transport 
element 
(3) IDLC 
"Tariff Protection" represents payments from the Equalisation Fund which insure that SASOL 
receives at least a crude oil equivalent of $21.1 per barrel. 
Inland transport comprises the (theoretical) cost of transporting liquid fuels into the interior from 
the coast. 
The IDLC (In Bond Landed Cost) is the theoretical cost of importing refined liquid fuels. 
All of these elements are explained in greater detail in Annexure B. 
Refinery margins and profits have been secret for many years, however there is some 
reason to believe that there is 'scope for significant reduction without threatening the viability 
of these refiners. Indeed during 1994 the LFTF secured two agreements which involved small 
reductions in the formula determining the benefits to SASOL and the crude oil industry. Some 
analysts have suggested that South African crude oil refinery profits are 600% of those 
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commonly earned in NWE. The Automobile Association study also records very good profit 
levels in the refining industry. The crude refining industry is somewhat similar to the auto 
assembly industry in South Africa, in that there are too many small prOducers. Consequently 
the re-regulation of the liquid fuels industry should be carried out in such a manner as to 
encourage a process of rationalisation of the refining industry as it expands refining capacity . 
Reducing element (2), the inland transport cost is also possible. The simplest way 
would be to reduce the Petronet pipeline tariffs. However Petronet's parent company, the 
parastatal, Transnet, has recently been privatised. It has a large pension fund deficit and 
requires Petronet's contributions to assist in making up the shortfall. Again the point is that 
there are consequences to be faced in making such adjustments. 
Reducing element (1), SASOL' s 'Tariff protection' would not directly affect SASOL' s 
'fuel alternate value' price as it is a subsequent 'add-on'. Obviously it would lower SASOL's 
turnover, profitability and possibly its ability to meet its commitments to the 'fuel alternate 
value' pricing formula. What are the other likely consequences of a r~uction in the synfuels 
subsidy/support? Firstly it is likely to lead to a reduction in the (pre-tax) petrol price which 
has benefits for the whole economy. Secondly the cumulative effect of the removal of the 
support and a lower petrol price will significantly impact upon SASOL's share price rating. 
It will also reduce SASOL's cash flow which it has been using to finance its current wave of 
investments. Reduced profits are likely to cause SASOL to have to solicit capital markets by 
the usual means in order to raise investment capital, which in turn is likely to exercise a 
restraining influence upon SASOL's investment splurges. Thirdly, it would also level the 
playing fields of opportunity between coal based and oil or gas based petrochemical players 
to some extent. This, in it's turn, may serve to widen the range of basic chemical building 
blocks available at more competitive prices. 
An initial obstacle that would need to be dealt with, will be an agreement given by 
government to SASOL that 'tariff protection' will be kept in place until the end of 1995 
(SASOL Executive Director Du Toit quoted in Business Day, 29-7-92:7). In addition to this 
SASOL has a 'parachute' clause in its 'claw-back' loan agreement with the Central Energy 
Fund (see Annexure B). If SASOL's subsidy is lowered, its loan repayments to the state 
(CEF) are correspondingly lowered as well, leaving SASOL virtually unaffected. However 
the implications for CEF cash flow and its ability to repay Mossgas debt would probably be 
affected. This will need careful consideration by a state under pressure to increase its social 
spending. 
A reduction in SASOL's 'tariff protection' is likely to make SASOL more determined 
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to break out of its 9% ceiling share of the retail market (through the 'Blue Pump' scheme). 
If it were to be given greater access to the retail market through official structures, changes 
to the Ratplan Agreement would have to be negotiated with the crude oil refining industry 
which would be unwilling to concede market share to SASOL. 
Broadly stated, the present regulatory regime reflects a delicate 'compromise' between 
two aggressively opposed camps - the (state backed) synfuels industry and the crude oil 
refining companies.2 The processes of political democratisation and reintegration into the 
global economic system are placing stress upon this historic 'compromise'. Any changes to 
this regulatory latticework which did not embody an 'equality of misery' principle for these 
two camps could easily unleash a titanic fight between these two forces which could have far 
reaching and _ potentially very damaging consequences for the country. Underpinning the 
regulatory regime is the regulation of the pump price-of petrol (Retail Price Maintenance or 
RPM). If a 'shake out' in the liquid fuels industry was precipitated, one of the first casualties 
would be RPM. Once petrol discounting at the pump took place retailers would have to 
compete which in tum would require them to cut costs. One of the easiest costs for retailers 
to cut would be labour costs. If the obligatory 'no self service' clause in the Ratplan were 
thus undermined some 70 ()()() jobs would be jeopardised. 
The preceding brief review of the ramifications and implications of piecemeal change 
10 the liquid fuels industry for petrochemical industry purposes strongly suggests that 
suddenly pulling away one or more of the main props supporting this fragile latticework of 
regulations would be ill advised and may have unintended consequences. Instead equity 
considerations suggest moving along a path of steadily evolving change towards a more 
benign regulation of the liquid fuels industry, that is, decreased regulation in some areas and 
possibly increased regulation in others. In particular the need to guard against the propensity 
in the industry towards a cartel or oligopolistic practices requires controls. Such an approach 
will stand better prospects of carrying along with it the various interest groups which make 
up the industry and avoiding confrontation. A government and particularly a Department of 
Minerals and Energy Affairs with firm resolve to manage the process would be desirable. 
An extensive (but unpublished) government study of regulation in the oil industry was 
carried out in 1990. It found no reason to change the prevailing system apart from certain 
marketing aspects (CEF Chief Executive, Lourens van den Berg, quoted in Davie, 1991b:17). 
Government has begun to reconsider such issues and commenced another investigation into 
2. Excluding Natref which is 60% owned by SASOL. 
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deregulation of the liquid fuel industry (Business Day, 23-9-92:7). In addition the National 
Economic Forum's Liquid Fuels Task Force (LFTF) began a review of the regulatory regime 
governing the industry in late 1993. 
Finally, but most importantly for our purposes here, if the price which SASOL 
receives for its petrol were lowered, then the 'fuel alternate val~e' of raw gas to SASOL 
would be correspondingly lower, potentially leading to lower olefin prices. This is only a 
potential benefit. It assumes that SASOL and Polifin maintain their 'fuel alternate value' 
pricing formula. If SASOL's petrol profits are under threat, a more likely response from 
SASOL may be to try and off-set this by attempting to raise the price of raw gas rather than 
decrease it. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the 'fuel alternate value' will be lower. 
In summary a reduction in the elements of synfuels support, could lower the value of 
petrol to SASOL and consequently hold the potential to pass on benefits to the commodity 
plastics jiliere in the form of lower raw gas prices. A reduction in synfuels support/subsidy 
is unlikely, by itself, to yield world priced olefins, therefore other measures must also be 
considered. These are elaborated in the next section. 
The apprQpriate transfer price of raw ~as streams 
"Most successful exports were based on those materials which are available 
locally at world competitive prices ... " (Romatex Annual Report, 1992) 
Thus far the discussion has accepted the 'fuel alternate value' as the appropriate 
transfer price for SASOL's raw gas streams. However the question still remains; is the 'fuel 
alternate value' formula valid? What is the appropriate transfer price for a petrochemical 
stream from the upstream source (SASOL) across the ownership boundary to the ownership 
of the next link in the production chain? This difficulty is similar to the problems faced in 
Latin American and South East Asian economies discussed in a previous chapter. Such 
problems are amplified in a small market with a single producer such as South Africa. Before 
1994 pricing was left to a combination of the market and a state which lacked any clear 
industrial strategy for the filiere, resulting in uncompetitive pricing. With the advent of 
Politin and the 'fuel alternate value' formula the filiere clearly has low cost intermediate 
inputs at the. upstream end on the basis of a defensible formula. 
However the 'fuel alternate value' formula may camouflage a quite different public 
policy issue: Polifin may be purchasing SASOL's gas streams at too Iowa price. If so then 
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the economic viability of SASOVs synfuel operations may be compromised and its need for 
a subsidy/protection correspondingly inflated. 
What then is the appropriate transfer price for these raw gas streams and what are the 
alternative mechanisms and options for determining an appropriate price for these gas 
streams? The appropriate pricing mechanism must balance the trade off between the need for 
low cost inputs into the commodity plastics filiere against the need to minimise any subsidy 
which SASOL's synfuel operations may require. 
There are several possibilities: 
a) Import parity pricing: this is not an option as SASOL' s coal based raw gas streams 
are unique in composition and the infrastructure to import such gases does not exist 
(a part of the missing link problem). These gas streams are in effect non-tradable and 
the market cannot operate, unlike the South Korean, Taiwanese and other examples 
considered earlier where their petrochemical feedstock is naphtha which is a 
frequently traded commodity. Naphtha provided additional import parity leverage for 
the state arising from this additional link in the cha,in. 
b) A cost plus fonnula: that is the cost to SASOL of the raw gas stream plus a 
reasonable return. This concept was used by SASOL prior to 1981 to determine its 
ethylene prices. It gave an estimate of what ethylene would cost at the beginning of 
the year and by mid year revised the figures, backdating the new price to the start of 
the year (The Daily News, Plastics Supplement, 25-8-81: 1). This was obviously 
unsatisfactory for downstream producers who had to commit themselves to contract 
prices which could not be backdated. The present difficulty is to establish what the 
cost to SASOL is, particularly the share of capital costs, of producing a by-product 
integral to its process. The calculations, if possible, would be extremely complex. A 
second difficulty in employing a cost plus formula is that all the risks and the benefits 
will be transferred onto Polifin. 
c) A price detennined from the polyethylene price: The ethylene price has been 
determined by formula from the polyethylene price which was an import parity price. 
It would be possible to extend this concept one link further back upstream to the raw 
gas price. For example if the polyethylene price was 100 units, the ethylene price 
might be 50 units and the raw gas stream might be half again of the ethylene price. 
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The two formulae would be driven off the import parity price which, as has been 
pointed out, is a function of the polymer tariff. The approach carries with it the 
danger of perpetuating a management mind-set which sees lobbying for higher tariffs 
as an important strategy to compensate for operations which are not internationally 
competitive. Assuming a constant tariff there will be some long term inducement to 
improve efficiencies as a result of improvements to efficiency internationally. 
d) Regulation: The state could simply regulate the raw gas stream price. However the 
difficulty in determining an appropriate price for these gas streams will remain with 
the regulator. This would not be a very elegant or politically astute approach in the 
present economic climate. 
e) Promote vertical integration: This process has been virtually thrust upon SASOL and 
AECI and could be promoted still further by removing the ownership boundary 
between the first and second links in the chain created by the advent of Polifm. There 
are several possibilities, for example: encourage SASOL and Polifm to merge into a 
single business. AECI's interests in Polifin might be exchanged for shares in SASOL 
itself. The present SASOL and Polifin would then be one entity and the transfer price 
would become academic. Instead the real focus of debate could then become the tariff 
on polymer. A further advantage of this approach is that SASOL's profitability could 
be determined across the full range of its operations. This would allow the more 
profitable activities to 'cross subsidise' the less profitable, thus reducing the need for 
an external synfuels subsidy. A countervailing tendency may weaken this approach. 
The aggregation approach envisaged here runs in Quite the opposite direction to the 
corporate strategy pursued by SASOL itself in recent years. 
Even if SASOL and Polifin were integrated into a single concern a further 
pricing problem would remain and that is the price at which such an integrated 
concern would sell ethylene to other customers. The present formula arrangement 
between Polifin and Safripol for determining the ethylene price could simply continue. 
Promoting vertical integration suggests that SASOL also take over Safripol (in 
exchange for cash or SASOL shares) which would then make the ethylene price 
academic as well. 
How might vertical integration be promoted? There are several possibilities. 
One is to follow the Taiwanese example in the way it dealt with its first PVC 
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producers. It simply forced them to merge into one business. Another option is to 
follow the French example of the early 1980s. In order to rationalise and restructure 
the reluctant French chemical industry, the leading private chemical companies were 
nationalised. Once the restructuring objectives had been attained a process of 
privatisation followed. This option could involve the nationalisation of at least 
SASOL's Secunda operations, Polifin (or key parts of it) and Safripol (the 
Sentrachem/Hoechst joint venture). The advantage of nationalisation is that it obviates 
SASOL's current need to meet blue chip shareholder expectations in so far as profits 
are concerned and allows more resources to be redirected to development downstream. 
The disadvantages of nationalisation are likely to include vociferous condemnation by 
the local business community, scaring nervous international investors and possibly 
damage to South Africa's international credit rating. The international implications of 
nationalisation may be amplified if the shareholding of major international firms such 
as Hoechst (in Safripol) were nationalised. Furthermore local shareholders, primarily 
insurance policy owners and pension funds would probably lose money and this may 
arouse internal popular discontent. 
Another option involving nationalisation would be to make only the synfuels 
part of SASOL a public utility. This would be easier to justify politically and it could 
then be used to provide low cost liquid fuels and petrochemical feedstocks. The 
potential disadvantage of this is that such a public utility might well require a subsidy. 
During 1994 rumours in the industry suggested that SASOL synfuels was inflating its 
(coal) input prices and deflating its (chemical) output prices with the net result that the 
synfuels activities appear less profitable than might otherwise have been the case. It 
is reasonable to expect the political process to take some time to come to a decision 
to declare a part of SASOL a public utility. During this period SASOL might structure 
its other activities in such a way as to commercially prejudice the synfuel utility. 
Consequently very careful monitoring and a capacity to rewrite commercial 
agreements would be an important element of such an option. 
Instead of nationalising, could the state use the Equalisation Fund contributions 
from the petrol price to buyout other SASOL shareholders? If this plan was 
announced simultaneously with notice of the withdrawal of subsidies, two to three 
years ahead, shareholders would presumably be keen to sell. However even at its 
lowest share price in 1993/4, SASOL's market capitalization was approximately RIO 
billion and since the 'tariff protection' subsidy is worth only just over R 1 billion p.a. 
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this would not be possible within two to three years. If other elements in the petrol 
price build up from which SASOL benefits were included, this would not change the 
time frame dramatically. 
f) Increased competition: Increased competition is unlikely to arise at only the raw gas 
stage. On the contrary increased domestic competition would require (in view of 
Polifin's degree of vertical integration) investment in a similarly integrated operation. 
Such a large investment may require state assistance in some form. Furthermore even 
if there were two producers it is not certain that they would not collude on prices in 
some way thus defeating the object. Indeed since the lynchpin of pricing in thefiliere 
is the polymer tariff, adjustments to this may be a far simpler way of introducing real 
competition into the filiere. This possibility is taken up below. 
Pricine Ethylene 
Assuming that an appropriate pricing arrangement for the raw gas streams had been 
achieved, the next hurdle would be to ensure that some of the benefits were passed on in the 
ethylene price.3 How might this be done? Again there are several options. Many of those 
outlined above in relation to pricing the raw gas streams may be applied mutatis mutandis to 
ethylene pricing. There are two central options here. 
Firstly a relatively simple measure would be for the state to regulate the ethylene price 
at the level of one of (or a combination of) the lower priced international markets, such as 
the US Gulf which is likely to remain the global price setter (Vergara & Babylon, 1990:9). 
Would SASOL's viability be seriously threatened if its ethylene price were lowered 
in this way? Based upon 1991 ethylene sales and company financial statements, the loss to 
SASOL would have been R173 million or 2.3% of sales. This of course is a larger share of 
after tax profit (16.6%) but notwithstanding such a loss, SASOL would still have been the 
most profitable chemical company in the world according to Fortune Magazines' top Global 
500 corporations at 11.7% (profit as a share.of sales) (Fortune Magazine, 27-7-92). 
There is only one option which stands out as a means of improving the input pricing 
structure along the filiere. If the preceding analysis is correct and the polymer tariff is the 
lynchpin of pricing along the filiere then the obvious option is to reduce or remove the 
3. A similar approach could be applied to propylene. 
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appropriate polymer tariffs.4 The effect of lower polymer tariffs on the ethylene price inside 
Politin is somewhat academic as it is essentially an accounting question. However this is not 
the case in regard to the price at which Safripol would purchase ethylene. 
If polymer tariffs were removed Safripol and the oletin customers within the Politin 
group - if Politin complied with the Competition Board ruling not to discriminate - would, 
for the duration of the prevailing agreement, be able to pass lower prices upstream to Polifm 
in terms of the formula agreement. However when the prevailing agreement expired, Politin 
might not be willing to renew it because of the costs involved. Instead of continuing with the 
formula, Polifin may prefer to raise the price of oletins to Safripol (and its subsidiaries) in 
some way. This would ultimately force Safripol out of business or into a merger with Politin. 
Lowering polymer tariffs seem likely to bring about, in one way or another, further 
vertical integration or restructuring at the upstream end of the industry. This would be an 
acceptable outcome, from South Africa's point of view, provided the necessary checks and 
balances were in place to govern the enlarged monopoly. 
This (zero tariff) option amounts to ethylene prices continuing to be a function of 
'import parity one step removed'. If it is assumed that PQlitin wishes to keep its ethylene 
customers and no further vertical integration takes place, Polifin may have to sell its ethylene 
at below world prices. This may be necessary in order to keep its customers in business 
because they are not the most efficient producers. In other words world-priced polyethylene 
(imports) in feeding backwards (upstream) to the ethylene price, has to pass through an 
inefficient conversion mechanism requiring lower than world priced ethylene. 
Whether Safripol and Politin's polymer operations could survive a zero tariff is not 
clear. However lower tariffs are a convenient tool, if handled correctly, to goad the polymer 
industry to greater efticiency and lower prices. If polymer tariffs were reduced to zero would 
this be sufficient to meet the objective of world priced inputs? It seems not. This is because 
the import parity (elF) price will be above world prices as it contains transport insurance, 
wharfage and related costs. These costs added about 22 % to the NWE FOB price in August 
1992.5 
How then might world priced (or lower) inputs be inserted into the domestic 
commodity plasticsjiliere? To overcome the disadvantages of import parity pricing identitied 
4. Given the level of vertical integration already achieved by Polifin various stringent checks and balances 
become necessary and a review of polymer tariffs is called for. The need for such checks and balances would 
be increased if further vertical integration took place. 
5. Figures provided by Safripol for HDPE and PP. 
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above, the polymer import elF price could be substituted by the export FOB price, which 
is likely to be at or below world prices, as shipping, insurance and other costs are not yet 
included. Using the export FOB price the same calculation (extrapolating backwards) could 
be made to determine the ethylene price. This would require the state to regulate that the 
export parity (FOB) price be the one used. Given that polymer exports from most countries 
take place at 'dumped' prices and that the preceding analysis has shown that domestic 
polymer producers are least competitive in periods of low world polymer price such 
regulation could be ruinous for Polifin and Safripol. 
However both Polifin and Safripol offer polymer to customers at below typical 
domestic prices for export purposes. The problem such exporters have is that they have been 
powerless to secure long term contracts on this basis. This has made it difficult to justify 
investments in machinery and equipment dedicated to-exports. The question thus arises, how 
might the state secure long term export parity pricing for converters wishing to export? 
One option would be to impose an export tax on raw polymer to discourage polymer 
exports for so long as there was a domestic market (ultimately intended for export) for that 
polymer at (FOB) export parity prices. Such discouragement should not be an onerous burden 
for polymer producers since they should be indifferent as to whether polymer is sold on the 
domestic market or the export market, provided the price is the same. This would then make 
polymer available at world or below world prices (since transport and related costs to the 
export destination are excluded). An important feature of such an export promoting policy 
would be transparency in setting the export parity prices. This is because some plastic 
converters claim (in confidence) that the polymer manufacturing monopolies are playing 'king 
maker' by selling at different 'export' prices to different converters. (Further variations of 
this option are considered below.) 
Finally, it cannot be assumed that even a vertically integrated producer would be 
profitable without tariff protection or a subsidy of some sort. 
In selecting from among the above options two guiding notions should apply. Firstly, 
vertical integration should be accompanied by other measures necessary to prevent rent 
seeking by the large monopoly which Polifin represents. To the extent to which future policy 
promotes further vertical integration then the need for accompanying measures is increased. 
Secondly and most importantly, will the option selected result in lower than world priced 
olefins being inserted into the plastics filiere? Nearly all of the options outlined above are 
likely to result in significantly reduced polymer prices for domestic converters. 
In the short term, if feedstock continues to be obtained from SASOL at the 'fuel 
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alternate value', then the reduction or removal of tariffs on commodity polymers is called for. 
Setting the appropriate tariff level as well as the costs to taxpayers and/or motorists of 
allowing SASOL to sell its gas streams at the 'fuel alternate value' needs detailed and careful 
evaluation. If it is found that such an arrangement prejudices the economics of SASOL's 
synfuels operations and public policy makers are not willing to tra~e off the disadvantage to 
SASOL's synfuels operations against the advantages to the commodity plasticsjiliere, then 
the price of the ~w gas stream will need to be set by some transparent and equitable 
mechanism. 
On balance, two of the options outlined above or a combination of them appear more 
attractive. The encouragement of further vertical integration in the petrochemical and polymer 
industries but only with attendant measures to constrain the resultant monopoly. This would 
bring the industry further in line with international developments. Secondly a mechanism to 
bring domestic olefin prices into line with world prices. 
Most of the above options have implications for SASOL's profitability and possibly 
its survival, whatever its ownership structure. This necessitates a review of SASOL's capacity 
to absorb lower profits on fuel and/or raw gas stream sales . . There are two factors which will 
help SASOL in this regard. Firstly chemical production is concentrated at SASOL 2 and fuel 
production at SASOL 3. The significance of this is that SASOL's loan obligations to the CEF 
are governed by an agreement which reduces the payment of loans to the extent to which 
SASOL 3 does not receive·protection.6 To this real 'safety net' may be added the second: 
the results from the current spate of investments. One industry analyst expects SASOL to do 
well in 1994 and 1995 as a result of returns from new projects coming on stream in the 
context of improving domestic and international economic growth (Tison, 1992). 
Should these benefits prove inadequate the state also has room in which to manoeuvre, 
short of a cash subsidy or nationalisation. (A more open and public process for arriving at 
subsidies is considered below.) The state's interest in SASOL is through the IDC's 20% (and 
declining) ownership, the state pension fund's 10% ownership, tax returns and of course the 
regime of regulatory support governing the liquid fuels industry. Several options thus exist 
for the IDC and/or the Receiver of Revenue to forego some returns in order to fund lower 
petrol and/or olefin prices in the reasonable hope that these would be recovered from taxes 
on increased output and employment downstream. If the state were to forego certain income 
it would presumably want to be sure that an adequate mechanism was in place to provide 
6. The SASOL 3 'claw-back' agreement referred to in Annexure B. 
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internationally competitive olefin prices. 
From the direction of the foregoing discussion it may be apparent that what is in 
process of being proposed here is an idea bo~owed from Japanese and Korean export 
promotion policy of the 1960's and 1970's, adapted for local conditions. In Korea "the main 
effect of subsidies was to make intermediate products available to Korea's export sector at 
international prices" (Hasan, 1976:21), whilst at the same time promoting efficient backward 
linkages from exports and exporting output from the most labour intensive processing stage 
(Westphal et al, 1979:248). Suppliers of exporters were permitted tariff free access to 
intermediate inputs in order to encourage backward linkages. There are striking parallels 
between South Korea and South Africa. South Korea also suffered from inefficient 
petrochemical production and had to develop an incentive and disincentive regime to 
accommodate this. As a result of these inefficiencies South Korean producers were given 
additional import substitution incentives (Westphal et al, 1979:241). Japan during the late 
1960s and early 1970s pursued preferential price policies for naphtha, the feedstock for their 
petrochemical industry (Greene, 1991). 
Assuming that a mechanism has been adopted which will provide competitively priced 
olefins to polymer manufacturers, the next policy hurdle is a mechanism to ensure that this 
advantage is passed on down thejiliere and not simply appropriated at the next step, polymer 
manufacture. 
Trade Policy: Tariffs for commodity polymers and plastic raw materials 
Strategies to pass lower prices down to the next link in the production chain have been 
used in South Korea and Taiwan. In Korea's case the pricing system was far from 
transparent, as Yusuf et al lament: "so overwhelming was the scope of the government's 
economic jurisdiction and regulatory activities, that it requires some ingenuity to make very 
much of the pricing system ... " (Yusuf et al, 1985:47). 
In South Africa's case it appears comparatively simple. The tariff reference price has 
been identified as the critical lynchpin of the pricing structure up and down the jiliere. With 
this in mind the most obvious mechanism to induce lower domestic commodity polymer 
prices from the monopoly producers is through a reduction in tariff protection.7 The 
reduction of tariffs thus far has been instrumental in restructuring this sector and should 
7. This has also been discussed above as one means of inducing lower olefin and raw gas prices. 
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continue as it is central to the competitiveness of the entire plasticjiliere. However it should 
proceed in a planned manner with advance warning, avoiding the pitfalls of the present ad 
hoc approach. 
The reduction or removal of tariffs on commodity polymers in a globally over traded 
market may give rise to the concern that local producers will collapse in the face of import 
competition. However the costs of exiting an industry can be high for local chemical 
conglomerates. In addition to the cost of sunk capital there are other perhaps more important 
considerations, such as a conglomerate's strategic market position. The commodity polymer 
business is high volume with correspondingly high turnover. These high turnovers contribute 
to the firm's market power even if profits are not that good. The loss of that scale of turnover 
may well make other operations within a conglomerate's portfolio more vulnerable to 
takeover. Consequently there is reason to suspect that neither Polifin nor Sentrachem/Hoechst 
will lightly abandon their positions in the polymer industry. On the other hand the lack of 
preparedness, by AECI, for the removal of import control on PVC, despite eight years 
warning by the state, suggests that more than just warning is required. Tariff reductions are 
a convenient goad with which to prod polymer manufac.turers to expand to world scale 
capacity and increase efficiencies. Other inducements to invest, such as the tax regime, are 
discussed below. 
Assuming that polymer manufacturers receive olefins at world or lower than world 
prices, (as suggested above) at the same time as tariffs are reduced by a corresponding 
amount, their relative position should be improved or at least unchanged. In addition there 
is no reason to believe that Polifin and Safripol would not make the necessary investments 
and adjustments to improve their productivity, indeed there are signs ' of this occurring 
already. However tariff reductions could lead to an increase in commodity polymer imports 
in the short term if these producers do not bring operating efficiencies up to world standards. 
The speed at which tariffs could be reduced or removed is a difficult issue not least 
because it will depend upon international prices which are difficult to predict. Tariff reference 
prices, set in Rand terms, are the key consideration in so far as polymer tariffs are 
concerned. It would appear reasonable to reduce this Rand value by 15 % to 20% p.a., in real 
terms. An inflation rate of 10% p.a. would achieve this in about two years (assuming the 
Rand reference price remained unchanged). 8 Given the discrepancies between domestic and 
8. Sou,th Africa's ge~eral commitment in the Marrakech Agreement (arising from the Uruguay round of GAIT 
talks) IS ~ ,lower tanffs by one third over five years. As at September 1994 the actual tariffs (as opposed to the 
GAIT ceIlings) for polymer had still to be determined. 
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say, North West European (CDV) prices, this would bring domestic prices to those levels in 
2 to 4 years, which should be sufficient time for local producers to get their house in order. 
At some stage in this process the ad valorem tariff (typically 10%) would take over from the 
reference price. To the extent that olefin prices are reduced or regulated downwards the 
process of tariff reduction could be accelera~. 
In formulating strategy, consideration of equity issues and the effect that strategy may 
have on ownership concentration also needs to be taken into account particularly in the South 
African context. Korea ensured low input prices to downstream sectors protected by tariff 
barriers and in the process facilitated the growth of Chaebol (large conglomerates). Taiwan 
attempted to adopt a more egalitarian approach. It also ensured low input prices to 
downstream sectors, comprising many small and medium sized enterprises, but more carefully 
avoided the vertical integration of ownership than Korea (The Economist, 5-3-88:6). 
However the Taiwanese approach did not preclude the emergence of large 
petrochemical conglomerates like Y C Wang's Formosa Plastics Group which is vertically 
integrated in petrochemicals (Wandycz et al, 1989). In 1988 it had sales about 4.5 times the 
size of SASOL's. Both approaches employed state involvement at the upstream end to achieve 
policy objectives. A key lesson from these models is to have a comprehensive approach which 
encompasses the entire length of the fiUere rather than fiddling with this or that link in the 
chain and expecting the results to trickle further up or down thefiUere. An additional lesson 
that may be drawn from this is that the emergence of large, vertically integrated 
petrochemical companies is to .a certain extent unavoidable in petrochemicals, but this need 
not necessarily preclude the coexistence of competing small and medium sized enterprises. 
Trade and pricine policy for plastic converters and fabricators 
Key objectives in a strategy designed to expand the plastic products industry include 
the expansion of higher value added economic activity of lower capital intensity and the 
expansion of employment. Lower prices may be expected to increase local demand and may 
also lead to some substitution of plastic for other materials. However without general 
economic growth, expansion in domestic markets is likely to be somewhat limited. 
Exports from the Plastic Products industry have been shown to be relatively small and 
it is in this area that considerable growth potential lies. A growth in exports would help to 
reduce the industry's trade imbalance and contribute to an improvement in the balance of 
payments. Expansion of manufacturing exports is necessary to reduce South Africa's 
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dependence upon primary materials which have been experiencing declining terms of trade. 
If a general effort is to be made to expand manufacturing exports, plastic products which are 
integral to so many manufactured items will need to be internationally competitive in ~rder 
to facilitate such a general effort. 
Successful competition in international markets will require improvements in the 
industry across a range of issues such as product quality, the capacity to develop new 
products, marketing, intra-firm and inter-firm efficiencies. Access to world priced polymer 
will be more a prerequisite than a panacea for success. 
Undoubtedly such significant reductions in polymer prices as have been suggested 
above, must be of assistance to would-be exporters. However polymer at world prices would 
simply put South African converters in the same position as their international competitors. 
In fact, somewhat worse off, if the disadvantage of shipping costs, wharfage, insurance etc. 
to export markets are taken into account. 
Consequently for plastic product exporters, the objective should rather be the provision 
of polymer to converters at lower than tariff free import parity prices. A benchmark below 
this level would be the South African FOB price obtained by polymer exporters. If this were 
required by regulation for polymer manufactured into plastic products for exports, the 
proportion of a polymer producer's output sold at FOB prices is likely to increase over time, 
as exports increase, and may eventually threaten their survival. (Because they would be 
selling a large proportion of output at depressed world prices.) A mechanism is necessary to 
counter-act this possibility. 
In recent years the negotiated price for ethylene includes provision for a type of profit 
sharing mechanism, whereby the actual ethylene price is a function of the polymer producer's 
ex-works selling price. There seems to be no reason why a similar pricing mechanism should 
not be employed lower down the filiere instead, between polymer sellers and converting 
exporters. 
Put simply: polymer manufacturer (A) sells polymer to plastic converter (8) at the 
South African FOB price. (8) then converts the polymer into a plastic product and exports 
it. Part of the profit from the export selling price is then passed by (8) back to polymer 
producer (A). Both (A) and (B) stand to gain. The same pricing system could be regulated 
for those plastic products deemed necessary for national reconstruction such as PVC used as 
sheathing for electrical distribution cables or water piping etc, although the returns are likely 
to be lower. A variation of this idea, in the form of discounts, has been used in the past in 
commercial agreements between polymer manufacturers and converters. 
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For this system to operate successfully there would have to be transparency of local 
polymer FOB prices. This should not be difficult as they are in any event collected by 
Customs & Excise. The final link in the system could then be self regulating, ie. by 
negotiation between the parties, provided of course that the state required them to negotiate 
the prices. This could be done quarterly or at some other suitable regular interval. Other 
important items in such negotiations would be the extension of credit and the period over 
which credit would be extended. This has been a contentious issue in the past. 
Traditionally such negotiations have taken place but between the individual polymer 
manufacturer and the individual converter. The consequence has been accusations of 
arrogance directed by small converters towards the large polymer manufacturing companies. 
In addition the larger polymer users have been able to negotiate more favourable rates but not 
the small volume users. 
To avoid such problems, and drawing upon the Taiwanese model, it could be required 
that the polymer manufactures association negotiate the prices with the plastic converters 
association. By requiring the collective associations to do this a number of policy goals may 
be addressed, albeit indirectly. By requiring them to cooperate in their collective self interest 
other objectives may also be addressed. This may assist in defusing the tensions and 
suspicions rampant both between the plastic converters themselves and between plastic 
converters and the polymer producers. If it was required that only one price be agreed upon, 
this would reduce the ability of conglomerate linked converters to use their 'muscle' in a way 
that did not benefit all converters. Opportunities for small and medium enterprises would be 
more balanced by removing the price advantage larger converters currently enjoy. By 
conducting the negotiations for the commodity polymers jointly both the producers and the 
converters would have to address the issue of one type of polymer being substituted for 
another as a result of differential pricing. Finally the monopolistic polymer manufactures 
would be faced with the collective strength of the converters who would have access to 
alternate supplies (imports), which would act to balance the power relationships more 
equitably. Direct negotiation seems preferable to past practice of indirect negotiation, via 
memoranda submitted to the Board of Tariffs and Trade. 
In addition to a more equitable distribution of profit among the producers along the 
links of the chain, the pricing structure suggested above would help establish a 'virtuous 
cycle'. Import competition would act as an incentive for polymer producers to improve their 
product quality and their relationships with their exporting customers, perhaps in the form 
of technical and marketing assistance. The monopolistic polymer producers have, in the past, 
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neglected this relationship although there are recent indications that this may be changing. 
Improved customer service by polymer producers may, in tum, encourage purchasing of 
domestically produced polymer rather than imported polymer. Simultaneously it should help 
exporters to move away from lower value added type products towards higher value added 
type products. This in tum has advantages for technology and skill development. There is also 
the possibility that smaller plastic converters, inexperienced in export, could be assisted by 
the larger polymer manufacturing companies (polifin, Sentrachem and SASOL) which are 
experienced exporters, perhaps developing further something of the trading house type 
activities integral to the Korean Chaebol. In addition the possibility of larger profits in the 
plastic converting industry, also holds out the possibility of higher wages there. 
The final links in the Jiliere follow broadly two streams from the plastic converters. 
On one hand, final products go to wholesalers and or ·retailers and then finally to consumers. 
On the other hand, intermediate products, such as packaging, serve a variety of other 
industries. How can it be ensured that lower polymer prices will be passed on to these final 
links in the chain, rather than the profit catchment merely being shifted down the chain a link 
or two? There is no easy solution to this problem. 
Many converters argue that in their highly competitive markets a period of 
accumulation is necessary to recapitalise. To some extent this may be unavoidable in the short 
term at least, particularly in oligopolistic markets. As the industry grows some increase in 
competition may be expected in oligopolistic markets which may help to pass on lower prices 
to consumers. However in a small market like South Africa no reliance can be placed upon 
this. 
Tariff regulation will be crucial as imports are and will become, the principal 
competition. In oligopolistic markets tariff reduction will remain an important instrument for 
improving the prospects of lower prices reaching consumers. The need to accurately monitor 
production and trade is again highlighted. Finally a vigilant Competition Board will also make 
an important contribution. 
These are all partial answers to a difficult problem, but taken together, offer some 
reasonable hope for consumers. In the final analysis, it is clear that the bias in the pricing 
mechanism suggested here is in favour of the downstream sectors and their exports. This is 
warranted by the lower capital labour ratios and the particularly low level of exports from the 
plastic converting sector. 
It should be noted that a large share of the polypropylene market lies in textile 
applications. The pricing system suggested above will need to be taken into account when 
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determining tariffs for the appropriate sectors of the textile industry. The same applies in 
respect of export incentives. 
Tariff policy for the Plastic Products Industr,y9 
Tariff policy possibilities in the short term are governed by the nature of the industry, 
(it is highly differentiated with uneven strengths and weaknesses) and the limited abilities of 
the Department of Customs and Excise. A simple uniform tariff structure is unlikely to have 
the desired results although it would be simpler to administer. Rather a carefully nuanced and 
differentiated tariff structure would best meet the desired policy objectives. Such an approach 
regrettably does not seem immediately possible in South Africa. On the other hand too 
differentiated a tariff structure without adequate policing lends itself to corruption. Thus an 
attempt is made in the following suggestions to bear these conflicting demands in mind and 
to try and strike a compromise between them. 
In the Hght of the poor international competitiveness of South Africa's plastic 
converting industry it would be undesirable for South Africa to lower tariffs significantly in 
the short term. Nevertheless since the plastic converting industry serves basically two 
markets, consumer items and intermediate inputs across the economy, it is important for 
broader developmental objectives to get prices as low as possible. Since most plastic items 
are import parity priced, lowering (not removing) tariffs is the obvious choice. However 
where other mechanisms can be found within the domestic market to achieve lower prices 
behind tariff barriers, then these should be preferred. Increased competition is one possibility 
although this is limited where oligopolistic production occurs in the domestic market. The 
complexity arising from the myriad products produced makes this difficult but not impossible. 
An easier, from an administrative point of view, although less nuanced approach is to regulate 
tariffs. Either way a more careful regulation of tariffs would be beneficial. Some suggestions 
in this regard have been made in Chapter Seven. 
Tariff reductions would seem feasible as two developments take place. Firstly as 
polymer and other input prices are lowered and secondly as the industry's manufacturing 
practice improves and international competitiveness improves. The process of achieving tariff 
reductions should be carried out in accordance with the suggestions made below concerning 
institutions ~d processes to deal with tariffs and the tripartite industry forum. 
9. Thi.s discu.ssion excludes plastic articles nonnally considered to fall within the auto components, textile and 
other mdustnes. . 
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Eneineerine plastics 
Engineering plastic volumes have grown slower than commodity polymers. In 
packaging applications (roughly half of polymer consumption) they are forecast to grow 
slower than commodity plastics over 1990-95 (BMI, 1991:75). This is a result of their 
extremely limited local manufacture, the pattern of domestic demand and limited hi-tech type 
products produced by the converting sector. 
A strategy which emphasises too strongly a rapid switch to hi-tech engineering 
polymer type products will boost imports. Rather this should wait until the prospects of 
increased local production of aromatics and downstream engineering polymer plants looks 
more certain. This seemingly unavoidable delay is disadvantageous in that, from a technology 
development and more sophisticated applications point of view, South Africa may continue 
to lag behind world trends. Two partial solutions offer some consolation. 
Firstly, in the interim, remaining tariffs and surcharges on engineering plastics not 
produced locally should ideally be removed. In this way imports from the Far East, at 
generally lower prices, could be imported, converted to higher value added products and 
targeted at markets in Africa, NWE and North America. The automobile industry may also 
benefit from this in view of the shift in the local content programme from weight to value. 
However one must bear in mind that, to a certain extent, engineering and commodity 
polymers are interchangeable, depending upon the application. One would need to guard 
against imported engineering polymer being substituted for locally produced commodity 
polymer intended for domestic consumption and thus unnecessarily increasing imports. 
Hence, where this applies, the timing of this tariff removal would best coincide with the 
introduction of the suggested pricing system and reduction in commodity polymer tariffs. 
Secondly whilst waiting for the domestic petrochemical and engineering polymer 
industry to restructure and develop, something of a compromise solution seems possible in 
the short to medium term. Relative to other polymers made in South Africa, polypropylene 
production far exceeds domestic demand and further potential propylene exists at, what 
SASOL claims are internationally advantageous prices. Polypropylene, being a C) polymer, 
is more amenable than other commodity polymers to a wider range of applications and to near 
engineering plastic status by the addition of fillers and additives. It also has comparatively 
large applications (44% by volume) in the textile industry and implications for strategy in that 
sector. This already forms a part of the plans of a leading company in that sector. 
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"In recent years the Group's polypropylene operations have competed successfully 
against imports and in international markets. Polypropylene based textile operations 
have been consolidated under Extruded Fabrics to take advantage of the competitive 
cost structure of local polypropylene polymers. The objective is to focus technological 
capability in this product area which has growth opportunities both domestically and 
internationally. " 
"Most successful exports were based on those materials which are available locally 
at world competitive prices such as wool, polypropylene, and acrylic." (Romatex 
Annual Report, 1992:7) 
In addition, as international auto manufacturers have sought to reduce the number of materials 
used and lower the costs of using engineering polymers, the chief beneficiary among the 
commodity polymers has been PP. Himont for example has developed PP auto dashboards 
and instrument panels, with PP structural frames, PP foamed padding and PP synthetic leather 
covers. This facilitates recovery and recycling as only one. type of polymer is used. 
It would appear sensible, then, to exploit SASOVs relative propylene/PP advantage 
in the short to medium term. This seems preferable to pursuing (as Taiwan and other 
countries with more developed petrochemical sectors have) a shift into engineering polymers, 
which would mean a surge in imports with the consequent negative impact on the balance of 
payments. 
Institutions and processes to deal with dumpin&. tariffs. subsidies and export incentives 
Since dumping is a real threat in commodity polymers, especially during global 
recessions, consideration needs to be given to this problem. A conventional response is to 
think in terms of quantitative or non-quantitative import restrictions. The difficulty with such 
measures is that they pass on the costs (of less than competitive local producers) to precisely 
the wrong constituency, the plastic converters, the very sector to whom this strategy is 
attempting to deliver polymer at less than world prices in order that it may lower prices and 
expand. There are two ways to avoid this pitfall. One is to make anti-dumping protection 
conditional upon the maintenance of satisfactory domestic polymer prices and below world 
prices for exporters. This condition is important not least because the polymer industry 
currently regards their level of protection as merely an anti dumping device, albeit an 
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inadequate one from their point of view. An alternative to tariffs is subsidies, effectively 
spreading the costs of keeping such a producer in business across the entire society. 
Unfortunately subsidy applicants are likely to find that they are merely one in a long queue. 
Both suggestions of course create opportunities for rent seeking but no more so than 
the current system utilised by the Board of Trade and Industry. Indeed the possibilities for 
rent seeking could be reduced, and the process of democracy advanced, if applications for 
such subsidies required a far more public inquiry than has been the norm to date. Such an 
inquiry could consist of permanent members such as organised polymer manufacturers, 
organised plastic converters, organised labour and the Board of Trade and Industry. It is 
important that applications for assistance be entertained only if they come from industry 
associations as this will tend to reduce the potential for rent seeking which is usually firm 
orientated. Such a practice will also force objections from within the industry to be sorted out 
'in-house' beforehand, thus eliminating the need for the time consuming practice of allowing 
rival firms to comment upon state proposals. 
Hearings would be public and other interested parties would be entitled to make 
written and oral representations. Naturally a company ~king subsidies would need to 
disclose its financial position, a further disincentive to rent seekers. 10 Subsidies would need 
to be restricted to limited fixed periods, requiring a further inquiry in order to be reinstated. 
It is acknowledged that certain resources, people's time and energy etc, will be needed 
to operate such a system. However there is no reason to suppose that the overall costs to 
society would be that much higher than the current system, which has been far too cosy a 
relationship between big companies and the state. Such hearings should be held expeditiously. 
Although a concern here has been rent seeking by employers, corruption among the state 
bureaucrats should not be overlooked. The more open system proposed here may also serve 
to limit the opportunities for the latter. It will also offer the benefits of building democracy, 
so sorely needed in South Africa. 
Such inquiries raise the issue of the quality of information available to participants. 
This is addressed below along with research and development. 
Export Incentives 
In an earlier chapter certain key elements for export expansion were identified: tariff 
10. Th~re is considerable merit in requiring all income tax returns to be public as a general measure against 
corruption. 
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free access to intermediate inputs for both direct and indirect exporters and back to back 
letters of creditll , probably underwritten by a state fmancial institution. The following 
section deals with suggestions in this regard. 
a) The Polymer Industry 
Some polymer manufacturers have been exporting. One thrust of the strategy proposed 
here is to promote the local beneficiation of this previously exported plastic raw material by 
way of exports from lower down the production chain. The incentive for polymer producers 
to allow and promote local beneficiation should be the opportunity to share in the benefits of 
final export sales. However export incentives ought to enable suppliers of intermediate goods 
(polymer producers) to benefit. 
GElS was scheduled to be phased out in March 1995 according to Org Marais, 
Former Minister of Trade and Industry (FM, 23-8-91:65). In addition South Africa's 
admission to GA'IT may also require some earlier adjustments to GElS. If some form of 
GElS or export incentive is to remain in this jiliere, the.n these events present a timely 
opportunity to restructure such incentives. 
Ideally only plastic raw material which cannot be beneficiated locally should be 
exported. However since an objective of the strategy being suggested here is to nudge and 
drive the polymer producers to expand their plant capacities to 'world scale', the scale of 
additional tranches of capacity will in all probability result in increased polymer exports at 
times, regardless of incentives. Consequently export incentives should ideally be redesigned 
in such a way that direct exports of intermediate inputs such as polymer would not ' be 
assisted. Instead they would only be assisted if they were intermediate inputs into final export 
products. In taking this line of thinking further, if exporters are to be given higher status in 
South African industrial policy than those who produce only for the domestic market, then 
final exporters should exercise some measure of control over the incentives which are passed 
back upstream to intermediate input suppliers. The additional benefit of such an arrangement 
in the plastics jiliere is that it would redress, to some extent, the power imbalance between 
the plastic converters and the polymer monopolies. 
There is also an important although less tangible issue which needs to be addressed 
and that is the lack of collaboration and cooperation between the polymer producers and 
11. Credit schemes enabling indirect exporters to obtain credit for exports. 
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plastic converters. This is a difficult issue to address head on. Indeed it may be best 
addressed tangentially from several different directions (examples of this below). However 
one means of addressing it directly would be the establishment, by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (OTI), of a forum of stakeholders purely for the purposes of engendering 
cooperation. (This idea is taken up in more detail below.) Another might be for the DTI to 
be given a general standing instruction to try and increase cooperation wherever possible in 
its dealings with stakeholders in this Jiliere. 
b) The Plastic Converting Industry 
Currently GElS and Phase 6 export incentive schemes are important to plastic 
converters in ameliorating the anti-export bias. However assuming that state financial 
assistance, if necessary, will enter the pipeline at the upstream end and should reach 
converters in the form of lower polymer prices, then the objective would be to move away 
from cash incentives at the downstream end and towards other forms of assistance which 
improve international competitiveness and export marketing. These are addressed elsewhere 
in this chapter under various headings, principally, capital goods, export marketing, 
technology restrictions, research and development and skills. 
Since the plastics converting industry provides intermediate inputs to a wide range of 
other manufacturing industries it is important that it is not excluded from whatever export 
incentive schemes may operate in those industries it supplies. For example in South Africa 
a comparatively large proportion of polymer is consumed by packaging. Much rigid plastic 
packaging is in the form of bottles and closures, which if empty, are generally non tradeable. 
Consequently there is a need to link export incentives for final exporters back to the plastic 
packaging supplier. This is intended to enable the latter to provide packaging at less than the 
current domestic value so as not to disadvantage the export prospects of the food exporter. 
Domestic plastic packaging prices will be comparatively high as it is suggested that tariffs on 
these products remain but at reduced levels. 
One mechanism to achieve this backward pricing linkage is to encourage or require 
packaging suppliers to enter profit sharing agreements whereby the plastic packaging supplier 
provides packaging at an FOB price in exchange for a share of the profits from export sales. 
Another means would be to structure any export incentive in such a way as to make 
intermediate suppliers direct beneficiaries, rather than through just conventional commercial 
arrangements. This is intended to protect the interests of small converting firms against the 
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power of large customers. In addition the state could play a facilitative role in encouraging 
such backward linkages by providing better information to link suppliers and customers. 
Another option would be to allow plastic converters which are indirect exporters 
access to imported polymer free of tariffs and surcharges. 
A reduction in import barriers (in accordance with the forthcoming implementation 
of the Marrakech Agreement) in South Africa's target markets would also help to increase 
exports. The analysis in preceding chapters suggests that although South Africa's international 
competitiveness in plastic products is relatively low, it nevertheless still has prospects in 
certain high wage countries. Consequently South Africa's reclassification in terms of GAIT 
as a developing country or other means to improve access to those markets would be 
important for export expansion. If international competitiveness improves over time then the 
range of target markets could be widened. 
The large firms in the polymer industry are experienced exporters, most are connected 
to MNCs. On the other hand small and medium sized plastic converters will, almost as a 
prerequisite, require assistance in identifying and serving export markets. The experience in 
successful East Asian economies is that successful exporting requires considerable promotion 
efforts on the part of the state agencies (Wade, 1991:368). Consequently the prospects of 
export success for the plastic converting industry are tied to some extent to the general level 
of manufactured exports together with the state's willingness and ability to fund export 
promoting activities. 
International developments suggest that increasingly the role of the state is to provide 
the 'operating platform' from which internationally competitive firms can launch their forays 
into world markets. A critical element in this approach is the supply of good quality market 
intelligence and supportive trade missions and diplomatic initiatives. The South African DTI 
could do far more in these areas. In this regard there is much to be learned from South 
Korean government's export marketing activities. 
The longer term objective, in the plastic converting industry, would be to steer export 
assistance to small and medium firms through structures of cooperation between them, so 
rewarding cooperation. This is necessary for various reasons. Small firms especially lack the 
capacity to master all the considerable skills necessary to export successfully. It is a means 
of counteracting the unusually high levels of mutual suspicion and distrust currently existing 
in the plastic converting industry. Cooperation maximises the advantage which lies in the 
synergies of skills and capacities these producers have in generating products for export. In 
the longer term cooperation on issues such as R&D and technology could be facilitated from 
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this basis. A greater role by the DTI (or other appropriate state agency) in export promotion 
could, in the course of carrying out such functions, arguably find opportunities and means 
to encourage the type of cooperation currently lacking in thefiliere. 
For the short term, engendering this cooperation will not be easy. Marshalling of 
producers to collectively meet large orders will take energy and ti~e to begin with. SAFfO's 
restructuring along industrial lines should assist. Ideally some form of government agency 
which is proactive in seeking out potentialiy cooperative firms and drawing them into export 
business is needed. To begin with a few small offices in strategic locations, staffed by 4 or 
5 suitably skilled persons would be adequate to coordinate state and commercial bank deals, 
freight forwarders, SAFfO, facilities offered by the Department of Trade and Industry etc. 
The costs would be small in comparison with South Africa's many, and often times 
duplicated, state funded bureaucracies. 
Disincentives are appropriate for those that blatantly refuse to cooperate. The simple 
but effective South Korean expedient of terminating an offender's electricity supply seems 
unlikely to be within the range of powers granted to the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Publicising offenders is a less harsh but sometimes telling form of censure. This could be 
encouraged by placing a general responsibility on firms, trade and industry organisations and 
institutions to make such lapses in cooperation public. Beyond this there is a spectrum of 
disincentives ranging from the compilation of 'black lists' of such firms, to the withdrawal 
of incentives and so on, depending upon the power the policing agent for industrial 
development is able to muster. 
Breaking into export markets requires persistence and investment in the effort. It takes 
something like 2-3 years work to develop an export business in Africa.12 In the past the state 
has used tax incentives by way of exemption on export marketing expenses (Section l1(bis) 
of the Income Tax Act phased out in March 1992). This was subject to misuse and abuse and 
withdrawn for that reason. Nevertheless some incentive of this type is necessary. Perhaps it 
could be administered differently - by for example the industry association - using peer group 
policing. This might be linked to a small levy the value of imports and exports. Taiwan for 
example imposes 0.05% levy to fund such export marketing assistance. 
One source of considerable potential assistance to exporters is the Department of Trade 
and Industry. However its 'Trade' branch is currently separate from its 'Industry' branch. 
12. Moss D Op~rtuniti~ fo~ two way Chemical trade in sub-Saharan Africa, presentation at 'Opportunities for 
eltpo~ of cbe~cals senunar , Small Tonnage Interest Group of SA Institution of Chemical Engineers and SA 
Cheoucal Institute, Alrode, 26-2-92. 
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There would appear to be merit in merging these two activities for industries which are 
identified in order to expand exports. 
Successful marketing of exports is related to quality systems, which for exporters 
means the ISO 9000 system. This can be a fairly lengthy and time consuming system to 
install and as far as can be ascertained tends to be restricted to the larger firms. It is difficult 
to make detailed practical suggestions here other than that assistance, both financial and in 
the form of expertise should be given to small and medium firms in order to facilitate their 
adoption of the ISO 9000 system. 
Capital Goods 
Capital costs at all levels of the jiliere are a large share of production costs. This is 
especially true in the petrochemical and polymer industry in which projects also have long 
lead times. 
Widespread agreement exists among employers that the cost of capital in South Africa 
is too high. To remedy this there are two schools of thought among employers: 
a) those that argue for the removal of various tax subsidies such as Section 37(e) 
and who favour instead a plan for the progressive reduction of corporate tax 
from the current 48 % to about 35 %, 
and 
b) those that argue for maintaining the level of corporate tax at approximately the 
same level and to provide selective tariff, surcharge and tax incentives to 
targeted capital investment along the lines currently practised by the state. 
The cost of capital is an economy wide problem closely bound up with the fiscal crisis 
and thus an important part of the 'great economic debate'. In so far as investment for 
domestic markets is concerned, the impression gained during field work for this study (in 
1992) is that other factors such as political uncertainty and levels of violence have more to 
do with the current investment strike than the tax regime. 
In so far as investment for exports is concerned it would seem that, in terms of capital 
goods, South African investors are at a relative disadvantage if we exclude for the moment, 
Section 37(e) incentives and the IDC's soft loans to exporters. Consequently if exports are 
to be expanded, this will have to be corrected in some way. The obvious options are one or 
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the other of the two approaches outlined above. Tariff and surcharge relaxations are a further 
option. The impact across the economy of each option would need to be evaluated. Such an 
evaluation is beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless some comment upon the current incentives is possible. Ideally an 
industrial strategy aimed at creating an indigenous machine tools industry is needed. The 
limits and deterioration of this industry in South Africa have been highlighted by Kaplan 
(1991) together with some tentative suggestions for an expanded capital goods sector. In so 
far as injection moulding tools go, even the provision of good quality tool steel from local 
steel producers at competitive prices would be a useful start. Short of the rapid development 
of the local machine tools industry, it appears reliance upon imported machinery and 
equipment will remain a feature of the plastic converting industry. 
The use of credit by Korean economic planners was a key ingredient in their success 
(Byung-Nak Song, 1990). This is partially recognised by the IDC. It subsidises loans to 
install export capacity. Money is lent at 9% provided that 60% or more of the production is 
exported. The difficulty for those plastic converters hoping to enter the export market is to 
secure export markets for 60% of output. Indeed it discriminates against small producers. To 
remedy this a sliding scale would seem more appropriate so that those who begin exporting 
a small proportion of output may also benefit. 
An important aspect of credit, especially for small firms, is immediate access to 
subsidised short-term credit to finance working capital for export purposes. To address this 
such IDC loans could be extended to working capital. A two tier structure could operate, with 
preferential rates being applicable to domestically produced inputs. 
These suggestions would necessitate changes in the IDC to expand its emphasis from 
large projects to include small ones and to extend its operations into all major plastic 
producing regions of the country. Some restructuring to make it more 'user friendly' to small 
firms and to reduce paper work and 'red tape' seems desirable. Investment intended for 
identified national reconstruction initiatives could also be assisted in this way. 
Whichever mechanism is used, facilitating investment in new machinery and 
equipment will impact upon jobs. Jobs are already being lost to new technology as the aging 
capital stock is replaced. Investment incentives aimed at promoting exports will only speed 
up this inevitable process. Some mechanism to secure employment will be necessary, the 
difficulty lies in identifying the appropriate location for this. Tying it to subsidised interest 
rates generates difficulties in determining the duration of the protection in an industry like the 
plastic converting industry which has such varied technologies. A partial solution to the 
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problem of job loss may be to empower organised labour in this area with rights to challenge 
unilateral shop floor restructuring. In addition it would be equitable to subsidise investments 
in human capital (such as training) to at least the same extent as capital is subsidised. The 
principle of neutrality between capital and labour would appear to be the minimum 
requirement given the extent of South Africa's unemployment problem. 
These suggestions taken together and along with the others made here, give some hope 
that jobs lost would be off-set by new jobs arising from new investment in response to the 
pricing structure and other elements of the strategy suggested here. 
Ener~y costs 
Electricity prices in South Africa are internationally competitive (SACOB 1991). 
However the structure of tariffs yields discounts to large consumers and discriminates against 
small producers. 
For the plastic converting industry, energy costs are an important consideration. One 
small firm which has become a successful exporter acknowledged that their theft of electricity 
during their start-up days was an important advantage which made it possible to get the 
business established. Since ESKOM is prepared to subsidise large capital intensive projects 
like Alusaf, through the structure of its electricity charges, there is no reason why similar 
advantages should not apply to assist labour intensive small firms in the plastic converting 
industry to get established particularly as exporters. 
Labour Costs 
As has been shown in a previous chapter South African wages in the Plastic Products 
industry are generally lower than those in the developed economies but higher than those in 
the newly industrialising countries. On wage costs alone South Africa cannot compete with 
the low wage economies. However lower real wages for low income South African wage 
earners does not seem an appropriate (or even attainable) policy objective especially in the 
light of the low standards of living they experience and the strength of organised labour. The 
conventional thesis, that there is an inverse relationship between the level of wages and the 
number of jobs, does not seem to be uniformly supported by the evidence especially if the 
experience of the Asian NICs is taken into account. 
The alternative to lower real wages is to focus instead upon improving productivity 
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and increasing the output per unit of wage costs. The analysis of the international 
competitiveness of the Plastic Products industry provides the key for policy recommendations 
in this area. Increasing productivity is at the heart of the policy suggestions made here and 
the evidence collected in this study suggests that there is considerable scope for improved 
productivity. An area in which large gains are possible in many firms, lies in the 
reorganisation of produ~tion processes on the shop floor and the reorganisation of work which 
will accompany it. 
Typical production systems which may be considered here are Kanban, Kaizen, JIT, 
self managing teamwork, multi-skilling and flexibility (see for example Bessant 1990, Best 
1990, and Imai 1986). Human resource management initiatives frequently accompany these 
changes. Among such are employee involvement initiatives, de-layering of management 
hierarchies, enhanced training and others. Such initiatives also have the potential to yield 
'whole' jobs (as opposed to the work fragmentation which has occurred under Taylorist 
production regimes) and new levels of industrial democ~cy in South Africa. For the purposes 
of this discussion these may be grouped within the notion of 'world best practice'. 
On the other hand there are several such initiatives ~ithin this package of production 
systems which if implemented on their own, can seriously undermine trade unions. These 
include an emphasis upon the individual at the expense of the collective, individual 
performance appraisal, the use of temporary labour and sub-contracting. No doubt both 
employers and unions will attempt to 'pick plums' from among these possibilities. The 
outcome of this struggle will determine whether a redistribution of power in the workplace 
materialises or not. 
This complex nexus of issues is elaborated further below. 
Environmental costs 
The indications are that the petrochemical and plastics industries are among the less 
environment-friendly industries. They are large users of energy and have greater 
environmental impact than their US counterparts. Only detailed environmental auditing can 
reveal the extent of this impact. Such mechanisms are beginning to be developed by the 
SABS. An obligation upon firms to conduct regular environmental audits appears to be a cost 
effective approach requiring a minimum of bureaucracy. To avoid the 'referee and player' 
syndrome such environmental audits need to be carried out by independent parties and most 
importantly the results need to be publicly available. 
382 
Post consumer plastic waste is a growing problem, worldwide, from the point of view 
of environmentally sustainable development (given the fact that plastic is not bio-degradable) 
as well as from an aesthetic point of view. Those countries which have introduced some form 
of obligatory recycling are accumulating growing stockpiles of plastic waste which they have 
been struggling to get rid of. Following in the footsteps of other toxic substances, exporting 
it to less powerful economies is one option. To avoid becoming a dumping ground for waste 
plastic and to encourage recycling of local waste, South Africa should consider an import 
prohibition or very high tariffs on scrap and recycled plastic unless domestic supply cannot 
meet demand, which seems unlikely. 
South Africa has enjoyed a comparatively high level of plastic recycling in comparison 
with Western Europe. This is a function of South Africa's traditionally higher virgin polymer 
prices. A reduction in virgin polymer prices, as suggested above, is likely to have a negative 
effect on polymer recycling. 
Whether or not domestic polymer prices are lowered, South Africa will need an 
appropriate strategy to deal with the growing problem of plastic pollution. International 
experience suggests that recycling is the route to follow. How could this be promoted? 
The collection and sorting costs of plastic need to be reduced. To facilitate this, all 
new plastic products should be required to carry the international symbols identifying the type 
of plastic the item is made from. This may also assist export marketing of new plastic 
products as they will be seen to be environmentally conscious and this will also facilitate the 
recycling of same in the importing country. 
An ideal opportunity exists to link waste recycling to job creation programmes or 
public works which are currently receiving increasing attention. For example the state and 
municipalities could offer a reward per kilogram of waste plastic, to anyone who cared to 
collect it and bring it to certain collection points. A recent initiative like this in one township 
proved very successful. Plastic bottles and containers if separated out at this point could fulm 
a constant need government hospitals have for dispensing containers in efforts to keep 
medicine prices down. Targeting one township or area at a time can help reduce transport 
costs. 
Another option is to introduce a deposit system for plastic bottles although this is more 
complicated. Plastic incineration as an energy source has not yet emerged in South Africa: but 
this is another alternative and is preferable to land filling. 
If the collection costs of scrap plastic can be overcome, it may also find a useful 
application in building materials for low cost housing. 
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Competition Policy 
In a small market like South Africa, industries such as the petrochemical industry with 
large economies of scale tend to operate in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. 
Unfortunately the corporate strategies of the major chemical firms in the local industry have 
compounded the problem. AECI, for many years the leading local chemical firm, is the 
clearest example. For many years it followed a corporate strategy apparently underpinned by 
models of classic static industrial organisation in which it sought to locate in areas of weak 
competition or to initiate changes in the industry structure so as to reduce competition. 
There are essentially two approaches to dealing with this problem and a choice has to 
be made between them. Free marketeers tend to argue for increased competition, whilst those 
who, in Wade's (1991) terminology, would 'govern the market', argue for the controlled 
existence of monopolies. For the purposes of the task at hand the latter appears to offer the 
better solution. The type of controls will be various but as has been argued above, lower 
tariffs will be important in allowing competition into the domestic market. 
Porter (1990) has emphasised the need for firms to adopt strategies which will lead 
to dynamic competitive advantage. However changing local management's mind-set, away 
from the tried and trusted strategies which they have relied upon in the past to direct the local 
chemical industry will be no easy task. Certainly government's role is likely to be restricted 
to suggesting, nudging, urging and at most subsidising in some way the costs firms incur in 
engaging consultants and advisors. There may however be a window of opportunity for the 
Government of National Unity in the immediate post apartheid period to employ 'soft' policy 
options (in conjunction with 'harder' options such 'as tariff Iiberalisation). It could bring firms 
together under the banner of 'Reconstruction and Development' and try and bind them 
through moral suasion into a process of 'making a fresh start' and in this way influence 
corporate strategies. 
Forward inteeration and dominance in the plastic convertine industry 
Pricing mechanisms, as have been suggested above, may also act as a strong incentive 
for polymer manufacturers to integrate forward into the converting business and to enter into 
competition with their customers, an understandable cause for concern among such customers. 
This gives rise to fears that the big chemical companies, (two of them have links to large 
South African conglomerates), will take over and dominate the converting industry. 
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These fears may be allayed to a certain extent by a quick review of the present 
structure of the industry. It is a widely diverse industry with a wide range of technologies, 
skills and markets and is accordingly not easily corralled by large companies. Packaging is 
the largest single market for all polymers, 47.6% by volume in 1990.'1 This market is 
dominated by three firms, Nampak, Kohler and Con sol , each .of which is owned by a 
conglomerate and unlikely to surrender its lucrative business easily. 
Outside of packaging, Polifin and to a lesser extent, Sentrachem, tend to prefer and 
are more forward integrated in the lower value added commodity bulk or mass market type 
products which tend to have limited export potential (ie Southern Africa) due to the nature 
of those products. An exception is Mega Hi-Tech's (Sentrachem) auto bumper export 
business. However this may be turned to advantage as some of these products such as piping 
can playa major role in housing and national reconstruction, provided that their prices can 
be kept low. The obvious mechanism to do this is by tariff reduction. Excluding packaging, 
the indications are that export potential outside of Southern Africa is stronger in more design 
intensive or speciality type niche markets, which thus far tend not to have been favoured by 
the large companies outside of packaging. 
SASOL, prior to the advent of Polifin, was not forward integrated at all. As primarily 
an energy business, it is ill equipped to make a foray into the converting or carpeting 
industry. It is as yet unclear what impact SASOL's majority shareholding will have on the 
businesses AECI put into Polifin. Nevertheless SASOL has the resources to make 
considerable acquisitions and may be expected to do so either directly or via Polifin. A likely 
target will be polypropylene usage in the textile industry, an area in which growth is strong, 
exports are significant and further potential exists. Once Polifin has invested in a new 
(ethylene based) PVC plant it may be expected, depending upon the capacity of the plant, to 
expand its subsidiaries which use PVC so as to assure itself of a significant 'base load' for 
its new plant. Polifin will be balked in PP for so long as Sentrachem and Hoechst control 
Safripol and its marketing arm. As has been argued earlier, the advent of Polifin requires 
very active monitoring of prices accompanied by a competition agency capable of eliminating 
discriminatory pricing. Indeed vigilant state regulation of prices, as has occurred in South 
Korea, may become necessary. 
There are several instances where conglomerates have used their financial muscle to 
remove sm~ler, more efficient producers. At the same time it must be recognised that only 
13. Calculated from BMI. 1991 and Plastics Federation of SA figures. 
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the very largest of South Africa's plastic converting businesses approximate 'world scale'. 
Drawing the line between inefficient conglomerates silencing competition by takeover on the 
one hand and genuine attempts to achieve a scale of operations capable of competing 
internationally, on the other, will require careful examination. Nevertheless measures will be 
necessary to improve the chances of small firms surviving where they rub up against 
subsidiaries of conglomerates. Among the measures required will be a more rigorous 
Competition Board capable of more rigorous investigations as well as other efforts to bring 
about cooperation among small and medium enterprises , discussed below. 
Concentration and Cooperation 
The plastic converting industry can be characterised by two phenomena: domination 
by conglomerates in certain (often oligopolistic) markets and a proliferation of small firms 
(often in cut-throat competition) in others. A twin approach is needed to deal with the two 
phenomena identified here: one to develop the capabilities of larger firms and another to 
develop the capabilities of small firms. 
The experience in the US has been that plastic converting firms equivalent in size to 
some of South Africa's largest firms have been the most innovative. In South Africa these 
firms are typically linked to conglomerates. The extent of domination by conglomerate owned 
firms could be reduced if policies were adopted which de-linked the plastic converting firms 
from their conglomerate owners. De-linking firms from their conglomerate parents may 
expose them to greater threat of forward integration by the chemical conglomerates, SASOL, 
Polifin and Sentrachem. Such forward integration is already the case to some extent. Further 
forward integration need not be rejected out of hand because of the advantages vertical 
integration offers and the possibility that the international competition will be vertically 
integrated. Such developments would need to be monitored by a more dynamic Competition 
Board with enhanced powers and an ability to take industrial policy into account. For example 
the extent to which exports of plastic products would be increased as a result of such forward 
integration would be one important yardstick for the Competition Board to apply in approving 
such takeovers. 
Simultaneously it is suggested that policy aimed at small firms should attempt to lure 
and corral them into a number of industrial districts in the major centres. One already exists 
to some extent in practice to the east of Johannesburg around the offices of the Plastics 
Federation. Best defines industrial districts as "dynamic constellation(s) of mutually adjusting 
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firms" (Best, 1990:235) in which a mixture of co-operation and competition prevails. The 
intention would be to promote the design and innovative capabilities of small plastic 
converters. The promotion of this objective could also form a part of the lure to attract such 
firms to the proposed districts, in the form of the technical advice and information centres 
elaborated on below. Such centres could also provide advice on export marketing advice as 
well as functioning as coordination points for cooperative export efforts. Other aspects of the 
strategy elaborated here such as lower energy prices and access to soft credit could be linked 
to participation in such industrial districts. 
Human Resources and Skins 
The key skill bottlenecks in the Jiliere which need to be addressed are: illiteracy 
among the black workforce, the supply of operators and artisan toolmakers, industrial 
designers, polymer technologists, production engineers and chemical engineers. The " 
replacement of blacks by whites in the Industrial Chemicals and Refinery industries suggests 
that much more attention needs to be given to the training of black process operators. Indeed 
the complex issues of afftrmative action for previously disadvantaged race and gender groups 
requires urgent attention. Skill formation and training appear to offer the most viable route 
to correcting past distortions in the labour market. Such initiatives are more likely to succeed 
than heavy handed state intervention if left to negotiations between organised labour and 
business, subject to the general requirement that they be able to demonstrate progress over 
time. There are signs that the state is tentatively moving in this direction although as has been 
seen in the case of the Plastics Industry Training 'Board the state has thus far been reluctant 
to oblige business to involve organised labour. 
Human resource development is the weakest link in South Africa's range of 
capabilities according to International Competitiveness Reports. The costs of correcting this 
historical deficiency is likely to be large. Setting the exact levels of spending appears best left 
to negotiation between business and labour in each industry in the first instance. 
The level of contributions by employers to the Plastics Industry Training Board, 
currently 0.75 % of payroll, is wholly inadequate for the task at hand. 14 To encourage 
greater spending on training, by both employers and employees, such expenditure should at 
least be tax deductible. Should the flscus allow, then state contributions should be made to 
14. In Australia, which does not have South Africa's legacy of apartheid education, a training tax of 1.5% of 
the wage bill has been introduced. 
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the industry training boards provided that, they are representative of organised business and 
organised labour, have mapped out and agreed appropriate career paths and that these training 
programmes have been discussed and synchronised as far as is practicable with institutions 
of adult education and of higher learning such as technikons and universities. 
The Chemical Oil & Allied Industry Training Board was struggling to launch itself 
over 1993-94 and will, when operational, cover the upstream end of the jiliere. The intent 
of the employers in this case is simply to gain accreditation for their own training schemes 
and to increase the supply of trained artisans, a matter in which they have the support of the 
whites only unions and oddly, the black consciousness union as well (Interview, Bonner). The 
ideas suggested above may equally be applied to the Chemical Oil & Allied Industry Training 
Board. 
Research. Development and Technolo~ical Capacity 
The insights gained from this study suggest that South Africa needs to develop a 
national innovation system, an issue beyond the ambit of this study. The contribution which 
the findings of this study can make to this larger question is to point out the weaknesses 
evident in thisjiliere, and what might be done to correct them, thus providing something of 
a case study for the wider issues. The low levels and in some instances, non-existent levels 
of R&D spending suggest that incentives are necessary to increase the level of R&D 
spending. 
Technology licensing agreements are important limitation upon exports from the 
plastic Gonverting industry. Firms will have to be encouraged to renegotiate the terms of these 
agreements. If unsuccessful they will need a channel to the Department of Trade and Industry 
enabling the complaint to be taken further at government level. New technology licensing 
agreements restricting exports will have to be avoided as far as possible. 
Dealing with the constraints imposed by foreign technology licenses on local 
beneficiation and modification will require active state intervention. The reluctance of foreign 
investors to develop technology locally also requires attention. 
In so far as manufacturing is concerned proposals exist for a National Manufacturing 
Research Centre (see De Lange, 1992). If industry specific sub-branches of such a centre 
could be established at regional level, to facilitate access by small firms, then this would add 
another complementary level. 
In the plastics converting industry the objective of the broader research and 
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development environment should be to facilitate the development of new products and to 
provide a reservoir of innovative ideas that can be turned into practical projects. This has to 
be addressed at a number of different but complementary levels: university, industrial design 
school and plastics technology. Most importantly these inputs have to reach, or be accessible 
to fums 'in the field'. Ideally, technical advice centres, for want of a better term, should be 
set up in the major centres. 
It is important to recognise that much of the skill base in the industry exists 
informally, in the capacity of its managerial staff. This ability, as one interviewee put it, 'to 
steal with our eyes' during international visits and adapt this knowledge for their own use is 
important. It is a critical capacity which should not be undermined whilst it continues to exist 
and consequently the local technical advice centres suggested here, should have a facilitative 
bias to try and develop and formalise these skills. At the same time industry experts point out 
that this is a declining skill base (Interviews, Naude and Huisman). Preparation is obviously 
needed to begin replacing this shrinking skill base. The pbjective here would be to establish 
a 'virtuous cycle' beginning with the accreditation of existing (often informal) skills and using 
a package of incentives and rewards, to encourage skill formation and incremental innovation 
(dealt with in more detail below). 
The final challenge will be to create an interaction and intercourse of ideas up and 
down these various levels of research, development, technical advice and 'hands on' 
knowledge. 
The need for much better information about the industry has been identified. The 
chemical and petrochemical industries are located in the 'commanding heights' of the 
economy and the nature of their development is a matter of considerable importance from a 
public policy point of view as has been demonstrated in this study. Yet South Africa with its 
strong heritage of secrecy among the business community and the state, and its weak Central 
Statistical Services is poorly placed to provide quality information. IS Compounding this 
problem is the global phenomenon that quality information concerning the chemical and 
plastics industries has been very largely privatised. 
A neutral and authoritative body is sorely needed to monitor the industry and provide 
the public, employers and labour with accurate information, both local and international, 
bearing in mind that the petrochemical industry is a global industry. This is clearly the state's 
responsibility, and would fit most usefully as an adjunct to a new Ministry of Industrial 
15. See Meth (1991) for an account of CSS shortcomings in manufacturing employment and output statistics. 
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Development and Planning. Unfortunately neither the CSS nor the IDC have the tradition. 
What is important, from the chemical industry point of view, is that such a body should be 
industry specific and chemical industry focused. It would also seem advisable that although 
state funded it should have a considerable measure of independence from the state, business 
and organised labour. Equally important its research findings should be publicly available at 
low cost. 
The rationale for this suggestion is that if public policy formation about crucial areas 
of the economy such as the petrochemical industry are to be made more democratic, the basic 
facts (which are not readily available) will need to be made available so that individuals and 
interest groups may formulate their views upon facts and not upon conjecture and speculation. 
Secondly the centralisation of such a facility will ensure economies of scale in the gathering 
of imported and expensive resource material, which would be of benefit to companies, state 
departments, industrial negotiating forums and the public at large. 
A further justification for state expenditure on generating and distributing information 
and knowledge about the industry both locally and internationally lies in its importance to 
fmns in the design of their corporate strategies. 
The need to regularly monitor tariff codes and production referred to earlier could also 
be absorbed into the functions of such a research and information unit. It may also develop 
links with organisations like SAFfO which have begun to restructure on an industry basis. 
Problems in extracting the requisite information from local producers will be significant. 
Penalties, perhaps in the form of fines, seem the simplest measure of securing compliance 
with requirements for the provision of information. 
'Soft' Technolo~ies and 'Virtuous Cycles' 
Evidence collected in both the polymer industry and the plastic converting industry, 
suggested that a small proportion of firms had begun to employ, what has been termed above 
as 'world best practice'. This type of 'soft technology' offers fabrication industries in 
particular (such as the plastic converting industry) an opportunity to improve productivity at 
comparatively low cost. Indeed diffusion of the know-how to implement such systems is 
something which government could facilitate by employing one or more incentives. 
Continuous incremental innovation lies at the heart of this notion of 'world best practice'. 
Many incremental gains can come from shop floor contributions. The Japanese talk of 
'mining the gold in workers heads'. Indeed it could be argued that since apartheid has stifled 
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workplace interaction, in particular between white supervisory staff and black production 
workers, then there exists a reserve of shop floor contributions which have gone largely 
untapped. If so, then it may follow that the end of political apartheid provides an opportunity 
to harvest a better than average contribution from shop floor workers. 
However persuading black workers to relinquish voluntarily some of the 'gold in their 
heads' is unlikely to be an easy task, given the impact apartheid has had on the shop floor 
relations and the industrial relations system. The challenge facing management is how they 
might create a virtuous cycle which mobilises this tacit knowledge on the shop floor, links 
it to formal knowledge which in tum is linked to incremental gains in productivity and 
efficiency. This seems only likely to materialise to the extent that the frrm is able to win 
workers co-operation and loyalty. 
Such co-operation and loyalty is unlikely to .be forthcoming until two fundamental 
concerns for shop floor workers are addressed; job security and rewards for their intellectual 
contributions. 
Such complex issues lie mostly beyond the ambit of this study however a basic 
framework or approach is offered here in an attempt to address these issues at a general level. 
The framework proposed is set out schematically in Figure 39. This model proceeds from the 
assumption that the adoption of 'world best practice' production systems will lead to the 
reorganisation of work on the shop floor which in tum requires changes to job descriptions 
and the skills necessary to fulfil such job descriptions. 
The organisation of work, individual job descriptions, wages, rewards and skills 
become inextricably caught up together in a 'skills/wage nexus'. These issues will need to be 
negotiated between management and workers, most usefully at the firm level. A part of the 
incentives necessary to attract labour into active participation in 'world best practice' 
techniques will be the need to link the incentive/reward system to skill acquisition so that 
human capacity building becomes an integral part of the system. Such negotiations are likely 
to be difficult and time consuming at first. Consequently it would be helpful if a basic 
framework of wages and conditions of employment as well as education and training 
programmes was addressed by industry training boards thus leaving more negotiating time 
for production and reward issues at the firm level. This dual level approach would have the 
additional benefit of providing an opportunity for the development of some form of wage 
policy at the industry level. 
In order for shop floor workers to negotiate effectively in such a dual level approach 
some improvement in their rights to firm information and in their bargaining status could well 
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Figure 39 Schematic Model for Upliftin~ Production Efficiencies. Skills and Rewards 
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Skill will only be enhanced if training takes place. This has been discussed above. 
However it is important to note that in this innovation driven model, skills need to be seen 
as both "those competencies which will both enable the worker to cope as the production 
process evolves as well as enabling workers to contribute to that process of innovation and 
evolution. This suggests that competencies should be more generic than specific and that the 
training scheme/s offered should allow for core competencies to be developed to higher and 
higher levels along a broad career paths. If there is to be mobility of labour between firms 
in a changing industrial landscape, competencies will need to have national recognition and 
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certification. At the same time allowance will need to be made for firm level training. Both 
of these are accommodated within the current model adopted by the Plastics Industry Training 
Board (discussed earlier). 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of implementing this model will be dealing with 
worker's major uncertainty - job security. Job guarantees would be ideal but may be difficult 
to sustain in a restructuring industry. Some form of safety net or bridge to new job 
opportunities will need to be developed to accommodate those who are made redundant by 
the apparently inexorable labour shedding march of technology (of both the 'hard' and the 
'soft' varieties). 
Firms will need to offer, almost as a precondition, some form of security to their 
workforces. This could be coupled to training and some form of unemployment income over 
and above the meagre payments made by the Unemployment Insurance Fund. It is 
acknowledged that this aspect of the framework is the least developed and requires further 
imaginative development. 
Institutions. Policy Formation and Industrial Relations 
The process of change management which introduces industrial restructuring is almost 
as important as the changes themselves. Indeed they are not entirely separable. Insights 
gained from this study emphasise the need for much greater care and attention to be given 
to the process of change. Examples of this include the experience of the Plastics Industry 
Training Board levy, the complaints about state inconsistencies and the impact of industrial 
restructuring on job security. 
The strong centrist apartheid state drove the economy down a path intended to meet 
its own domestic public policy objectives mediated only by business lobbying. In order to 
avoid similar pitfalls of a different kind in future, far more open and consensual decision 
making processes are required which empower the previously disempowered relative to the 
state. That is labour and previously disenfranchised groups such as black civic organisations. 
Firstly an economy-wide frame of reference seems necessary so that all participants 
in the economy have a sense of the direction being pursued and the general targets at which 
policy is to be aimed. The tripartite National Economic Forum (NEF) comprising organised 
business, labour and government established an embryonic institution within which national 
and sectoral economic trajectories could be devised. If its deliberations are conducted 
transparently and its decisions publicised in advance, complaints by business about the lack 
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of predictability in policy may be addressed. Indeed their very participation in the process 
may go some way to dealing with this complaint. 
At the industry level the introduction of this or any other strategy will have to be 
accompanied by discussion and negotiation among all the stakeholders in the industry, 
organised employers, organised labour and the state, ideally an industry sub-committee under 
the auspices of the NEF. Changes in tariff levels to induce greater efficiency among the 
polymer producers may also cause jobs to be shed. Recapitalisation of the existing converting 
operations, particularly for export is likely to be labour shedding. These difficult issues will 
need to be negotiated with organised labour. Overall a move to higher levels of industrial 
efficiency along the lines of the 'new competition' will require a new kind of collaboration 
between capital and labour which can only arise from discussion and negotiation at both the 
industry and the firm level in which there is an adequate requirement for the disclosure of 
information on the part of business. 
The Plastics Federation has operated a Plastics Industries Committee comprising the 
three large companies (SASOL, AECI and Sentrachem) together with the Association of 
Plastic Processors of South Africa (APPSA). It has dealt with contentious issues in the 
industry such as the trade regime and acted as a "Pre-Clearing-House for 
response/recommendation to Pretoria in an effort to speed up policy-decision making" 
(Spindler, 1992: 14). This provides a nucleus to which organised labour and the state could 
be added to provide the plastics filiere with an industrial strategy planning and negotiating 
forum. Many employers and employees in the industry are not a party to employer 
associations or trade unions. Incentives to correct this would help to generate strong 
institutions and more broadly based policies. 
An institutionalised industry forum at a national level appears essential if in the 
formation of industrial policy issues there is to be a levelling of opportunity. In previous 
attempts such as the Working Group for the Promotion of the Chemical Industry, organised 
labour was excluded. It is important for the latter to be included since in the formation of 
public policy objectives they represent an important group which has historically been 
unrepresented and which needs to be heard. An inclusive process will also have more 
legitimacy during the difficult and sometimes painful implementation phases. In such a forum 
organised labour will lack expertise. Such disadvantages could be addressed by statutory 
support and (differential) government funding for participants in tripartite institutions of this 
type. 
Such institutions will work better if it is within their power to control resources such 
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as cash or access to incentives. Active participation and more equitable outcomes should then 
replace rent seeking and unnecessary industrial action. 
However on its own such an institution is likely to fail. This is so because ultimately 
the restructuring and adjustments which need to be made must be made by firms and the trade 
union organisation in those firms. Neither the management nor the union leadership appear 
particularly well prepared for the firm level adjustments which are necessary. Given the 
generally antagonistic relationships between managers and unions in the industry, with 
considerable distrust on both sides, some form of assistance appears to be necessary if this 
relationship is not to spill over into unnecessary lock-outs and strikes. Assistance could 
usefully be directed at training, for both managers and union leadership in how firms could 
be made more efficient through work reorganisation. Legislative changes will be necessary 
to secure for workers access to relevant information. about their firm and their inclusion in 
strategic decision-making. 
Job security is a fundamental issue for ordinary workers. Unless a mechanism is found 
to address this need apart from the very limited retrenchment packages common in the 
industry, workers will find it difficult to accept the wider objectives of any industrial strategy, 
even if their trade union leadership is involved in its formulation. The resolution of this 
difficult issue, perhaps more than any other, will influence the prospects for attempts, driven 
by industrial policy, to make the commodity plastics jiliere more dynamic. 
ANNEXURE A 
ETHANE'S ALTERNATE VALUE AS INDUSTRIAL GAS 
Prices as at September 1992 
Given: 1 cubic metre ethane 
1 Kg ethane 
1 cubic metre industrial gas 
1 Gigajoule industrial gas 
Therefore: 
1. 1 Kg ethane 
Therefore 
1 tonne ethane 
= 66.04 Megajoule 
= 51.923 Megajoule 
= 18.9 Megajoule 
= R17.685 (average) 
= 51.923 Megajoule 
= 51.923 Gigajoule 
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1 Gigajoule industrial gas costs R17.685, therefore the 
value of 1 tonne ethane as industrial gas is: 
51.923 Gigajoule X R17.685 
= R 917.85 
Conclusion: 
The value to SASOL of ethane, as industrial g~ is approximately half that of the value to 
SASOL as ethylene, if ethylene is R 1 800 per tonne. Ethane is also worth more as industrial 
gas than as petrol. However it should be borne in mind that this is somewhat of a theoretical 
exercise in that other gases of lower calorific value would need to be included to make 




The Petroleum Products Act (No. 120 of 1977) and other legislation l placed a veil of secrecy 
over the petroleum industry. It was only in May 1993 that the government produced a 
document outlining the workings of the oil industry. 2 
PART ONE 
The Oil Industry's re&ulator.y re&ime and SASOL's 'suawrt' 
There are eight principal elements to the oil industry regulations which are 
summarised below. 
1. The In Bond Landed Cost (IBLC) 
The IBLC is the official import parity price of refined product. It is the price at which 
South African refineries and SASOL sell refined product to the liquid fuel wholesaling and 
marketing companies, the so-called 'refinery gate' price. 
Although SASOL is paid an import parity price, this does not mean that, under normal 
conditions, it would import refined products. 
The theoretical (IBLC) price is based on an average of four refinery prices; one 
refinery in the Persian Gulf (Bahrain) and three in Singapore. Those less trusting of the 
'Seven Sisters' and their kind may have their curiosity aroused to learn that three of these 
refineries belong to multinational oil majors which also operate refineries in South Africa. 
This (IBLC) theoretical model envisages that crude is shipped from the Persian Gulf to 
Singapore, refined there and the resultant refined product shipped to South Africa. 
The IBLC model is criticised on the grounds that it is crude oil which is imported and 
not refined product (petrol, diesel etc). This is true, however the commercial basis for 
building refineri~s in South Africa rests upon the notion that by importing crude and refming 
l. The Central Energy Fund Act (No. 38 of 1977), the National Supplies Procurement Act (No. 89 of 1970) 
and the Import and Export Central Act (No. 45 of 1963). 
2. During the period when research for this study was being conducted the secrecy provisions in this area made 
it almost impossible to conduct research in this area. Subsequently as official information has become available 
it has been possible to make corrections where necessary. 
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it locally, the cost of locally produced liquid fuels would be lower than directly imported 
liquid fuels. In this sense the IBLC acts merely as a form of tariff protection for local 
refineries in order to protect their refining margins (Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs, 1993). 
The validity or otherwise of a form of tariff protection for local crude oil refiners is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Within the model of the IBLC, several issues are identified which serve to raise the 
IBLe above a 'realistic' import parity price. Firstly Singapore and Bahrain prices are higher 
than Rotterdam and Mediterranean spot prices. If Singapore and Bahrain are to be the 
reference points then the shortest route between the Gulf and Durban is not via Singapore. 
Secondly the shipping costs from Singapore to Durban built into the model apply to refined 
product, which attracts considerably higher freight and insurance rates than crude oil, which 
is the commOdity actually imported. If refined product vessel freight rates are to be a part of 
the model, then larger and less expensive vessel freight rates could be built into the model. 
Finally, the four reference refinery prices used are (higher) 'posted' prices and not 'spot' 
prices. 
2. Inland Transport Costs 
Transport costs from the coast into the interior are built into the petrol pump price and 
are based on Petronet's rates. 
SASOL is paid a price for its synfuel products which includes inland transport costs. 
This is criticised because in fact SASOL produces its synfuels from local coal and does not 
transport any product inland from the coast. 
The opposing view is that SASOL is merely applying a commonly accepted economic 
principle of locational advantage. That is, it sells its product on the inland market, at the price 
that the next nearest supplier could sell it for, and since the next nearest suppliers are at the 
coast, it is entitled to the inland transport cost allowance. 
A choice between these two opposing views is strongly influenced by the view taken 
of SASOL. That is, can it be regarded as a normal commercial operation, if so, it would be 
entitled to its locational advantage. Or should it be regarded as a strategic installation to 
which conventional commercial criteria should not be applied? This is a question of public 
policy yet to be decided in post apartheid South Africa. 
The transport cost is the theoretical cost of railing product from the coastal refineries 
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to the interior, 10.2 cent/litre in August 1992. In practice crude oil is piped from Durban to 
SASOL's Natref refinery in Sasolburg at far less than the cost of railing it, believed to be 
only about 3c/l. This provides Petronet (the state pipeline company) with windfall profits. 
To complicate matters further, Petronet's parent company, Transnet (state owned) has 
run up very substantial deficits in its pension fund and accordin.gly is trying to hold onto 
every available source of revenue for this purpose. Consequently a further public policy issue 
arises: should motorists contribute to the elimination of this pension fund deficit through 
paying higher petrol prices (via the inland transport cost) or is this something that should be 
shared among all taxpayers and dealt with in the state budget? 
It is obvious that SASOL's synfuel production does not rely on imported crude oil at 
all. Nevertheless it is reimbursed as if it did. This is estimated to be worth about 6 cents/litre 
to SASOL. 
SASOL's Protection 
3. 'Synfuel Protection' or 'Tariff Protection' 
SASOL's synfuel output is uplifted by the wholesaling companies at the mLC. 
However should IBLC crude oil equivalent price be below a US 23$ I barrel floor price, then 
SASOL receives the difference from the Equalisation Fund which is funded by a levy on the 
petrol price. Since 1-7-89, government has guaranteed SASOL a US 23 $/barrel oil equivalent 
floor price for its petrol (SASOL Annual Report, 1990: 18).3 This is very important to 
SASOL in periods of low oil prices. Should the oil price rise above US 28.7 $lbarrel SASOL 
is required to contribute 25 % of such profits to the Fund. Income to the Equalisation Fund 
is derived from a national levy on the petrol price. SASOL regards the cumulative effect of 
the way in which this calculation is made as 'tariff protection" (Sunday Business Times, 8-11-
92). The continuation of protection is an important public policy issue and negotiating lever 
for government. 
The difficulty with SASOL's 'tariff protection' arrangement is that it has an inverse 
relationship with the crude oil price (see Figure Bl). Consequently when South Africa's 
international competitors are enjoying low energy prices, South African motorists have to 
contribute more to SASOL, raising local transport costs. Unfortunately the converse does not 
3. On 17 December 1993 the National Economic Forums Liquid Fuels Industry Task force reduced this figure 
to US $21.8 and again on 18 June 1994 to US $21.1 per barrel. 
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apply - when oil prices are high, petrol prices in South Africa are also high although the 
payments to SASOL are lower as is evident in 1990/91 year when the Iraqi war drove up 
crude oil prices. It is only when crude oil prices are above $28.7 1 barrel that the converse 
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Note: 'Payment' represents payments to SASOL from the Equalisation Fund. 
Source: Department of Mineral & Energy Affairs 
4. The SASOL 3 'Claw-back' A~reement 
On 25-2-91 SASOL bought the outstanding 50% share of SASOL 3 from the (state 
owned) Cental Energy Fund (CEF) for R617 million. In order to pay for this share SASOL 
borrowed R2 283 million from the CEF at 16 % interest. By agreement if 'tariff protection' 
is lowered, first the interest and then the capital amount will be reduced in proportion to the 
impact such a reduction has on SASOL's guaranteed $23 1 barrel oil price. 
5. Wholesalin~ and Retailing Arran~ements for Synfuels 
The wholesaling of liquid fuels requires a network of pipelines, storage tanks and 
delivery vehicles capable of handling volatile fluids. The costs of developing such a network 
is considerable and for this reason the government has permitted 'product swaps' between 
different producers and wholesalers for the purposes of serving the market more efficiently. 
The result for the motorist, is that if for example, they fill up with Shell petrol in 
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Cape Town, the chances are very good that in fact the petrol was produced at Caltex's 
refinery in Cape Town, rather than at Shells' refinery in Durban. Similarly in Pretoria the 
chances are very good that whichever brand of petrol the motorist chooses, they will in fact 
be getting petrol produced by SASOL, and so on across the country. 
Although there are dangers in allowing such collusive practices, there are also 
benefits for motorists, if such a system is managed properly. Competition in petrol 
wholesaling would require much larger investments in transport and storage facilities, which 
would be passed on to motorists. 
The advent of SASOL introduced two problems: the surplus crude oil refinery capacity 
and SASOL's lack of any distribution network. A deal struck between Government and the 
oil industry covering both of these areas. In so far as product distribution was concerned, the 
oil companies agreed or were obliged to purchase. (uplift) 91 % of SASOL's output, in 
proportion to their market share, at the prevailing IBLC and to sell it through their 
wholesaling and retailing networks. In return for this SASOL was not allowed to own or 
franchise its own petrol stations and was restricted to direct marketing of not more than 
9.23% of all petrol retailed through its 'Blue Pumps' on the forecourts of the other oil 
companies. In so far as refining capacity was concerned, crude refiners were required to shut 
down capacity in order to make room for SASOL production in the market in exchange for 
which they were compensated with a generous protection (the IBLC). 
Later the oil companies claimed that they were incurring lower returns as a result of 
these arrangements, and successfully negotiated a 'synfuel upliftment levy' payment from 
government. This took the form of a levy on the petrol price routed through the Equalisation 
Fund to the oil companies. 
Without the protection of a government strongly supportative of SASOL, the structure 
of this agreement makes SASOL very vulnerable. If for some reason the cooperation of the 
oil companies fell away, SASOL would have no wholesaling and retailing infrastructure 
through which to sell its product. This is an important bargaining lever in future for both a 
democratic government and the oil companies. 
6. Fixed Wholesale marein 
The Petroleum Activities Return Agreement (PAR) allows the state to set the profit 
of the wholesalers (5.56 cents/litre in August 1992). The wholesalers are the crude oil 
refining companies which also market 91 % of SASOL's fuel. 
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7. Delivery Cost 
This is a payment to refiners for delivering their product, often by road tanker, 2.9 
cents/litre in August 1992. 
8. Fixed Retail Marl:in 
The state sets a fixed margin of return for retailing operations in cents per litre of 
petrol sold. 
PART TWO 
What would the cost of closinl: SASOL be?' 
Could South Africa afford to close SASOL? One element of this decision will be the 
foreign exchange implications and the job losses that will arise. A precise calculation of the 
effects of SASOL's closure ought to be made before any such decision is made. What follows 
is a rough estimate designed to establish the approximate order of magnitude of the figures 
involved. 
Some of SASOL's a~tivities may be assumed to survive if the regulatory support is 
withdrawn. 
Assumptions 
The following will Survive: 
SASOL One (currently being converted into a chemical plant and consequently not eligible 
for support) 
NATREF (an inland oil refinery) 
Sigma Colliery (continue selling to SASOL I) 
Secunda Collieries (either through sales to ESKOM or exports via Richards Bay) 
SASOL Technology (in modified form) 
Prices Candles 
Gascor part originating in Sasolburg. 
4. This section is based upon 1992 figures which predate the advent of Polifin. 
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The following May Survive: 
Power stations: on Secunda site may be able to sell power or contribute to the ESKOM 
grid depending on surplus capacity situation. 
The following will close: 
Gascor 
Sasol Fertilizers 
. (part originating in Secunda, replaced by ' electricity where 
possible. No direct forex implication, although gas users may 
need to import machinery to convert to electricity. 
(Secunda operations. Spare capacity at IOF, Phalaborwa and 
AECI will make up the shortfall and relocate some jobs to these 
plants so no forex change). 
SASOL Explosives (SMX) (AECI will make up spare capacity so no forex change) 
SASOL Chern ethylene, propylene and other chemical sales 
SASOL Polymers PP sales 
The calculation which follows, like most such calculations rests upon certain 
assumptions, in this case several assumptions have had to be made about the oil price, 
SASOL's petrol capacity and others (see Table BI). It should also be borne in mind that it 
is a snapshot of a particular year (1992) and a fully fledged calculation would need to build 
in assumptions about the future prices of oil and polymer. Similarly the impact of a 
continuing decline in the Rand exchange rate will increase the impact of closing the synfuel 
operations. Several aspects of SASOL's operations have been omitted (which would increase 
the impact of SASOL on the economy) as this is merely a rough calculation intended to 
illustrate the point that the costs of closing SASOL will be high. 
SASOL's forex savings on petrol alone are about R1.8bn p.a .. This together with 
SASOL being the only major source of olefins to the plastics industry will mean forex losses 
of R 2.8 bn p.a., about 1.1 % of GDP.s This precludes any hasty closure of these plants at 
least until alternatives exist. (This assumes that the coastal crude oil refineries could, in the 
event of SASOL's closure, make up the difference. Currently they lack sufficient capacity 
5. In 1991 GDP was R267.37bn according to the South African Reserve Bank, June, 1992, Monthly 
Bulletin. 
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(Automobile Association, 1992:72). The implication is that more costly refined product would 
have to be imported until the coastal refineries expanded capacity.) 





Petrol 90 OOObpd @ $19 bl 1,872.45 
Ethylene 
Propylene 
PP 33840 tonnes @ R2071.53 70.10 
LDPE 77302 tonnes @ R2258rr 174.55 
LDPE 4310 tonnes @ $700rr 
LLDPE 49049 tonnes @ 93.73 
R1911rr 
LLDPE 20830 tonnes @ $6OOrr 
PVC 35000 tonnes @ R 1886rr 66.01 
PVC 35000 tonnes @ R1586rr 
HDPE 110000 tonnes @ $800rr 264.00 
HDPE 10000 tonnes @ $700rr 
2,540.84 
TOTAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE 2,837.56 
Notes: Zero tariff IS assumed on 01' mer 1m orts. p y p 
$ = US Dollars 
Excbange rate used: RJ.OO = $1 . 



















On the benefit side of the equation presumably fuel regulations which raise prices 
could be dispensed with and the converting industry would benefit to some extent from 




COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION 
Introduction I 
The principle of comparative advantage "implies nothing more than maximising the 
potential economic welfare of a country's residents"2 (Schydlowsky, 1984:440). 
Ricardo's theory of comparative advanta~e 
Historically the notion of comparative advantage is often first associated with David 
Ricardo's writings on trade theory. His famous theory of comparative advantage was 
fundamentally concerned with why countries trade and by implication, in which area of 
production should they best specialise. His theory of comparative advantage requires a 
country to specialise in the production of those goods whose cost of production (labour cost) 
is lowest relative to other goods. He compared two countries, England and Portugal and 
argued that if each country specialises in producing the goods in which they have a 
comparative advantage (greatest relative efficiency), then trade will be mutually beneficial to 
both countries. 
Ricardo employed a number of simplifying assumptions that are inadequate for 
understanding modern trade and production. He assumed that there was only one factor of 
production - labour, that there were no intermediate inputs and only two countries. Also many 
different commodities are produced nowadays making a comparison of each commodity with 
each other commodity a laborious approach. 
1. Much has been .written on ~e. subject of comparative advantage and effective rates of protectioD, with many 
Duances and techmcal compleXities. The purpose here is to provide a basic introduction and overview. 
2. The existing conditions and resource endowment are given. The distribution of economic welfare within a 
country is as. important as production in achieving optimum welfare but comparative advantage is principally 
concerned WIth measurements at the country level. 
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Domestic Resource Cost 
In a more complex world in which a country may produce many commodities, a 
standard unit of comparison is helpful. Assuming there remains only one factor of production, 
labour, then the units of labour required to produce say one, US$ of each commodity could 
be ranked, thus revealing the differing amounts of domestic resources necessary to produce 
one US$ worth of each commodity. This in its simplest form is the 'Domestic Resource Cost 
(PRC) of Foreign Exchange'. 
In reality, however, the production of most commodities involves several factors of 
production as well as domestic raw materials and intermediate inputs. The difference between 
the value of a good and the value of the intermediate goods or raw materials necessary to 
produce it is equal to the value added. Similarly the value added in producing the same 
commodity at world prices can also be determined. 
A more complex DRe index can be created by ranking the amount of value added in 
the production of each commodity, instead of units of labour, necessary to procure one unit 
of foreign exchange. Defining domestic resource costs in this way has important benefits for 
computation and international comparison. Measuring domestic resource costs in this way is 
also a statement about the extent of the country's resources committed to the production of 
each commodity measured in units of foreign exchange. Put differently, it is the cost, in 
terms of domestic welfare, of earning (or saving) one unit of foreign exchange. It then 
becomes possible to divide the commodities listed in the index into those where there is a 
comparative advantage and those where there is not, that is there is comparative advantage 
in those activities where the value added (PRC) is less than or equal to the shadow price of 
foreign exchange. Conversely there is comparative disadvantage in those activities where the 
value added (PRC) is greater than the shadow price of foreign exchange. 
Effective Rates of Protection 
Many of the calculations necessary to determine the DRC may then also be used to 
determine the closely related, effective rate of protection. 
The concept of the 'Effective Rate of Protection' (ERP) is the main method used to 
determine the effects of protection on local industry. "The purpose of ERP studies is to 
determine the way in which the pattern of industrial outputs observed under the existing 
structure of protection differs from what would be observed under free trade" (Warr, 
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1992:29). 
Before proceeding further a key distinction needs to be made between nominal tariff 
protection and effective protection. Nominal protection is the tariff on an imported good. In 
South Africa these tariffs are imposed by the Department of Customs and Excise at the point 
of entry into South Africa or the Southern African Customs Union. 
The concept of effective protection differs from nominal protection in that it takes into 
account the tariffs payable upon intermediate inputs as well as the nominal rate of protection. 
Similarly effective protection needs to take account of export subsidies or other measures 
which distort prices away from those which a free market may set. Typically ERP 
calculations have been used to determine the impact a country's pattern of industrial 
protection has had on the structure of production of its traded goods. Analytically the 
approach to studying ERP focuses upon the value added rather than upon the value of outputs. 
The effective rate of protection is defined as: 
"the percentage excess of domestic value addeq, obtainable by reason of the 
imposition of tariffs and other protective measures on the product and its inputs, over 
foreign or world market value added." (Balassa and Associates, 1971:4) 
The crucial advance made by the theory of effective protection over nominal tariff 
theory, is that it takes into account the entire protective structure. Thus a tariff on a fmal 
product will increase value added whilst a tariff on intermediate inputs for the manufacture 
of the final product will act as a tax upon value added. The net protection therefore has to 
take the effect of both tariffs into account. 
By calculating the ERP for a country's industries it is possible to observe the way in 
which industrial outputs have been allocated within the economy in comparison with how they 
might have been allocated under free trade at any point in ' time. 
The ERP measure is superior to the DRC measure in evaluating the desirability of 
individual industries (Balassa B & Schydlowsky DM, 1968). However a number of 
qualifications apply. 
Firstly the greater value added resulting from a protective regime may be partly 
attributable to the higher rate of return to capital arising from the protective regime. 
Secondly that intermediate inputs are not necessarily invariant to the level of 
protection. For example if GElS (export) incentives were significantly reduced, the extent of 
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domestic content (currently required by GElS) may reduce as imported intermediates were 
substituted. 
Thirdly the assumption that industries operate in competitive factor and product 
markets is not necessarily valid. Certainly in South Africa, neither the ethylene market nor 
the (black) labour markee have conformed with perfect free market competition during the 
apartheid era. This could lead to the inclusion within the value added of an 'excessive' rate 
of return on capital. 
Fourthly, as indicated above, ERP measures static comparative advantage and is 
unable to capture dynamic comparative advantage which may, for example, lie in frrms' 
ability to absorb technology and to make incremental innovations. 
A variant of the DRC measure, the Local Cost of Foreign Exchange is dealt with in 
Part Two. 
PART TWO 
MEASURING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
LOCAL COST OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION 
Introduction 
In Part One the theory of comparative advantage and effective rates of protection has 
been outlined. However the extent to which an economy enjoys comparative advantage or 
disadvantage is a product of the individual enterprises and in~ustries which make up that 
economy. 
In this Annexure an attempt is made to bring such theoretical approaches to bear upon 
an individual project and to determine, at that level, the projects' contribution, or otherwise 
to comparative advantage. More specifically this investigation has the twin objectives of 
determining whether the resources employed in a large new polymer facility are yielding net 
savings/earnings of foreign exchange or not and determining the relationship between foreign 
exchange earnings/savings and the nominal tariff on the polymer in question. 
The project selected is SASOL's polypropylene facility as it is the newest and one of 
the largest domestic producers of polymer. Given that it has newer technology and 
3. Constraints were imposed, inter alia, by pass laws and the Group Areas Act. 
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approximates world scale it is assumed that similar computations focused upon older and 
smaller polymer plants would yield less favourable results. 
Local Cost of Foreien Exchanee 
Many governments influence resource allocation within their boundaries through a 
variety of measures and in this South Africa has been no exception. Indeed, as has been 
discussed in the main text, the South African chemical industry has been considerably 
influenced in this way. Government measures which may influence resource allocation include 
taxes, investment incentives, the trade regime, exchange rates and of course more direct 
intervention, in the South African case, the pursuit of military/strategic public policy goals. 
Within such a policy matrix, firms make investment decisions which, if astute, generate good 
returns, and encourage the allocation of further resources to such activities. However resource 
allocation under these conditions is not necessarily synonymous with the optimal resource 
allocation consistent with balance of payments goals. 
Evidence has been presented (in the main text) regarding the trade imbalance in the 
chemical sector. Such large imbalances, in the context of wider balance of payments 
considerations, begs questions concerning optimal resource allocation and concerning the 
means by which such imbalances may begin to be corrected. 
Criteria are needed in order to assist in identifying activities in which the domestic 
economy has a comparative advantage and which would optimise the use of domestic 
resources and thus assist government in modifying its package of incentives and disincentives 
to optimise resource allocation. 
A helpful criterion in this regard is the Local Cost of Foreign Exchange (LCF). It 
measures the ~ foreign exchange savings or earnings, on the assumption that if activity A 
earns or saves foreign exchange at a lower cost of local resources than activity B, then 
activity A is to be preferred. It is to be stressed that it is the ~ earnings of exports or 
savings on imports, rather than the gross, which represents the balance of payments effects 
(World Bank, 1976). 
The Local Cost of Foreign Exchange may be expressed as: 
Where: 
LCF = V 




domestic value added 
the CIF price of the imported commodity 
costs of imported intermediate inputs (World Bank, 1976) 
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In this expression the numerator represents the domestic resources which must be 
given up (value added) in order to earn foreign exchange and the denominator the ~ savings 
or earnings in foreign currency. The lower the ratio the more desirable the project in that less 
domestic resources will be given up for each unit of foreign currency and vice versa. In 
performing such computations difficulties similar to those discussed in relation to comparative 
advantage and effective rates of protection (see Part One) are encountered. 
In the course of this study firms were unwilling to release all of the information 
necessary to perform LCF calculations. Consequently another route had to be taken within 
the limitations of the information available. In this instance an attempt is made to arrive at 
the LCF via a computation of the Effective Tariff Protection (ETP). In the course of the 
investigation into ETP some additional and helpful policy pointers with regard to tariffs 
emerge. 
Effective Tariff Protection 
Effective Tariff Protection is conceptually related ~o LCF, indeed the two formulas 
are mathematically related and can be derived from each other (World Bank, 1976). The 
important distinction between nominal protection and effective protection is discussed in Part 
One and is equally applicable here. Put simply, ETP is the real level of protection enjoyed 
by the domestic manufacturer, rather than nominal (apparent) protection to be found in the 
tariff book. 
The production of many commodities involves the use of intermediate inputs some or 
all of which may be imported and upon which there may be tariffs and other duties levied. 
Similarly local content programmes can have 'hidden' within them imported inputs upon 
which duties were levied. In seeking the effective protection, it is thus necessary to 'strip out' 
such 'hidden' tariff protection, in order to determine the actual protection given to domestic 
value-added. 
The formula for computing Effective Tariff Protection is: 
ETP - t - tl 






= tariffs on the final product 
tariffs on intermediate inputs 
CIF price of final product 
value of imported inputs/components 
(World Bank, 1976) 
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The ETP reveals the income derived by the domestic producer, as a result of protection, as 
a proportion of the value added created by the producer. 
The formula is applied to the SASOL polypropylene case in Table C 1. 















TARIFF ON FINAL PRODUCT It I Actual Nominal 
Ref price R2300 (FOB NWE RI724.53 x90%) 14-8- 747.92 
92. (a) 
TARIFF ON IMPORTED INTERMEDIATE INPUTS 
It'] 
Capital Cost 
Tariff paid 1989 Rands 14,800,000.00 
Tariff paid 1992 Rands 20,394,638.07 
Assume Salvage 5 % 1,019,731.90 
Depreciation straight line 20 years (a\) 968,745.31 
Capital cost tariff per toone (b) 7.43 
Additives, plasticbers, 
stabilizers Rltoone, (lO%/tonne) (c) 12.8 
Total (b) + «(:) 20.23 
Tariff on final product less tariff on intermediate inputs 
(a)-(b+c) 727.69 
IMPORTED (ClF) PRICE OF FINAL PRODUCT 
FOB NWE, Homopolymer raffia, (b\) 
US $/toone, 14-8-92 620 
Exchange rate 14-9-92 2.7815 
FOB NWE, Homopolymer raffia, Rltonne 1724.53 
3.1.1 Freight Insurance (Rands) 300.00 
3.1.2 Landing (Rands) 13.00 
3.1.3 Wbarfage (Rands) 34.00 
3.1.4 Foward cover @ 2% 41.43 
Total 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 388.43 
Total landed price (Rands) 2112.96 
PRICE OF IMPORTED INTERMEDIATE INPUTS 
Additives, plasticisers, stablilizers Rltonne (lO%/toone) 12.80 
Capital depreciation (c\) 16,612,673 
Assume production tpa (less defects) 130320 
Depreciation per Rands/tonne 127.48 
Total imported inputs Rltonne (4.1 + 4.2) 140.28 
Value added 1972.68 
ETP, NET TARIFFIVALUE ADDED, % 36.9 35.4 
Depreciation has been proportionately reduced by the proportion of imported capital goods and the tonnage 
output. It should be borne in mind that in the project under consideration here, surcharges were only 
introduced towards the end of the project. 
SASOL produces a variety of grades of PP. A common grade, homopolymer, Raffia grade, was selected 
for this example. As a conservative (US prices were lower) indicator of international prices, NWE fob 
prices prevailing on 14-8-92 are employed. 
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c\ Assumptions <Rands) 
1. Capex 1989, Propylene recovery 
2. Capex 1989, PP 
3. Total Capex 1989, 
4. Total (1989) capex in 1992 Rands 
5. Imported content 47% 
6. Depreciation straight line 20 years, 
assuming salvage value is 5% 
7. Therefore depreciation is 










There are certain caveats to be made about this example. It is assumed that the 
propylene feedstock has no imported content. As a product of the Secunda works there is no 
doubt that there is imported content in the capital stock there. However to apportion a share 
to propylene, which arises as a by-product in the process in any event, is complex, if not 
impossible. 
The effect of imported capital goods is noteworthy. If the imported content of the 
capital investment is increased from 47% to 90% the ETP increases by only 2.9%. This 
suggests that the effective tariff protection and the local cost of foreign exchange of this 
polypropylene plant are not sensitive to the proportion of imported capital stock. 
If the nominal tariff is reduced to 10% of the FOB price in this calculation then the 
ETP drops from 36.9% to 8.3%. 
Tariff level; effect on ETP and LCF 
If the nominal tariff on polypropylene is reduced to zero in this calculation then the 
ETP drops to -1 %. This is significant from a local cost of foreign exchange point of view. 
Since the LCF formula may be derived from the ETP formula (see above) it is possible to 
determine the LCF as follows; 
LCF = e(1 + ETP) 
Where e is the official exchange rate (World Bank, 1976). 
Therefore LCF = 2.7815(1 + .369) 
= R3.8079 
The result is greater than the official exchange rate and therefore this project has a 
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comparative disadvantage with the current tariffs in place. 
However, if the nominal tariff is reduced to zero then the result is cause for less 
concern as the LCF is neutral from a foreign exchange point of view. 
LCF = 2.7815(1-1) 
=0 
Conclusions 
The tariff, in this case the reference price formula, is the main determinant of the rate 
of effective tariff protection. The nominal tariff is high; 43.4% of the FOB value and 35.4% 
of the CIF value. In addition the freight, insurance and related charges of importing from NW 
Europe amount to 22.5% (of the FOB price) which taken together, amounts to considerable 
protection in itself. These results strengthen the argument, in the main text, that the tariff on 
polymers is the critical lynchpin of pricing along the jiliere and the need for a very careful 
evaluation of the level at which this tariff should be set. 
By varying the nominal tariff level it was demonstrated that a clear relationship exists 
between the nominal tariff level and the local cost of foreign exchange. Only when the 
nominal tariff was reduced to zero did the local cost of foreign exchange move from a 
negative result to a neutral result. 
These LCF findings support the anti-export bias identified by Fallon et al (1993) and 
the undesirability, from a local cost of foreign exchange point of view, of maintaining high 
polymer tariffs. It also demonstrates that the foreign exchange rate for the SASOL PP plant 
at that time was significantly higher than that prevailing for the economy as a whole. That 
is the foreign exchange earnings/savings from this plant were negative. Ideally this result 
should be compared with the results from similar computations across the economy in order 
to determine which projects were the most favourable ie. where the least domestic resources 
could be given up for each unit of foreign exchange earned or saved. 
ANNEXURED 




CRUDE OIL. NATURAL G~S AND COAL. 
(FEEDSTOCKS) ETHANE (from Natural Gae), 
Uatural Gas Liquids. Naphtha and Gas 011 
from Petroleum refineries, Ethane, Propane 
and Synthes1s gas from Synfuels (only in 
SA) . 
THE SEVEN MAJOR BUILDING BLOCKS (which 
constitute 90\ of all the raw materiale used 
1n the Organic Chemical Industry) : 
3.1 Ethylene 
3.2 Propylene 
3.3 C4 OleUns 
3.4 Benzene 
3.S Toluene 





4 . 1 ~I"fYLENE Deriv~.t!~esl 
4.1.1 Polymerisation to LOPE, LLDPE. 
HOPE and EPDM rubber (with 
propylene) 
4.1.2 Oligomerisation products, i.e. 
short chain polymers 
4.1.3 Oxychlorination to VCM (PVC) 
4.1.4 Oxidation to : 
Ethylene Oxide/Glycol 
Acetaldehyde/Acetic Acid 
4.1.5 Alkylation with Benzene to 
Ethylbenzene/Styrene 
4.1.6 Hydration - to Ethanol 
4.1.7 Oxo (hydroformylation, with CO 
and "2 to Alcohols 
4.1.8 Vinyl acetate Monomer (VAM) 
(also from Acetylene, and from 
Acetic Acid. 
4.2 PROPYLENE Derivatives: 
4.2.1 Polypropylene (PP). homo- and 
copolymers. EPDM rubbers (with 
ethylene) 
4.2.2 Oligomerisation (short chain 
polymer.s) 
4 . 2.3 Oxidation to 
Propylene Oxide/Glycols 
Acrolein and Acrylate. 
4 . 2.4 Ammoxidation - acrylonitrile 
4.2.5 Alkylation with Benzene to CUMENE 
4.2.6 Oxo to butyraldehyde and higher 
alcohols 
4 . 2.7 Hydration to isopropanol 
4.3 C4 OLEFIN DERIVATIVES: 
4.3.1 Butadiene polymerisation and 
copolymerisation to PB and SB 
Rubbers 
4 . 3.2 Nylon 66 intermediates (Adipic 
Acid and hexamethylenediamlne) 
4.3.3 Maleic anhydride 
4.3.4 Butenes - comonomers In LLDPE and 
HOPE (with ethylene) 
4.3.5 Isobutylene to HTBE for Gasoline 
octane Improvers (Lead Substitute) 
\() -~ 
".6.2 Por"xyle ne to Terephthal1c Acid 
4.4 !!~!! ~.!;tIE Der !'y~~!~~~:. for PET (saturated polyestera~ 
4.4 . 1 With propylene to CUMENE for 
Phenol and Acetone synthesis 
4 . 4.2 With ethylene to Ethylbenzenel 
Styrene 
4.4 . 3 Hydrogenation to CYCLOIIEXANE ~nd 
Caprolactam CNylon 6) 
4 . 4.4 Oxidation to - Maleic Anhydride 
4 . " . 5 Chlorination - to Chlorobenzenes 
(nllC etc. ) 
4 . 4.6 Anllinc 
4 . 5 TOLUENE Derivatives: 
4.5.1 De - alkylation to Benzene 
4 . 5.2 Toluene di - isocyanate (TDl) 
4 . 5.3 Chlorination to Benzyl Ch\oride 
and homologues 
4 . 5 . 4 Oxidation to Benzoic Acid 
4.6 XYLENE Derivative9: 
4 . 6 . 1 Orthoxylene to Phthalic Anhydride 
LEVEL 5: ------
4 . 6 . 3 Mntaxylene for Isophthali~ Acid 
4.7 MET"ANE: 
4.7.1 Ammonia and fertilisers (including 
urea) 
4.7.2 Acetylene (also from Carbide) 
4.7 . 3 Methanol for formaldehyde. : Acetic 
Acid and MTBE 
4 . 7 . 4 Syngas - hydroformylation wIth 
olefins for higher alcohole, 
phosgene, TDI 
5.1 ETIIYLENE Derivative uses: 
5.1 . 1 Polyethylenes for extrusion to 
pipe and film - injection moulding 
and blow moulding ' 
5 .1 . 2 IUgher oleUns for 
LM' detergcnt9 
IIigher alcohols (for phthalate 
pla9ticisers in PVC) and 
Synthetic Lubricants 
r----~ 
5.1.3 VCM to PVC rigid and flexible 
compounds (using plasticisers) 
5 . 1.4 Ethylenq oxide to Glycol 
5.1.5 Styrene for 
polystyrene (packaging. 
mOUldings. insulation) 
unsaturated polyesters · 
ion exchnnge resins 
paint resins 
SBR elastomers and latexes 
ABS and SAN 
5.1.6 Ethanol for solvents 
5 . 1.7 N-Propanol 
5 . 1.8 VI\M to PVI\~ for pBlnts and 
5.2.2 Higher alcohols for phthalate 
plasticiser manufacture for use in 
flexibl~ PVC compounds film sheet. 
coated products. Also for mIning 
chemicals (small) 
5 . 2.3 Propylene Glycol for unsaturated 
polyesters. polyurethanes and 
other polymers 
5 . 2.4 Acrylonitrile for acrylic fibres. 
5.2.5 
acrylic acid and acrylates 
Phenol for resins, nylon 66, 
detergents, lube additives 
I\cetone for solvents, epoxy 
resins, methacrylates, isoprene 
adhesives and PIR 
5.2.6 Higher alcohols for plasticisers 
5.2 Uses of PROPYLENE Derivatives: (see 5.2.2 above) 
5.2 . 7 Isopropanol solvents 
5 . 2 . 1 Polypropylene film sheet, tapes, 
injection and blow moulding. 5.3 Uses of C4 OLEFIN Derivatives: 
etc . 
5.3.1 SB and PB rubbers for tyres, 
conveyor belts etc. 
00 -~ 
5.3.2 Nylon 66 fibres and converted 
5.3.3 
articles 
Maleic anhydride for unsaturated 
polyesters (for use with glass 
fibre) , synthetic food acids and 
other resins 
5.3.4 LLDPE/HDPE p~oducts - see 5.1.1 
above 
5.3.5 MTBE for motor gasoline as a lead 
substitute 
5.4 BENZENE Derivative uses: 
5.4.1 See 5.2.5 above (CUMENE) 
5.4.2 See 5.1.5 above (Styrene) 
5.4.3 Nylon 6 for textile fibres and 
moulded articles (Caprolactam) 
5 . 4.4 See 5.3.3 above (Maleic Anhydride) 
5.4.5 Crop protection (now banned) 
5.4.6 Dyestuffs and rubber chemicals 
(Aniline) 
5 . 5 T-'~~Y~~~~i! ri,::,.ativ~_l!.s~.~: 
5.5.1 
5 . 5.2 
See 5.4 above (Benzene) 
Polyurethanes for paints. 
insul~tion , injection moulding. 
elastomers. etc. (TDI) 
5.5.3 Various specialities 
5.5.4 Small specialities 
5.6 Derivatives of XYLENES: 
5.6.1 PVC plasticisers, resins for 
paints, unsaturated polyester 
I 
resins for boats, roof sheeting. 
tanks, furniture etc. (Phthalic 
Anhydride) 
5.6.2 Saturated polyester resins (PET) 
for textile fibres and beverage 
packaging (Coke bottles) 
(Terephthalic Acid) 
5 . 6 . 3 Speciality resins (Iso-phthalic 
Acid) 
5.7 Derivatives of METIII\NE: 
0\ 5 . 7.1 Various (I\mmonia) -~ 5 . " . 2 Vorious. I've n ntl Polyi s oprcnQ 
(Acetylelle) 
5.7 . 3 Ufo Pf r p~ills ( f o ["Inn 1 t1ehycle ) • 
solvents. esters. V",., and rVl\s 
(Acetic Acid) 
5 . 7 . 4 See 5.2.2 above, also 4.5 . 2 
Lf.VF:L I): SOlne examples of FINISIIED PRODUCTS derived 
from Levels 1 - 5 above 
Packoging in the form of film (printed 
and unprinted), crate s , boxes, bottles, 
d r ums, bags (woven And plain). CliPS, 
pots , etc . etc. 
~~gents in liquid and solid form 
~nthetic Lubricants 
Pipes, calendared sheet. leather cloth 
c onti IIgs , w" llp"'pf'r , cnbl e s , sho~s etc. 
,\\1 t o ",ot i ve: trim . bumpers . r 31l'!ls . 
hubc aps. " ash 'i! r bottles . light ftxtur"?s . 
c"hl ~ s, brackets, l-dndscreen tt 1m , 
" P"" : I" t: ~ . p" i .. t. !1. nt.' :. ' ~lr::. 
~, printlllg III~S, sf)lvents ( o r '1'1 
t. }'I''' ' ; o f " ppll e 'ltl r ",:;. '!tr. . 
Textile fibres, fabrics for clothes. 
upho lstery fo r furnJ ture and automoth'o;! . 
etc . etc. 
Ills ulotion ma t erials . injection InoulcJ c d 
,II t i c les - (1I('nl tille , household goods ,mil 
a ppli a llces, e lectronics , etc. 
!t..~_es, cC?nveror be lts , rubber goods . <'t ,- . 
FUCl! iture, le i sure !loads, elec;trolll o:; s . 
etc . 
Building materials, including flooring . 
roof sheeting , cladding coatings, etc . 
('t e: . 




In this study reference is made to three categories of countries: NICs, 2nd Tier NICs and 
DMEs in various tables and figures. The selection of countries in these groups are drawn 
from Fostner and Ballance (1990). There are some unexpected omissions, for example India 
and China, but for the purposes of comparative analysis used here the benefits outweigh these 
disadvantages. South Africa is included in the DMEs group by Fostner and Ballance but in 
this study South Africa has been excluded and its data presented separately. 
The country groupings are: 
Newly Industrialisin& Countries (NICs) 
Argentina,. Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Singapore and Taiwan. 
2nd Tier Newly Industrialising Countries (2nd Tier NICs) 
Columbia, Cyprus, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Tunisia and Uruguay. 
Developed Market Economies (DMEs) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. 
In certain of the tables data for all of the countries listed above were not available. In 
these cases, for example Table 4.2, where only a rough comparison was intended, alternative 
countries have been included for which data were available. In other cases, for example Table 
6.28, those countries for which data were not available were excluded. In each case the 
countries for which data was available are specified. 
ANNEXURE F 
PLASTIC CONVERTING INDUSTRY SURVEY 
METHODOLOGY AND OUESTIONNAIRE 
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The objective of the survey was, in the first instance, to interview a sample of 
producers in the plastic converting industry in the Johannesburg and Durban areas. The nature 
of the questions posed was intended, at a general level, to gain an insight into the quality of 
the industry and to record problems or difficulties and advantages which firms perceived to 
be retarding or advancing the development of the plastic converting industry. 
In the light of the wide diversity of products manufactured by the plastic converting 
industry, it was expected that a wide range of firm types would be encountered. Accordingly 
a flexible format interview was planned, guided by a questionnaire to be used whenever 
possible (see example below). 
The purpose of the survey was not so much to develop a quantitative database on the 
industry as to develop a qualitative understanding of the issues confronting the industry. 
The Sample 
The Johannesburg and Durban/Pinetown areas were selected for specific reasons. 
Johannesburg is the commercial hub of South Africa's foremost industrial region, the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region. It has a correspondingly large concentration of 
plastic converting firms which have the added advantage of proximity to the local commodity 
polymer producers in Secunda and Sasolburg. Durban was selected as it too is an important 
centre in the plastic converting industry as well as being South Africa's major port. The latter 
consideration allowed some opportunity to determine whether or not proximity to a port 
influenced the use of imported raw material and/or the propensity to export. 
A commercial register of all known firms operating in the plastic converting industry 
was used to generate lists of firms in each of the two target areas. The firm population in 
each of the two target areas was divided into small (less than 100 employees), medium 
(between 101 and 500 employees) and large firms (over 500 employees). A random sample 
of firms was selected giving equal. representation to the three firm sizes from the firms in the 
Johannesburg area and the Durban/Pinetown area. In the event of a randomly selected firm 
being unwilling or unable to participate, the next selected firm was approached until the 
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sample quota had been met. 
A total of thirty firms were interviewed: twenty conducted business in the 
Johannesburg area and ten in the Durban/Pinetown area. Ultimately the sample firms 
interviewed employed approximately 19% of the plastic converting industry workforce. 
The sampling method generated a wide range of firm types. Among the sample is the 
largest plastic converter in the country as well as one firm which had only two employees 
including the manager. In the larger firms, specialisation within management sometimes 
meant that the interviewee's knowledge about the firm was good on certain issues and less 
so on others. Alternatively where branch plants of a national firm were visited (several fell 
into this category) they tended to focus on production issues and questions relating to wider 
issues were referred to 'head office'. 
This considerable range of respondents and their often guarded and cautious attitude 
(discussed below) confirmed the need to employ an open format type approach with 
interviewees. This enabled flexibility in pursuing those areas which the respondent was more 
familiar with or willing to discuss, whilst a prepared questionnaire served as a guide to the 
conversation. During the course of the interviews it emerged that certain firms within the 
sample were not themselves engaged in plastic conversion. 
One such firm manufactured appliances and although it purchased plastic raw material 
in bulk (in order to gain volume discounts) it resold this to its subcontracting firms which 
processed the material in moulds, owned by the appliance manufacturer. Another firm was 
engaged principally in importing and exporting polymer. Yet another firm interviewed might 
more properly fall within the construction or engineering sectors except that it installed only 
plastic piping and tanks in the process industries. Only certain types of tanks were purpose 
made by this firm, otherwise all plastic pipes and fittings were sourced from other firms. 
Their skill lay in designing systems of pipes and tanks. 
Whilst interviews of these types of firms yielded no production engineering data, other 
insights beneficial to the study were gained. In a sense these firms represented some of the 
complexity and diversity within the industry and accordingly they were regarded as valid 
elements of the sample. 
IntervieWeeS 
A director or another leading person in the firm was approached for interviews in the 
first instance. Due to non-availability in some cases, and factors such as differences in 
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managerial structure and scale of operations, it was not possible to interview persons in 
strictly comparable positions. However all those interviewed held senior positions in their 
firm's management structure. 
Most respondents only agreed to be interviewed on condition that confidentiality would 
be maintained. Despite this undertaking being given several frrms placed strict limits on the 
information they were prepared to disclose. Some refused to permit factory walk-throughs. 
These factors have limited this study in that certain information is not available or cannot be 
published. In certain instances information which could enable easy identification of particular 
frrms has had to be withheld in order for this condition to be met. 
Factory Walk-throu~hs 
At the conclusion of interviews permission was requested for a walk-through tour of 
the plant, where appropriate. This was not always acceded to but where it was, additional 
interesting information frequently came to light. The purpose of these walk-throughs was to 
gain a first hand visual impression of the production engineering and work organisation 
aspects. It also offered opportunities to clarify and verify certain information. 
Part of the rationale for this approach was an attempt to verify the senior 
management's (interviewee's) responses and to determine if they were in accordance with the 
facts on the shop floor. In some instances observations made whilst walking through 
production areas together with information from other firm representatives encountered there, 
contradicted that given by the interviewees. Where subordinates gave conflicting information 
it was often difficult to further verify this with the interviewee, for fear of jeopardising the 
subordinate's position and affronting the interviewee. Generally where such differences were 
observed it appeared that the interviewee had exaggerated the firm's prowess in one regard 
or another, and to this extent the data collected should be viewed with some circumspection. 
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OUESTIONNAIRE FOR PLASTIC CONVERTER INDUSTRY 
1. Main products % of turnover 
1 .................. . 
2 .............. ... . 
3 .................. . 
2. Market share of largest four producers? 
1 ............. % 
2 ............. % 
3 ............. % 
4 ............. % 
3. Number of employees 
4. Total assets . ......... (Replacement value) 
5. Are you a subsidiary of a foreign/domestic firm? ....... 
6. Name of holding company and percentage of shareholding? 
6.1 How does the (foreign) parent company view its South African investment? 
6.2 Is it planning to invest further - why/ not? (assume a political settlement) 
7. Perceived basis of comparative advantage. (probe: strategic focus - mass/niche 
market, domestic foreign.) 
8. Do you have any licensing arrangements with foreign firm/s? 
8.1 Extent / nature of restrictive clauses? 
8.2 Percentage of sales (if exported) covered by restrictive clauses? 
THE SCALE OF PRODUCTION 
9. What is the minimum efficient scale of production/batch size in your main product 
line? 
- plant size ........................ . 
- Firm size ......................... . 
10. Have these minimum efficient scales changed in recent years? 
11. Do you expect these minimum efficient scales to change significantly in future years? 
12. What cost disadvantage does lower batch size/scale impose on you? 
13. Would you say that generally speaking capacity under-utilization is a more serious 
problem than lack of economies of scale? 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
14. How would you rate the technological capabilities of your firm? (product and process 
technology) 
Does your firm have the capability to: 
14.1 Choose among alternative technologies? 
14.2 Utilize current technology to designed standards? 
14.3 Adapt technologies? 
14.4 Generate new products and processes? 
15. What is the predominant form of technology transfer? 
15.1 Wholly owned foreign investment? 
15.2 Joint venture with foreign investors? 
15.3 Importing of capital goods? 
15.4 Process and product licences? (with what restrictions?) 
15.5 Employment of foreign personnel, sending people abroad? 
15.6 Networking with other firms? 
16. Estim.ated distance of your firm from the 'world leading edge'? 
17. Does the firm have a defined R&D division? · ... 
17.1 How' many full-time personnel does it have? 
17.2 With what qualifications? 
18. Total cost of R&D? 
18.1 As percentage of sales? ...... .. 
18.2 As percentage of profits? ...... . 
INPUTS 
19. Where do your capital goods come from? 
- local suppliers (with what degree of local content) 
- imports 
20. Age of capital goods? 
% < 3 years old: ......... 
% 3 or more and less than 6 years old: ....... . 
% 6 or more and less than 10 years old: ...... . 
% more than 10 years old: ....... 
21. What are your views of the SA machine tools industry? 
22. Cost structure: 
22.1 Capital goods ............ as % of production costs 
22.2 Polymer ................ as % of production costs 
23. What polymer types are you using? 










24. What percentage of your polymer is imported? 
25. Are these patterns changing over time? 
PRODUCTION ENGINEERING 
26. Have you made changes to plant layout recently? Why? 
27. What is the trend in batch size? 
28. What is the trend in lead times? 
29. What is the trend in throughput time? 
30. Defect rate: as % of sales: ......... . 






Workforce: direct labour ...... (%) indirect labour ....... (%) 
Stock turns: 
Raw materials: ....... . . . 3 years ago ........ . 
Work in progress .... . .... . 3 years ago ........ . 
Finished goods ......... . 3 years ago .. ...... . 
INDUSTRIAL RELA nONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
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33. What problems has the firm encountered in the field of human resources and how is 
the firm responding? 
33.1 With regard to production workers? 
33.2 With regard to technical personnel? 
33.3 With regard to management? 
34. How do you see the role of trade unions? 
35. What would be your attitude to co-planning with organised labour at plant and/or 
national level? 
TRAINING 
36. To what extent is the low skill level of your workforce a constraint? 
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37. What in-house training programmes do you have? 
38. How effective is the Plastics Federation training? 
39. What is your firm's attitude to the recently introduced training levy? 
COMPETITIVENESS 
40. What are the reasons for local plastic products being more expensive than imported 
products? (rank top four) 
a) High cost of intermediate goods 
b) High cost of semi-skilled labour (production workers) 
c) High cost of skilled and technical personnel 
d) Lack of availability of skilled and technical personnel 
e) Short production runs 
f) Capital equipment and technology not up to date 
g) Other 
41. Do you face import competition and is it forcing competitiveness? 
GOVERNMENT POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
42. Attitude towards government policy: 
42.1 Tariffs? (inputs and products) 
42.2 Export subsidies/ GElS? 
42.3 Education/training facilities/ system? 
42.4 Health and safety regulations? 
42.5 Financial services? 
42.6 Depreciation allowances? eg Section 37(e) 
43. What is your evaluation of government capabilities? 
LONG TERM FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
44. Could SA have a large plastics converting industry like Taiwan, Korea or Japan? 
45. What would this require? 
46. If you had polymer at NWE prices would you begin/increase exports? 
47. How would you react to the notion of an industry agreement including firms, 
government and unions working out an agreement on productivity, investment, wages, 
training, retrenchments etc? 
INTERVIEWS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Ambr~si, G M (28-7-92) Managing Director, Plastinternational cc, Johannesburg. 
Arkley, J (2-12-92) Director, Xactics, Durban. 
Baker, F (2-9-92) AECI Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Beier, H (4-12-92) Managing Director, Beier Industries (Pty) Ltd., Pinetown. 
Blackburn, D (1-9-92) Managing Director, Safripol, Sasolburg. 
Bonner, Chris (18-7-92) National Education Coordinator, Chemical Workers Industrial Union, 
Johannesburg. 
Brand, JJ (2-9-92) Managing Director, SASOL Polymers, Johannesburg. 
Coetzee, C (22-7-92) Managing Director, Ampaglas S.A. (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Cook, C (3-3-92) CSIR Information Services, Johannesburg. 
Cranston, S (2-3-92) Journalist. Financial Mail, Johannesburg. 
Davis, B (8-1-92) Managing Director, Convotec, Johannesburg, (by telephone). 
du Plessis, E (3-12-92) Marketing Director, Durban Bag Company, Durban. 
Fraser, K (22-7-92) PVC Marketing Manager, AECI Chlor-Alkali and Plastics Ltd., 
Johannesburg. 
Handcock, N (2-12-92) Managing Director, Xactics, Durban. 
Huisman, R (4-12-92) National Chairman, Plastics Institute of South Africa, Pinetown. 
Jankes, R (24-7-92) Marketing Director, Main Industries (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Jeffrey, G (3-12-92) Managing Director, Marley Cushion Flooring, Durban. 
Johnson, S (29-7-92) Managing Director, Mega Pipe, Johannesburg. 
Kauerauf, R (21-7-92) Calibre Plastics (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Kerr, A (1-12-92) Managing Director, K Engineering, Durban. 
Kydd, D (29-7-92) Managing Director, Mega Plastics, Johannesburg. 
Laing, H (25-3-92) Chemical Marketing and Consulting Services, Irene, Transvaal. 
Lake, D W (30-7-92) Manager, Energy & Feedstocks, AECI, Modderfontein, Johannesburg. 
Lebotschy, W (21-7-92) Managing Director, Barlows Appliance Company, Johannesburg. 
LeRoux, R (24-7-92) Director, Plastic Concepts, Johannesburg. 
Lloyd, P J D (24-2-92) Industrial and Petrochemical Consultants (Pty) Ltd, Johannesburg. 
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Macdonald, C (20-7-92) Chief Executive, Nampak Polyfoil, Johannesburg. 
MacDougall, L V (30-7-92) Development Manager, AECI, Modderfontein, Johannesburg. 
Marriot, J (3-9-92) Managing Director, SASOL Technology, Johannesburg. 
Martin, A (2-12-92) Production Manager, Mega Plastics, Pinetown. 
McDonald, K (30-11-92) Managing Director, Kemclad, Pinetown. 
McIver, A (25-3-92) Project Manager, Strategic Raw Materials Project, Sentrachem, 
Johannesburg. 
Meiring, H (27-7-92) Executive Commercial Director, Aberdare Group, Johannesburg. 
Meredith, T (29-7-92) Managing Director, Mega Hitec, Johannesburg. 
Naude, W (4-3-92) & (24-7-92) Executive Director, Plastics Federation of South Africa. 
Oakley, W (20-7-92) General Manager, Xactics Transvaal, Johannesburg. 
Orbell, G (27-7-92) Director, Mototech (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Pienaar, S W (30-7-92) Logichem Process, Sandton, Johannesburg. 
Pitt, P (21-7-92) Koreachem cc, Johannesburg. 
Pretorius, H M (4-9-92) Managing Director, Mega Pak, Johannesburg. 
Raffalsky, W (23-7-92) Managing Director, Plastomark, Johannesburg. 
Randleff-Rasmussen, KJ (30-7-92) Commercial Manager, Energy & Feedstocks, AECI, 
Modderfontein, Johannesburg. 
Redelinghuys, J (30-7-92) Consultant, Sandton, Johannesburg. 
Roberts; H (1-9-92) Deputy General Manager: Technical, CEF (Pty) Ltd. Sandton. 
Schilling, R F (27-7-92) Managing Director, Mototech (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Scott, Dr N (2-9-92) Technical Manager, SASOL Polymers, Johannesburg. 
Searle, D (20-7-92) Director, Sagercy (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Shiels, R (29-7-92) Managing Director, SAGEX, Johannesburg. 
Smith, E C (27-7-92) Director, Lapack, Johannesburg. 
Smith, M vB (2-3-92) Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
Stanyer, M (1-12-92) Branch Manager, Famtech Natal, Durban. 
Stelma, Y (30-7-92) Energy Consultant, Energy & Feedstocks, AECI, Modderfontein, 
Johannesburg. 
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Tattam, D (1-9-92). Cargo Trade, Johannesburg. 
Thee, J (27-2-93) CWIU Senior Shop Steward, USABCO (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Toerien, OF (31-8-92) Senior Manager, Industrial Development Corporation, Sandton, 
Johannesburg. 
Trubshaw, C W (21-7-92) Shawson Plastics, Johannesburg. 
Tyndall, C (28-7-92) Marketing Director, Solidur, Johannesburg. 
van Zyl, T (31-8-92) Manager: Project Development, Industrial Development Corporation, 
Sandton, Johannesburg. 
van Zyl, K (1-9-92) General Manager, SFF Association, Sandton. 
Walker, D (30-11-92) Regional Manager, Consol Plastics, Durban. 
Williams, C (29-7-92) Commercial Manager, Van Leer, Johannesburg. 
Wood, A (4-9-92) Manager, Mega Flex, Johannesburg. 
INTERVIEWS OVERSEAS 
Arro, Pella (21-6-92) Worker Vice Chairman, Prevention of Industrial Disasters Committee, 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland. . 
Ashmore, Dr F.S. (9-6-92) Safety and Fire Consultants, London. 
Aykac, Ahmet (19-6-92) Professor, International Institute for Management Development, 
Lausanne, Switzerland. 
Bernard, Beatrice (4-6-92) Ex Administrator, ORKEM, Paris. 
Bonvin, Jean (5-6-92) Director, OECD Development Centre, Paris. 
Cattenat, Rene (4-6-92) Ex Administrator, Rhone Poulenc, Paris. 
Chalandon, Guy (4-6-92) Administrator, Elf Aquitaine, Paris. 
Cockburn, Mike (1-6-92) Head of Communications Department, CEFIC (European Chemical 
Industry Council), Brussels. 
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de Wit, Drs. P. J. (2-6-92) Controller Corporate Development, DSM, Sittard, The Netherlands. 
Evans, John (5-6-92) General Secretary, TUACC, Paris. 
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